ML20111C777
| ML20111C777 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 03/11/1985 |
| From: | AAMODTS |
| To: | NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| References | |
| CON-#185-061, CON-#185-61 SP, NUDOCS 8503150534 | |
| Download: ML20111C777 (18) | |
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION u
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in the Matter of
- \\'4 METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY et al.
Docket 50-289 8 (Three Mile Island Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1)
ERRATA, AAMODT MOTION MARCH 6,1985 page 2 - add Exhibit F - October 1,1980 deposition of Thomas Gerusky, pp 33-41 Exhibit F-provided 9t/L Substitute pages 6,7 and 8,with those provided.
page 3 - 4th line under "2.0 Background" - change "were" to "was".
page 9, line 16 - Cnange "There" to "there".
page 10 Miller testimony, line 2 - Omit "was" after "This".
page 12, line 2 - Change "this" to "these".
page 12, line 3 - Change " change" to " changes".
page 12 - 2nd line under "3.4 The fact..." - Add "OIA" before " investigators",
page 15, 3rd line from bottom - Add quotation mark after " decision".
page 15, 2nd line from bottom - Omit "the latency".
page 16, 2nd line - Omit "which" and add "although it" before "provided" page 18, line above "4.0 Discussion" - Change "as Attachment C" to "in Exhibit E".
page 20 - first line after "6.0 Conclusions" - Eliminate underlining.
8503150534 850311
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PDR ADOCK 05000289 G
't Exhibit F October 1,1980 deposition of Thomas Gerusky, pp. 33-41 fb9thd.MS ttlYY l
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NUCLTAR ?EGULATORY CC:4MISS IO!:
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3 12 INTERVIEW CF THOMAS GERUFKY Z
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APP EARANCES :
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NORMAN MOSELEY, U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 5
Office of Inspection & Enforcement.
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Office of Inspection & Enfercement.
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l DAVID GAMELE, U.S. Nuclear Reculatdrv Ccm=ission, 20 Office of Inspector & Auditor.
21 RICEARD HOEFLING, ESO., U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Cc=missicn, j
Office of Executive Legal Director.
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New you have testified to others, and in fact I 2q notice on your note sheet of your knowledge of the 10-R per hcu:
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A That's what they gave us.
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Are there other records, notes, or reports or e
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accumulated recollections, any of those things, that might j
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Do you recall what was told you - ' what specifically
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I'm talking about surveys.
What 21 surveys were made, for instance?
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Yeah, we were told that there were'no onsite readings
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designed for containmant -- for centnin=cnt design pressure,
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that went along with this was that if we are following procedur I) 4 our procedure says if it's reading 800-R per hour at the dcme a
5 monitor, this is what the dose rate downwind would be at design An d
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these numbers aren't real.
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chances.
We are going to send a team over to check it out, 8
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and then we notify PEMA or Civil Defense to be prepared to i
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Fas this all told to you at the same time you receive z
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It may have taken a 21 few minutes, but we also -- he also informed us of the pressure l
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So let me make sure I understand it.
It is in this
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That's about what I remember.
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Q All within this general conversation?
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"Do you have any people d
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19 BY MR. MOSELEY:
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So there was action tarien to notify 'PEMA af ter the 21 first prediction?
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Yes.
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And then some time elapsed before PEMA was called bac:
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and said --
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1 it cppocred to ba lika en hour or semothing.
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that precipitated this second call to PEMA?
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Did you say earlier that Z
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Excuse me.
We told PEMA to be prepared to evacuate
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was for design pressure, but it war less than that, and they h4
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No, that they didn't have onsite readings.
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They told you that?
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Yes, the people inside had detected no airborne 23 radioactivity.
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Did they associate that with the 10-R per hour dose 25 projection in Goldsboro?
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Q To say that, "We don't really think it's real, 3
because"?
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I don't know who said it first Ni 6
but they agreed they didn't believe that it was a real reading i
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That and the very low pressure in containment.
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BY MR. MOSELEY:
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Let me make sure -- I'm not sure that I'm not confuse:
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20 the validity.
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And then at some --
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We called PEMA.
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You called P&_A, and then at some time later the 4
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No, no.
The surveys had been made -- were being made-i 8
onsite at the time that call was --
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Yes, we had results that they were not able to detect
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Not scme minutes later?
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WW Iii 18 believe there was any need to evacuate anybody, based upon p
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Then subsequently readings were taken across the l
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It's probably in the letter.
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quicker.
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No, it was after 7:30.
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20 up, and there was a meeting going on of all the depart =ent over 21 at some place in another building.
We were sending people over
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There was an awful lot of information, a lot of l
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cctivity going en in cur offico at tho tirre.
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even hungry.
I lost about 10 pounds during the first three h) weeks.
I didn't eat much.
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During the day, didn't you have a secretary manning Rj 6
tne phone, the direct line between your office and the site?
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10 first day.
We may have had a secretary on the phone just holdi:-
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13 information during that first 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
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19 offices coming in and just sitting by the phone, waiting for 3
a 20 someone, and if there was a need from the utility side for them 21 to talk to somebody else, she vould come and get us.
If not, 22 she would just take down some information, and that's it.
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awful lot of the survey data was recorded that way.
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But your belief now was this was after March 287 l
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That we had a secretary who was taking down informatic I
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Q Yes.
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A Yes.
I think --
3 BY MR. GAMBLE:
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Mr. Gerusky, during the time interval from when you g
5 received the calculated dose rate of 10-R per hour, and when 8
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you received the actual Go dsboro other-side-of-the-river R
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7 measurements that caused everyone to discount the calculated A{
8 reading, was there any other information passed during that 0
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time, any,other onsite measurements or any other kind of infor:
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I don't remember.
I know that we were.not very -- we w.
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12 j didn't,really believe that evacuation would have to take place 5
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We just didn't want to take any chances, 2 '15 even, until that reading came back.
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And how long was that, again?
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I think in reconstructing it, or at Id E
19 least the telephone -- the PEMA ' telephone duty log indicated
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23 BY MR. MOSELEY:
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Going back, I have one more specific period to touch
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George Kunder, who is the utill r
i ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.
. The Staff responded superficially to nearly all aspects of the Aamodt motion. The responses were based on false statements, some of which were cunningly contrived. The Aamodts requested a retraction of two statements where were so blatantly factually false, that to allow them to stand unchallenged was intolerable. See Section 3.6, pp.15 The Staff reiterated. Licensee's argument concerning the Gerusky testimony, and as with the Licensee, provided no transcript citations or quotations _ See pp. 3-6.
3.1 There is no way that the Licensee and the Staff could believe that Gerusky " corrected" his May 3.1979 testimony in an October 1.1980 interviets On May 3,1979, Gerusky testified as follows concerning TMI personnel's first report of offsite surveillance:
in the meantime, I requested them to try to get their teams somehow to Goldsboro, and they said that the State Police helicopter was there and that they would get'one of their teams up in the air and over Goldsboro. We stayed on the phone with them. They found no radiation levels onsite or in Goldsboro that would indicate any kind of a leak. So threrfore, we then notified the Civil Defense to hold tight..
T_his was all before 8:00...
Exhibit A, pp.14 (emphasis added) 1
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> 0n October 1,1980, eighteen months after the accident, the NRC Staff attempted to shake Gerusky loose from his May 3,1979 testimony.
The Staff confronted Gerusky with a document alleged to be a' Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency (PEMA) log, which it can be presumed, was t
in conflict with Gerusky's May 3,1979 testimony. See Exhibit F.
Gerusky was obviously affected by the Staff's attempt to influence l
his recall. He described the October 1,1980 interview as a " briefing".
He indicated that he had been briefed at another session with the NRC Staff l
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six months before. See Exhibit F, pp. 41.
Despite these outright attempts to influence Gerusky's recall, a thorough search of the 3
l October 1,1980 interview transcript (pp. 33-41) does not provide any evidence that he changed his testimony. The Licensee and the NRC Staff knew that.
l The Licensee and the Staff did not identify precisely where they found Gerusky had " corrected" his May 3,1979 testimony in the October 1,1980 transcript, as they claimed in their responses.
Understandably, Gerusky responded haltingly during the October 1,1980 1
briefing. He did not have his notes from the morning of the accident as he did during the May 3,1979 interview. Nevertheless,' he maintained that i
i TMI personnel claimed offsite surveillance between 7:30 and 8:00 a.m.
2 on the first day of the accident:
No, it was after 7:30. Its a feeling and I really haven't tried i
to verify it one way or another to determine what these times were in the past year and a half. because i didn't think it
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was important, but I have a feeling it happened sometime between 7:30 and 8:00.
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I don't know. I think in reconstructing it, or at least the l
telephone...the PEMA telephone duty log indicated it may have been en hour, which surprised me a little bit the first time
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I heard that, six months ago in another one of these briefings.
4 Exhibit A, pp. 59,'41 (emphasis added)
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The following responses of the Licensee and Staff are, therefore, wrong, and deliberately so:
The NUREG-0760 investigators then reinterviewed Mr. Gerusky and explored this inconsistency. air. Gerusky told the investi-gators that the Commonwealth had been informed of the Goldsboro dose rate prediction and of the onsite measurement before 8:00 a.m., out it was in fact an hour later tnat an actual measure-ment at Goldsboro was reported tothe Commonwealth -- a fact evidenced by the PEMA log... not surprisingly, therefore, tha portion of the NUREG-0760 draft which relied on Mr. Gerusky's first interview was not included in the final report. See NUREG-0760 at 31-33.
It is evident, therefore, that there is neither new nor significant information concerning the Goldsboro dose rate prediction.
The statements which might have appeared at one time to provide a basis for the Aamodt's contention -- Mt. Gerusky's 1979 interview -- have long since been publicly clarified by Mr. Gerusky himself.
Licensee Response, January 25,1985, pp. 3.4 However, Mr. Gerusky, has acknowledgea that his statement, quoted in Attachment 4 to the Aamodt Motion, reflects an error in his recollection, and this error was corrected by Mr. Gerusky in an October 1,1980 interview by the f\\,RC Staff.
where Mr. Gerusky indicateo that it was about 9:00 a.m. When the Goldsboro measurement was reported to the Commonwealth.
See October 1,1980 transcript of NRC Staff interview of Thomas Gerusky, exerpts of which ate attached to Licensee's Response to Aamodt Motion dated January 25, 1985. The timing of of Licensee's report is evidenced by the Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency 109 Q
Staff Response, February 4,1%5, pp. 4 The Licensee and Staff analyses (above) of the Gerusky testimony are wrong and dishonest.
l
9-3.2 The Licensee and Staff conveniently overlooked the testimony of other BRP employees in the May 1979 deposition The Licensee and Staff reponses made no mention of the testimony of two oiher BRP employees William Dornsife, the a nuclear engineer, and Margaret Reilly, a health physicist, who also testified, along with Gerusky, on May 3,1979. (The first 20 pages of this deposition are provided as Exhibit A Following Gerusky's statement ("This was all before 8:00."),
which referred to TMI personnel's claim that a survey in Goldsboro had discounted high predicted releases. Dornsife said. "The next notes we have is, about 8:30..." and went on to describe g his preparations for briefing Lt. Gov. Scranton and a press conference.
Several conclusions can be drawn:
1.
The times recalled by the BRP personnel were accurate.
W&1E 2.
There no significant communications between 8:00 and 8:30 a.m.
g 3.
Dornsife could not have prepared for his briefing of the lelutenant governor and the press conference at 8:30 a.m. If he 4
had not already received information concerning offsite surveillance.
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Therefore, either TMI personnel reported offsite surveillance to BRP prior to 8:00 a.m. or three BRP personnel collaborated to fabricate this assertion.
s The Staff prefers the subsequent gross changes Miller and Dubiel made in their testimony. Suddenly, the day after Miller's testimony before SIG (above), Dublel began the apparently uncomfortable change in testimony:
...I don't recall a time. I believe it was an hour later...
I thought one did (concerning the helicopter landing).
I have been led to believe...we requested a helicopter.
Which team got there first I don't know... (Exhibit 8. pp.' 10.11. )
The change in testimony is not credible. The Staff's preference for this incredible testimony is suspicious. The Staff may have participated in developing these changes; related matters are under DOJ investigation, we understand from media reports.
3.4 The fact that tne NRC investigations da not reflect the Gamble conclusions is of no signiffrance.
The development and content of NUREG-0/60 has been an open question since 1981. DIA investigators questioned the appropriateness of NRC Staff non-investigators conducting depo!.itions.
DIA referred the matter to the Department of.lustice in March 1981.
Gamble, and another investigator Roger Fortuna, wrote in a memorandum of December 1.1981 (Exhibit C) that "the facts warranted prosecution for willful misrepresentations, omissions, or violation of NRC regulations."
The Licensee Response (pp 2) and the Staff Response (pp.3-4)
Imply that the failure of NUREG-0760 to include the Gamble reports (" working drafts") is evidence that cuts against the Aomodt Motion.
The Licensee and Staff know better.
t UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGutATORY COMMISSION a
This is to certify that ERRATA, AAMODT MOTION MARCH 6.1985 was and a letter of March 11. 1985 to the Commissioners were served on the following Service List on March 11, 1985.
'M M.
SERVICE LIST Nunzio J. Palladino, Chairman U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Ellyn R. Weiss, Esq.
Washington, D. C. 20555 Harmon, Weiss & Jordan 2001 S Street, N.W.#430 2
VThomas M. Roberts, Commissioner,
Washington, D. C. 20009 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 Thomas Y. Au, Esq.
Office of Chief Counsel James K. Asselstine, Commissioner Department of Environmental U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Resources Washington, D. C. 20555 505 Executive House P.D. Box 2357 i
Frederick Bernthal, Commissioner Harrisburg, PA 17120 S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Ington, D. C. 20555.
George F. Trowbridge, Esq.
Shaw, Pittman, Potts &
Lando W. Zeck, Jrl., Commissioner Trowbridge U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 1800 M Street NW l
Washington, D. C. 20555 Washington, D. C. 20036 Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Three Mlle Island Alert U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 315 Maclay Street l
Washington, D. C. 20555 Harrisburg, PA Atomic Safety and Licensing Tom Devine, Esq.
Appeal Board Government Accountability U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Project Washington, D. C. 20555 1555 Connecticut Avenue Washington, D. C. 20036 Docketing and Service Section (3)
Office of the Secretary U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Consnission Washington, D. C. 20555 MarVE. Wagner, Esq.
i U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Staff j
i U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 l
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