ML20107K805
| ML20107K805 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Callaway  |
| Issue date: | 10/15/1982 |
| From: | Walling L UNION ELECTRIC CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20106A329 | List: |
| References | |
| FOIA-84-671 SDP-ZZ-PP003, SDP-ZZ-PP3, NUDOCS 8502280408 | |
| Download: ML20107K805 (13) | |
Text
SDP-ZZ-PP003
' Octob3r 15, 1982 A l3 Revision 0 yp) f CALLAWAY PLANT SECURITY DEPARTMENT PROCEDURE --
SDP-ZZ-PP003 DISCOVERY OF SABOTAGE DEVICES OR OTHER EVIDENCE OF SABOTAGE RESP. DEPT. M c*cunI% PREPARED BY % &b8 ,5 APPROVED BY Wh '
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Proc d. NO. SDP-ZZ-PP003
.' R v. O Date October 15, 1982 DEFICIENCY LIST e
Section Deficiency Descri'ption Constraints 3.I & 3.6 SDP-ZZ-PP007 Reporting of Refer to APA-ZZ-TAP 02 Security Events.to NRC not developed.
3.7 & 3.8 CAS/SAS Operators positions Uniti positions are are unfilled. filled, the Shift Security Supervisors assume the responsibilities.
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' Proc d. No. SDP-32-PP003 R v. 0 List of_ Effective Pages Revision Number Paqd 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 1
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, Proc 0d. ND. SDP-ZZ-PP003 Rev. 0 Table of Contents Section Page Number
- 1. 0 ,l Purpose and Scope 1 2.0 Definitions 1 3.0 Procedure 2 4.0 References 6 5.0 Attachments 6 6.0 Records , 6 6.1 QA Records 6 6.2 Commercial Records 6 9 4 4
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, Proc:d. No. SDP-ZZ-PP003 Rsv. O DISCOVERY OF SABOTAGE DEVICES CR OTHER EVIDENCE OF SABOTAGE 1.0 PURPOSE AND SCOPE
/ This procedure indicates steps to be taken to mitigate or prevent damage to the plant from a bomb, or in the event of sabotage, or attempted sabotage.
2.0 DEFINITIONS 2.1 ALL CLEAR Term Used to indicate that a threat no longer exists, return to normal operations.
2.2 SECURITY EMERGENCY The term used to describe the state of readiness of the plant and Security Force personnel to respond to security-related situations that pose a clear or immediate threat or danger to the plant from unknown intruders and call for a prompt response by Security, law enforcement officers and plant personnel. When a Security Emergency is declared,. emergency procedures are placed in effect and the CSD is contacted with a request for assistance.
2.3 CSD Callaway County Sheriff Department.
2.4 CAS/SAS l
Central Alarm Station / Secondary Alarm Station.
- Wi'll_ful_ damag_e ghuj;tamFer1Ng3or destruction to l . oo Fr3Moirggtgpm,epworJ e political, economic i
er reason.
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, Procid. No. SDP-ZZ-PP003 Rev. 0 3.O PROCEDURE ff07 gg
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'$ 1 vice o bom ca he Emergenc Extbnsion 8325.t gn .
,/ eEvisorg e employee shall or tam 1% any bomb, suspicious device or g g f sabotage.
3.2 Trained law enforcement personnel are responsible for investigating sabotage and removing any bomb or suspicious device.
3.3 anag sha 1 _er g7 la egyfollowing ensure y ).EiiE/~ite s are performed:
3.3.1 goghe gpproprigtgJcorNtit]'em-%r 3.3.2 f bomb could affect J or 3.3.3 Take steps to mitigate the consequences of sabotage or,an explosion.
3.3.4 he' impact _ofepossibletd== M atagy- vi._ g s M ifbN 6 =and gs 3.3.5 Evacuate the unessential personnel, as necessary.
3.3.6 Declare Security Emergency if necessary.
3.3.7 . on
_ Aag N t M er-.2% m s a uv w3 or evlCe.
t 3.3.8 Execute portions of the Radiological Emergency
[ Response Plan as necessary.
l 3.3.9 Ensura repairs are made on damaged systems. '
l 3.3.10 When danger is over, declare All Clear.
f 3.3.11 Receive formal report from Superintendent, Security.
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' Procsd. NO. SDP-EE-PP003 Rev. 0 3.4 Superintendent, Security or Security Supervisor or his designee shall ensure the following items are performed:
3.4.1 Declare Security Emergenc'y, as necessary.
3.4.2 Notify the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in
/ accordance with plant procedures.
3.4.3 When danger is over, declare All Clear.
3.4.4 Investigate incident and submit formal report to Manager, Callaway Plant.
3.5 M'fE3EBupfr71sstf~pperatigg-superv Wr::Por his F designee shall erfs'ure Eh~edbw n performed:
items are 3.5.1 gYdC;EmJeXgencygqHTVMfliceET
.5 2 g ,emj g,g g,74gp g g g gg g g g y De approached for inspection. Determination may be made by interviewing the person (s) discovering the device or by viewing from a remote location.
N Determine the type and extent of damage or possible damage to the plant.
WESudame Determine if sabotage could affect vital areas.
3.5.5 Take steps to mitigate the consequences of sabotage, attempted sabotage or an explosion.
3.5.6 Declare Security Erergency, as necessary.
2.5.7 Determine the impact of possible damage to the health and safety of the public and plant personnel. ,
3.5.8 Evacuate unessential personnel, as necessary.
.3.5.9 Execute portions of the Radiological Emergency Response Plan as necessary.
3.5.10 Determine the status of affected vital systems.
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lllllFS.5.ll Determine systems.
the operability of affected vital 3.5.12 Take steps to mitigate t,he effects of degraded vital systems.
3.5.13 Shutdown the plant, should the need arise.
3.6 shift Security Supervisor or his designee shall ensure the following are performed:
3.6.1 Notify Shift Supervisor / Operating Supervisor and Superintendent, Security.
3.6.2 Determine the type or nature of suspected sabotage device. Explosive devices should not be approached for inspection. Determination ~
may be made by interviewing the person (s) discovering the device or by viewing from a remote location.
3.6.3 Contact CSD and request assistance to include bomb disposal assistance should a bomb be
, located.
3.6.4 Notify Nuclear Regulatory Commission in accordance with plant procedures.
3.7 CAS/SAS operator shall:
3.7.1 Contact CSD and request assistance to include bomb disposal ' assistance should a bomb be located.
3.7.2 Maintain communication with CSD.
3.8 Security Officers (Investigators) shall:
3.8.1 Determine the size, type or nature of bomb or sabotage device. Explosive devices should not be approached for inspection. Determination may be made by interviewing the person (s) v disco'ering ~the. ' device or by viewing from a remote location.
328.2 Limit use of 2-way radios.
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- Proc 3d. ND. SDP-ZZ-PP003
. Rsv. 0 3.9 Other plant employees shall:
3.9.1 Determine the size, type or nature of bomb or sabotage device. Explosive devices should not be approached for inspection. Determination may be made by interviewing the person (s) discovering the device or by viewing from a
/. remote location.
3.9.2 Take steps to mitigate the consequences of sabotage.
3.9.3 Determine the status of affected vital systems.
3.9.4 Determine the operability of affected vital ,
systemsa 3.9.5 Shutdown plant if directed by Manager, Callaway Plant /EDO or Shift Supervisor / Operating Supervisor.
3.9.6 Take steps to mitigate the effects of degraded vital systems.
3.10 Bomb Disposal Unit shall:
3.10.1 Determine the extent of possible damage to the plant.
3.10.2 Dispose of suspected bomb.
3.11 Termination of Threat.
3.11.1 Upon notification by plant management that a threat no longer exists, Superintendent, security, Security Supervisor or his designee will declare "All Clear".
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4.0 REFERENCES
4.1 Callaway Plant Security Plans (Physical Security Plan, Safeguards Contingency Plan, Security Force Training and Qualification Plan) 5.0 ATTACHMENTS f
None 6.0 RECORDS 6.1 QA RECORDS None 6.2 COMMERCIAL RECORDS 6.2.1 Incident Report.
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CALLAWAY EQUIPMENT TAMPERING INCIDENT ON JULY 4,1984 On July 4, 1984 at 3:07 p.m. (CDT), Containment Purge Isolation and Control Room Ventilation Isolation signals (CPIS & CRVIS) were actuated. The cause was due to three circuit breakers being ned in an AC distribution anel (NG 028-A1). The panel is located at th The licensee's follow-up actions showed that the circui reakers were manua ly opened and not due to a trip. The event was reported to the NRC at 5:58 p.m.(CDT), on July 4, 1984.
A Confirmatory Action Letter (CAL) was issued to the licensee on July 6,1984 that required (1) The licensee to conduct a thorough investiption of the event to determine the most probable causes, and (2) Provide the results of their investigation to the NRC for review and acceptance. The above actions were to be completed prior to the Plant Manager's approval to take the reactor critical.
A. Licensee's Actions Since July 4, 1984
. Assigned two security managers (one licensee and one security contractor manager) to conduct the investigation. Both persons have criminal investigation experience and expended approximately 200 hours0.00231 days <br />0.0556 hours <br />3.306878e-4 weeks <br />7.61e-5 months <br /> of effort.
. Conducted reviews of computer printouts to determine who was.in the ;
when the incident occurred.
55 ersonswereinitiallyidgt4f,iefwithinth t the time of the m p;c. ion; M of the 65 were eliminated as suspects based upon trol records which showed that they could not have been i at 3:07 p.m. on July 4, 1984.
. Notified the Kansas City and Jefferson City Offices of the FBI and Callaway Sheriff's Office.
Both of fices declined to investigate the incident. Determined not a criminal act within their jurisdiction.
Jefferson City FBI SA visited site, discussed investigative methods and had no recommendations to change investigative methodology.
. Latent fingerprint was obtained from AC distribution panel.
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. Conducted initial interviews of 59 individuals.
. Conducted follow-up interviews of 24 individuals.
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. Fingerprinted 24 persons for fonparisons with latent fingerprint l obtained from the distribution panel. --
. All persons involved in follow-up interview submitted to providing l fingerprint cards and agreed to take a polygraph examination if investigative results implicated them.
. Fingerprints and latent print ,.,rovided to offsite person considered as an expert in fingerprint identification. Insufficient points in latent print for identification purposes.
. 14 supervisors, Union Electric (EU) and contractor, interviewed to confirm information received through follow-up interviews. No discrepancies were noted.
. UE and contractor (Daniels) personnel offices contacted to determine if a report of disciplinary action was initiated for July 4,1984.
. Onsite personnel files of UE employees scheduled for follow-up interviews were reviewed for investigative leads. No results.
. The guard contractor reviewed onsite personnel and screening records for security force personnel scheduled for follow-up interviews. No investigative leads developed.
. Onsite screening files for contractor personnel scheduled for follow-up interviews and who were screened by UE were reviewed. No investigt.tive leads developed.
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. Vice President Nuclear published letter advising all personnel of the serious consequences of equipment tampering and pledging use of necessary resources to investigate all such incidents.
B. Investigative Results
. Identity of person (s) who tampered with the circuit breakers in the l
AC distribution panel was not established.
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C. Interim Security Measures Implemented
. was initiated
. To deter future incidents of tampering and reduce safety consequences n h ch ev nt occurs in the future the licensee has within th to include:
dditional etc.) will have access controlled by use of the security compu er or hard keys.
Alarms from the additional portals will be responded to by the security force.
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. The above .interire security measures would remain in ef fect until DRSS
Conclusions:
. Licensee conducted an in-depth investigation to determine the cause(s) and identity of persons (s) who tampered with the circuit breakers.
. The interim security measures are appropriate and should deter and reduce safety consequences if a future incident of equipment tampering occurs.
. The licensee's investigative actions should deter future incidents of tampering with equipment and have shown employees the licensee's willingness to commit substantial resources and time to investigate such incidents.
ADDITONAL REQUIREMENTS
. Advise the licensee that the provisions of the July 6, 1984 CAL have been complied with as far as they are capable of complying with it.
Therefore, the restriction in the CAL pertaining to taking the reactor critical can be terminated.
. " Post one the decision about interi being upon completion of the Confirm that construction activities will c an e construction i forces reatly reduced prior This final decision should be made immediately prior to comp ion of th e
SAFyUAUS' F0M101
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