ML20107F933
| ML20107F933 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | LaSalle  |
| Issue date: | 02/22/1985 |
| From: | John Marshall COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO. |
| To: | Harold Denton Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| 9795N, NUDOCS 8502260237 | |
| Download: ML20107F933 (89) | |
Text
{{#Wiki_filter:. ?
- Commonwealth Edison One First Nitional Plaza. Chictgo, Illinois
- Address Reply to: Post Office Box 767 Chicago, Illinois 60690 February 22, 1985 Mr. Harold R. Denton, Director
, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation ! U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comn41ssion Washington, DC 20555
Subject:
LaSalle County Station Unit 1 l Environmental Qualification of l Electrical Equipment l NRC Docket tb. 50-373 References (a): September 4, 1981 letter from L. O. DelGeorg to A. Schwencer. (b): Section 3.11, SER (March 1981), SSER #1, (June 1981), SSER #2 (February 1982). (c): January 8, 1985 letter from J. G. Marshall to H. R. Denton. t
Dear Mr.Denton:
In accordance with a request made by Mr. A. Bournia during a telecon of January 22, 1985, the following information is provided. It is intended to supplement the Reference (c) submittal regarding an extension on the schedular requirements of 10CFR 50.49 (g). Provided as Attachment A is a table which identifies by equipment number each application for which an extension is being sought. Also identified is the manufacturer and model number of the pertinent item.' This table corresponds directly to the report provided in Reference (c) which broadly reviews the actions required to attain a qualified status and proposes a schedule for implementation. Further, in the column headed
" Reference",'the page number is identified from the LaSalle County Assessment to Justify Interim Operation, VOL II, QUAD-1-81-852 (Rev. 3, June-1982) compiled by Quadrex Corporation, where the item was individually reviewed by function, failure mode and effects, and whether operator action was required for the needed safety function. For your convenience,. copies of the pertinent pages are provided in Attachment B.
Recall that the main volume of the report was transmitted.to ;the Commission per Reference (a) and followed-up by explanatory FEA's 'via letter of October 22, 1981; the commission's acceptance was provided in Reference (b) following the field audit of October 1981. The up-dated revision of the JIO report which included the Component Application-NO m
^
r
- 4 H. R. Denton February 22, 1985 Statements was transmitted to the Commission as a part of the 90-day response to the SER in June 1982. Although this study was undertaken prior to issuance of the rule, it is our judgement that all provisions of 10CFR 50.49 (1) are adequately addressed.
Should you need any further information regarding this matter, please contact this office. Very truly yours,
} D. % Y J. G. Marshall Nuclear Licensing Administrator 1m cc: A. Bournia - via Federal Express Resident Inspector - LSCS G. J.-Diederich Attactunents A: Environmental Qualification - Request for Extension Unit 1
~
B: Assessment'to. Justify Interim Operation. C: Additional Justifications for Interim Operation s *
'rg
}
9795N V , _4, i? s _ wi s-- 5 c -
4 Attachment-A Environmental Qualification - Request for Extension
-LaSalle County Station, Unit Identification of Applications for Which an Extension is Requested Namco Limit' Switches- Conformance to 10CFR50.49(1)
Equipment-No. Model No. Reference * (1) -(2)- (3)- -(4) (5) 1B21-F022A-D EA-740 See Attachment C b b,d 1821-F028A-D EA-740 See Attachment C b b,d 50R, Inc. Pressure Switches Conformance to 10CFR50.49(i) Equipment No. Model No. Reference * (1)- (2) -(3) -(4) (5) 1821-N015A-D BIT (1) M.5-2.8a b d b,d 1821-N020A-D BIT (1) M.5-2.8b b d b,d IB21-N023A-D BIT (1) M.5-2.8c b d b,d 1821-N039A-H BIT (1) See Attachment C d b,d 1821-N039J-N,P, BIT (1) See Attachment C d b,d R,S,U,V 1821-N045A-D BIT (1) M.5-2.8e b,d 1821-N056A-D DIT(1) M.5-2.15a b b,d 1B21-N048A,C 12N M.5-2.30b c b,c-
- IB21-N0488,D 12N M.5-2.30c .c b,c
. 1C71-N002A-D 12N M.5-2.30d d. b,d
- Note (1): The presently installed switches are manufactured by Barksdale.-
~
Limitorque Valve Motor-0perators Conformance to 10CFR50.49(1): Equipment No. Model No. Reference'* (1) (2)- (3) (4)- -(5)~
-1E22-F012 SB-0-25' M.5-2.79a b,d lE22-F001 .SMB-00 M.5-2.81a b b,d lE22-F015. SMB-2-60 M.5-2.83a _b _d. b,d lE22-F011 SMB-3 _M.5-2.85a ~b d-' .. b , d l lE22-F010 SMB-4-100 - 'M.5-2.87a b- d b,d
_.11E22-F023 ,SMB-4-150 M.5-2.89a' b d . b ,d _-
- lE12-F003 A,B SMB- LM.5-1.99f dL .d- b,d lE12-F006 A,8 ;SMB'- -M.5-1.99h Lb,d-lE12-F0ll'A,B SMB M.5-1.99j b,d'
~lE12-F021 'SMB'- M.5 l.99m- . d '- b,d:
lE12-F024-A,B. SMB M.5-1.99n
~
d b,d-
.b,d ilE12-F026 A,B SMB M.5-1.99p; .b- . . _
- lE12-F027.A,B- SMB. M.5-1.99q. b- d b,d-xlE12-F047 A,B SMB- -M.5-1.99t- .
.b,d lE12-F048 A,B: 5MBL -M.5-1.99u- :b d .b,d lE12-F049 A,8 SMB - .M.5-1.99v- :b d' ,, b,d ilE12-F064 A,B,C-- , SMB ~ -M.5-1.99y: d: b,d lE12-F068 A,B- SMB .M.5-1.99z- -
'd b,d-
- Refer:to:LaSalle~ County Station Assessment to Justify Interim 0peration.'Quadrex Report
.No. QUAD-1-81-852,--Rev.'3, Appendix F. .
e _ .- n
Limitorque Valve Motor Operators -(Cont'd)- Conformance to 10CFR50.49(1) Equipment'No.- -Model-No.- Reference *- - (1)- (2) -(3)- (4)- (5) lE12-F092 SMB M.5-1.99ad b,d
.lE12-F094 SMB M.5-1.99ae b,d lE21-F011 SMB M.5-1.99ai d b,d lE21-F012 SMB- M.5-1.99aj d b,d IE51-F010 SMB M.5-1.99as b b,d lE51-F059 SMB M.5-1.99az b b,d lE51-F068 SMB M.5-1.99bb b b,d IVP053-A,B SMB M.5-1.99bq b d b,d IVP063 A,B SMB M.5-1.99br b d b,d
-lV0029 SMB M.5-1.99bu d b,d
-Valcor Solenoid Valves- Conformance- to 10CFR50.49(1) i Equipment'No.' -Model No.- -Reference *- (1) (2) (3) '(4)' (5)
IIN100 V526 M.5-1.86d b,d IIN101 V526 .M.5-1.86d b,d SOR, Inc. Differential-Pressure Switches -Conformance to 10CFR50.49(1) Equipment-No.- Model No.- Reference-*: -(1)- -(2)- (3)- (4)- -(5)- l-h 'lE31-N007 A,BL 288(2)- M.5-2.17c- d b;d , lE31-N008 A-D 288 (2) 'M.5-2.17d~ b,d 1E31-N009'A-D 288 (2) M.5-2.17e_ -d. b,d 1E31-N010 A-D. 288 (2) M.5-2.17f '
- d b,d.
lE31-N011 A-D- 288 (2)- M.5-2.17g , d_ b,d-
-lE31-N012 A~,B 288 (2) M.5-2.17h d ~b,d 1E31-N013 A,8 288_(2) .M.5-2.171~ b :d: b,d :
.lB21-N024 A-D' 288 (2) .M.5-2.19a. ' b.d ' ' , dc _b,d-
. Note (2): The presently installed switches are manufactured by.Barton.
J
-Siemens-Blower-Motor >
~ -
- Conformance to 10CFR50149(1) -
Equipment No. Model No'.- : Reference'* -
'(1) (2)- (3) (4) ;(5) -
lE32-C001: .2CH6- -M.5-2.75a d- Ib.d' lE32-C0028,F- ~2CH6z M.5-2.75a -- d 'b,d-
' E S4K Flow Element - -
/Conformance to 10CFR50.49(1')
(3)- -(4) d5) "U
' Equipment-No.' -Model ~ No. : ' ^2 Reference-*' (1)" -(2)'
f lE32-N006A,E;J,N - 20-9651-8550. M.5-2.43a: b b;;d{ i* Refer to (ISalle County Station Assessmenti to' Justify Inthba Operation. Quadrex Report
~
s 'No. QUAD-1-81-852, Rev._3,_ Append 1x F.- , a- ,.
'Delphi Hydrogen - Oxygen Analyzer Panel- Conformance to 10CFR50.49(1)
Equipment No. Model No. -Reference-*- (1) -(2)- (3) (4) (5) 1PL76J K-IV M.5-1.56a d b,d
- 1PL77J K-IV M.5-1.56a d b,d Atomics International Hydrogen Recombiner- Conformance to 10CFR50.49(i)-
~
Equipment No.' -Model No.- Reference * -(1) -(2) (3) (4) (5) i lHG01A~ # Nil 6000024-03 M.5-1.75a b d b,d Systems Control DC' Motor Control Center- Conformance to 10CFR50.49(i) 4 Equipment No. Model No.- Reference-* (1) -(2)- -(3)- -(4)- (5) lDC06E Custom M.5-1.6a c b,d { i Klockner-Moeller AC Motor Control' Center Conformance to 10CFR50.49(1)
~ Equipment No.- Model-No.- Reference-* (1) (2)- -(3)-' (4)- (5)-
11AP71E' -Series 170 M.5-1.4a c d b,d
..l AP75E ' Series 170 - M.5-1.4d- 'c d b,d LlAP76E Series 170 M.5-1.4g c .d b,d
- LAP 78E-
-Series 170 M.5-1.4j c- d- b,d 1AP82E- ' Series 170 M.5-1.41 c d b,d-LAP 83E Series 170: M.5-1.40 c .d b,d Magnetrol' Level Switch -
-Conformance to 10CFR50.49(i)=
~ Equipment No.-- -Model-No. Reference-*1 -(1) (2)- (3)- '(4) (5)" -
~
- ICll-N013 A-D4 .751 M.5-2.26a '
d- b,d L1E22-N001 A,B-.- , ~ 751' M.5-2.26c . d ;. b,d
?lE22-N002 A,B, 751- M.5-2.26c .d. b,d=
zGeneral Electric Terminal Board"
'Conformanceto#10CFR50.49(i)>
-(3) 'i(4) -(5);
[EqEipmentNoi' I M e1 No. -7 Reference *l ' (1)' -(2) -
~
h* [ilPL33J ,"z1,' 'f Y EB-5!. iPk32Ji . M .'5-1.105a ' . b' '
.dL b,d '
.n
. *~ 4EB-5: ; 'M.5-1;105b :b - ,
d .: !b,d:
-b,d,
~
1 EB-5 1 x?'N.5-1.105c- b id 41PL34J~ lPL35JL 1EB-Si M.5-1.105d bL . d Tb,d ;; . ilH22-P018: .EB-5 M.5-2.71t. ld. Lb,d , 1H22-P021 .. EB-5'- ' N.5-2.71a. _ d' _ l b,d tV to Justifyl Interia Operation Quadrex Report
?*Referito LaSalle County StationDAssessment i
~*
- 2No.' QUAD-1-81-852,-Rev..3,. Appendix F.-
p .. - y ,,
Gsneral Electric-Term'inal Board-(Cont'd)- Conformance'to 10CFR50.49(1) Eauipment No.- Model No.' Reference * (1) (2)' (3)- (4) (5) 1H22-P022 EB-5 M.5-2.71a d b,d lH22-P024 EB-5 M.5-2.71a d b,d 1H22-P025 EB-5 M.5-2.71a d b,d
-lH22-P026 EB-5 M.5-2.71a d b,d 1H22-P027 EB-5 M.5-2.71a d b,d lH22-P030 EB-5 M.5-2.71a d b,d 1H22-P031 EB-5 M.5-2.71a d b,d lH22-P032 EB-5 M.5-2.71a d b,d lH22-P033 EB-5 M.5-2.71a d b,d lH22-P041 EB-5 M.5-2.71a d b,d lH22-P042 EB-5 M.5-2.71a d b,d lH22-P055 EB-5 M.5-2.71a d b,d Barton LeveliTransmitter/ Switch Conformance - to - 10CFR50.49(1)
Equipment-No. -Model- No. - Reference * -(l)- (2) (3) (4)- (5) 1821-N026 A-D 760 M.5-2.23a d b,d General Electric-Sensor & Converter Conformance-to 10CFR50.49(1) ______ Equipment-No.- - Model No. Reference * .(1) -(2)' -(3) '(4) -(5)
'lD18-N009 A-D 194X927 M.5-2.67a' d b,d .lD18-N015 A-D ~194X927 M.5-2.67b d b,d i, .+:
- 4975L-11
+' ' -
A
~
+
1 1
Attachment-B Tha following pages are excerpted from the report entitled, LaSalle-County Station Assessment to Justify-Interim Operation, Report No. QUAD-1-81-852, Rev. 3, Appendix F, prepared by Quadrex Corporation The main volume of the report was transmitted to the Commision via the September 4, 1981 letter from L.0. DelGeorge to A. Schwencer. An up-dated revision of the report which included the attached Component Application Statements was transmitted as a part of the 90-day response to the SER in June 1982. 4975L .
.: e
.-(> ,
if 3 g-
.t 4
-L ,
hr I V u V [ .. p , - ,
( . .
~
TABLE M.5-1 (Cont.) g m) COMPONENT APPLICATION STATEMENT Component AP-71E
' This component is located in the Reactor Building, elevation 761',
in environmental zone H4A. Hence, this component is exposed to a harsh environment for the Instrument Line Break Event Outside - Containment and high radiation from the LOCA Inside Containment C (see Section 4.4, page 4-32, of Quadrex Report QUAD-1-81-852). The impact of component failure is considered only for these events. (a) Component Function This component provides motive and control power to the ( components shown in the reference key diagram - 480 volts ' MCC 135X-1 (Division 1). (b) Effect of Component Failure The failure of this component due to the Instrument Line
'.. Break Event in the Reactor Building or the LOCA event will C not preclude achieving the six safety objectives, namely safe shutdown, containment isolation, core coverage, RHR, containment integrity and effluent control (see Section 4.4,l page 4-32, of Quadrex Report QUAD-1-81-852). .
Failure of this component for this event will not affect the-
-((;~
other 480 volt components .in the electrical power distribution-system. (c) Impact on Other Systems' The components in the following systems are affected by the
' failure of this component; however, their ~ operation -is not
(. required for this event.
- 1. Switchgear Heat Removal-System VX-02C, VX-03C: battery room exhaust' fan
. 2. Hydrogen Recombiner System -
~
HGO-01B, HGO-02B, HGO-05B, HG-068 recombiner inlet l and discharge valves.- -
- 3. Containmect Monitoring System - ~ i lCM-02PA, CM-0 ?A; sample pumps.'
L The components;in'the rollowing systems are affected, but-their:
.six safety objective func;.fons can be accomplished byfthe redundant
- components' or alternate systas powered ~from redundant MCC's located
'~Liniwidely separated areas of the building. - Physical, obstructions, massive ~ heat sinks, and limited dischargeEthrough the small ..line -
A. .would limit'the~ extent of the harsh environment such that failure of=
.{ one is highly unlikely and-if one were to fail the'others would:
~
. continue to. provide the function... -
~
M.5-1.4a
'C _ s y %.J- '-
--- e. g g
l ( TABLE M.5-1 (Cont.)
- l. Nuclear Boiler System
~
_s B21-F019 (Containment isolation function) C The redundant valve B21-F016 is powered from MCC 136Y-2 located at elevation 740' B21-F067A, B, C & D (Containment isolation function) main steam line drain j The. redundant valves are B21-F022A, B, C & D are powered from RPS MG sets. 4 ( ' i
- 2. Primary Containment Purge System VQ-029, VQ-040, VQ-026 (Containment isolation function)'
The redundant valves V0-027, VQ-030, VQ-031 are powered from
~C Division 2 MCC 136X-2 located outside the harsh envimnment.
VQ-038 (Containment isolation function) t The redundant valve VQ-037 is powered from Division 2 MCC 136X-1 located at elevation 820'-1" ! 'O 3. Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System E51-F008, E51-F064 (Safe shutdown and core coverage functions) . 4-The redundant system HPCS is powered from Division 3 MCC 143-1 located outside the harsh environment. d E51-F008, _ E51-F064 (Containment isolation function) ~ J The redundant valve. E51-F063 is powered from Division.2' MCC 136Y-2 t located at' elevation 740'. +
- 4. Residual Heat Removal
[:C , ' E12-F008 (Containisient isolation function)
~ The redundant'.valviE12-F009 is powered fmm. Division 2 MCC 136Y-1
' located'at elevation 710'36".
-E12-F023 (Containment isolation function) %
-(t The.redundgntvalvesarecheckvalvesin.theRCICsystemi E12-F008'(Shutdown cooling function) M
" :The, redundant valves E12-F004B and-C-(suppression pool: cooling)!
are powered from Division 2 MCC 136Y-1,136Y-2zlocatediat ' M. - elevations:710-6"~- and,740'. E12-F312A is not required- for H2 ' recombiner cooling. -
! 5. . Reactor / Water Clean-up System ,
~
i
- G33-F004L(Containment isolation function).!
5 s- - 1The: redundant valve G33aF00li is powered from Division 2 MCC 136Y-ll
- located at.. elevation 710'-6".; ' G33-F040 is not . required.1 .b .V( '
, 4
~
.M.5-1.4bi . ,
f s
.c h_ _ .
- ! , , - , . ..L, - JL : $ W -
c . TABLE M.5-1 (Cont.)
- 6. Primary Containment Ventilation System VP-053A, B; VP-063A, B (Containment isolation function)
The redundant valves VP-113A, B; VP-114A, B are powered from C Division 2 MCC 136Y-1 located at elevation 710'-6" (d)~OperatorAction Essential safety systems are maintained on separate divisional power. Safe shutdown is accomplished with any one entire division I failing. Consequently, no operator action is required to meet the six safety objectives for the Instrument Line Break. With respect to LOCA radiation, interim operation with this equipment is justi- ! . fied by the successful testing already completed and documented.'
References:
-C - Schematic: 1E-1-4000CT C ._ .. _
(( ..g
- (
- (. t "
- ([ . .
{ -
?
M.5-1.4c- -_ (v ~
~
~ +
4 . 3
/ .T. ' - -
I
' TABLE M.5-1 (Cont.)
m) COMP 0NENT APPLICATION STATEMENT ^ Component AP-75E , C This component is located in the Reactor Building, 740' elevation in environmental zone H4A. Hence, this component is exposed to a harsh environment for the Instrument Line Break Event Outside Contain-ment and high radiation from the LOCA Inside Containment (see Section 4.4, page 4-32, of Quadrex Report QUAD-1-81-852). The impact of component failure is considered only for these events. (a) Component Function This component provides motive and control ppwer to the components shown in the references key diagram - 480 volts MCC135Y-1(Division 1). ( (b) Effect of Component Failure
- The failure of this component due to the Instrument Line Break Event in the Reactor-Building or the LOCA event will not. preclude
, achieving the six _ safety objectives, namely safe shutdown, contain-ment isolation, core coverage, RHR, containment integrity and
.C effluent control (see Section 4.4, page 4-32, of Quadrex Report QUAD-1-81-852).
Failure of this component for this event will not affect the other 480 volt components in the electrical power distribution system.-
~
C (c) Impact on Other Systems
~ The components in the following systems are affected by the failure -
of this component; however, their operation is not required for_ this - event.
-(' 1. Reactor-Recirculation System:
B33-F023A Reactor recirculation suction
=B33-F067A Reactor-recirculation discharge .
B33-D003A Hydraulic control . unit
- 2. - Standby Li_ quid Contml System: .
t :C41-C001A -
'SLC pump-C41-F001A~ SLC' storage' tank outlet -
C41-D002 -SLC tank heater
, - 3. Control Rod Drive Hydraulic System:
, C11-F003 CRD cooling-water pressure 1~
- 14. Reactor Water. Cleanup System:- N G33-F101. Drain Valve
~, .G33-F100 Recirculation loop-line to RWCU - 1
- 5. ' Residual Heat-Removal System- . .
lt , E12-F064A_ Minimum flow bypass .
- b-
~
. 6. Nuclear Boiler System
, 1821-F065A- Feedwater: isolation' ,
-M.5-1.4d-
~
' A :- ,
" ~ - '
,g - * -
-T I -
( .
- 7. MSIV - Leakage Control System:
E32-F001A.E,J,N MSIV inboard valves C E32-F032A,E,J,N MSIV inboard valves I The components in the following systems are affected by the failure of this component but their six safety objective functions can be accomplished by the redundant components or alternate systems powered from redundant MCC's which are located in widely separated areas of the building. Physical obstructions, massive heat sinks, and limited c discharge through the small line would limit the extent of the harsh environment such that failure of any one is highly unlikely and if one were to fail the others would continue to provide the function.
- 1. Primary Containment Purge System:
VQ-042, VQ-043 (Containment isolation function) The redundant valves VQ-027, VQ-030, are powered from Division 2 MCC 136X-2 located outside harsh environment. VQ-036, VQ-048, VQ-051 (Containment isolation function) C The redundant valves VQ-034, VQ-035, VQ-047, VQ-050 are powered from Division 2 MCC 136Y-1 located at 710'-6" elevation. VQ-041 (Containment isolation function) The redundant valve VQ-037 is powered from Division 2 MCC 136X-1 located at 820'-6" elevation C( -2. Residual Heat Removal System: E12-F052A, E12-F087A (Residual heat removal- function) The redundant valves E12-F052B and E12-F087B are powered from MCC 136Y-2 located at-740' elevation. 1 E12-F040A, B (Containment isolation function) ~ The redundant valves E12-F049A, B are powered from Division 2 MCC 136Y-1 located at 710'-6" elevation.
- 3. Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water System: .
WR-029, WR-040:(Containment isolation function)
- The redundant valves WR-179.and WR-180 are powered from Division 2 MCC 136Y-2 located at.740' elevation.
- 4. CSCS-ECWS
[ DG-035 (Core coverage function) The. redundant system HPCS is powered from Division-3; MCC 143-1 which .is . located outside the harsh environment. 4
- {
M.5-1.4e 1 , L!
g- , .
\
(d) Operator Action
- (~ Essential safety systems are maintained on separate divisional i I power. Safe shutdown is accomplished with any one entire division failed. Consequently, no operator action is required to meet the i
1 six safety objectives for the instrument line break. With respect to LOCA radiation, interim operation with this equipment is justi-
, fied by the successful testing already completed and documented.
References:
(. Schematic: iE-1-4000DU i
- (- .
. g {-
O b
**.-p-- ..w-.'~9.,m,' . , '- hw#'-- %.'.'-
W 0
- 4. .-
l7 [ - o
' M.5-1.4f ~ '
C 3 ,
;- 4
- . _- . _ .. .- =._ _ . - _ -_ -
d ( . ~ TABLE M.5-1 (Cont.) ; l { m) COMPONENT APPLICATION STATEMENT Component AP-76E g i-This component is located in the Reactor Building, 710'-6" elevation in environmental zone H4A. Hence, this component is exposed to a harsh i environment for the Instrument Line Break Event Outside Containment and high radiation from the LOCA Inside Containment (see Section 4.4, page 4-32, of Quadrex Report QUAD-1-81-852). The impact of component failure (- is considered only for these events. (a) Component Function This component provides motive and control power to the components shown in the reference key diagram - 480 volt, MCC 135Y-2 (Division 1). (b) Effect of Component Failure The failure of this component due to the Instrument Line Break Event in the Reactor Building or the LOCA event will not preclude ' achieving the six safety objectives, namely safe shutdown, contain-( ment isolation, core coverage, RHR, containment integrity and
. effluent control- (see Section 4.4, page 4-32, of Quadrex Report
~
QUAD-1-81-852). Failure of this component for this event'will not affect the other 480 volt components in the electrical power distribution'
.r( system.
(c) ' Impact on Other Systems
- The components in the following systems are affected by the failure of of this component; however, their operation is .not required for this event.
- 1. : Residual Heat- Removal:
E12-F073A, F074A . Heat Exchanger Vent: E12-F024A 'RHR test, containment spray to suppression pool E12-F016A,- F017A . Containment spray _. F027A .--
-E 2. -Low Pressure Core Spray: . _
E21-F012 ~LPCS-test bypass to suppression pool E21-F011
' '~
- LPCS minimum flow bypass-
- 3. Reactor. Building Equipment Drain System: .
RE-08PA' N.E. reactor building equipment: drain sump pimpf ~ W RE-07PA N.W. reactor building equipment drain sump pump; ,
- 4. 1 Diesel Fuel-Oil-System:
- 0D001P: - Diesel.' generator fuel transfer. pump
-5..;MSIV Leakage. Control System.
J Li t. (' :E32-C001-
;E32-B001A~,E.J,N
. Inboard system; blower 1 Pipe heaters E32-F002A E,J,N: . Inboard valves:
y M.5-1.4g- - y . .
~
g . -
- ~
/ g -.
- ;. . . :n. ,.,
r
~
The components in the following systems are affected by the failure 4 !T ( of this component. But the six safety objective functions can be accomplished by the redundant components or alternate systems powered from redundant MCC's which are located in widely separated areas of the building. Physical obstructions, massive heat sinks, and limited discharge through the small line would limit the extent of the harsh environment such that failure of any one is highly unlikely and if one were to fail,the others would continue to provide the function. i 1. Residual Heat Removal System: C
72-F053A, B (Containment isolation function)
E The redundant valves E12-F050A, B are testable check valves. The redundant valves E12-F099A, B are powered from Division 2 MCC 1364-2 located at 740' elevation
' E12-F004A, F047A, F048A,F003A, F026A, F068A, F011A, F006A (Residue,1 heat removal function)
-The redundant valves-E12-F0048, F047B, F0488, F003B, F026B, F0688, F011B, F006B are powered from Division 2 MCC 1364-1 located at 710'-6" elevation.
E12-F042A (Core coverage function) The redundant valve E12-F0428 is powered from MCC 136Y-1 located at 710'6" elevation. The alternate system HPCS (also - available) is powered from Division 3 MCC 143-1 located outside the harsh environment.
;4.(- ~ 2. ~ Low Pressure Core Spray:
E21-F001, F005, C002- (Core coverage function)
~ The ' alternate' system HPCS is powered from Division 3 MCC 143-1l which is located outside'the harsh environment.
[ ' 3. Core Standby Cooling System: LVYO4C RCIC/LPCS pumps cooler fan (LPCS - core coverage,n
- RCIC : safe . shutdown functions)
The redundant- fan VYO2C for HPCS is ~ powered from Division 3 MCC 143-1 which isilocated outside the harsh environment.1-- , 1 VYO1C,~(Core coverage function)l The redundant fan VYO2C for'HPCS11s powered from Division 3 7 ' MCC 143-1 which is? located outside the harsh environment.; LVY0lc ;VYOSC (Residual heat l removal function)- t' The redundant fans VYO3C, VYO6C-(RHR B/C) ire l powered from E
- MCC 136Y-1 located ~ at 710'-6" elevation.
4.~ ' Reactor Core jIsolation Cooling ~ System: E51-C003{(Safeshutdownand;corecoverage).. i
'd.
~
L TheTalternat'e system HPCS:is fpowered3 rom Division' 3 MCC -143-1
~
which is located outside the harsh' environment.. _
- M.5-1.4h-
~ r -
p '
, 1 m ~
m m s- T Y -=a-r4 t '., * - - - -*-e %r-T-' 9 x i. 4
7 (d) Operator Action
; .(
Essential safety systems are maintained on separate divisional r power. Safe shutdown is accomplished with any one entire division failed. Consequently, no operator action is required to meet the six safety objectives for the instrument line break. With respect to LOCA radiation, interim operation with this equipment is justified by the successful testing already completed and documented.
- g. '
References:
Schematic: lE-1-4000CV ( ( C 1 9 O % W,, ' * , . . - . I
+
E t
., e
. 2
. M.5-1.41_
a. l--i ~ '
,y.
<( . -
TABLE M.5-1 (Cont.)
- h m) COMPONENT APPLICATION STATEMENT
( Component AP-78E This component is located in the Reactor Building, elevation 820'-6" in environmental zone H4A. Hence, this component is exposed to a ! harsh environment for the Instrument Line Break Event Outside Contain-ment and high radiation for the LOCA Inside Containment (see Section g 4.4, page 4-32, of Quadrex Report QUAD-1-81-852). The impact of component failure is considered only for these events.
. (a) Component Function This component provides motive and control power to the.
components shown in the reference key diagram - 480 volts f MCC 136X-1 (Division 2).
~(b) Effect of Component Failure The failure of this component due to the Instrument Line Break Event in the Reactor Building or the LOCA event will not pre-
_g clude achieving the six safety objectives,-namely safe shutdown, containment isolation, core coverage, RHR, containment integrity and effluent control (see Section 4.4, page 4-32, of Quadrex Report QUAD-1-81-852). Failure of these: components for this event will not affect the C{ other 480 volt components in the electrical power distribution system. (c) _ Impact on Other Systems' ' The components in the following systems are affected by this component failure; however, their failure will not-affect
<( achieving the six safety objectives. ,
- 1. Reactor Pmtection MG set room
! exhaust fan (lVX08C and IVX06C)(1) battery room
- 2. Refueling platfonn (lF21-E003)
~
The;following components are affected by the failure of this MCC, but their six safety-objective; functions.can be accomplished _ by the. redundant components' found in;the same or other systems powered from redundant MCC's located in widely separated areas of the 1 building.1 Physical obstructions, massive heat sinks, and limited . w
' discharge through the small'.line would limit the. extent of the_
harsh environment -such that failure of any one .is highly .unlikely . and if one 'were to' fail,the others would continue.to provide the-
~ function.- /
,~
- 11. ' Primary Containment Vent Exhaust to Purge Train' Isolation?
V Valve-~(IVQ-037).7, The redundant 'vsive is 'IVQ-038 'which is! powered by Division 1;-
. MCC 135X-1 located in elevation 761'. ,
-fh 4 -
-@ M.'5-13j. '
4
~
L - w ,
(.-.... -. ...._. - - . . .. -.- - - - - - - ___ . _ - . - - - . . .. . - 5-j7(- TABLE M.5-1 (Cont.) h~
- 2. Control Room HVAC Supply Fans (0VC-01CA and OVC-02CA).
! The redundant control room HVAC supply fans (0VC-01CB h
- j. and OVC-02CB) are powered by Division 2 MCC 236X-1 i ,.
4
.t located in Unit 2.
!.: 3. Standby Gas Treatment Isolation Valves (1VG-001 and i~ IVG-003), auxiliary relay power for IVG-01C, lVG-02C and IVG-001, standby gas treatment equipment train F cooling fan.(WG-02 , heating coil (1VG-01A) and C supply fan (1VG-01C will fail should this MCC fails. j Unit 2 can be used as a backup for Unit 1 provided 4 isolation valve IVG-001 can be opened manually by
, plant personnel, j' (d) Operator Action I'i Essential safety systems are maintained on separate divisional power. Safe shutdown is accomplished with any one entire 4 division failing. Consequently, no operator action is required 1 to meet the six safety objectives for the Instrument Line Break i
Event. With respect to LOCA radiation, interim operation with
- i. this equipment is justified by the successful . testing already j_[ completed and documented.
References:
- Schematic: 1E-1-4000CV.
E O M y h
- p. '
~
. M.5-1.4kL -
f ,
>04a , ,
, s <
*u-?-%,MY
'. ? -'* 9' r
m 4*
" '"F"
" 'M '*
- L#
( t TABLE M.5-1 (Cont.) m) COMPONENT APPLICATION STATEMENT Component AP-82E This component is located in the Reactor Building, elevation 710'-6", in environmental zone H4A. Hence, this component is axposed to a harsh environment for the Instrument Line Break Outsia; the Containment and 4 4
.high radiation from the LOCA inside containment (see Section 4.4, page C
4-32, of Quadrex Report QUAD-1-81-852). The impact of component failure is considered only for this event. (a) Component Function This component provides motive and control power to the components
.shown in the reference key diagram - 480 volts MCC 136Y-1 g (Division 2).
(b) Effect of Component Failure The failure of this component due to the Instrument Line Break Event in the reactor building or the LOCA event will not preclude achieving ( the six safety objectives, namely safe shutdown, containment isolation, core coverage, RHR, containment integrity and effluent control (see Section 4.4, page 4-32, of Quadrex Report QUAD-1-81-852). Failure of this component for this event will not affect the other 480 volt components in the electrical power distribution system. cc (c) Impact on Other Systems The_ components in the following systems are affected by this component failure, however, their failure will not affect achieving the six. safety objectives. I 1.: Main steam line drain Valve B21-F020 is not required for containment. isolation.
- 2. - RHR Loop B pump minimum flow bypass valve E12-F0648 to the suppression pool is not required to operate for this event.
t RHR system operation is not affected by the failure of this component.
- 3. . RHR B/C water leg pump E12-C003.' Failure of this valve does-not affect ' operation of.RHR Loop A for this event. LPCS, HPCS and RCIC are available as backup..
- 4. RHR system emergency make up water cross-tie. valve E12-F093.
Failure of this valve has no'effect'in the operation of the RHR system. 5.
~
RHR pump E12-C002B test return line discharge to the suppression y pool _(E12-F021). - This valve is not required _ for RHR system operation
'M.5-1.4t.
1- ,
TABLE M.5-1 (Cont.)
~
7
- 6. S. E. reactor building sump pump 1A (RE-03PA) and south reactor floor drain sump 1A (RF-02PA) are NON-ESS, therefore,
{ it is not required to function during this event. C- 7. Diesel generator fuel transfer pump (lD0-01P).
- 8. Hydrogen recombiner valves 1E12-F3128,1HG-001 A,1HG-002A, 1HG-006A, lHG-009, lHG-003 and 1HG-018 are not required to operate for this event.
(. 9. MSIV-LCS outboard blowers E32-C002B & F are not required to operate fo'r this event.
- 10. Residual Heat Removal:
E12-F073B, F074B Heat exchanger vent E12-F024B RHR test, ca tainment spray to suppression *
': E12-F016B, F017B, F0278 pool E12-F016B, F0178 F0278 Containment spray The following components are affected by the failure of this MCC, but their function can be accomplished by the redundant components ,
found in the same or other systems powered from redundant MCC's <' (c which are located in widely separated areas of the building. Physical obstructions, massive heat sinks, and limited discharge through the small line would limit the extent of the harsh environment such that failure of any one is highly unlikely and if one were to fail the others would continue to provide the function. _(( 11. . RHR pump suction valve E12-F004B from the' suppression pool. The redundant valve is E12-F004A which.is located in Division 1 MCC 135Y-2 located at elevation 710'-6" .
- 2. , RHR suction cooling inboard isolation -valve E12-F009
.( The redundant valve for this function is RHR suction cooling outbaard isolation valve E12-F008 which is powered by Divisjon 1
-MCC 435X-1 located at elevation 761'.
- 3. RHR discharge to radwaste inboard-isolation valve' E12-F049A.
~ ~
-I' The redundantivalve to' be used for isolation function is itHR discharg discharge to radwaste outboard isolation . valve E12-F040A, B, . which .is provided by Division 1, MCC 135Y-1-located at elevation 740'.. l
- 4. Reactor water clean up system inboard isolation valve G33-F001.
(, ' The redundant valve for this-function is the RWCU system outboard
-isolation valve G33-F004 which is powered by Division >l MCC 135X-}
- located at elevation 761'.
- 5. RHR pumps 8/C cubicle cooler. fan IVY-03C .
.s Failure'can: occur to RHR pumps E12-L002 B & C'due to high~ ambient-temperature. RHR Pump A is available for Le9p A to function .
' ' since RHR Pump A cubicle cooler (IVY-01C) which is' powered byl '
Division 1 MCC 135Y-1 located at-elevation 710'-6" is still ~
- operable.
'N.5-1.4m. w -
o m L .. %-
~
' 1.=
- (
7 . TABLE M.5-1 (Cont.) -
- 6. RHR service water pumps C,D cubicle cooler fan IVY-06C.
Failure can occur to RHR Loop B service water pumps due to high ambient temperature. RHR Loop A service water pumps A, .B cubicle cooler fan IVY-05C powered by Division 1 MCC 135Y-2 I located at elevtaion 740' is available to service RHR Loop A operation.
- 7. Drywell Cooler lA inlet inboard isolation valve IVP-ll3A, B i The redundant valve to be used for this isolation function is
(~ the drywell cooler lA outlet outboard isolation valve 1VP-063A, B powered by Division 1 MCC 135X-1 located at elevation 761'.
- 8. Drywell Cooler lA outlet inboard isolation valve IVP-114A, B The redundant valve to be used for this isolation function is
> the Drywell Cooler 1A outlet outboard isolation valve IVP-053A, B
_I powered by Division 1 MCC 135X-1 located at elevation 761'.
- 9. Residual Heat Removal Function, E12-F004B, F0478,_ F0038,' F026B, F006B, F0688, F0llB The redundant valves E12-F004A, F047A, F048A, F003A, F026A, I F006A, F068A, F0llA are powered from Division 1 MCC 135Y-2 located at elevation 710'-6".
L 10. Core Coverage Function E12-F042B-The redundant' valve is powered from Division 1, MCC 135Y-2 I(- located at elevation 710'-6"." The alternate' system'HPCS (also available) is powered from Division 3 MCC 143-1 located outside the harsh environment.- (d) Operator Action Essential safety. systems are maintained on separate divisional power.
. b- Safe shutdown is accomplished with any one entire division failed.-
- Consequently no operator action is required to meet the six safety ?
objectives for the ~ Instrument Line Break Event. -:With respect to-
- LOCA radiation, interim operation with .this equipment is justified by ~
the successful testing already completed and documented., ' "
- (.
References:
4 a ,
-P&ID:
^
Schematic: lE-1-4000CX FCD: 4
~ .
. M.5-1i4n=
4
'm
& 'o
- m =--
,_f- - = + - +F 6 "P P -
- g. .
TABLE M.5-1 (Cont.) C \ g m) COMP 0NENT APPLICATION STATEMENT l
- 1. Component AP 83E 4 This component is . located in the Reactor Building, 740' elevation, in environmental zone H4A. Hence, this component is exoosed to a harsh environment for the Instrument Line Break Outside the Contain-I ment and high radiation from the LOCA inside containment (see Section 4.4, page 4-32, of Quadrex Report QUAD-1-81-852). The impact of component failure is considered only for this event.
. (a) Component Function This component provides motive and control power to the
[ components shown in the reference Key Diagram - 480V MCC 1364-Z (Div. 2). (b) Effect of Component Failure The failure of this component, due to the Instrument'Line Break Event g , in the reactor building or the LOCA event, will not. preclude achieving the six safety objectives, namely safe shutdown, containment isolation, core coverage, RHR, containment integrity and effluent control (see Section 4.4, page 4-32, of Quadrex Report QUAD-1-81-852).
~
Failure of this ' component for this event will nor. affect the other 480V components in the electrical ~. power distribution system. - (c)- Impact on Other Systems
~
The components in the follosing systems are affected by failure
, of this component; however, their.operationg iis -not required.'
- ( l. Reactor Recirculation-System
' :B33-F0238~ = Reactor recirculation' suction B33-F0678 . Reactor recirculation discharge - B33-D003 -Hydraulie control unit-
- 2. ~Stan'dby Liquid Control System: . .-
.' C41-C001 B SLC pump-l4 7C41-F001B SLC tank outlet C41-D003 SLC tank-heater:
- 3. Residual Heat Removal System: . .
E12-F094 RHR service water cross-tie g - E12-F064C : RHR pump C minimum flow bypass .
- 4. : Reactor Core Isolation Cooling-System:J E51-F076 RCIC steam line warm-u.p. ..
E51-F086' RCIC vacuum breaker isolation-a ( T
~
M.5-1.4o- - t _ E A s e--- * ' * * '-'
- E 3
m 'i2 -
? I. li. l TABLE M.5-1 (Cont.) i.
- I The components in the following systems.are affected by the failure o
' of this component but the six safety objective functions .can be accomplished by redundant components or alternate systems powered from redundant MCCs which are located in widely separated areas of the. building. Physical obstructions, massive heat sinks, and limited
- discharge through the small line would limit the extent of the harsh environment such that failure of any one is highly unlikely and if C
one were to fail the others would continue to provide the function. i
- 1. Nuclear Boiler System I B21-E016..(Containment isolation function) 7 The redundant valve B21-F019 (outboard isolation) is powered from Div.1 MCC 135X-1 located at 761' elevation.
- 2. Residual Heat Removal System E12-F042C (Core coverage-function) ,
i f- The-alternate system HPCS is powered from Div. 3 MCC 143-1.which is located outside the harsh environment. E12-F004C (Residual . heat removal function)
.The.redundantvalveE12-F004A(suppressionpoolcoolingLoopA)'
( is powered from Div.'.1 MCC 135Y-2 located.at-710'-6" elevation. E12-F0528,;F0878 (Residual, heat removal function) The redundant valves E12-F052A ,F087A are powered from-Div.- 1 MCC 135Y-1 located at 740' elevation.
~
L . -
'E12-F099A, F0998-(Containment isolation function)
The reduridant valves. E12-F053k, B- (outboard isolation);are
- poweredjfrom Div.1 -MCC)35Y-2 located at.710'-6") elevation. -
t :-3. : Primary Containment: Purge System
.VQ-034 & VQ-035, VQ-047, VQ-050 (Containment' isolation function) . -
The redundant valves VQ-036,)VQ-048, VQ-051'are powered-froni '
^ Div.il ' MCC 135Y-1 located at 740'J elevation.: '
[ '
. 4L Reactor Buildina' Closed Coolina Water System'.
f -
, j:
, # WR 179, LWR '180'(Containmentiisolation function)" ~
~
1The redundant valves WR 029,0WR 040 are: powered LfromlDivul,
'~ 1
~
-.- _ ' MCC 135Y-1.
C .~ '
~{ <
W { , y j
- a. , g
? A 't :-
S, , 4 e
~
l . ~ % % w
. . . .. ~c
_ m p _-~ > ' = **
'" h Y, h
_ *[ -
-- . a. :_.
7 TABLE M.5-1 (Cont.) g 5. Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System E51-F063 (Containment isolation function) This redundant outboard isolation valves E51-F008 & F064 are powered from Div.1 MCC 135X-1 located at 761' elevation. I E51-F063 (Safe shutdown & core coverage functions)
. The alternate system HPCS is powered from Div. 3 MCC 143-1 which is located outside the harsh environment.
(d) Operator Action 7-Essential safety systems are maintained on separate divisional power. Safe shutdown is accomplished with any one entire division failed. Consequently, no operator action is required to meet the six safety objectives for the Instrument Line Break Event. With respect to LOCA radiation, interim operation with the equipment is
- (~ justified by the successful testing already completed and documented.
References:
' Schematic: 1E-1-4000CY
~
(:.( f o w =~e- s,:, m "4, E' ~ y 2 d~
~ ^
~
.M.5-1.4q-
;e .
;. ; . . . . - . . ~.
g a *>
^p 1 # #
E " 4 ' q " - - L= . . _ . _ . . .
( ~ c, TABLE M.5-1 (Cont.) ! m) COMPONENT APPLICATION STATEMENT ( Component DC 06E This component is located in the RCIC/LPCS cubicle in environmental zone H5A. Hence, this component is exposed to a harsh environ;aent only-for the Instrument Line Break Event in the RCIC/LPCS cubicle ( (see Section 4.4, page 4-32, of Quadrex Report QUAD-1-81-852). The impact of component failure is considered only for this event. (a) Component Function This component provides motive and control power to the components shown in the reference Key Diagram - 250 VDC MCC 121Y (Div.1). C (b) Effect of-Component Failure The failure of this component due to the Instrument Line Break Event in the RCIC/LPCS cubicle will not preclude achieving the six safety objectives, namely safe shutdown, containment isolation, core coverage, RHR, containment integrity and effluent control ( (see Section 4.4, page 4-32, of Quadrex Report QUAD-1-81-852). Failure of this componer$t for this event will not affect the other 250 VDC or 480V components in the electrical power distribution system. (( (c) _ Impact on Other Systems The following components in.RCIC systemare affected by the failure-of this component but their operations .are not required: E51-F022 RCIC test bypass lto' condensate storage tank' d E51-F059 .RCIC test bypass to condensate storage _ tank E51-F080 RCIC vacuum breaker isolation The following components .in the RCIC system are affected; however,
-( the safe shutdown ~and core coverage functions can-be accomplished:
by HPCS system and the heat removal function can'.be accomplished by RHR system. The- HPCS and RHR systems are. powered. from.480'V-1MCCs which are located outside the RCIC/LPCS' cubicle and are not powered by separate-electrical divisions which are not affected-by: this event. [~ .. RCIC ~ RCIC-Barometric condenser. vacuum pump Barometric. condenser vacuum tank condensate pump; E51~-F045- -RCIC steam to: turbine E51-F010 . RCIC pump; suction from condensate storage . tank! I E51-F013- ~ RCIC pump discharge t .
'E51-F046 -RCIC turbine cooling water supply ~
?E51-F031 RCIC pump suction from_ suppression pool A- 'M.5-1.6a.
,v .
.w -
.~.
. TABLE M.5-1 (Cont.)
E51-F068 RCIC turbine exhaust E51-F069 RCIC vacuum pump discharge E51-C002 RCIC Turbine trip and throttle valve (partofturbine) The uninterruptible power supply is not required.
-(d) Operator Action
- For a break in the RCIC cubicle, the RCIC is considered unavailable. This occurs only in one of three ECCS divisions.
Therefore, two full divisions are available to mitigate the event. No operator action is required with the unavailable RCIC. Following accident confirmation based on leak detection, emergency procedures are followed for long term core and containment cooling usi.no the remaining two divisions (no action prior to 10 minutes-after the event) resulting in meeting all six safety objectives. In the analysis of LOCA and HELB, no credit is given for RCIC. Based on these facts, this component does not require hcrsh environ-mental qualification and'will be removed from the h.arsh qualification-s program. However, .tnis component will be qualified to normal and
~
abnormal environments atJa l'ater date.
References:
Schematic: 1E-1-4000EC- c N
, N r
P[
.'M.5-1.6b Rev. 3 ~, f 6/10/82 i 7.
j'. s - u y . - k ,, i
' ~ '
( x _ , ,
+ ,
m, g >< s f*?
4 4 TABLE M.5-1 (Cont.) !' m) COMPONENT APPLICATION STATEMENT i Component HG01A $ The Atomics International 211A (for unit 1) and 211B (for unit 2),
- Part No. N116000024-03, Hydrogen Recombiners are located in the Reactor
- Building in environmental zone H4A. Hence, these components are exposed to a harsh environment for the Instrument Line Break Outside Containment and high radiation from the LOCA Inside Containment (see Section 4.4,
, page 4-32, of Quadrex Report QUAD-1-81-852). The inpact of component failure is considered only for these events. , (a) Component Function
. These components control the concentration of combustible gases in the primary containment following a LOCA, taking suction from the
- drywell area and returning the discharge to the suppression pool i area in Units 1 or-2.
(b) Effect of Component Failure lC The loss of these components will not preclude achieving the six safety objectives, namely safe shutdown, containment isolation, lE core coverage, RHR cohtainment integrity and effluent control (see Section 4.4, page 4-32 of Quadrex Report QUAD-1-81-852). Failure of these components for these events will affect the C (~) operation of the Hydrogen Recombiner in the unit subjected to the harsh environment. The backup unit in the non-accident unit will provide the alternate functional capability. C -(c)- Impact on Other Systems n The sole function of these corponents is to control combustible -O gas concentration in Units 1 and 2. No other. systems are-affected by their failure. (d) Operator Action These devices are not required when the harsh' environment caused- !IC
- by the Instrument Line Break Outside Containment exists. For LOCA
, considerations, the hydrogen recombiner on the unaffected unit serves.
1- as a back-up. Therefore, no operator action is required to achieve. -
- any of the six safety objectives.
References:
P&ID: ' M-130, Sheets 1 and 2 _ Schematic: -1E-1-4103AF FCD: ;FSAR Figure 6.2-33, Sheets 1 and 2 -
- M.5-1.75a
( K f 1 ii , g+ ,-- r.--- , - - - , - - ,- i--- . . , , - , -
I h , TABLE M.5-1 (Cont.) l l m) COMPONENT APPLICATION STATEMENT l Component IN100, IN101 I These Valcor V52600-5800-1 solenoid valves are located in the reactor i building in environmental zone H4A. This component is exposed to a harsh environment for the Instrument Line Break Outside the Containment and the high radiation from the LOCA Inside Containment (see Section 4.4, page 4.32 of Quadrex Report QUAD-1-81-852). The impact of component failure is considered only for these events. (a) Component Function These solenoid valves are required for isolating the pneumatic system lines serving the drywell for maintenance. (b) Effect of Component Failure , Failure of these components may disable the drywell pneumatic system but operation of these components is not required to achieve the six safety objectives as described in Quadrex Report QUAD-1-81-852. (c). Impact on Other Systeps l For these' events, no other systems are affected by the failure of these components. These components have.no electrical interface with components of any other system. r ."(.{ 't ~ (d) -Operator Action This device is not required when the harsh environment caused by , the Instrument Line Break Outside the Containment and the high - radiation-from the LOCA'inside the containment exists. Therefore, no operator action is required to achieve any of the 'six safety _ di -objectives.
References:
P&ID: _ M-66, Sheet 7 o !O L I o
. 4 3+
r l- >
- M.5-1'.86d
+
1 s
.y, ii &. ~
- - - r -
- - I e -
)
~ TABLE M.5-1 m) COMPONENT APPLICATION STATEMENT Component E12-F003A, B These MOVs are located in the RHR cubicle in environmental zone H6. . Hence, these components are exposed to a harsh environment for the Line Break Outside the Containment in the RHR cubicle and high radiation from the LOCA inside containment (see Section 4.4, page 4-32 of Quadrex ,' Report QUAD-1-81-852). The impact of component failure is considered only for these events. 4 (a) Component Function These motor operated valves control the shell side discharge of the RHR heat exchangers. l (b) Effect of Component Failure' ' Failure of these components will affect the flow of the RHR system on the output of the shell side of the heat exchanger. No failure () mechanism at the valve can cause the valve to change position from open or close because the motor control centers are not at the same location as the valves. The failure of these components due to the t' Instrument Line Break Outside the Containment will not preclude achieving the six safety objectives, namely safe shutdown, containment isolation, RHR, containment integrity and effluent control (see c. o g(~i r Section '4.4, page 4-32, of.Quadrex Report QUAD-1-81-852). (c) Impact on Other Systems
- The sole function of 'these components is to provide control for the
- RHR flow from the outlet of the heat exchanger. . No other systems are affected by their failure..
C)
, (d) Operator Action These devices are not required when the harsh environment caused by the line break exists. They are in the' position to' perform their -
intended safety function. The RHR heat exchanger. in the unaffected f'g loop is available to provide cooling. mTherefore, no operator action is required to ~ achieve any of the six safety objectives. -
References:
P&ID: M-96,15heet 4
. Schematic: lE-1-4220AX, AY.
FCD: . FSAR Figure' 7.3-11' p 4 r M.5-l'.99f. m - -
f TABLE M.5-1 (Cont.) m) COMPONENT APPLICATION STATEMENT ~ Component E12-F006 A, B I These motor operated valves are located in the Reactor Building in environmental zone H6. Hence, these components are exposed to a harsh environment for the Instrument Line Break Outside Containment , and high radiation from the LOCA Inside Containment (see Section 4.4, page 4-32 of Quadrex Report QUAD-1-81-852). The impact of this component failure is considered only for these events. (a) Component Function
- These motor operated valves are required for RHR shutdown cooling.
(b) Effect of Component Failure These valves are always in the position to perform their intended safety function. No failure mechanism at the valve can cause the valve to change position from open or close because the motor control centers are not at the same location as the valves. The failure of these components due to the Instrument Line Break Outside Containment or the LOCA event will not preclude achieving the six safety objectives, namely safe shutdown, containment iso-lation, core coverage, RHR, containment integrity and effluent control (see Section 4.1, page 4-2, of Quadrex Report QUAD-1-81-852). 4 {. (c) Impact on Other Systems The sole function of these valves is for RHR shutdown cooling. Y Failure of these valve motor operators. does not affect other systems. O (d) Operator Action These devices are not required when the harsh environment caused by the Instrument Line Break or LOCA radiation exists. Therefore. no operator action is required to achieve any of the six safety objectives.
References:
P&ID: 'M-96, Sheets 1, 2, Zones A-6, B-6 Schematic: 1E-1-4220-BA, IE-1-4220-BB, IE-1-4220-AH FCD/FSAR: Figure 7.3-21,' Sheet 5_.
'M.5-1.99h
TABLE M.5-1 (Cont.) m) C0!PONENT APPLICATION STATEMENT Component E12-F0llA&B These MOVs are located in the RHR cubicles in environmental Zone H6. Hence, these components are exposed to a harsh environment for the Line Break Outside the Containment in the RHR cubicle and high radiation
._ from the LOCA inside containment (see Section 4.4, page 4-32, of Quadrex Report QUAD-1-81-852). The impact of component failure is considered only for these events.
-(a) Component Function These motor operator valves are required for RHR loop A and B heat exchanger discharge to the suppression pool.
(b) Effect of Component Failure Failure of these components may disable etther the RHR Loop A or - Loop B steam condensing mode but this mode is not required to meet O the six safety objectives as described in Quadrex Report QUAD 81-852. No failure mechanism at the valve can cause the valve to change position fro ~m open or close because the rotor control centers are not at the same location as the valves.- (c) Impact on Other Systems Gb No other systems are affected by the failure of these motor operator valves. These valves have no electrical interface with'other components of any other systems. (d) . Operation Action
-g These devices are not required when .the harsh ~ environment. caused by the Instrument Line Break Outside- the Containment and -the LOCA radiation harsh environment. exists. Therefore, no operator action
~is required to achieve any of the six safety objectives.
References:
- C' P&IDi M-96, Sheet 4, Zone A-3 & A-6
- Schematic ' Diagram: lE-1-4220BE & BF FCD: FSAR Figure 7.3-12, Sheet 2 t .
"M.5-1.99j
" ~
q e- _ __
TABLE M.5-1 (Cont.) m) COMPONENT APPLICATION STATEMENT Component E12-F021 The Limitorque Type SMB is located in the Reactor Building in environ-mental zone H4A. Hence, this component is exposed to a harsh environ-ment for the Instrument Line Break Event Outside Containment and high radiation from the LOCA Inside Containment (see Section 4.4, page 4-32, of Quadrex Report QUAD-1-81-852). The impact of component failure is considere'd only for these events. (a) Component Function This component is used for testing the RHR pump (E12-C002C) (b) Effect of Component Failure This valve is nonna11y closed and is opened only for test. Failure of.this component prevents testing of the RHR pump; however, failure of this component has no effect in achieving the six safety objectives as described in Quadrex Report g QUAD-1-81 -852. No failure mechanism at the valve can cause the valve to change position from open or close because the motor control centers are not at the same location as the valves. (c) Impact on Other Systems . O b, No other components or system is affected by the failure of this component. This valve has no electrical interface with other components on this system or any other system, nor does it affect the operation of the RHR system. (d) Operator Action This device is not required when the harsh environment caused by the instrument line break exists. It perfonns its function before it is affected by the LOCA radiation harsh environment. Therefore, I no operator action is required to achieve any of the six safety objectives. f
References:
l P&ID: M-96, Sheet 3. Zone E-6 Schematic: 1E-1-4220BH FCD: FSAR Figure 7.3-12, Sheet 4 1 M.5-1.99m
1 i i
- e
- l TABLE M.5-1 (Cont.)
m) COMP 0NENT APPLICATION STATEMENT
. Component E12-F024A and B The Limitorque type SPEs are located in the RHR cubicle in environ-mental zone H6. Hence, these components are exposed to a harsh environ-
- ment for the Instrument Line Break Outside Containment and high radiation from the LOCA Inside Containment (see Section 4.4, page 4-32, of Quadrex Report QUAD-1-81-852). The impact of component failure is considered only for these events.
(a) Component Function These components are used for RHR pumps E12-C002A and B test return line to the suppression pool and for suppression pool cooling. (b) Effect of Component Failure , Failure of these components prevents testing of the RHR pump operation and normal pool cooling. Failure of these components
- O has no affect in achieving the six safety objectives as described in Quadrex Report QUAD-1-81-852. No failure mechanism at the l
valve can cause the valve to change position from open or close - because the motor control centers are not at the same location , as the valves. -
.GC (c) Imput on Other Systm
. No other component or system is affected by the failure of these
- components. -These valves have no electrical interface with other components on this system or any other systems.
(d) Operator Action 0
- These devices are not required when the harsh environment caused by the Instrument Line Break exists. They. perform their function-before they are affected by the LOCA radiation harsh environment.
Therefore, no operator. action is required to achieve any of the I six safety objectives. . C
References:
! P&ID: M-96, Sheets .1 and 2. Zones 02 and El Schematic: 1E-1-4220BK, BL E .FCD: FSAR Figure 7.3-12, Sheet 3 i: ( 1
, M.5-1.99n
, , TABLE M.5-1 (Cont.)
m) COMPONENT APPLICATION STATEMENT Component E12-F026A & B The Limitorque type SMBs are located in the RHR cubicle in environmental : zone H6. Hence, these components are exposed to a harsh environment for the Instrument Line Break Event Outside Containment and high radiation from the LOCA Event Inside Containment (see Section 4.4, page 4-32, of Quadrex Report QUAD-1-81-852). The impact of component failure is considered only for these events. (a) Component Function These components are used for RHR heat exchanger steam condensing mode discharge to RCIC pump suction. (b) Effect of Component Failure Failure of these components prevents RHR heat exchanger steam condensing mode flow to RCIC pump suction. Steam condensing is still available through the suppression pool. No failurre mechanism g at the valve can cause the valve to change position from open or close because the motor control centers are not at the same location as the valves.* Failure of these components has no effect in achieving the six safety objectives as described in Quadrex report QUAD-1-81-852. (c) Impact'on Other Systems No other component or system is affected by the failure of these components. These valves have no electrical interface with other components on this system or any other systems. O (d) Operator Action These devices are not required when the harsh environment caused by the Instrument Line Break Event or LOCA Event exists. Therefore, no operator action is required to achieve any of the six safety objectives. C
References:
P&ID: M-96.-Sheet 4,_ Zones 84 and B5 Schematics: 1E-1-4220BK, BM FCD: FSAR Figure 7.3-12, Sheet 2 M.5-1.99p' 8 e
, . . TABLE M.5-1 (Cont.)
m) COMPONENT APPLICATION STATEMENT Component E12-F027A, B The Limotorque type SMBs are located in the RHR cubicle in environ-mental zone H6. Hence, these components are exposed to a harsh environment for the Instrument Line Break Event Outside Containment and high radiation from the LOCA Inside Containment (see Section 4.4, page 4-32, of Quadrex Report QUAD-1-81-852). The impact of component failure is considered only for these events. (a) Component Function These components are used for RHR heat exchanger flow to suppression pool spray. (b) Effect of Component Failure Failure of these components disable suppression pool spray flow from heat exchanger. The alternate loop at RHR is still avail-able for the Instrument Line Break Event. - RHR suppression pool .g cooling is still available to cool the suppression pool. No failure mechanism at the valve can cause the valve to change position from open or close because the motor control centers are not at the same location as the valves. Failure of these components has no afeect in achieving the six C (; safety objectives as described in Quadrex Report QUAD-1-81-852. (c) -Impact on Other Systems There is no electrical interface with any other systems. Suppression pool cooling is not affected by the failure of these ,o components. (d) Operator Action These devices are not required when the harsh environment caused by the Instrument Line Break exists. They perform their function before they are affected by the LOCA radiation harsh environment. C Therefore, no operator action is required to achieve any of the 0 six safety objectives.-
References:
P&ID:~ M-96, Sheets 1 & 2, Zones: Sheets 1 C-5; Sheet 2, C Schematic:'.1E-1-4220BK, BN .
. FCD: FSAR Figure 7.3-12,: Sheet 3
.1 t
M.5-1.99q
TABLE M.5-1 (Cont.) m) COMPONENT APPLICATION STATEMENT Component E12-F047A. B The Limitorque type SMBs are located in the RHR cubicle in environ-mental zone H6. Hence these components are exposed to a harsh environ-ment for the Instrument Line Break Outside the Containment and high radiation from the LOCA Event Inside Containment (see Section 4.4, page 4-32 of Quadrex Report QUAD-1-81-852). The impact of component failure is considered only for these events. (a) Component Function These components are used for RHR pump discharge flow to RHR heat exchangers. These are normally opened valves only closed for normal initiation of steam condensing. (b) jffect of Component Failure Failure of these components under worst condition will result in o the valves remaining in their as-is position which has no effect on this ofety function. No failure mechanism at the valve can cause the valve to change positio'nfrom open or close because the motor control centers are not at the same location as the valves. Failure of these c.omponents has no effect in achieving the six safety objectives as described in Quadrex Report QUAD-1-81-852. (c) Impact on Other Systems No other component or system is affected by the failure of these - 3 components. These valves have no electrical interface with other components on this system or.any other systems. (d) Operator Action These devices are in the position to perform their intended safety function. Therefore, no operator action is required to - achieve any of the six safety objectives. C
References:
P&ID: M-96, Sheet 4, Zones E-4 and E-5' , Schematic: lE-1-4220BS, BT~ FCD: FSAR Figure 7.3-12, Sheet 5 ' y M.5-1.99t ,.
~
i 1 TABLE M.5-1 (Cont.)
, m) COMPONENT APPLICATION STATEMENT Component E12-F048 A, B The Limitorque Type SMBs are located in the RHR cubicle in environmental zone H6. Hence, this component is exposed to a harsh environment for 4
the Instrument Line Break outside the containment and high radiation from the LOCA event inside containment (see Section 4.4, page 4-32, of Quadrex Report QUAD-1-81-852). The impact of component failure is considered only for these events. (a) Component Function
- These components are used for RHR pump discharge to the reactor vessel for core coverage.
(b) Effect of Component Failure These valves are normally open and aligned for the LPCI mode. Failure of these components under worst condition will prevent l O diverting LPCI flow through the heat exchangers. RHR pump C002C, LPCS, HPCS and RCIC sfstems are available to provide core coverage. Failure of these components has no effect in achieving the six safety objectives as described in Quadrex Report QUAD-1-81-852. . No failure mechanism at the valve can cause the valve to change
< position from open or close because the motor control centers are 10 h. not at the same location as the valves.
4 (c) Impact on Other Systems No other component or system is affected by the failure of .these
- components. These valves have nc electrical interface with other -
components in this system or any other system.-
.y
-(d) Operator Arf, ion
.These devices' are not required when the harsh environment caused by the Instrument Line Break exists. -They perform their function before
' they 'are affected by the LOCA radiation harsh environment. The.
, c- operator will take action in accordance with the emergency procedures to divert the LPCI flow to the RHR heat exchangers.
~ ^
References:
P&ID: M-96, Sheet 4, Zones E-1, D-8 Schematic: - 1E-1-4220BS. BU FCD: FSAR Figure 7.3-12, Sheet 2 [' M.5-1.99u i .-. L
TABLE M.5-1 (Cont.) iI ! m) COMPONENT APPLICATION STATEMENT Component E12-F049 A, B ' The Limitorque Type SMBs are located in RHR cubicle in environmental zone H6. Hence this component is exposed to a harsh environment for the i Instrument Line Break Event Outside Containment and high radiation from i the LOCA Event Inside Containment (see Section 4.4, page 4-32, of i j Quadrex Report QUAD-1-81-852). The impact of component failure is considered only for these events.
- (a) Component Function
[ These components are used for RHR heat exchanger wann up discharge to reactor building equipment drain tank during normal shutdown cooling initiation.-. They are not used in any accident mode. (b) Effect of Component Failure i Failure of these components prevents condensate drainage to the g' reactor building drain tank. If the accident occurs during warm up the valves could fail to isolate. Isolation can be achieved by closing E12-F049, otherwise the valves are normally closed. Failure of these components has no effect in achieving the six safety objectives as described in Quadrex Report QUAD 81-852. No failure mechanism at the valve can cause the valve to G {, change position'from open or close because the motor control centers are not at the same location as the valves. !. (c) Impact on Other Systems
. No other component or system is affected by the failure of .these components. These valves have no electrical interface with other
- O components in this system or any other system, nor do they affect the operation of the RHR system.
id) Operator Action , -g These devices are net required when the harsh environment caused by the Instrument Line Break exists. They perform.their function-before they are affected by the LOCA radiation harsh environment.- Therefore, no operator action is required to achieve any of the six safety objectives. J
References:
~
PAID: M-96, Sheet 4, Zones C-1, D-8 Schematic: lE-1-4220BV, BW FCD: FSAR Figure 7.3-12, Sheet 3 M.5-1.99v
TABLE M.5-1 (Cont.) m) COMPONENT APPLICATION STATEMENT Component E12-F064A, B. C These motor operated valves are located in the reactor building in environmental zone H6. Hence, these components are exposed to a harsh environment for the Instrument Line Break Event Outside Contain-ment and high radiation from the LOCA inside containment (see Section 4.4, page 4-32, of Quadrex Report QUAD-1-81-852). The impact of component failure is considered only for these events. (a) Component Function These motor operated valves provide minimum flow bypass to the suppression pool.- (b) Effect of Component Failure Failure of these valve operators under worst condition may prevent pool.valves from opening and minimum flow bypass to the suppression the
.3 No failure mechanism at the valve can cause the valves to change position from open to close because the motor control ,
centers are not at the same location as the valves. Failure of these valves have no impact on other systems and it has no affect in achieving the six safety objectives as; described in Quadrex Report QUAD-1-81-852. C h, (c) Impact on Other Systems No other component or system is affected by failure of these components. These valves have no electrical interference with other components or any other system. O l(d) Operator Action These devices are not required when the harsh environment caused by = - Instrument Line Break exists. These devices perform their function ' before it is affected by the LOCA radiation. The operator will take action in accordance with the emergenc
. C' cooling if the valves are inoperable. y procedures to achieve core ,
References:
P&ID: Schematic: 1E-1-4220CA FCD: FSAR Figure 7.3-12, Sheet 4 [ M. 5-1.99y Rev. : 1,10/5/81~
/,.w --
l TABLE M.5-1 (Cont.) i m) COMPONENT APPLICATION STATEMENT Component E12-F068A, B i j The motor operated valve E12-F068A is located in ECCS equipment cubicle j in environmental zone H5E, and E12-F068B is located in RHR cubicle in . environmental zone H6. Hence, these components are exposed to a harsh i environment for the Instrument Line Break Event Outside Containment and high radiation from the LOCA Inside Containment (see Section 4.4, page 4-32, of Quadrex Report QUAD-1-81-852). The impact of component failure is considered only for these events. (a) Component Function r These motor operated valves are used in the RHR service water ! heat exchanger discharge. !- (b) Effect of Component Failure
-Failure of these components under worst condition would prevent g opening the valves for RHR service water flow (discharge). No failure mechanism at the valve can cause the valve to change position from 1
open to close because the motor control centers are not at the
- same location as the valves.
Failure of these valve operators have no effect in achieving the g{. six safety objectives as described in Quadrex Report QUAD-1-81-852. J (c) Impact on Other Systems No other component or system is affected by failure of these components. These valves have no electrical interface with other components. ' i0- (d) Operator Action
~
These devices are not required when the' harsh environment caused by - Instrument Line Break exists. These devices perforin their function before it is affected by the LOCA radiation. Therefore, no operator action is required to achieve any of the six safety objectivess !I
References:
P&ID: M-87, Sheets 1 and 2, Zones F2 and 82 Schematic: lE-1-4220CB, CC-FCD: FSARFigure7.3-12, Sheet'2-(E12-F068Aisnotshown) M.5-1.992
9 TABLE M.5-1 (Cont.) m) COMPONENT' APPLICATION STATEMENT Component E12-F093 This motor operated valve is located in RHR cubicles in environmental zone H6. Hence, this component is exposed to a harsh environment for the Instrument Line Break Event Outside Containment and high radiation from the LOCA Event Inside Containment (see Section 4.4, page 4-32 of Quadrex Report QUAD-1-81-852). The impact of component failure is considered only for these events. (a) Component Function This motor operated valve is required for emergency makeup water crosstie. (b) Effect of Component Failure Failure of this component may disable emergency makeup function for RHR but this function is not required for core coverage nor residual heat removel. No failure mechanism at the valve can 8 cause the valve to change position from open or close because the motor control centers are not at the same location as the valves. 3 Failure of this valve 6perator has no affect in achieving the six safety objectives as described in Quadrex Report QUAD-1-81-852. (c) Impact on Other Systems { No other systems are affected by failure of this valve motor operator. This valve has no electrical interface with components on this system or any other systems. (d) Ooerator Action " O- This device is not required when the harsh environment caused by the Instrument Line Break or LOCA event exits. Therefore, no oserator action is required to achieve any of the six safety-o>jectives. '
References:
- P&ID
- M-96, Sheet 4, Zone F-4 -
Schematic: lE-1-4220CG M.5-1.99ad
TABLE M.5-1 (Cont.) m) COMPONENT APPLICATION STATEMENT Component E12-F094 This motor operated valve is located in RHR cubicles in environmental zone H6. Hence, this component is exposed to a harsh environment only l for the Instrument Line Break Event Outside Containment and high ' radiation from the LOCA Event Inside Containment (see Section 4.4, page 4-32, of Quadrex Report QUAD-1-81-852). The impact of component failure is considered only for these events. (a) Component Function This motor operated valve is required for emergency makeup water crosstie. (b) Effect of Component Failure Failure of this component may disable emergency makeup function of RHR but this function is not required for core coverage nor residual heat removal. No failure mechanism at the valve can
.cause the valve to change position from open or close because .O the motor control centers are not at the same location as the valves. ,
Failure of this valve operator has no affect in achieving the
,six safety objectives as described in 'Quadrex Report QUAD-1-91-852.
(c) Impact on Other Systems No other systems are affected by failure of this valve motor operator.
, This valve has no electrical interface with other components on this system or any other systems.
(d) Operator Action O. This device is not required when the harsh environment caused by-the Instrument Line Break or LOCA Event exists. Therefore, no
' operator action is required to achieve any of the six safety n objectives.
References:
P&ID: M-% ' Schematic: 1E-1-4220CG M.5-1.99ae Rev. 1, 10/3/81 7 y
TABLE M.5-1 (Cont.) m) COMPONENT APPLICATION STATEMENT Component E21-F011 The Limitorque type SM is located in the RCIC/LPCS cubicle in environmental zone H5A. Hence, this component is exposed to a harsh environment for the Instrument Line Break Event Outside Containment and high radiation from the LOCA Inside Containment (see Section 4.4, page 4-32, of Quadrex Report QUAD-1-81-852). The impact of component fai. lure is considered only for these events. (a) Component Function This component is used for LPCS pump minimum flow bypass to the suppression pool. (b) Effect of Component Failure Failure of this component would slightly reduce LPCS injection flow, and does not significantly affect the LPCS operation. 3 No failure mechanism at the valve can cause the valve to change position from open or close because the motor control centers are not at the same location as the valves. Failure of this component has no affect in achieving the six safety objectives as described in Quadrex Report QUAD-1-81-852, C b, (c) Impact on Other S.ystems
-No other component or system is affected by the failure of this '
component. .This valve has no electrical interface with other components on this system or any other systems. ~O (d)L Operator Action This device is not required when the harsh environment caused by the instrument line break exists. . ;It performs its function before it is affected by the LOCA radiation harsh environment. Therefore, no operator action is required to achieve any of the six safety objectives.. g
References:
P&ID: M-94, Sheet 1. Zone C3 Schematic: 1E-1-4221AB. FCD: FSAR Figure 7.3-10,. Sheet 2 M. 5-1.99ai
-1 l
, TABLE M.5-1 (Cont. ) l m) COMPONENT APPLICATION STATEMENT Component E21-F012 The.Limitorque type SMB is located in reactor building in environmental zone H4A. Hence, this component is exposed to a harsh environment only for the Instrument Line Break Outside Containment (see Section 4.4, page 4-32, of Quadrex Report QUAD-1-81-852) and to high radiation following the LOCA event. The impact of component failure is considered only for these events.
(a) Component Function This component is used for testing LPCS pump (E21-C001) function with pump taking suction from the suppression pool and discharging back to the suppression pool. (b) Effect of Component Failure Failure of this component prevents testing of the LPCS pump. 3 Failure of this component has no effect in achieving the six safety objectives as described in Quadrex Report QUAD-1-81-852. No failure mechanism at the valve can cause the valve to change position from open or close because the motor control centers are-
. not at the same location as the valves.
Ch (c) Impact on Other Systems No other component or system is affected by the failure of this-component. This valve has no electrical interface with other components or this system or any other system, nor does it
;O affect the operation of the LPCS.
(d) Operator Action This system is not reouired to operate during these events. This valve is normally closed and does not operate for these events. If it is open during a LOCA event, capability to close will' be-g maintained. prior to being exposed to high radiation. No operator action is required to meet the six safety objectives.
References:
P&ID: M-94,' Sheet 1. Zone C-5 Schematic: 1E-1-4221AC-FCD: FSAR Figure 7.3-10, Sheet 1 I' %' N.5-1.99aj
r.
. . . TABLE M.5-1 (Cont.)
m) COMPONENT APPLICATION STATEMENT Component E51-F010 This motor operated valve is located in the Reactor Building in environ-mental zone HSA. Hence, this component is exposed to a harsh environment for the Instrument Line Break Event Outside Containment and high radiation from the LOCA Event Inside Containment (see Section 4.4, page 4-32, of Quadrex Report QUAD-1-81-852). The impact of component failure is considered only for these events. (a) Component Function This motor operated valve is required for RCIC pump suction from the condensate storage tank. (b) Effect of Component Failure This valve is normally open, but failure of this valve to close could eventually disable RCIC injection, if low level was experienced in the condensate storage tank. Failure of this component may disable RCIC system; however, the alternate system HPCS is available D for shutdown cooling or core coverage and RHR system is available for heat removal. No f'ailure mechanism at the valve can cause the valve to change position from open or close because the motor control centers are not at the same location'as the valves. Failure of this valve operator has no effect in achieving the 3C1 six safety objectives as described in Quadrex Report QUAD-1-81-852. (c) Impact on Other Systems No other systems are affected by failure of this valve motor operator. This valve has no electrical interface with other components of O any other system. (d) ' Operator Action - This device is not required when the harsh environment caused by the Instrument Line Break Event or LOCA Event exists. It is in the position to perform its intended safety function. Therefore, 7 no operator, action is required to achieve any of the six safety objectives.
References:
P&ID: M-101, Sheet 2. Zone A5 Schematic: lE-1-4226AP' FCD: FSAR Figure 7.4-2, Sheet 1 M.5-1.99as
TABLE M.5-1 (Cont.) m) COMPONENT APPLICATION STATEMENT Component E51-F059 This motor operated valve is located in the RCIC/LPCS cubicle in environ-mental zone H5A. Hence, this component is exposed to a harsh environment for the Instrument Line Break Event Outside Containment and high radiation from the LOCA Event Inside Containment (see Section 4.4, page 4-32 of Quadrex Report QUAD-1-81-852) . The impact of component failure is cor.sidered only for this event. (a) Component Function This motor operated valve is required for RCIC test bypass to condensate storage tank. (b) Effect of Component Failure This valve is normally in the closed position perfoming its safety function. Failure of this component during test my disable RCIC system, however, the alternate system HPCS is available. O No failure mechanism at the valve can cause the valve to change position from open or close because the motor control centers are not at the same location as the valves. (c) Impact on Other Systems , C {- No other systems are affected by failure of this valve motor operator. This valve has no electrical interface with other components of any other systems. (d) Operation Action This device is not required when the harsh environment caused by O the Instrument Line Break or LOCA Event exists. Therefore, no operator action is required to achieve any of the six safety objectives.
References:
C P&ID: M-101, Sheet 2. Zone E-5 Schematic Diagram: lE-1-4226AW FCD: FSAR Figure 7.4-2, Sheet 1 i M.5-1.99az l m ;
1' 4 g TABLE M.5-1 (Cont.) m) COMPONENT APPLICATION STATEMENT Component E51-F068 - This motor operated valve is located in the reactor building in environmental zone H5E. Hence, this component is exposed to a harsh environment for the Instrument Line Break Event Outside
- Containment and high radiation from the LOCA Event Inside ;
!' Containment (see Section 4.4, page 4-32, of Quadrex Report l QUAD-1-81-852). The impact of component failure is considered '
, only for these events. l (a) Component Function . This motor operated valve is required for RCIC turbine j j . exhaust to suppression pool. ( i < (b) Effect of Component Failure ! This valve is normally open which is the position to perfonn its safety function. Failure of this component i 4 I may disable RCIC system; however, the alternate system
- HPCS .is available. ,
No failure mechanism at the valve can cause the valve to 4 change position from open or close because'the motor control centers are not at the same location as the valves. C Failure of this valve operator has no effect in achieving '; the six safety objectives as described in Quadrex Report : QUAD-1-81-852. (c) Impact on Other S_vstems 0: No other systems are affected by failure of this valve motor operator. This valve has no electrical interface with other components of any other systems. (d) Doerator Action This device is not required when the harsh environment- ,. C caused by the instrument line break or LOCA event e'xists. Therefore, no operator action is required to achieve a,ny of the six safety objectives. References : - P&ID: M-101, Sheet 1, zone C-7 ^ Schematic Diagram: 1E-1-4226AY FCD: FSAR Figure 7.4-2, $heet 5 M.5-1.99bb
._ - . - . . _..m_.....
. . TABLE M.5-1 (Cent.)
m) COMPONENT APPLICATION STATEMENT Component VP053A. B These motor operated valves are located in the reactor building in environmental zone H4A. Hence, this component is exposed to a harsh environment for the Instrunent Line Break Event Outside Containment and high radiation from the LOCA Event Inside Containment (see Section 4.4 page 4-32 of Quadrex Report QUAD-1-81-852). The impact of component failure is considered only for this event. (a) Component Function These motor operated valves are required for primary contain-ment chilled water outboard isolation. (b) Effect of Component Failure Failure of these valve operators in the worst condition will prevent these valves to close upon receiving an isolation signal from the primary containment and reactor vessel isolation system. Containment isolation is achieved by automatically closing inboard isolation valves S which are located inside the containment, therefore, they are not affected by the instrument line break. In addition, this is a closed system within primary containment.- The failure of these components will not preclude achieving the six safety objectives, namely safe shutdown, containment r isolation, core coverage, RHR, containment integrity and CU effluent control (see Quadrwx Report QUAD-1-81-852). No failure mechanism at the valve can cause the valve to change position from open or close because the motor control ' L centers are not at the same location as the valves.-
.O (c) Isoact on other systems No other systems are affected by failure ~of~ this motor operator valve. This valve has no electrical interface with other components of any other systems.
g .(d).:OperatorAction This device is not required when the harsh environment caused by the instrument line break exists. This device performs its function before it is affected by the LOCA radiation harsh environment. Therefort, no operetor action
. is required to achieve any of the six safety objectives.
References:
Pa!D: M-86, Zones E2 and C2 Schematic: 1E-1-4081 AE FCD: , FSAR Figure 7.3-23,. Sheet 1
, , -M.5-1.99bq w
a-
~ _ . _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ __ __ _
i TABLE M.5-1 (Cont.) l I
; m) COMPONENT APPLICATION STATEMENT ,
i Conconent VP063A,B These motor operated valves am located in the reactor building
- in environmental zone H4A, hence this component is exposed i to a harsh environment for the Instrument Line Break Event Outside Containment and high radiation from the LOCA Event Inside Containment (see Section 4.4, page 4-32, of Quadrex Report QUAD-1-81-852) . The impact of component failure is considered only for these events.
(a) Component Function These motor operated valves are required for drywell cooler outboard isolation. (b) Effect of Component Failure Failure of these valve operators in the worst condition l will prevent these valves to close upon receiving an 3 isolation signal from the primary containment and reactor vessel isolation system. Containment isolation is achieved by automatically closing inboard isolation valves which are located inside the containment,'therefore, they are not affected by the instrument line break. In addition, this is a closed system within primary containment. The failure of these components will not pruclude achieving
*/ the six safety objectives, namely safe shutdown, containment isolation, core coverage, RHR, containment integrit effluent control (see Quadrex Report QUAD-1-81-852)y and No failure mechanism at the valve can cause the valve to change position from open or close because the motor control O centers am not at the same location as the valves.
(c) Impact on Other Systems No other systems art affected by failure of this valve motor operator. .This valve has no electrical interface with other c components of any other systems. This device is not required when the harsh environment caused by the instrument line break exists. This device perforins its function before it is affected by the LOCA
' radiation harsh environment. Therefort, no operator action is required to achieve any of the six safety objectives.
Referwnces: P&ID: M-86, Zones 02 and 52 Schematic: lE-1-4081AE, AF FCD: FSAR Figure .7.3-23, Sheet 1 M.5-1.09br L
TABLE M.5-1 (Cont.) m) COMPONENT APPLICATION STATEMENT Component VQ-029 This motor operated valve is located in the Reactor Building in environmental zone H4A. Hence, this component is exposed to a harsh environment for the Instrument Line Break Event Outside Containment and high radiation from the LOCA Inside Containment. (see Section 4.4, page 4-32, of Quadrex Report QUAD-1-81-852). The impact of component failure is considered only for these events. (a) Component Function This motor operated valve is required for drywell purge - line isolation. (b) Effect of Component Failure Failure of this component may disable Primary Containment Purge System, but operation of this system is not required to meet the six safety objectives as described in Quadrex
- g. Report QUAD-1-81-852. The valves are normally closed and are open only during shutdown. Therefore, this isolation function is assured: No failure mechanism at the valve can cause the valve to change position from open or close because the motor control centers are not at the same location as the valves.
n -L' ('- (c) Impact on Other Systems No other systems are affected by failure of this valve motor operator. This valve has no electrical _ interface with other components of any other systems. () (d) Operator Action This device is not required when the harsh environment caused' by the instrument line break' exists. It performs its function before it is affected by the LOCA radiation harsh environment. Therefore, no operator action is required to achieve any of the ' six safety. objectives.- C
References:
P&ID: M-92, Sheet 1. Zone D2 Schematic: 1E-1-4082AD , V ,
.M.5-1.99bu- '
l, TABLE M.5-3 (Cont.) i j m) COMPONENT APPLICATION STATEMENT l Component PL-32J ! This component is located in the basement floors outside ECCS equipment i
- cubicles in environmental zone H5E. Hence, this component is exposed to
} ' a harsh environment for the Instrument Line Break Outside Containment and high radiation from the LOCA Inside Containment.(see Section 4.4, i page 4-32, of Quadrex Report QUAD-1-81-852). The impact of component I failure is considered only for .these events. ! (a) Component Function ! This component provides control and indication for HPCS cubicle
- ventilation.
(b) Effect of Component Failure 1 Failure of this component may disable the ventilation system for HPCS cubicle but. the ventilation system for RCIC/LPCS cubicle is i available for the alternate RCIC and LPCS systems. (The control j panel for RCIC/LPCS is in zone H5A).. iO . i Failure of this component has no effect in achieving the six l safety objectives as described in Quadrex Report QUAD-1-81-852.
-(c) Impact on Other Systems -
! 1Q, No other systems are affected by the failure of this component. This component does not have electricaliinterface with any other systems. ,
- (d) Operator Action This device is not required when the harsh environment caused by.
, O- the instrument line break exists. It performs its function before L it is affected by the LOCA radiation. Alternate systems. are-available to provide core coverage and cooling. Therefore, no. operator action is required to achieve any of the six _ safety L objectives. lC
References:
Schematic: .1E-1-4089AA
'o
-M.5-1;105a.
Y
- - ~
! + TABLE M.5-1 (Cont.)
, m) COMP 0NENT APPLICATION STATEMENT Component PL-33J l i
' l This component is located in the basement floor outside ECCS equipment i cubicles in envimnment zone H5E. Hence, this component is exposed to a harsh environment for the Line Break Outside Containment in the RHR ) cubicle and high radiation from the LOCA Inside Containment (see Section
- i. 4.4,page4-32,ofQuadrexReportQUAD-1-81-852). The impact of component ,
j failure is considered only for these events. l j (a) Component Function This component provides control and indication for RHR B&C cubicle
- ventilation.
(b) Effect of Component Failure Failure of this component may disable the ventilation system.for RHR B&C cubicle but the ventilation system for RHR A cubicle is available for RHR system (Division 1). The control panel PL-34J for RHR A cubicle -is in zone H5E but widely separated from panel O' R 3N. Failure of this component has no effect in achieving the six safety objectives as described in Quadrex Report QUAD-1-81-852.
~
(c) Impact on Other Systems No other systems are affected by thel failure of this component. This component does not have electrical interface with any other system. - (d) Operator' Action . - U
-.O This device is not required when the harsh' envinnment caused by the instrument line break exists. It perfoms its function before it is affected by the LOCA radiation. Alternate systems are available to. provide core coverage and cooling.- Therefore,'no operator
' action is required'to achieve any of the six safety objectives.
C
References:
Schematies: 1E-1-4089AA M.5-1.105b gi g,
, , TABLE M.5-1 (Cont.)
m) COMPONENT APPLICATION STATEMENT ( Component PL'-34J ' This component is located in the basement floor outside ECCS equipment ! 4 cubicles in environment zone H5E. Hence, this component is exposed to a harsh environment for the Line Break Outside Containment in the RHR cubicle and high radiation from the LOCA Inside Containment (see Section 4.4, page 4-32, of Quadrex Report QUAD-1-81-852). The impact of component i failure is considered only for these events. - l j (a) Component Function , j This component provides control and indication for RHR A cubicle j ventilation. i 7 (b) Effect of Component Failure ' Failure of this component may disable the ventilation system for RHR A cubicle, but the ventilation system for RHR B&C cubicles is available for RHR. system (Division 2). The control panel PL33J for ' RHR B&C is in zone H5E but widely separated from panel PL-34J. 3
- Failure of this component has no effect in achieving the six safety objectives as described in Quadrex Report QUAD-1-81-852.
(c) Impact on Other Systems No other systems are affected by the failure of this component 2 l "Q~ , This component does not have electrical interface with any other systems. '
,(d) Operator Action This device is not required when the harsh environment. caused by the instrument line break exists. It performs its function before
- .it is'affected by the LOCA radiation. Alternate systems are
'available to provide core coverage and cooling. Therefore, no operator action is required to achieve any of the six safety objectives.
References:
Schematic: ' 1E-1-4089AA x j{ 9
+
,. G.^
+* h i M.5-1.105c N,
*.b
^
. i ek l
. 1
o . TABLE M.5-1 (Cont)
~
m) COMPONENT APPLICATION STATEMENT Component PL-35J This component is located in the RCIC/LPCS cubicle in environmental zone HSA. Hence, this component is exposed to a harsh environment for the Line Break Outside Containment and high radiation from the LOCA Inside Containment (see Section 4.4, page 4-32 of Quadrex Report QUAD-1-81-852). The impact of component failure is considered only for these events. (a) Component Function This component provides control and indication for RCIC/LPCS cubicle ventilation system. (b) Effect of Component Failure Failure of this component may disable the ventilation system for RCIC/LPCS cubicle but the ventilation systems for HPCS and RHR cubicles are available for the alternate HPCS and RHR systems. (The control panel for HPCS/RHR cubicles are in zone H5E). < Failure of this" component has no effect in achieving the six safety objectives as describe ~d in Quadrex Report QUAD-1-81-852. (c) Impact on Other Systems ,
,f 'No other systems.are affected by the failure of this component. '
This component does not have electrical interface with any other systems. (d) Operator Action This device is not required when the harsh. environment caused by 6 'the instrument line break exists. It perfonns its function before - it;is affected by the LOCA radiation. Alternate-systems are-available to provide core coverage and cooling. Therefore, no operator
- action is required to achieve any of the six safety objectives.
References:
f.
~
Schematic:- 1E-1-4089AB M.5-1.105d.
)
i ~- J 1 ,t~ , . , _ ._ x _. m
i . TABLE M.5-2 (Cont.) a e
- m) COMPONENT APPLICATION STATEMENT Component B21-N015 A, B. C & D The Barksdale BIT-M12SS-GE steam line pressure components are -l located in the accessible area of the Turbine Building in environ- l mental zone H7. These components are exposed to a harsh environment for a Line Break Outside the Containment (see Section 4.3, page 4-23 of Quadrex Report QUAD-1-81-852). The impact of this component failure is considered only for this event. ,
(a) Component Function - These components sense main steam line pressure just upstream of the turbine stop valves and provide a trip to close the main steam isolation and drain valves. (b) Effect of Component Failure i The loss or failure of'these devices will prevent isolation of the main steam lines and drain lines on loss of pressure in the main steam line. Diverse isolation signals are available that Il are not affected by the line break outside containment. The loss of these components will not affect safe shutdown, contain-ment isolation, core coverage, RHR, containment integrity, and effluent control as described.in Quadrex Report, QUAD-1-81-852. (c) Impact on Other Systems c ({'1 The sole function of these components is to initiate main steam line and drain line isolation on loss of pressure in the main steam line. . (d) :0perator Action Due to physical and electrical separation, these devices willl
. C) ^
perform their function before they are affected by this event; Therefore, no operator action is required to.achiee any of the six safety objectives.
References:
' $ P&ID: M-55, Sheet 3 . Schematic: IE-1-4232AB,' AC, AD.'AE FCD: FSAR. Figure 7.3-13, Sheet ' 2 (B-I)'
~
l
, '4..
i 4 (. .M.5-2.8a g._ m, .5,-. -
i TABLE M.5-2 (Cont.) m) COMPONENT APPLICATION STATEMENT Component B21-N020A, B, C, &D The Barksdale BIT-M12SS-GE reactor pressure.. measurement components are located in the reactor building in environmental zone H4A. Hence these components are exposed to a harsh environment for the Instrument Line Break Event Outside Containment and high radiation from the LOCA Event Inside Containment (see Section 4.4, page 4-23, of Quadrex Report QUAD-1-81-852). The impact of this component failure is considered only for these events. l (a) Component Function These components sense vessel pressure and initiate scram on high vessel pressure with MSIVs closed. (b) Effect of Component Failure The loss or failure of these devices disables one of the sensing functions which initiate scram on high reactor vessel pressure. Diverse signals are available for scram. Failure of E these components has no effect in achieving the six safety objectives as described in Quadrex Report QUAD-1-81-852. (c) Impact on Other Systems f The failure of components affects only the reactor protection and the primary containment and reactor vessel isolation C([ systems. (d) Operator Ac'tien-Due to physical and electrical separation, these' devices will perform their function before they are affected by this event. C) -Therefore, no operator action is required'to achieve any of the six safety objectives.
References:
F&ID: _ M-93, Sheets 4 & 5-
- Schematic 5 1E-1-4215AC,;AD,LAE, AF; 1E-1-4232,'1E-1-4203 ~
FCD: FSAR Figure 7.3-13, 7 2-1, 7.3-7 M.5-2.8b .
-N u
TABLE M.5-2 (Cont.) m) COMPONENT APPLICATION STATEMENT Component B21-N023 A, B, C, and D The Barksdale BIT-M12SS-GE reactor pressure measurement components are located in the Reactor Building in environmental zone H4A. Hence, these components are exposed to a harsh environment for the Instrument Line Break Event Outside Containment and the high radia-tion from the LOCA Event Inside Containment (see Section 4.4, page 4-23 of Quadrex Report QUAD-1-81-852). The impact of this component failure is considered only for this event. (a) Component Function These components sense vessel pressure and initiate reactor scram on high pressure. (b) Effect of Component Failure The loss or failure of these devices disables one of the sensing functions which initiate scram on high reactor vessel pressure B (half-scram mode). Diver:;e signals are available for scram. Failure of these components has no effect in achieving the six safety objectives as described in Quadrex Report QUAD-1-81-852. , (c) Impact on Other Systems These components affect only the reactor protector system. (d) Operator Action Due to physical and electrical separation, these devices will' perform their function before they are affected by this event. . Therefore, no operator action is required to achieve any of the_ , O-six safety. objectives.
References:
, P&ID: M-93, Sheets 4 & 5
" EC&I: 1E-1-4215 t FSAR: 7.2-1,_7.3-7 .
M.5-2.8c
TABLE M.5-2 (Cont.) . m) COMPONENT APPLICATION STATEMENT Componenti B21-N045A, B, C, and D C These Barksdale BIT-M1255-GE pressure switches are located in the ! f Reactor Building in Environmental zone H4A. Hence, these components are exposed to a harsh environment for the Instrument Line Break Event l Outside Containment and high radiation from the LOCA Inside Containment. ' (See Section 4.4, page 4-32, of Quadrex Report QUAD-1-81-852.) The impact of component failure is considered only for these events. f (a) Component Function These components sense reactor vessel pressure and provide a signal to the recirculation system for trip (ATWS) of the recirc pump motors on high reactor pressure. 7 (b) Effect of Component Failure The failure of these components due to the Instrument Line Break Event or the LOCA event will not preclude achieving the six safety objectives, namely safe shutdown, containment isolation, core coverage, RHR, containment integrity and effluent control (see Section 4.4, page 4-32, of Quadrex Report QUAD-1-81-852). I Failure of these components for these events will affect the trip (ATWS) of the recirculation pump motors on high reactor pressure. These events will not result in high reactor pressure, or a need for these components to function, p (c) Impact on Other Systems The sole function of these components is to trip the recire pump motors on reactor high pressure. No other systems are affected by their failure. (d) Operator Action l' Due to physical separation, failure of one instrument line will not-impact the other division components. This device is not required when the harsh environment caused by any break exists. . Therefore,- - no operator action-is required to achieve any of the six safety objectives. i
References:
P&ID: M-93, Sheet 5 Schematic: ?lE-1-4205AB, AM FCD: FSAR Figure G.A-2,- Sheet 6 ( ( [ t ,-: M.5-2.8e-
< ~
._:__ . . .:_ . =- . _ . .-
; TABLE M.5-2 (Cont.)
I m) COMPONENT APPLICATION STATEMENT Component B21-N056A, B, C, and D
- The Barksdale DIT Condenser Vacuum components are located in the turbine building in environmental zone H7. Hence, these components i
are exposed to a harsh environment only for the Line Break Event Outside Containment (see Section 4.3, page 4-23 of Quadrex Report QUAD-1-81-852). The impact of component failure is considered only' for thisevent. (a) Component Function These components sense condenser vacuum and provide a trip to automatically close the main steam line isolation and drain i valves. 1 (b).EffectofComponentFailure 4 The loss of these components due to the Line Break Event , Outside Containment will not preclude achieving the six safety objectives, namely safe shutdown, containment isolation, , core coverage RHR, containment integrity and effluent control 8_ (see Section 4.3, page 4-23, of Quadrex Report QUAD-1-81-852). Failure of these components for this event will eliminate the condenser low vacuum signal used to automatically initiate the isolation of the main steam line and drain valves only. Manual and automatic MSIV closure on other diverse signals, such as C C- low steam line pressure, are available.- (c) Impact on Other Systems The sole function of these components is to provide:a trip to automatically isolate the main steam line and drain valves on o low condenser vacuum. No other systems are affected by their failure. ( (d) Operator Action i ~These devices are'not required when the harsh environment caused by the line break event outside containment exists. Therefore, l N: k
.no operator action 1s required to. achieve any of the six. safety
' objectives.
References:
P&ID: ~M-56,~ Sheets 2 and-3.
-Schematic: 1E-1-4232AB,'AC, AD, AE- '
N FCD: 7.3-B,. Sheet:2 in . _
' M.5-2.15al hl 2
TABLE M.5-2 (Cont.) m) COMPONENT APPLICATION STATEMENT Component E31-N007 A, B The Barton 268 differential pressure switch components are located in the RCIC/LPCS cubicle in environmental zone H5A. Hence, these components are exposed to a harsh environment for the line break in the cubicle and the high radiation from the LOCA event inside containment (see Section 4.4, page 4-32 of Quadrex Report QUAD-1-81-852). The impact of component failure is considered Only for this event. (a) Component Function These components sense the differential pressure in the RHR steam condensing supply line and close the isolation valve. (b) Effect of Component Failure The valve is normally closed except during steam condensing mode. The failure of these components will not preclude achieving the six safety objectives, namely safe shutdown, containment isolation, core coverage, RHR, containment integrity and effluent control (see Section 4.4, page 4-32, of Quadrex 3 Report QUAD-1-81-852). Diverse signals are available for isolation. ,
- (c) ' Impact on Other Systems The sole function of these components is to isolate the RHR steam condensing supply line. No other systems are affected
,(s;P
- - by their failure.
~
(d) Operator Action These components are not required when.the harsh environment caused by the line break exists. Due to physical and electrical
.cy separation, these and other redundant devices will perform their function before they are affected by this event..
- Therefore,sno' operator action ~is required to-achieve-any-of'the six safety' objectives..
~
References:
~C- -P&ID: - FSAR. Figure 7.3-15 Schematic: lE-4226 AD. -
FCD: FSAR Figure 7.4-2, Sheetil 7 i I s M. 5-2.17c ' h J
TABLE M.5-2 (Cont.)
~
m) COMPONENT APPLICATION STATEMEN1 Components E31-N008A, B, C, & D I The Barton 288 differential pressure indicator switch components are ; located in the reactor building in environmental zone H4A. Hence, these components are exposed to a harsh environment for the Instrument Line Break Event Outside Containment and high radiation from the . LOCA Inside Containment (see Section 4.4, page 4-32, of Quadrex Report QUAD-1-81-852). The impact of component failure is considered only for these events. (a) Component Function These components sense the main steam.line flow and initiate Primary Containment and Reactor Vessel Isolation Control System (PCRVICS). (b) Effect of Component Failure The. failure of these components due to the Instrument Line Break Event in the reactor building will not preclude achieving the six 9 safety objectives, namely safe shutdown,~ containment isolation, core coverage, RHR, containment integrity and effluent control (see Section 4.4, page 4-32, of Quadrex Report QUAD-1-181-852). Failure of these components will affect only the automatic initiation-of containment isolation which is not required for the Instrument C Lt Line Break Event Outside Containment. These components are not required for the LOCA Event Inside Containment.- (c) Impact on Other Systems The sole function of these components is to initiate' containment
.O - . isolation (PCRVICS). No other systems are affected by their failure.
(d) Operator Action These devices are not required when the harsh environment caused. by the Instrument Line Break Event and LOCA exists. Therefore, C no operator' action _is required to achieve any of the six-safety objectives. Due to physical separation, failure of one instrument line will not impact the components in the.other 3 PCRVICS divisions. -
References:
P&ID: .M-15, Sheet'2,. Zone F-2 S Schematic: lE-1-4232AB,-AC, AD,'and AE l _ IED: -FSAR Figure 7.3-15,. Sheet 2 T P ,,
- M.5-2.17d. ,
4-4
~
7 I - i l
, . TABLE M.5-2 (Cont.)
{ m) COMPONENT APPLICATION STATEMENT j Component E31-N009A, B, C, and D ' The Barton 288, differential pressure indicator switch components are located in the reactor building in environmental zone H4A. i Hence, these components are exposed to a harsh environment for the Line Break Event Outside Containment and high radiation from i the LOCA Inside Containment (see Section 4.4, page 4-32, of Quadrex
- Report QUAD-1-81-852). The impact of component failure is j considered oaly for these events.
(a) Component Function These components sense main stream line high flow and initiate Primary Containment and Reactor Vessel Isolation. (b) Effect of Component Failure The failure of these components will not preclude achieving the six safety objectives, namely safe shutdown, containment isolation, core coverage, RHR, containment integrity and 8 effluent control (see Section 4.4, page 4-32, of Quadrex Report QUAD-1-81-852). (c) -Impact on Other Systems-The sole function of these components is to initiate. containment g{ isolation (PCRVCS). No other systems are affected by their failure. (d) Operator Action i These devices are not required when the harsh environment caused by the line break in the tunnel exists. 'They perform
- O their function before they are affected by the-LOCA radiationi harsh environment. Therefore, no operator action,is required' to achieve any of the six safety objectives. .
References:
. P&ID: M-155,. Sheet 2, Zone F-2
- Schematic: 1E-14232AB, AC, AD,"AE E
- FCD: . FSAR Figure 7.3-15, Sheet-12 e
.,s^ -
4 h
. M.5-2.17ei t , .
.r
. HL 1
,, ae ; ~ ~
r
l TABLE 14.5-2 (Cont.) m) COMP 0NEl:T APPLICATION STATEMENT Component E31-N010A, B, C, D The Berton 283, differential pressure indicator switch components are located in the reactor building in environmental zone H4A. Hence, these components are exposed to a harsh environment for the Line Break Event Outside Containment and high radiation from the LOCA Inside Containment (see Section 4.4, page 4-32, of Quadrex Report QUAD-1-81-852). The impact of component failure is considered only for these events. (a) Cy ponent Function These compenants sense rcain stream line high flow and initiate Primary ContainT.ent and Racetor Vessel Isolation. (b) Effect of Component Failure The failure of these components will not preclude achieving the six safety objectives, namely safe shutdown, containment isolation, core coverage, Rl!R, containment integrity and D ef fluent control (see Section 4.4, page 4-32, of Quadrex Report QU/.D-i-81-852). (c) Impact on Other Systems The sole functien of these ccm;onents is to initiate containment - isolation (PCRVCS). No other systems are affected by their 0 ! failure. (d) Operator Action
- These devices are r.c+ required when the. harsh environment caused by the line break in the tunnel exists. They perform
'O. their function before they are affected by the LOCA radiation harsh environment. Therefore, no operator action is required
.to. achieve any of the six safety objectives.
References:
C P&ID:
~
14-155, Sheet 2, Zone F-2 Schematic: 1E-14232AB,-AC, AD, AE. FCD: FSAR Figure 7.3-15, Sheet 2 N M'. 5-2.17f- ,y, t ~ *
.^'
TABLE M.5-2 (Cont.) m) C0:4P0NENT APPLICATION STATEMENT Component E31-N011A, B, C, and D The P.arton 288, differential pressure indicator switch components are located in the reactor building in environmental zone H4A. Hence, these components are exposed to a harsh environment for the Line Break Event Outside Containment and high radiation from the LOCA Inside Containment (see Section 4.4, pege 4-32, of Quadrex Report QUAD-1-81-852). The impact of component failure is considered only for these events. (a) Com;.enent Function
; These components sense main stream line high flow and initiate Primary Containment and Reactor Vessel Isolation.
(b) Effect of Component Failure The failure of these components will not preclude achieving the six safety objectives, namely safe shutdown, containment _8 isolation, core coverage, RHR, containment integrity _and
-effluent control (see Section 4.4, page 4-32, of Quadrex Report Q'JAD-1-81-852).
.- ' (c)' Impact on Other Systems C {#i The solc fur.ction of these componer.ts is to initiate containment isolation (PLPJCS). .Ho other systems are affected by their failure.
. (d)' Operstor Action
-These devices are not' required when the harsh environment D caused'by the line break in the tunnel exists. .They perform'
'their function before'they are affected by the LOCA radiation harsh environment. .Therefore, no operator action is required
'to achieve any of the'.six safety; objectives.-
JC
References:
P&ID: H-155, Sheet 2 Zone F-2
- Schematic: lE-14232AB,'AC, AD,~AE FCD: "FSAR Figure:-7.3-15, Sheet 2>
V _' p-i
! i M.5-2.17g
. -;3.
i [S-~ , e,
$ g-
_ w '" " ~
TABLE M.5-2 (Cont.) 1 .- , . m) COMPONENT APPLICATION STATEMENT Component E31-N012A, B The Barton 288 differential pressure switch components are located in the RHR cubicle in environemntal zone H6. Hence, these com- , ponents are exposed to a harsh environment for the line break in the cubicle and the high radiation from the LOCA event inside containment (see Section 4.4, page 4-32, of Quadrex Report QUAD-1-81-852). The impact of component failure is considered 4 only for these events. (a) Component Function These components sense high flow in the RHR shutdown suction
- line and isolate shutdown cooling flow, i
(b) Effect of Component Failure The failure of these components will not preclude achieving the six safety objectives, namely safe shutdown, containment isolation, core coverage, RHR, containment integrity and
- -g
~
effluent control (see Section 4.4, page 4-32, of Quadrex Report QUAD-1-81-852). (c) Impact on Other Systems The sole' function of these components is'to isolate the shutdown cooling flow in RHR. No other systems are affected . by their_ failure.
.(d) Operator Action These components are not required when the harsh' environment.
caused by the line break exists. Due to physical and electrical
.g . separation, these and other redundant devices will perform their function before they are affected by this event.
Therefore, no operator action is required to achieve any of the six safety objectives. ,
References:
.C P&ID: M-155, Sheet 2, tone F-2 Schematic: 1E-1-4232AKl '
' O 4
m M.5-2.17hl
' ^ d " T "
, % .7,-
'7
- l I
l _- TABLE M.5-2 (Cont.) l i
~
l m) COMPONENT APPLICATION STATEMENT Component E31-N013A, B The Barton 288 differential pressure switch components are located .l in the RCIC/LPCS cubicle in environmental zone H5A. Hence, these components are exposed to a harsh environment for the line break
; in the cubicle and the high radiation from the LOCA event inside
}- containment (see Section 4.4, page 4-32, of Quadrex Report , QUAD-1-81-852). The imapet of component failure is considered only for these events. (a) Component Function These components sense the RCIC steam flow, isolate the RCIC steam supply (on high flow) and provide annunciation in the main control room. (b) Effect of Component Failure The failure of these components will not preclude achieving the six safety objectives, namely safe shutdown, containment isolation, core coverage, RHR, containment integrity and effluent control (see Section 4.4, page 4-32, of Quadrex
' Report QUAD-1-81-852).
-{, '
Failure of these components for this event will affect only the RCIC system. HPCS will be available for safe shutdown, core coverage and RHR. system will be available for residual-heat removal. (c) Impact on Other Systems The sole function of these components ~is to isolate the RCIC
~
steam supply. - No other systems are affected by their failure.
-(d)- Operator. Action Due to physical and electrical:separat. ion,'these and other redundant devices will perform their. function:before they are-affected by this event. Therefore, no operator action is required
'to achieve any of the six-safety objectives.
References:
.P&ID:. M-155, Sheet 2, Zone F-2 Schematic: -1E-1-4226-AF FCD/FSAR: Figure 7.4-2,3Sheetil r-
=
;M.5-2.1711 -
T Rev. 3, 6/1/82 :
- ~~ ~ - -
TABLE M.5-2 (Cont.) m). COMPONENT APPLICATION STATEMENT Components B21-N024A, B, C, and D The Barton 288A reactor level components are located in the reactor building in environmental zone H4A. Hence, these components are exposed to a harsh environment for the Instrument Line Break Event Outside Containment and the high radiation fmm the LOCA Inside Containment (see Section 4.4, page 4-32 of Quadrex Report QUAD-1-81-852). The impact of component failure is considered only for these events. (a) Component Function These components sense reactor vessel water level and trips HPCS and RCIC at Level 8, and reactor scram at low water level (Level 3). [ (b) Effect of Component Failure ' The loss of these components due to the Instrument Line Break Event Outside Containment will not preclude achieving the six safety objectives, namely safe shutdown, containment isolation, core coverage, RHR, containment integrity, and effluent control (see Section 4.4, page 4-32 of Quadrex Report QUAD-1-81-852). 8 ! For the instrument line break in the reactor building open area, there is no automatic scram since the transient effects are not large enough to cause automatic initiation of the RPS. The reactor operator recognizes the situation and manually initiates j shutdown, core cooling, and inventory control via the RPS.
- C 0, Failure of these components for_ these events will affect the '
automatic trip logic for RPS and HPCS of Division III only. This does not inhibit manual scram and manual HPCS trip. l . (c) Impact on Other Systems EO - The sole function of these components is to provide a reactor. high water level trip to the HPCS and RCIC as well as low water level scram. No other systems are affected by their failure. (d) Operator Action t Due' to physical separation, failure of one instrument line will !' not impact the components in' other ECCS and RPS~ divisiovis. These: devices are not required when the harsh environment caused.by the. instrument line break exists-and the Level 8 trip function is not-r required when the LOCA radiation harsh environment exists. They'. perform their_ Level 3 function <before.they-are _affected by the : LOCA radiation and harsh environment. Therefore, no operator. <_ action is required to achieve any of the six safety objectives..
References:
lP&ID: M-95 Schematic:i lE-i-4215;'4226AF, 4226AC-FCD: . FSAR Figure 7.2-1, Sheet '2 b M.'5-2. l'9a ~ D* w g- a
- ff ur--- e- 'k 0- - f+ - T'i e
TABLE M.5-2 (Cont.) m) COMPONENT APPLICATION STATEMENT Component B21-N026A, B, C, & D The Barton 760 reactor water level components are located in the Reactor Building in environmental zone H4A. Hence, these components are exposed to a harsh environment for the Instrument Line Break Event Outside Containment and high radiation from the LOCA Inside Containment (see Section 4.4, page 4-32, of Quadrex Report QUAD-1-81-852). The impact of component failure is considered only for these events. (a) Component Function These components sense reactor vessel water level and automatically initiate MSIV closure, RWCU isolation, and SGTS at Level 2. _ (b) Effect of Component Failure The loss of these components due to the Instrument Line Break Event Outside Containment or the LOCA Event will not preclude acnieving the six safety objectives, namely safe shutdown, containment isolation, core coverage, RHR, containment integrity and effluent control (see Section 4.4, Page 4-32, of Quadrex Report QUAD-1-81-852). O
~
Failure of these components for this evut will affect the automatic initiation of SGTS, MSIV closure and RWCU isolstion valves. Contain-ment isolation and RWCU isolation are not required for this event. Isolation can be achieved by manually initiating MSli' closure. CO (c) Im,act on Othe, Systems The sole function of these components is to provide a low reactor water level initiation signal to the Reactor Water Cleanup isolation valve, SGTS, and Main Steam Isolation Valves. No other systems are
'affected by their failure.
O (d) Operator Action Due to physical separation, failure of one instrument line will not-impact the other divison's components.~ These devices are not. required-
'when the harsh-environment caused by the Instrument.Line Break Event or LOCA Event exists. . These devices perform their function before C it is_affected by the LOCA radiation. Therefore .no operator action is required to achieve any of the six safety' objectives.
References:
P&ID: M-93, Sheets.4i a 5.
' Schematic: ~ Figure 1E-1-4232A8,.AC, AD & AE
'FCD: 7.3-13 M.5-2.23a Ll2
~
~ ~
- z. .- . - . -
1 . j TABLE M.5-2 (Cont.)
?
j m) COMPONENT APPLICATION STATEMENT Component Cll-N013A, B, C, and D The Magnetrol 751 reactor water level components are located in the i reactor building in environmental zone H4A. Hence, these components
- are exposed to a harsh environment for the Instrument Line Break Event ,
2 Outside Containment and high radiation from the LOCA Inside Contain- l l ment (see Section 4.4, page 4-32, of Quadrex Report QUAD-1-81-852). ' The impact of component failure is considered only for these events. l (a) Component Function 3 These components sense water level in the scram discharge volume i and scram the reactor at high level. (b) Effect of Component Failure 4 The loss of these components due to the Instrument Line Break Event i Outside Containment or the LOCA will not preclude achieving the ! six safety objectives, namely safe shutdown, containment isolation, ! O core coverage, RHR, containment integrity and effluent control (see Section 4.4, page 4-32, of Quadrex Report-QUAD-1-81-852).- Failure of these components for this event will prevent the automatic scram function for high scram discharge volume only. It does not affect the other automatic scrams or the manual scram capability. h { Impact on Other Systems (c) The sole function of these components is to sense the high water level in the scram discharge volume and initiate automatic scram.
-No other-systems are affected by their-failure.-
(d) Operator Action These devices ~ perform their function before they are affected by the Instrument Line Break-Event or LOCA event. :Therefore no operatorL action.-is required to achieve .any of- the six ' safety objectives. t I Due to physical. separation, failure of one instrument line will not impact the components _in the other 3 RPS divisions.
References:
P&ID: .FSAR Figure 7.7-2,(Sheet-1, M-100, Sheet 2
. Schematic:, J1E-1-4215AC, AD, AE and AF'
- IED: FSAR Figure 7.2-1, Sheet-2 of 4:
- e M. 5 -2. 26 a :-
4, - - - - < , , . - _w[ , , . '. _~ .,
. . . -= . .= - . - . - - .
d TABLE M.5-2 (Cont.) : i
! i i '
m) COMPONENT APPLICATION STATEMENT Component E22-N001 A, B; E22-N002A, B
, The Magnetrol 751 water level components are located in environmental zone H7. Hence, these components are exposed to a harsh environment only for the Line Break Event Outside Containment (see Section 4.4, page 4-32, of Quadrex Report QUAD-1-81-852). The impact of component failure is considered only for this event.
(a) Component Function These compenents sense water levels in the condensate storage tank and the suppression pool, and align the HPSC suppression pool pump suction valve. (b) Effect of Component Failure The loss of these components due to the Line Break Event Outside Containment will not preclude achieving the six safety objectives, namely safe shutdown, containment isolation, core coverage, RHR, t O containment integrity and effluent control (see Section 4.4, page4-32,ofQuadrex,ReportQUAD-1-81-852). Failure of these components for this event will only affect the automatic alignment of the HPCS suppression pool pump suction valve. Suction will still be available from the CST. The manual alignment of the valve will not be affected by the level switches, and other - 1[i O
-ECCS systems are available.
(c) Impact on Other Systems. The sole function of these components is to provide water level signals for _ alignment of the suppression pel pianp suction valve.-
.O No other systems are affected by their failure.-'
I - (d)' Operator Action Failure of these components in~the worst' case could result in the loss:of HPCS inventory. However, ADS is available asa backup l c- and would automatically provide adequate inventory makeup. . - Therefore. L no operator action is required to meet the six safety objectives.--
References:
L LSchematic:L1E-1-4222AC t FCD: FSAR Figure 7.3-6,-Zone'H-7 L M.5-2-26c
- - . .-- a , .
. l
, . TABLE M.5-2 (Cont.)
\
l m) COMPONENT APPLICATION STATEMENT l Component B21-N048A, and C The Static-0-Ring N12 pressure switches are located in the reactor building in environmental zone H4A. Hence, these components are exposed to a harsh environment for the Instrument Line Break Event Outside Containment and high radiation from the LOCA Event Inside Containment (see Section 4-4, page 4-32, of Quadrex Report QUAD-1-81-852). The impact of component failure is considered only for these events. (a) Component Function These components sense drywell pressure and initiate
- Division I RHR, ADS, RCIC and LPCS at high drywell pressure.
(b) Effect of Failure The loss of these components will not preclude achieving the six safety objectives, namely safe shutdown, contain-O ment isolation, core coverage, RHR, containment integrity and effluent control (see Section 4-4, page 4-32, of Quadrwx Report QUAD-1-81-852). (c) Impact on Other Systems fs The sole function of these components is to provide a high CU drywell pressure initiation signal to Division I RHR, ADS, RCIC, and LPCS. No other systems are affected by their fail ure.
- These components are not required'when the harsh environment caused by the Instrunent Line Break exists. These components O perform their function before it is affected by the LOCA radiation harsh environment. Therefore, no operator action is required to achieve any of the six safety objectives.
References:
C P&ID: M-93, Sheet 5 Schematic: 1 E-4221-AB , 4226-AD, 4220-AJ FDC: FSAR Figures 7.3-10, Sheet 1 and 7.3-13, Sheet 3 M.5-2. 3Dti --a
TABLE M.5-2 (Cont.) m) COMPONENT APPLICATION STATEMENT Component B21-N048B, D The Static-0-Ring N12 pressure switches are located in the reactor building in environmental zone H4A. Hence, these components are exposed to a harsh environment for the Instrument Line Break Event Outside Containment and high radiation from the LOCA Event Inside Containment (see Section 4.4, page 4-32, of Quadrex Report QUAD 81-852). .The , impact of component failure is considered only for this event. (a) Component Function These components sense drywell pressure and initiate Division II RHR, ADS, and RCIC at high drywell pressure. (b) Effect of Component Failure The loss of these components due to the Instrument Line Break Event Outside Containment will not preclude achieving the six 'O safety objectives, namely safe shutdown, containment isolation, core coverage, RHR containment integrity and effluent control (see Section 4.4, page 4-32, of Quadrex Report QUAD-1-81-852). (c) Impact on Other Systems - The sole function of these components is to provide a high dry-f .C U well pressure initiation signal to Division II of ADS, RHR, and
-RCIC. No other systems are affected by their failure.
(d) Operator Action These components are not required when the harsh environment' caused O . by the Instrument Line Break exists. These components perform .
- their function before it is affected by the LOCA radiation harsh environment. Therefore, no operator action is required to achieve any'of the six safety objectives.
References:
C. P&ID: M-93, Sheet 4 Schematic: lE-1-4201-AH,' 4220-AK, 4009-AE FCD: FSAR Figure 7.3-12
.M.5-2.30c
'I
TABLE M.5-2 (Cont.) m) COMPONENT APPLICATION STATEMENT Component C71-N002A, B C. D . The Static-0-Ring N12 pressure switches are located in the Reactor Building in environmental zone H4A. Hence, these components are exposed to a harsh environment for the Instrument Line Break Event Outside Containment and high radiation from the LOCA Inside Containment (see Section 4.4, page 4-32, of Quadrex Report QUAD-1-81-852). The impact of component failure is considered only for these events. (a) Component Function These components sense drywell pressure, and initiate reactor scram containment isolation except for the MSIV's. (b) Effect of Component Failure The loss of these components due to the Instrument Line Break Event Outside Containment or the LOCA Event will not preclude achieving the six safety objectives, namely safe shutdown, 8 containment isolation, core coverage, RHR, containment integrity and effluent control (see Section 4.4, page 4-32, of Quadrex Report QUAD-1-81-862). Failure of these components for this function will affect the - drywell pressure automatic scram and automatic isolation of some
-- C h. lines except the main steam line. Manual scram and manual iso -
lation capability is available. This event does not require scram or containment isolation _on high drywell pressure so no safety function is affected. (c) Impact on Other Systems
- Ol The sole function of these components is to' provide a high drywell-pressure scram and isolation function. 'No other systems are affected by their failure.
_(d): Operator Action t
- Due to physical separation, failure of one instrument line will not impact the other 3 RPS and PCRVICS-divisions. This device is not required when the harsh environment caused by the Instrument Line Break exists. This device performs its function before .it is-affected by the LOCA radiation harsh environment. Therefore, no operator action is required to achieve .any of the six safety
. objectives.
References:
LIED: :FSAR' Figure 7.2-1 Sheet 3 Elementary: _lE-1-4215AC,ADUAE,AF;-1E-1-4252AF,AM FCD: FSAR Figure 7.2-1, Sheet 2 and.7.3-12, Sheet 1
- M.5-2.30d
~ r
-o- -- ~ s -e a,v. ,
L _z._ - _
_ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ . . . ___.__ .__~ _ ____ . _. _ TABLE M.5-2 (Cont.) m) COMPONENT APPLICATION STATEMENT 4 Component E32-N006 A, E, J, N 4 These components are located in the upper basement floor outside of ECCS equipment cubicle in environmental zone H5E. Hence, these components are exposed to a harsh environment for the line break outside the containment and the high radiation from the LOCA event l insidecontainment(seeSection4.4,page4-32ofQuadrexReport i QUAD-1-81-852).- The impact of component failure is considered only i for these events. l (a) Component Function i These components sense the inboard system flow into the low pressure manifold. This signal is used as a pennissive for
~
l isolating MSIV-LCS inboard system valves on high leakage flow ! in the steam lines. (b) Effect of Comoonent Failure
.O The failure of these components will not preclude achieving the six safety objectives, namely safe shutdown, containment isolation, core coverage RHR, containment integrity and effluent control I (see Section 4.4, pdge.4-32 of Quadrex Report QUAD-1-81-852).
Failure could trip the inboard MSIV-LCS system but the outboard system would. remain available. C0 (c) Impact on Other Systems The sole function of these components is to provide.a high leakage flow signal to isolate MS!V-LCS inboard valves. No other systems are affected by their failure. O (d) Operator Action This device is not required when the harsh environment caused by' the line break exists. For LOCA considerations, the outboard MSIV-LCS woul_d perform the required function in the unlikely event that the inboard MSIV-LCS becomes inoperable later in-the event. g The operator will take action in accordance with the emergency-
. procedures to control MSIV leakage.
References:
P&ID: M-55, Sheet 8 Schematic:: 1E-1-4225-AG-
~
FCD/FSAR:: ' Fig. 6.7-3, Sheet 2' _ M.5-2.43a m 3
--.n v - , . .,
--aw
{ . . TABLE M.5-1 (Cont.) i 1 l m) COMPONENT APPLICATION STATEMENT I Component PL76J, PL77J l 4 The Delphi K-IV Hydrogen-Oxygen Analyzer Panel components are located : in the reactor building in environmental zone H4A. Hence, these j i components are exposed to a harsh environment for the Instrument i Line Break Catside Containment and high radiation from the LOCA Inside Continnment (see Section 4.4, page 4-32, of Quadrex Report l QUAD-1-81-852). The impact of component failure is considered only p for these events. (a) Component Function
- These components contain the post-LOCA primary containment H -0 percentage recorders, and also provide inputs to the plant 2 2 computer.
i (b) Effect'of Component Failure The failure of these components due to the Line Break Event Out-side Containment or the LOCA event will not preclude achieving O- the six safety objectives, namely safe shutdown, containment isolation, core coverage, RHR, containment integrity and effluent 4 control (see Section 4.4, page 4-32, of Quadrex Report QUAD-1-81-852). Failure of these components for this event will affect the 4 capability to sample the H -0 2 percentage inside the primary i
. containment. ThiscapabilktyisnotrequiredfortheInstrument
> ~ Ch. Line Break Outside Containment event. i
. (c)' Impact on Other Systems The sole function of these components is to sample H,-0, percentage i'
. in the containment. No other systems are affected by their failure due to the Instrument Line Break Outside Containment.
. O-(d) Operator-Action These devices are not required when the harsh environment caused by the line break exists. No operator action is required'to achieve any of the six safety objectives for the instrument C
line break event. With respect to LOCA radiation,- interim operation with this equipment is justified by the successful testing already completed and documented.-
References:
P&ID:' M-156, Sheets 1 and 2 x Schematic: lE-14018AH, AJ, and AM y o M.5-1.56a-
4 l .. TABLE M.5-2 (Cont.) m) COMPONENT APPLICATION STATEMENT , [ Component Sensors and Convertors D18-N00SA, B, C, D are provided by G.E. These components are located in the turbine building area (inaccessible) . in environmental zone H8. Hence, these components are exposed to a harsh environment only for the Line Break Event Outside Containment . (see Section 4.3, page 4-23, of Quadrex Report QUAD-1-81-852). The impact of component failure is considered only for this event. (a) Component Function
- These components isolate secondary containment and initiate SGTS j- on high radiation in Reactor Building exhaust.
(b) Effect of Failure The failure of these components due to the Line Break Event Outside Containment will not preclude achieving the six safety objectives, namely safe shutdown, containment isolation, core
- coverage, RHR, containment integrity and effluent control (see Section 4.3, page 4-23, of Quadrex Report QUAD-1-81-852).
(j Failure of these components for this event will eliminate isolation of secondary containment and initiation of'SGTS from high radiation level. Isolation & SGTS occur on diverse signals.~ ! (c) Impact on Other Systems No other. systems are affected by their failure.
$(I (d) Operator Action r This device performs its function before it is affected by the LOCA radiation harsh environment. _Therefore, no operator action is required to achieve any of the six safety objectives.
2 C)
References:
E Schematic: lE-14218AK, AL, AM and 4232AP l l 1- '
- TJ t
~
h
-M.5-2.67a L
. i
.4 I
} u _
-g-+> .-
, , TABLE M.5-2 (Cont.)
m) COMPONENT APPLICATION STATEMENT Component Sensors and Convertors D18-N015A, B, C, D are provided by G.E. These components are located in the reactor building area in environmental zone H4A. Hence, these components are exposed to a harsh environment for the line break outside the containment and the high radiation from , the LOCA Event Inside Containment (see Section 4.4, page 4-32, of i Quadrex Report QUAD-1-81-852). The impact of component failure is j considered only for these events. (a) Component Function These components isolate secondary containment and initiate SGTS on high radiation in the fuel-pool ventilation exhaust.
.' (b) Effect of Failure
! The failure of these components will not preclude achieving the-l six safety objectives, namely safe shutdown, containment isolation, core coverage, RHR, containment integrity and effluent control (see Section 4.4, page 4-32, of Quadrex Report QUAD-1-81-852). O Failure of these components will fail to initiate isolation of , i secondary containment and initiation of SGTS. Isolation and SGTS occur on diverse signals. (c) Impact on Other Systems No other systems are affected by their failure. O I (d) ' Operator Action This device performs its function before it is affected by.the LOCA radiation harsh environment. Therefore, no operator action
, is required to achieve any of the six safety objectives.
' 6_
References:
Schematic: lE-1-4218AK, AL, AM and 4232AP l l. e 1
'M.5-2.67b. .
s r
, , . + -
9
.I - '. y<.y 1 , . - , s n: k-
TABLE M.5-2 (Cont.) m) COMPONENT APPLICATION STATEMENT Component Terminal Board (EB-5), H22-P0XX This component is located in the reactor building in environmental zone H5. Hence, this component is exposed to a harsh environment for the Instrument Line Break Event Outside Containment ind high radiation from the LOCA event inside containment (see Section 4. A, page 4-32, of Quadrex Report QUAD-1-81-852). The impact of componer failure is considered only for this event. (a) Component Function This component provides connections between the wiring in the panels and field wiring or cables.
~
(b) Effect of Component Failure Failure of this component for this event on one rack will only affect the operation of those instruments associated with one division and/or logic channel of the safeguard system within g the rack. Redundant safeguard system instrument racks are physically separated around the reactor building. These instrument racks are available to perfonn the functions required for initiating safeguard systems needed to mitigate:this event. Failure of this component will have no affect in achieving the six safety objectives as described in Quadrex Report QUAD-1-81-852.
-{
(-c) Impact on Other Systems The failure of this component only affects the operation of one rack and will not affect other redundant divisional instrument racks which are electrically and physically separated around the-O- reactor building.- (d) Operator Action This device is not required when the harsh environment caused by the Instrument Line Break exists. Back-up ESF systems are available, c This device performs its function before it is affected by the LOCA radiation harsh environment. Therefore,~no operator action-is - required to achieve any of the six safety objectives ~.
References:
Local rack arrangement drawing and wiring diagram '- GE supplied. M.5-2.71a-n 'U-
TABLE M.5-2 (Cont.) m) COMPONENT APPLICATION STATEMENT Component E32-C001, E32-C002B, F The Siemens 2CH6, modified General Electric 47A518663, Blower / Motors are located in the Recator Building in environmental zone H5E. Hence, these components are exposed to a harsh environment for the Instrument Line Break Event Outside Containment and high radiation from the LOCA Inside Containment (see Section 4.4, page 4-32, of Quadrex Report QUAD-1-81-852). The impact of component failure is considered only for these events. (a) Component Function These components are manually turned on after LOCA to divert leakage through the MSIV-LCS into the SGTS system for processing. in order to maintain offsite dosage to. within acceptable leakages.
- (b) Effect of Component Failure The loss of these components due to the Instrument Line Break -
Event Outside Containment or the LOCA Event will not preclude Q achieving the six safety objectives, namely safe shutdown, containment isolation, core coverage, RHR, containment integrity and effluent contrdi (see Section 4.4, page 4-32, of Quadrex ReportQUAD-1-81-852). Failure of these components for this event will affect the Qb. capability to process leakage through the SGTS system after a LOCA. Failure of these components will not prevent achieving the six safety objectives. The MSIV-LCS is not required for the Instrument Line Break Event.
'(c) -Impact' on other Systems O The sole function of these components is to' divert-leakage through the MSIV-LCS into the S3TS system. "No other~ systems are affected
- by their failure.
(d) Operator Action C- This system nomally requires manual initiation about 20 minutes : after the LOCA Event.- Therefore,- no' operator action is. required to achieve any of the six' safety objectives. .This device is not
~
required when the harsh environment caused by the, Instrument Line Break exists. This device will essentially perfom.its function; before it is affected by the LOCA. radiation . harsh' environment to a significant enough degree to potentially render the component: z inoperable.
~
References:
P&ID: M-ll6, Sheet 8 Schematic: 1E-1-4225AQ i M.5-2.75a
)
s .
~^
? <-~x 9 ,
a t- -n mre j}:,
TABLE M.5-2 (Cont.) m) COMPONENT APPLICATION STATEMENT Component E22-F012 This component is located in the HPCS cubicle in environmental zone H6. Hence, this component is exposed to a harsh environment for the Instrument Line Break Outside Containment and high radiation from the LOCA Inside Containment (see Section 4.4, page 4-32, of Quadrex Report QUAD-1-81-852) . The impact of component failure is considered only for these events. (a) Component Function This component provides minimum flow bypass to suppression pool. (b) Effect of Component Failure Failure of this component prevents minimum flow to the suppression pool. This valve is not required for safe shutdown or core coverage functions. Failure of this component has no effect in achieving the six safety objectives as described in Quadrex Report 3 ' QUAD-1-81-852. No failure rechanism at the valve can cause the
. valve'to change position from open or close because the motor control centers are not at the same location as the valves.
(c) Impact on Other. Systems . No other components or systems are affected by the failure of U (L'- this component. :This valve has no electrical interface with
- lather components of this system _or. any other system.
I' (d) Operator Action j c) This device is not required when the harsh environment caused. by the Instrument Line Break and LOCA exits. Therefore, no operator action is required to achieve any of the six_ safety objectives.
References:
L'O ~P&ID:- M-95, Zone ~C-3 . Schematic: 1E-1-4222AE-
.FCD: _FSAR Figure 7.3-6, Sheet 2-
'w. ~
i
-M.5-2.79a.
~
,* m .:' 4 n-e '+e ,q i . _ .
TABLE M.5-2 (Cont.) m) COMPONENT APPLICATION STATEMENT Component E22-F001 This component is located in the Reactor Building in environmental zone H5E. Hence,this component is exposed to a harsh environment for the Instrument Line Break Outside Containment and high radiation from the LOCA Inside Con-tainment (see Section 4.4, page 4-32, of Quadrex Report QUAD-1-81-852). The impact of component failure is considered only for these events. (a) Component Function This component is used for HPCS pump suction from the condensate storage tank. (b) Effect of Component Failure , Failure of this component under the worst condition will prevent closing of this valve and HPCS pump cooling will eventually be lost. RCIC and the other tuo ECCS divisions are;available as backup. No failure mechanism at the valve can cause the valve to change I. position from open or close because the motor control centers are not at the same location as the valves. Failure of this component has no effect in achieving the six safety. objectives as described in Quadrex Report QUAD-1-81-852. g {; - (c) Impact on Other Systems No other component or system is affected by the failure of this component. This valve has no electrical interface tolany other , . systems. 6 ' -
. ~(d) Operator Action This rievice is not required'when the. harsh environment caused by .
the Instrument Line Break exists. ;It perfonns its function before
.it is affected by the LOCA radiation harsh environment. Therefore. -
- no operator, action is required to achieve any,of the~'six safety i: objectives.- ~
g
References:
P&ID:- .M-95, Sheet 1,: Zone A.4.- , e e . , 4 Schematic:q1E l-422AD.
'FCDi .FSARFigure7.3-6,[Sheetl' ~
v
~
- ~ A l j
~
l" -3 , t g; a . U " N M 2.81a 7 -- c 4
4 . TABLE M.5-2 (Cont.) m) COMPONENT APPLICATION STATEMENT Component E22-F015 This component is located in the basement floor outside of the HPCS equipment cubicle in environmental zone H5E. Hence, this component is exposed to a harsh environment for the Instrument Line Break Outside Containment and high radiation from the LOCA Inside Containment (see Section 4.4, page 4-32, of-Quadrex Report QUAD-1-81-852). The impact of component failure is considered only for these events. (a) Component Function , This component is used for HPCS pump suction from suppression pool. (b) Effect of Component Failure i Failure of this component under the worst condition will prevent O - opening of this valve and suction from suppression pool to HPCS pump will be lost. RCIC system is available as a backup along with ADS. No failure mechanism at the valve can.cause the valve to change position from open or close because the motor control centers are no.t at the same location as the valves. Failure of this component has no effect in' achieving the six safety objectives as described in Quadrex Report QUAD-1-81-852. (c) Impact on Other Systems
.No other system is affected by the failure of ;this component.-
. This valve-has no electrical _ interface to 'any other systems. No cO other. systems are affected by their failure.
'(d) Operator' Action
~
This device is not required when the harsh environment' caused by the Instrument Line Break" exists. It performs its' function before it -is affected by the-LOCA radiation harsh environment.1 Therefore,_ C-no operator _ action is required to achieve'any of f the six safety. objectives. i
References:
P&ID: M-95, ZoneJB-6
' Schematic: 1E-1-4222AE.
Figure'7.3-6, Sheet 2c i
.FCD(
y
'M.5-2;83a= -
Et
e TABLE M.5-2 (Cont.) , j m) COMPONENT APPLICATION STATEMENT ! Component E22-F011 i This component is located in the basement outside of the HPCS equip-ment cubicle in environmental zone H5E. Hence, this component is exposed to a harsh environment for the Instrument Line Break Outside Containment and high radiation from the LOCA Inside Containment (see Section 4.4, page 4-32, of Quadrex Report QUAD-1-81-852). The impact of component failure is considered only for these events. (a) Component Function This component provides a test bypass to the condensate storage tank.
^
(b) Effect of Component Failure This valve is normally closed and is opened'only for test. Failure of this component prevents test bypass to the~ condensate - storage tank and may prevent the opening of valve F015 suction
.from suppression pool. However, RCIC and- ADS are available for 3 ; safe shutdown and core coverage functions. No failure mechanism at the valve can cause the valve to change position from open or close because the motor control centers are not at the same-location as the valves. Failure of this component has no effect in. achieving the six safety obje,ctives as described in Quadrex Report QUAD-1-81-852.
C (' - (c) Impa'ct-on Other S_ystems
~
No other systems are affected by the failure.of this component.
, . This valve has no electrical interface with' other systems.
-(d). Operator Action O- ..
This-device is not required when the: harsh environment caused
. by the. Instrument-Line Break exists. 'It perfoms its function before it is affected by the LOCA radiation harsh environmant.
- Therefore, no' operator action is required to achieve any of the six safety ~ objectives. ~
- C. -
References:
P&ID: M-95',-Zone D-3 cSchematic: 1E-1-4222AE' FCD: FSAR Figure 7.3-6,; Sheet 2 6 y : A .-
, :M.5-2.85a- -
~
f n. t
, f
e
, TABLE M.5-2 (Cont.)
- m) COMPONENT APPLICATION STATEMENT.
Component E22-F010 This component is located in the basement floor outside of the HPCS equipment cubicle in environmental zone H5E. Hence, this component is exposed to a harsh environment for the Instrument Line Break Out-side Containment and high radiation from the LOCA Inside Containment (see Section 4.4, page 4-32, of Quadrex Report QUAD-1-81-852). The impact of component failure is considered only for these events. (a) Component Function This component provides a test bypass to the condensate storage tank. (b) Effect of Component Failure This valve is normally closed and is opened only for test. Failure of this component prevents test bypass to the condensate storage tank and may prevent the opening of valve F015 suction
, from suppression pool. However, RCIC and ADS are available for 3 safe shutdown and core coverage functions. No failure mechanism at the valve can cause the valve to change position from open or close because the motor control centers are not at the same location as the valves. Failure of this component has no effect in achieving the six safety objectives as described io Quadrex Report QUAD-1-81-852.
(c) Impact on Other Syst g No other systems are affected by the failure of this component. This valve has no electrical interface with other systems. 9- _( d) Operator Action This device is not required when th'e harsh environment caused by the instrument line break exists. It performs its function before it is affected by. the LOCA radiation-harsh environment. Therefore, no operator action -is required to achieve any of.the six safety objectives
References:
LP&ID: M-95, Zone:D4. Schematic: lE-1-4222AD FCD: FSAR Figure 7.3-6, Sheet 2. M.5-2.87a S 6
e TABLE M.5-2 (Cont.) m) COMPONENT APPLICATION STATEMENT Component E22-F023 This component is located in the basement floor area outside of the HPCS equipment cubicle in environmental zone H5E. Hence, this component is exposed to a harsh environment for the Instrument Line Break Outside Containment and high radiation from the LOCA Inside Containment (see Section 4.4, page 4-32, of Quadrex Report QUAD-1-81-852). The impact of component failure is considered only for these events.
- (a) Component Function This component provides a test bypass to the suppression pool.
(b) Effect of Component Failure This valve is nonnally closed and is opened only for test. Failure of this component prevents test bypass to the 4 suppression pool. This valve is not required for safe shut-down or core coverage function, and RCIC and ADS are available. No failure mechanism at the valve can cause the valve to change
-O position from open or close because the motor control centers are not at the same location as the valves. Failure of this component has no ef'fect in achieving the six safety objectives as described in Quadrex Report QUAD-1-81-852.
(c) Impact on Other Systems No other components or other systems are affected by the failure of this component. This valve has no electrical interface w'ith other components of this system or any other system. (d)'OperatorAction O This device is not required when the harsh environment' caused by the instrument line break exists. It performs its function before it is affected by the LOCA radiation harsh environment. Therefore, no operator action _is required to achieve any of the
'six safety objectives.
i i
References:
'P&ID: M-95, Zone C-5 Schematic: lE-14222AF-
~
FCD: Figure 7.3-6, Sheet i n
'M-5-2.89a-
.s..
O'
.=
Attachment-C
- The following pages provide the Justification for Interim Operation for those li;ited items which were not addressed-in the Quadrex report, whose qualification is incomplete at present, and for which the proposed date for compliance with 10CFR50.49 is unit operation following November 30, 1985.
4 y-1; i 2
%, S'
- _ , oL,, - : ,-
.m am . . ,.t t. , e . .; 3
~
s
, ,. ,. x,.v . >
h - ' 9" ? 75L-13.- ,
- -'= #
'. s '
~ <
J ',
' J z . :, _
f' e3 ._ p f 1 g _L
~.
- ) "
. c.. . . ..
/ ' .. -
-L b . ;-.. -4
.;. . + n ,
m # .e
- j. e , =.
'l{?l'. . ;. l ,_.~ ' '
4 Component Application Statement (MSIV Position Switches) Component: MSIV Position Switches on Main Steam Isolation Valves (IB21-F022A,B,C,D; IB21-F028A,B,C,D) The limit switches on these valves track MSIV position. Actuation of the MSIV's is not dependent on these switches, nor does failure of these limit switches affect MSIV operation. . These limit switches provide a valve closed signal to the Reactor Protection-System logic. This logic provides a scram signal to anticipate the pressure / flux transients associated with MSIV closure. This trip signal is an output of
,the reactor protection system. l Position switches mounted on the inboard MSIV's (F022A-D) are in environmental *
- zone H2A, hence are potentially exposed to a harsh environment from a LOCA inside - 1 containment. Position switches mounted on the outboard MSIV's (F028A-D) are in
, environmental zone-HS, hence are potentially exposed to a harsh environment from an HELB outside containment ~or the high radiation from a LOCA inside containment.
(a) Component Function-These' position switches sense MSIV position and_intiate a scram signal
.when~the valves move 80 from their fully open position, during. periods '
when the mode switch is in RUN.. (They are bypassed when RPV pressure is. less than 824 psig). This-scram protects reactor vessel-~ pressure and-fuel thermal hydraulic safety limits but this is additional to other. Lprotective scrams. -The position switches are energized for the normally-
.open: state of_the MSIV. Movement _of the MSIV.beyond 80.from the fully open position opens the relay-associated with the particular position-switch. :The-logic for' scram is .3:4:2 or three of four switches ~ in parallel _ circuits _of two switches in each of two trains.
~ ~
For the RPS role.of the-position switches,! alternate' scram signals on high' vessel pressure and flux are available from diverse instrume.:ts to
. provide a backup reactor-scram.= Additionally, iftthe inboard position switches fail.due'to the' harsh environment caused by a LOCA,~the outboard ~
iswitches can function as required because they are adequately l qualified for high radiation and other accident parameters except for moisture sensitivity oversextended time periods, which is currently being- . iaddressed but:is.not fully resolved.- Conversely, the inboard position iswitches are'ayailable to provide a. scram signal if the outboard switches' are described due,to HELB environmental conditions.N . i i.
~
f
' Loss of_these position switches does not affect 4 safe shutdown, ~ ~
N containmentiisolation,; core coverage,;residualiheatiremoval,jcontainment: g -integrity.pnor, effluent _ control. gp w . ,4 _ ;P ;3y . .
;(b).~ Impact'ofOtherSystems1
' g'(._.
; , , . . . , y,, . .
W ' iThessolei function-of these position. switches 51s toiinitiatesa scram,oni ug-" '
~ ' MSIVfisolationk iFSAR' Chapter 6.overpressurization analyses (indicates.: +
that no:creditswas'taken for..theLanticipatoryl scram on MSIV.. closure,hence: ~ Tnon-existence of the MSIV. position; switch l scram.still fallsiithin the
~
e , 4
; pre-analyzed) safe:overpressurelicensingenvelope. i 4
) t. 2 i , '7
- v. A '
1; , _, ,l__ , lf <
e Component Application Statement (MSIV Position Switches) (Cont'd) (c). Operator-Action Due to physical separation of the inboard and outboard switches, the scram signal can be provided by the group unaffected by the steam / moisture associated with the DBE. Additionally, other instruments monitoring other vessel parameters (pressure and flux) are also available
. to initiate the scram signal. No operator action is required to meet the six safety objectives.
References-P&ID: M-55, Sheet 2
' Schematic: IE-1-4203.AB, AC, AD, AE, AF, AG, AH, AJ l
r a s
. 4975L-15 O-i_f s
-'w
- .' $N 4 _. _r w
. t 2 ;. .
2 1 a 4 4 I g h ac 4 ia- .
E J Excerpted from the transmittal . of-October 7, 1981 from W.R. Morgan, Quadrex Corp., to B.R. Shelton, CECO. ( m) COMP 0"ENT APPLICATION STATEMENT Component B21-t;039A, 3, C, D, E, F, G, H, J, K, L, M, N, P, R, 5, U, V { These Barksdale BIT-M12SS-GE reactor pressure components are located - l in the reactor building in environmental zone H4A. Hence, these com- ; ponents are exposed to a harsh environment only for the Instrument Line Break Event and high radietion from the LOCA inside containment (see Section 4.4, page 4-32, of Quadrex Report QUAD-1-81-852). The impact of component failure is considered only for these events. (a) Component Function These components which are located in Division I of the Auto Depressurization System are used to sense reactor pressure and will initiate the safety / relief valve (NO39A, B, F, G, H, J, K, L, M, N, & P) and ADS valve (NO39C, D, E, R, S, U, & V) function for vessel depressurization. (b) Effect of Component Failure The failure of these components will not preclude achieving the six safety objectives, namely safe shutdown, containment isolation, core coverage, RHR, containment integrity and effluent control (see Section 4.4, page 4-32, of-Quadrex Report QUAD-1-81-852). Failure of these components will affect the operation of a given
, ADS or SR valve, and disable the Lcw-Low set arming function.
(c) Impact on Other Systems
' The sole function of these components is to initiate opening of an
' ADS or SR valve and arming of the Low-Low set function. No other j systems are affected by their failure.
6 i (d) Operator Action The safety / relief valve system is not required for these events which are depressurization events. Division II of ADS is available l as well as HPCS if necessary. No operator action is required to i meet the six safety objectives. , ,.<- I
References:
; P&ID: M-23, Sheet 5 Schematic: lE-1-4201 , .d -
t
*. :E' i -
7-5 *
- (
, i : '.i i .
l ,
^
i . . _ _ _}}