ML20107C548
| ML20107C548 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Vogtle  |
| Issue date: | 12/19/1984 |
| From: | Foster D GEORGIA POWER CO. |
| To: | James O'Reilly NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| References | |
| REF-PT21-85 GN-497, NUDOCS 8502210378 | |
| Download: ML20107C548 (2) | |
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December.19, 1984 J',
c*&,4 United States Nu: lear Regulatory Comission f,
Office of Inspection and Enforcement File: X78G03-M69 0
Region II - Suite 2900 Log:
GN-497 y
101 Marietta Street, Northwest cp Atlanta, Georgia 30323
Reference:
Vogtle Electric Generating Plant-Units 1 and 2; 50-424, 50-425; Limitorque Operator Motors Qualification; GN-443, dated 11/12/84.
Attention: Mr. James P. O'Reilly In our previous correspondence on this subject, Georgia Power Company indicated that the results of the evaluation of this concern would be reported to the USNRC by December 21, 1984.
Georgia Power Company has completed its evaluation of this matter and has determined that the condition reported to the USNRC by Westinghouse Power Corporation in their letter NS-EPR-2964, dated September 26, 1984, is applicable to equipment supplied for the Vogtle Electric Generating Plant and is therefore reportable pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.55(e).
A copy of the Westinghouse letter ano a sumary of our evaluation are attached for your reference.
Properly qualified replacement equipment has already been ordered by Westinghouse for Vogtle and will be installed prior to initial fuel
-loading.
This response contains no proprietary information and may be placed i
_in the NRC Public Document Room.
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Yours truly, B o. sr.c*
D. O. Foster REF/DOF/tdm
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DISTRIBUTION:
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U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk i
Washington, D. C.
20555 R. J. Kelly J. A. Bailey G. Bockhold R. E. Conway O. Batum P. D. Rice G. F. Head H. H. Gregory C. S. McCall (OPC)
J. T. Beckham W. T. Nickerson E. L. Blake, Jr.
R. A. Thomas D. R. Altman (Shaw, et. al. )
D. E. Dutton D. L. Kinnsch (BPC)
J. E. Joiner W. F. Sanders (NRC)
J. L. Vota (W)
(Troutman, et. al. )
R. H. Pinson L. T. Gucwa D. C. Teper (GANE)
B. M. Guthrfe C. E. Belflower L. Fowler (LEAF)
E. D. Groover M. Malcom_(BPC)
T. Johnson (ECPG) 4 e
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Westinghouse Water Reactor manmemoiromien Electric Corporation Divisions PmewtaPomer*wu15n0 September 26, 1984 NS-EPR-2964 Mr. R. C. DeYoung, Director
- l Division of Inspection and Enfortement Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Coestission Phillips Building 7920 Norfolk Avenue Bethesda, Maryland 20014 i
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Dear Mr. Detoung:
This is to confim the telephone conversation of September 26, 1984, betwee'n Messrs. C. G. Draughon and J. A. Achenbach of Westinghouse and Mr. Robi Singh of the NRC.
In that conversation Westinghouse notified the NRC of a reportable item associated with motors utilized in safety-related Limitorque operator applications.
This item was reported under 10CFR50.55e for five
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construction plants ( A. W. Vogtle Units 1 and 2, Comanche Peak Units 1 and 2 and Millstone Unit 3) as discussed below. Westinghouse has advised these utility customers.
Background and Description l
Westinghouse was infomed by personnel at the Millstone 3 site that the motors on four Limitorque operators were not qualified to IEEE 323-1974 and IEEE 344-1975. A review of the purchase order detemined that the valves were I
specified to those standards, but no certification was supplied in the valve l
data package. Westinghouse subsequently reviewed all other orders with the i
same requirements and detemined that a similar problem exists on the l
A. W. Vogtle Units 1 and 2 and Comanche Peak Units 1 and 2 sites.
l All affected valves are in the charging pump auxiliary miniflow line.
had this problem gone undetected, the valve may not have functioned to provide 1
charging pump miniflow in the event of a steamline break or feedline break, i
which could ultimately have led to pump damage from running on the pimp l
deadhead.
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Mr. R. C.'DeYoung Septemb:r 26, 1984 NS-EPR-2964
!sumediate Corrective Action i
Since no operating plants are invc1ved, no inusediate corrective action is required.
r Permanent Corrective Action All affected motors have replacement, qualified units on order. All involved sites will have qualified motors installed prior to initial fuel loading.
I If you require additional information on this subject, please contact J. A. Achenbach (412-374-4041) or C. G. Draughon (412-374-5761) of my staff.
j Very truly yours, WESTINGWUSE ELECTRIC CORPORATION i
R E. P. Rahe, b., Manager 2
Nuclear Safety Department CGD/anj i
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Evaluation for a Reportable Condition Unqua. lfied Limitorque Operator Motors i
Initial Report:
On October 19, 1984, Mr. C. W. Hayes, Vogtle Quality Assurance Manager, reported a potential. deficiency to Mr. John Rogge of the' USNRC concerning unqualified Limitorque motor operators.
In subsequent correspondence, GPC indicated that the NRC would be informed if this condition was reportable per 10 CFR 50.55(e) by December 21, 1984.
Backamund Information:
On September 26, 1984, Westinghouse notified the NRC of a reportable item associated with motors-utilized in safety-related Limitorque operator applications. Westinghouse was informed by personnel at another power plant that the motors on four Limitorque operators were not qualified to appropriate IEEE standards (IEEE 323-1974 and 344-1975). The affected valves are in the charging pump auxiliary miniflow line (Nos. 8508A, B and 8509A, B).. Westinghouse reviewed the purchase order and detennined that the valves were specified to the appropriate IEEE standards, but no certification was supplied in the valve data package.
Engineering Evaluation:
The centrifugal charging punps are major components in that portion of the chemical and volume control system which also function as a high head injection.flowpath in the emergency core cooling system. The system was modified to. provide an' auxiliary miniflow path which is made available to protect each charging pump. Whenever a safety injection actuation signal is present,.
the normal miniflow path through the seal water heat exchanger is isolated. The auxiliary path is placed in service by automatically opening a motor-operated isolation valve in each individual charging pwp branch line. The normally closed. isolation valve receives power from the same electrical power train as the charging punp it is protecting.
If the reactor coolant pressure subsequently decreases, due to the processes imposed on the reactor coolant system, the relief valve will reclose as the charging punp flow is again directed'into the Reactor Coolant System. The auxiliary miniflow line will remain in service to relieve the pump flow should the reactor coolant pressure again increase.
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After the operator has diagnosed the initiating event and has assured that the requirements for tennination of safety injection have been met, the charging punp subsystem can be realigned for normal' operation. One step in this realignment
. procedure will be to reclose the one isolation valve in each auxiliary miniflow t
path to take the paths out of service.
In the-case of'an accident in which the safety injection flow cannot be terminated,.
the auxiliary miniflow path will remain in service until the refueling water storage tank reaches a low water level ~ condition and the transfer to circulation is to be
' accomplished. One step in the transfer to recirculation will require the operator.
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- to close both major operated isolation valves in each auxiliary miniflow path to positively isolate the relief valve from the charging pumps and prevent a return of the recirculation fluid to the refueling water storage tank.
It should be noted that since the notors for the motor-operated isolation valves did not have the proper certification, it cannot be assumed that these valves will be able to open or close as illustrated in the previous discussion. Thus, this condition could cause damage to the high-head' centrifugal pumps.
Review for QA Program Breakdown A review was conducted to detennine if a quality assurance program breakdown existed c
within Westinghouse on Limitorque. _ It was concluded that this condition was caused by transitions in Limitorque's internal procedures and subsequent investigations have shown this to be a one-time occurrence. Thus a breakdown in a quality assurance program did not occur.
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Conclusion:==
This condition represents a reportable condition per the criteria of 10 CFR 50.55(e) since it could have affected the future safe operation of the plant had it remained uncorrected.
Corrective Action:
t Westinghouse has ordered qualified replacement motors for the valves.
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