ML20107B998
| ML20107B998 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | River Bend  |
| Issue date: | 02/08/1985 |
| From: | Booker J GULF STATES UTILITIES CO. |
| To: | Harold Denton Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| RGB-20-114, NUDOCS 8502210120 | |
| Download: ML20107B998 (89) | |
Text
GULF STATES UTILITIES COMPANY POSTOFFICE DOX 2951 *DEAUMONT. TEXAS 77704 AREA CODE 713 838-6631 February 8, 1985 RBG- 20,114 File Nos. G9.5, G9.19.2 Mr. Harold R. Denton, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555
Dear Mr. Denton:
River Bend Station - Unit 1 Docket No. 50-458
. Enclosed is Gulf States Utilities Company's partial response to River Bend Station Safety Evaluation Report Outstanding Issue No. 3. and a final response to Confirmatory Issue No. 4. Attachment I lists the information provided in Attachment 2. This information will be included in a future amendment to the Final Safety Analysis Report.
Sincerely, L d2 J. E. Booker Manager-Engineering-Nuclear Fuels & Licensing River Bend Nuclear Group JEB/ ERG /je Attachments
- r 8502210120 850208 -
{DR ADOCK 05000458 PDR
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Attachment 1 Information Included In This Submittal OPEN ISSUE NO. 3
- 1. Reactor Water Cleanup System (Outside Conteinment)
- a. Table 3.6A-20 (pipe stress summary)
- b. Table 3 6A-37b (pipe whip analysis)
- c. Table 3.6A-50b (jet impingement analysis)
- d. Figures 3.6A-26 through 3.6A-28 (pipe break locations)
- 2. Control Rod Drive System (Outside Containment)
- a. Table 3.6A-18b (pipe stress summary)
-b. Table 3.6A-36b (pipe whip analysis)
- c. Table 3.6A-49b (jet impingement analysis)
- d. Figure 3.6A-24c (pipe break locations)
- 3. Main Steam Drain System (Outside Containment)
.a. Tables 3.6A-17b and 3.6A-17c (pipe stress summaries)
- b. Tables 3.6A-27b and 3.6A-27c (pipe whip' analysis)
, c. Tables 3.6A-40b and 3.6A-40c (jet impingement . analysis)
- d. Figure 3.6A-33c.(pipe break locations). Note: There are no changes to Figure 3.6A-33d submitted in FSAR Amendment 15.
i Associated changes to the text in FSAR Appendix 3C are also included.
CONFIRMATORY ISSUE NO. 4 1,. FSAR Appendix 3C, Section 3C.2.10.
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RBS FSAR In the Auxiliary Building -
From the steam tunnel, the four 24-in main steam lines (MSL) l15 (A,B,C, and D) enter the auxiliary building at the center of the north wall at approximate el 128 ft-0 in. Lines B and C drop to an elevation of 115 ft-O in (line C is a mirror
) image of line B and line A is a mirror image of line D).
j MSLs A and C run along the perimeter of the western half of
, the auxiliary building while B and D run along the perimeter of the eastern half of the auxiliary building, until they I
meet at the center of the south wall, where lines A and D drop to the elevation of approximately 114 ft-0 in. From
- this point all four lines run south into the turbine building.
Pipe whip of the MSLs in the auxiliary building has been precluded by the placement of restraints. Restraints i 1 MSS-PRR-902 (zero gap), 903 and 904 (omnidirectional) keep l the northern portion of line C from whipping in the auxiliary building. Restraints 1 MSS-PRR-922 (zero gap), 923 and 924 (omnidirectional) do the same for line B.
Similarly, restraints 1 MSS-PRR-912 (zero gap) and 913
( omnidi' rec,tional) for line A and IMSS-PRR-932 (zero gap) and 933 (omnidirectional) for line D, are provided for the same purpose.
Bumper or omnidirectional restraints are provided at the elbows of the main steam piping in the four corners of the
] auxiliary building to prevent damage to the walls due to i pipe whip. Strap restraints are provided to prevent whipping of the southern portion of the MSLs into the center of the auxiliary building.
A total of five zero-gap moment limiting restraints have been installed adjacent to the jet impingement wall, outside the containment, on the four drain lines running in the steam tunnel area and on the 3/4 in DTM line in the is auxiliary building. These restraints protect the break exclusion area from the impact of a ruptured pipe as well as keep stresses within acceptable limits in the break exclusion zone.
Nonessential targets for a jet discharging from a ruptured s main steam line include structural targets such as the walls, stairs, and floor framings and MSS, RHS, FWS, and WCS is piping lines, all of which have been designed to ensure their structural integrity.
t The potential targets that could be impacted by a whipping 18 drain line, either in the steam tunnel or auxiliary Amendment 16 3C.2-5 February 1985
_ _ . . , . . . . . , . , - . ._- y._. . , , . ,_ _ -. . _ . . _ . ~ .
RBS FSAR building, consist- primarily of -piping lines and their valves. However, a review of the -targets in question revealed that their failure was acceptable since none of these particular portions of the essential systems were required for either safe shutdown or break isolation. Other targets include walls and floors, all of which have been j_ designed to ensure their structural integrity.
Essential targets impinged by a jet discharging from a drain e line in either the steam tunnel or auxiliary building are essentially conduits serving area temperature monitors and MSS and FWS isolation valves. Since failure of the area temperature monitors will automatically trip the reactor protection system (fail safe) and since the area temperature monitors are not required to isolate the subject break, their failure is acceptable. A detailed review of the valve targets in question revealed that their failure was acceptable since these particular portions of the essential i systems were not required for safe shutdown and break p isolation.
i
?
)
l Amendment 16 3C.2-Sa February 1985 i
--RBS FSAR t
'l 1
~
i j THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY BLANK i
}
Amendment 16 3C.2-5b February 1985
RBS FSAR the floor at el-114 -ft-O-in and at el 106 ft-9 in divides-into two 6-in lines, which in turn become 3-in lines and supply the two pumps located in separate rooms. From the pumps' discharge, the two 3-in lines join again into a 4-in line, at el 106 ft-9 in, which goes up back into the steam tunnel and then through a penetration into the containment.
1 In the containment building the line runs upwards through the floor, into the heat exchanger room, and then into the a . heat exchangers. After leaving the heat exchangers, the 4-in line splits into two 3-in lines at el 165 ft-9 in and they run into the filter /demineralizers. After the D
filter /demineralizers, the two 3-in lines drop down and join again into a 4-in line at el 154 ft-3 in and return to the regenerative heat exchangers. From there, the line drops to
! an elevation of 117 ft-9 1/2 in, runs through the containment penetration into the auxiliary building, where it joins the RHS piping to the feedwater and returns to the 8
RPV. In every instance, when the line goes through the penetration, from the innermost zero-gap restraint in the containment building, through the penetration, and up to the outer zero-gap restraint in the auxiliary building, the j piping meets the stress criteria for no postulated breaks, as discussed in Section 3.6A.
- 16 15 Inside the Containment Because of the arrangement of the piping, there is very little equipment that could be damaged by the impact of a ruptured pipe. Among the possible targets, the more Q significant include the weir wall, SVV, CRD, and DER lines.
l To prevent this potential damage, a total of 11 restraints
- ** have been installed, including six zero-gap restraints nsar the containment penetrations.
The jet produced by the postulated breaking of the pipe would impact, among other targets, primarily the piping lines and their supports. The nonessential targets include DER, SVV, WCS, and RCS systems and the supports of lines
! RCS, WCS, SVV, RHS, and DER. All these targets have been designed to ensure their structural integrity.
l
. Inside the Steam Tunnel All RWCU piping, from inboard of the first moment-limiting (zero gap) restraint in the drywell to outboard of the moment-limiting- (zero gap) restraint in the auxiliary building, meets the stress criteria for no postulated
} breaks, as discussed in Section 3.6A.
Amendment 16 3C.2-16 February 1985
- - -- - -RBS FSAR Outside the Containment -
l Three zero-gap restraints have been installed outside the containment, adjacent to the penetrations, to protect the break exclusion area from the consequences of a ruptured pipe. Targets that could be impacted by a whipping line due 3 to an RWCU piping break include RHS, ICS, and FWS lines and j ICS restraints. However, in all the above instances, since 5 the whipping line is smaller than the target line, the target cannot be damaged. Other pipe whip targets include various walls and floors, all of which have been
? structurally designed to withstand the pipe whip loading, I and a ventilation duct that is not required for safe shutdown. "
i Even though targets impinged by a jet from a ruptured RWCU line include essential conduits leading to an RCIC fill pump t motor and various valves of essential systems, a more E detailed review revealed that these particular portions of the essential systems were not required for safe shutdown.
q Other targets affected by the jet include conduits for flow
} transmitters used to detect leakage. However, once a break occurs'in.a particular volume, the flow transmitters will i
not be required since area temperature monitors will detect
! and isolate the break. Hence, the failure of these targets is acceptable. The jet impingement targets also include conduits from area ambient temperature elements required for breakpoint isolation, but this is acceptable cince, in this
) instance, the elements are not in the postulated breakpoint volume.
3C.2.9 RCIC Head Spray The postulated pipe break ~ locations and restraints.are shown on Fig. 3.6A-20. The results of the associated stress calculations are summarized in Table 3.6A-11b.
The 6-in discharge pipe penetrates the containment and drywell, runs upwards, and after passing- through the normally closed valve (F066), enters the RPV head at
- el 172 ft-11 1/4in. Only the short pressurized section of h piping from the normally* closed valve F066 to the RPV head is classified as hich energy.
Circumferential breaks have been postulated at the terminal ends of the piping. Due to the postulated breaks, the only target the short section of pipe could whip into would be the RPV insulation frame, but the frame has been designed for pipe rupture loads. Hence, there is not a necessity for restraints.
~ Amendment 16 3C.2-17 February 1985
~~ RBS FSAR 3C.2.10 3-In and Smaller High Energy Piping 3C.2.10.1 Control Rod Drive Hydraulic System The piping and break locations are shown on Figures 3.6A-24b and 3.6A-24c. The stress analyses used to determine the 3
break locations are summarized in Tables 3.6A-18a and 3.6A-18b.
General From the condensate storage tank, the CRD lines enter the fuel building and, after passing through two filters, connect. to two drive water pumps. No breaks are postulated in this portion of the piping since it is not considered i high-energy piping. The pressurized lines that leave the pumps go through two more filters before entering the containment building and the flow control station.
The high-energy portion of the supply piping that leaves the
}
control station is comprised of the following four lines:
) .
- 1. The charging line, which provides a constant flow of pressurized water to charge the scram
> accumulators in the hydraulic control units (HCUs).
- 2. The cooling line, which maintains proper cooling of the drive mechanisms by providing a bypass flow of water to each of the drives, via the HCUs, during is normal operation periods when rod drive movement is not required.
, 3. The drive line, which supplies the HCU with the water required for rod positioning during normal operation of the system.
- 4. The exhaust line, which displaces excess cooling and exhaust water generated by normal drive motion to the RPV.
The supply piping emerges from the control station as a bundled group of various sized lines. This bundle of piping extends toward both the 90-deg and 270-deg side HCU banks.
Upon reaching the HCU banks, each of the supply lines branches. out over each bay of the HCUs and extends down into the HCUs.
The supply piping provides the necessary water and air for the proper functioning of the HCU during normal rod movement. The HCU provides the interface valving between Amendment 16 3C.2-18 February 1985
}
- ~-- -'
-the supply / exhaust piping and the insert / withdraw piping that operates the drives. The insert / withdraw pipings, starting from the HCU scram valves, are bundled in groups and enter the drywell wall through the penetrations approximately at el 130 ft at both the 90-deg and 270nkg sides. The pipe bundles drop to a lower elevation, extend toward the RPV, and enter the RPV through the CRD housing at approximately el 96 ft.
In the Fuel Building Because of the piping arrangement in the fuel building, the I
only targets that a whipping pipe could impact are the floors and walls of the building; however, these floors and walls have been designed to ensure their structural integrity.
Essential jet impingement targets required for plant safe shutdown include a conduit for a service water line flow transmitter. This flow transmitter monitors flow from the Division 2 standby service water pumps and flow into the 3
standby service water system cooling tower. The failure of
( this target is acceptable since the operator could verify the flow by monitoring pump discharge pressure and pump i motor run current, both of which are indicated in the contrcl room. Other essential targets include certain cable trays providing power for the fuel building ventilation syster fans which cool the spent fuel pool area. Failure of these cable trays is acceptable since repairs can be made in 4 hr. During this period, the spent fuel pool temperature will not increase to an unacceptable level.
I.
i Amendment 16 3C.2-19 February 1985
!.l g ;e ' t l ((i TABLE 3.64-17b f SUNNARY OF STRESSES IN HIGH-ENERGY ASME CL ASSES 2 AND 3 PIPING 9 I' i
i l NAIN STEAN DRAIN SYSTEN - OUTSIDE CONTAINNENT ( AUIILI ARY BUILDING) j l Total Pipe Break Description 9 Loca t ion __1Lgess(83 Additive Stress Limit of i .
Break Elevation I Z Eq. 9 Bq. 10 Stress 0. 8 (1. 24 +S y Break Break
- 224R1. 111-131 (ft-in t f f t-ial_ d2fil Jagil_ (psil fog 1T Poigtg__ 1121.
. .j ! 4 1 I .
115-0 7/16 107-9 1/2 - ( 4-3) 6, 50 2 7,436 13,938 32,400 TP CB l13 115-0 3/8 117-0 -(15-7 1/2) 32,400 TP. CB 11 3 114-3 1/8 117-3 3/8 - (5-9) 15,201 10,025 25,226 32,400 IP CB
] ;18 112-4 7/8 117-8 - (9-7) 13,446 12,268 25,714 32,400 IP CB I 19 112-0 3/8 118-0 1/2 - ( 9-7) 13,660 12,550 26,210 32,400 IP CB
! '20 111-8 11/16 136-9 1/2 - (9-7) 9,529 17,940 27,469 32,400 IP CB 21 111-4 3/16 137-2 - (9-7) 9,794 18,261 28,055 32,400 IP CB 22 110-10 5/8 137 -2 -(9-7) 9,910 .18,352 28,262 32,400 IP CB 27 . 914-10 1/4 117-0 -(13-3 1/2) ca) -
TP CB
'28 ! 119-9 117-0 -(13-3 1/2) cas .
IP CB 29 ' 120-0 117-0 -(13-0 1/2) ca -- IP CB 34 jl4-7 9/16 120-5 38-11 1/2 (83 -
TP CB I
i 35 #
114-10 5/16 117-0 -(13-10 1/2) (23 -
TP CB C3 1 127-9 1/2 118-5 30-2 1/2 cm), -
TP CB CO t 114-10 3/8 117-0 -(14-5 1/2) ca) -
TP CB 52 l 127-10:1/2 118-5 -(30-2 1/2) ca - .
TP CB 53 i i 114-10 7/16 117-0 - ( 15-0 1/2) ca -
TP CB
- i. 60 } 114-7 9/16 120-5 -(38-11 1/2) ca) -
TP CB 62 . 111-10 3/4 136-3 1/2 - (9-7) 9,072 16,852 25,929 32,4C0 IP CB 67 ! 110-3 3/4 149-0 1/? -(12-1) 9,401 16,112 25,513 32,400 IP CB 69 a 114-7 9/16 121-0 -(38-11 1/2) ca) -
TP CB 70 i 114-10 9/16 121-3 -(38-11 1/2) ca) -
TP CB
, , 71 1 118-1 9/16 116-2 -(38-11 1/2) ca) -
IP CB
- 72. , ! 118-4 9/16 115-11 -(38-11 1/2) cm3 -
IP CB 73 : i .; 127-10 1/2 117-10 - (3 0-2 1/2) ca) -
IP CB
, 73 ; I' 128-1 1/2 117-7 -(3 0-2 1/2) .ca) -
IP CB is
- 75 t 133-0 117-7 -(3 0-2 1/2) cas .
IP CB 76 133 -3 117-7 -(29-11 1/2) cm3 -
IP CB 77 I 117-11 1/2 117-0 - (14-8 1/2) ca -
IP CB j 78 . 117-9 3/8 117-0 -(14-6 3/8) cm3 -
IP CB 79 ; g 127-9 3/4 116-3 30-2 1/2 ca) -
IP CB 80 i - 128-0 3/4 116-0 30-2 1/2 ca) -
IP CB 81 82 l, 117-7 9/16 118-8 38-11 1/2 (83 -
IP CB
, 117-7 9/16 118-5 38-8 1/2 ca) -
IP CB
' 83 I 118-10 1/8 116-5 14-8 ca -
IP CB
, 84 , 119-1 1/8 116-5 14-5 (83 -
IP CB
! .l 85 126-4 7/8 116-5 6-11 cas -
IP CB 86 126-7 7/8 116-2 6-11 ca) -
IP CB t
l Amendmen t : 16 1 of 2 February 1985 4
-l j l i i
sBS rSAn t r i
! l
. TABLE 3.6&-17b (Cont)
!.f l
Total Pipe Break Description Location Stress (13 Additive Stress Limit of Break Elevation I E Eq. 9 Eq . 10 Stress 0. 8 (1. 2Sh +gg ) Break Br eak i 29131 11h13L (f t-ial fit-int jggil (ppil. __lP. Ell. ____1E31 ) Points II g 87 126-7 7/8 115-3 13/16 6-11 (*) -
IP CB 83 ; r 126-7 7/8 115-0 13/16 6-8 ca) -
IP CB 49 ; 126-6 115-0 13/16 -(7-0 3/8) (83 -
IP CB 8' 4 90 ' 126-6 115-3 13/16 -(7-3 3/8) (as -
IP CB 4 1
- 9) . 110 -1 15/16 152-0 - (14-8) 8,552 12,286 20,838 32,400 TP CB 95 ' 110-5 138-10 - ( 14- 8) 8,980 17,850 26,830 32,400 IP CB 96 110-5 7/16 138-5 - ( 14- 8) 9,089 16,581 25,670 32,400 IP CB 97 , 114-10 3/16 117-0 - ( 12-6 ) 10,091 6,039 16, 130 32,400 TP CB e
l 1
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,j 'I i 4
' h 1; IEIt IP = Int reediate point TP = Terminal point CB ='Circumferential break La = Longitudinal treak i
(135 tresses were calculated in accordance with Equations 9 and 10 of ASME Section III, paragraph NC-3652.
(a3 Pipe stresses are not required since pipe breaks are postulated at every fitting and attachment.
j '! l
's' WOTES: See Fi . 3.6A-33c for break locations. ,
l l J < The data presented in this table were used in conjunction with Section 3.6.21 to determine the break l}
t
- locations shown la Fig. 3.61-33c. The reference coordinate system is shown in Table 3.61-5.
4
) Ancadment 15 2 of 2 February 1985 2} l 11 !' -
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l' 1
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) TABLE 3.6A-17c
, ji SU55 ART OF STRESSES IN HIGH-ENERGY ASNE CLASS 2 PIPING 4
I-BAIN STEAR DRAIN SYSTEN - STEAM TUNNEL AREA j ,
It' l l Total Pipe Break Description i [ >
.f' Location S tres st : 3 Additive Stress Limit of Break El I Z Eq. 9 Eq. 10 Stress 0. 8 (1. 2Sh+S y Break Break
! P91st 1 111:13L fft-int Jft-ial 12311 JEAll. __122i[_ IDgif ___&giglg__ IJgg.
I I 125-7 1 107-9 1/2 - ( 14-8) TP CB
' Of , 125-5 122-6 - (17-1 3/4 ) IP CB i' Si14 125-5 122-8 1/4 - ( 17- 4) IP CB
{ 111-3 1/16 127-6 3/4 - (17-4) Stresses are not required for main IP CB
, 11 111-3 1/16 127-9 - (17- 1 3/4) steam drain piping system in the steam IP CB ,,
j 12 , 1117 3 1/8 127-9 -(16-9) tunnel area since pipe breaks are pos- TP CB 1$ 125-7 107-9 1/2 - ( 14- 1) tulated at every fitting and attachment. TP CB ll
') 1$
125-5 <123-3 7/8 16-5 3/64 IP CB 26 ,
125-2.3/4 123-5 16-7 IP CB lf23 111-3 1/8 ~126-9 - (16-7 ) -
IP CB i C6 t111-3 1/8 127-0 1/2 - ( 16-7) IP CB j ,: 25 53 115-0 3/8 135-5 - (16-7 ) TP CB 125-7 107-9 1/2 14-1 TP CB iI 32 111-2 13/16 128-6 - (16-5 ) . TP CB
> 35 125-7 107-9 1/2 14-8 TP CB l 42 111-2 13/16 129-1 - (16-5) TP CB l 1s
{
10 ,
125-5 123-1 -(16-0 3/4) IP CB
, 2j 125-5 123-2 1/2 - (16-4 1/2) IP CB i .
<, l l.
- I !
I K;T: IPi = Intermediate point TP = Terminal point CB;= Circumferential break
, LB = Longitudinal break NOTES: See ig. 3.6A-33d for break locations.
The data presented in this table were used in conjunction with Section 3.6.2A to deterstne the i breat locations shows la Pig. 3.6A-33d. The reference coordinate system is shova in Table 3.64-5.
A endment 16 1 of 1 February 1985 t
l l -
I '
RBS FSAP-
- i. ! >
}
i gl: i, i. TABLE 3.64-18b t i j . l~ i - Sua8&RY OF STRESSES IN HIGH-ENERGY PIPING i r !
CONTROL ROD DRITE SYSTER - FUBL BUILDING i i ,
}
! Total Pipe Break Description location Stgess Additive Stress Limit of Break Ele vation I Z Eq. 9 Eq. 10 Stress 0. 8 ( 1. 2hS
- A8 ) Break Break MAR 1 lit *.lBL Ift*iD1 fft-iEl .(Egil (psil (psil (psil Points II,ggs
! ; I 1j 72-1 1/2 127-6 80-5 1/2 TP CB 2i 72-1 1/2 127-6 81-7 IP CB 93 ! 72-3 1/2 127-6 81-9 IP CB
,4 74-4 127-6 81-9 IP CB
- j' j5 74-6 127-8 81-9 IP CB p 6 74-6 123-2 81-9 IP CB 8 74-8 123-4 81-9 IP CB
- 9 81-1 123-4 81-9 Stresses are not required for control IP CB 10 11 ,
81-3! 123-4 81-7 rod drive piping in the fuel building IP CB 81-3 ? 123-6 66-5 since pipe breaks are postulated at IP CB 12 81-3 1 123-4 66-7 every fitting and attachment. IP CB 13 l _81-3 ! 132-2 66-5 IP CB 15 i 81-3 129-2 66-5 IP CB i
18 j 81-3 129-2 65-3 IP CB 19 81-1 129-2 65-1 IP CB 20 76-9 . 129-2 65-1 IP CB 21 76-7 t 129-2 65-1 IP CB 22 75-0 j 129-2 65-1 IP CB 23 74-10 129-2 64-11 IP CB 25 272-1 1/2 127-6 68-1 1/2 TP CB 72-1 1/2 127-6 69-3 IP CB 26lI 27 72-3 1/2 127-6 69-5 IP CB 28 ' 74-4 l 127-6 69-5 IP CB 29 I 74-6 l 127-8 69-5 IP CB 31 f i 74-6 i 123-2 69-5 IP CB 33 74-8 123-4 69-5 IP CB 34 81-3 123-4 69-5 IP CB 37 81-3 132-4 66 IP CB 38 81-3 132- 4 68-9 IP CB
, 39 81-3 132-2 68-11 IP CB CO 81-3 130-4 68-11 IP CB 41 81-1 130-2 68-11 IP CB C2 , 76-8 130-2 68-11 IP CB 49 77-0 132-6 64-4 1/2 IP CB 50 77-0 132-6 64-4 1/2 IP CB 56 74-10 129-2 62-11 IP CB 57 74-10 130-0 '62-9 IP CB 59 77-0 129-0 61-9 IP CB
! 1 Annadmeat 16 I 1 of 2 February 1985 e
i
I t PBS FSA9
.k b,
4 l i j l , TABLE 3.6A-18b (Cont)
. . l fi- l I Total Pipe Break Description I '
Loc 1112n Stress A dditive Stress Limit of Break Elevation I Z Eq. 9 Eq . 10 Stress Break Break Point JG:$nt (ft-int lit,igt Iggil JE31L_ __1231L _0.8 (1.2 sh' SA) __E2iatS__
_1ggil IIPlf i i 89 i 107-0 72-5 2-8 3/4 IP CB i 90 107-0 72-7 2-6 3/4 IP CB 91 107-0 13-1 2-63/4 IP CB I' I 92 107-2 73-3 2-63/4 Stresses are not required for control IP CB 93 115-0 73-3 2-6 3/4 rod drive piping in the fuel building IP CB 95 ! 115-10 73-3 2-6 3/4 since pipe breaks are postulated at IP CB
' 96 116-0 73-1 every fitting and attachment. IP CB 93i{
2-6 3/4 116-0 y 70-8 2-63/4 IP CB 99 ' 116 -0 68-11 1/2 2-6 3/4 TP CB A
l \ \
1 i! ! -
t t i
! I i !
'.t ,
, I i .
1 4
i i f
I K3y: IP = Intermediate point TP = Terminal point CB = Circumferential break LB 5 Longitudinal break WOTES: See Fig. 3.6A-24c for break locations.
! The data presented in this table were used in conjunction with Section 3.6.2A to determine the break locations shown in Fig. 3.61-24c. The reference coordinate system is shown in Table 3.6 A-5.
{
Arendaeat 16 2 of 2 February 1985 s
- TABLE 3.6A-20 t
s ,.
SUMMARY
OF STRESSES IN HIGH-ENERGY ASME CLASSES 2 AND 3 PIPING RE ACTOR W ATER CLE ANUP SYSTEM - ~OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT Total Pipe Break Description Location Stress (8) Additive Stress Limit of Br:ak Elevation I Z Eg. 9 Eg. 10 Stress Break Point 0.8 (1.2 sh' SA ) Break J{t: int J{t-int JihlEl lE111 JP.21L_ J Rill _ (P.111 J 2ints UR22 i
1 116-0 107-9 1/2 4-3 11,659 15,354 27,013 32,400 TP CB 3 115-3 109-5 4-3 6,793 15,738 22,537 lus
, 32,400 IP CB 5 106-9 108-10 1/3 3-8 1/2 7,072 14,510 21,582 32,400 g is IP CB
- 7A ~ 106-9 95-9 0-0 - - - -
TP CB
- 20A 105-5 79-0 3-5 1/16 8,902 6,273 15,175 32,400 IP CB i ;30
- 97-9{ 77-6 8-10 - - - -
TP CB 36 98-1!1/2 84-0 3-5 5,331 8,102 13,483 32,400 IP CB
, j43 97-9: 77-6 8-10 - - - -
TP CB 44- 117-6 107-10 10-6 - - - -
TP CB 45 117 -6 108-11 10-6 7,255 7,116 14,371 32,400 IP CB is 45 117-0 109-5 10-6 6,445 8,951 15,396 32,400 IP CB 52A 106-9 92-4 11-3 - - - -
TP CB j 57 58 106-9 106-9 81-5 80-11 11-11 4-11 10,205 15,173 9,477 13,384 25,378 22,861 32,400 32,400 IP CB IP CB ,
72 98-10 77-11 9-2 - - - -
TP CB l' y 87 98-10 86-1 9-3 - - - -
TP CB
, 90 117-9 1/2 107-11 0-0 - - - -
TP CB 90A 126-0 1/2 116-3 - (2-0) 15,902 17,222 20,761 32,400 IP CB 988 117-9 1/2 116-6 7/8 2-0 ,
7,349 12,813 20,162 32,400 IP CB 108 124-9 121-5 3/4 6-8 5/8 TP CB 117 124- 120-6 1/8 -(6-6 7/8) - - - -
TP CB I ,
}
I
. _ 7-- -
Ke y: IP = Intermediate point TP = Terminal point CB = Circumferential break LB = Longitudinal break NOTES: See Fig. 3.6A-26 through 28 for break locations.
ls Stresses were calculated in accordance with Equations 9 and 10 of ASME Section III, paragraph NC-3652.
The data presented in this table were used in conjunction with section 3.6.2 A to determine the break locations shown in Fig. 3.6A-26 through 28.
The reference coordinate system is shown in Table 3.6A-5.
ls A cndment 16 1 of 1 February 1985 h l c . t I h l ft
TABLE 3.f1-27b SURu&BY OF PIPING FAILURE AN ALYSIS i i l
! 'I
) Piping System: Main Steam Drain Piping (Auxiliary Building) l Piping Line Numbers: - 1 DTB- 0 03 4, 1DTR-003-79-4, 1 DT R- 002-7 7- 4 , I DT M -00 2 4, 1DTR-002-74-4, l85
} l 4 1 DTM-002-7 5-4 C7rseguence of Piping Failure: Pipe whip i }
- i Break location Break Blowdown Protection j' Break El I Z Types Source meas ures Evaluation keial 111
- int 111:ial fft-ini (8) (*) Istanta (*) (*) Etantha 1 115-0 7/16 107-9 1/2 - (4-3) C mainsteam None ls
{
,j 13 115-0 3/8 '
117-0 - (15-7 1/2) C Mainsteam 1)1RSS*PBB-924 1)DSI i -923 i .
14 f114-3,1/8 117-3 3/8 - (5-9) C nainsteam None '
! 'l j 18 f 112-4 7/8 3 117-8 - (9-7) C sainsteam 1) MSS *PRR-923 1)DSI l8'
} I 19 ,112- 3/8 118-0 1/2 - (9-7) C Rainsteam 1)Rall 1)DSI l35 10 i 111-9 11/16 136-9 1/2 - (9-7) C Rainsteam 1) F1 El 114'- 0" 1)DSI l
1 2)1DTM-150-106-2 2) Note F
, 3) 1 DTM- 150- 107-2 3) Note F 4)1DTM-001-112-4 4)NRS
- l 5)1DTa-001-113-4 5) NRS l
6)1DTM-004-60-4 6) Note F, SPI 4
l 1j , 111-4 3/16 137-2 - (9-7) C Mainsteam 1) F1 El 114 8 - 0" 1)DSI 35 2 110-10 5/8 137-2 - (9-7) C Mainsteam 1)F1 El 114'-0" 1)DSI 27 114-10 1/4 1 17- 0 - (13-3 1/2) C Mainsteam 1)1 MSS-024-5-2 1) Note F, SPI
) 2)1 MSS-024-8-2 2) Note F, SPI ~
l 3)1FNS-020-62-2 3) Note F, SPI 4)1FNS-020-63-2 4) Mote F, SPI 1 5)1NSS*P69-902 5)DSI
- 6) 15SS
- PR B-922 6) DSI l
4 Ancadaent 16 1 of 6 February 1985 i
r RBS FS&W 2
. TABLE 3.64-27b (Cont) i i 1 i l 1
Piping S ystem: Main Steam Drain Piping (Auxiliary Building)
Piping Line Numbers: 1 DTN- 0 03- 7 8- 4, 1DTM-003-79-4, 1 DT R-0 02-7 6- 4, 1DTN-002-74-4, l 85
{ } 1 DTM-0 02-7 5- 4 Coxsequence of Piping Failure: Pipe whip i
i Break L2sation Break Blowdown Protectio n Break , El I Z Types Source Me as ures Evaluation E;;ini _ lit-int 111:ial lil-ini (*) (88 TAIstia (') (*) Remarks 28 119-9 117-0 - (13-3 1/2) C Mainsteam 1) 1 MSS-0 24-5-2 7) Note F, SPI j
- 2) 1M SS-0 24 2 2)hOte F, SPI 3)1FWS-020-62-2 3) Note 7, SPI 4)1FWS-020-63-2 4) Note F, SPI j , 1
- 5) 1 MSS
- PRR-90 2 5)SDI
', , ; 6) 1 N S S* P R R-922 6) S DI i t
< . 29 ' 120-0 i 117-0 -(13-0 1/2) C Mainsteam 1)'1N CS-Y 172 '
- 1) Mote F
[ j 2)1BCS-YF051 2) Note F
- 3) 1 WCS- 1 G33 *s0TF046, 3) Mote F
, ! V163, MOYF035,
,. SOYF041 i
f' 4) 1NCS-0 25- 110-4 5)1WCS-004-172-2 4)MBS
- 5) Note F, SPI
- 7) 1 ECS-0 04-32-4 7) Note F, SPI i i 8 31W CS-750-66-4 8)MBS i 9)1DTM-002-74-4 9) N RS, SPI i
10)1DTM-002-75-4 10)NRS, SPI i 11) 1 DT M-00 2-76-4 11)MBS, SPI i
f j
' 12)1 MSS-PBR-903 12)DSI I
l 13) 1 MS S- PB B-923 13) DSZ 14)15S5-024-5-2 14) Mote F, SPI i t 15)15SS-024-8-2 15) Note F, SPI i 16)1FNS-020-62-2 16) Note F, SPI 17 ) 1 F W S-0 20-63-2 17) Note F, SPI 34 114-7 9/16 '120-5 38-11 1/2 C nainsteam 1)sall (&J AN) 1)DSI 35 114-10 5/16 117-0 -(13-10 1/2) C Mainsteam 1)1sSS-024-5-2 1) Note F, SPI 2)1555-024-8-2 2) Note F, SPI i 3)1FWS-020-62-2 3) Note F, SPI i i 4) 1 FW S- 020- 63 -2 4) Note F, SPI
'l l 5)1 MSS-PRR-922 5) DSI
- 43 ,
127-9 1/2 118-5 30-2 1/2 C mainsteam 1)Sall (&J AN) 1)DSI i
l !
- Ascadment .16 2 of 6 February 1985 t
+
! i
- i !
' I TABLE 3,6A-27b (Cont) 4 i I I i i Piping Sys' ten: Main Steam Drain Piping (Auxiliary Building)
Fiping Line Numbers: IDTs-003-78-4, 1DTM-003-79-4, I DTM-0 02-7 6- 4, 1 DT M-002-74-4, l85
' I i 1 DTR-0 02-7 5- 4 clasequence of Piping Failure: Pipe ship i :
[' !
Break 12G111on Break Blowdown P rotection Break ___l E I z Types Source Meas ures Evaluation 22131 J[1-in t (ft-ini (ft-int (a) ca) Targets (3) (*3 gggggAs t 1
- I 44 11,4-10 3/8 117-0 - (14-5 1/2) C Mainsteam 1)F1 El 1248-9" 1)DSI
- 2) 1 DTM- 150-104-2 2) Note F
- 3) 1D T M-150-10 5-2 3) Note F j 4)1DTs-001-112-4 4) NRS
. i ! tj
- 5)1DTs-001-113-4 5)MBS jj 6)1NSS-024-62-2 6) Note F, SPI 52 1127-10 1/2 118-5 - (30-2 1/2) c sainsteam tivall (AA AE) -
- 1) DSI 53 114-10 7/16 117-0 - (15-0 1/2) c Mainsteam 1)F1 El 124'-9" 1)DSI 211DTM- 150-10 4-2 2) Mote F
-l 3) 1DTM- 150-10 5- 2 3) Note F 411DTM-001-112-4 4) NRS 86 5)1DTN-001-113-4 5}NBS l j ! 6)1 MSS-024-62-2 6) Note F, SPI 6h 11 8-7 9/16 120-5 -(38-11 1/2) C Mainsteam 1) Wall (AA AE) 1)DSI 62 : 111-10'3/4 136-3 1/2 - (9-7) c sainsteaa 1) F1 El 114'-0" 1)DSI
.' 2)1DTM-150-106-2 2) Mote F 3)1DT5-150-107-2 3) Note F 9
j 4)1DTM-001-112-4 4) NES 4 -.
5)1075-001-113-4 5)NRS i 6)1DTM-004-60-4 6) Mote F, SPI 67 110-3 3/4 149-0 1/2 - ( 12- 1) c sainsteam 1)F1 El 1148-0" 1)DSI
- 2) 1 DT R- 150-10 5-2 2) Mote F 3)1DTM-150-107-2 3) Note F 4)1DTM-001-112-4 4)NRS 5)1DTM-001-113-4 5) NRS
- 6) 1 D TR-0 04-6 0-4 6) Note F, SPI 69 114-7 9/16 121-0 -(38-11 1/2) C Mainsteam None I
, 70 114-10 9/16 121-3 -(38-11 1/2) C Mainsteam 1)Platf El 124'-9" 1)DSI I
as j 71 118-1 9/16 116-2 -(38-11 1/2) C Raisetaan 1) Rail (AE, A A) 1) DSI 12endmen t 16 3 of 6 February 1985
+
, i i > ?
n _. .--
. t
}
{ i BBS FSAR f
.l' TA8LE 3.6A-27b (Cont)
Piping 3.ystem; amaa Steam Drain Piping (Auxiliary Building)
Piping Line Numbers: 1 DT N- 0 03 -7 8-4, 1DTR-003-79-4, 1 DTM-0 02-7 6- 4, 1DTM-002-74-4, l is i i 1DTB-002-75-4
, Crasequene,e of Piping Failure: Pipe whip
_, Break L2Eation Break Blowdown Protect io n Break El I 2 Types Source se as ures Evaluation
(*) (*) Targets (*) (*> Etnarks telai
- JLL,: int lit: int aft-in) 72 118-4 9/16' 115-11 -(38-11 1/2) C Mainsteam 1)Platf El 1248-9" 1)DSI l 2) Platf El 111'-6" 2) DSI 73f 127-10 1/2 117-10 -(30-2 1/2) C Mainsteam 1)sall (AE, A A) 1)DSI 74 128-1 1/2 '
117-7 - (30-2 1/2) C Mainsteam 1)F1 El 141'-0" 1)DSI I ! 2). Wall ( AE, A A) 2)DSI l
, 75 133-0 117-7 - (30-2 1/2) C Mainsteam 1) F1 El 1418 - 0*
1)DSI 2)Platf El 124'-9" 2) DSI 3)sall (AE, A A) 3)DSI 76 > 133-3 1 17-7 - (29-11 1/2) C sainsteam 1)sall (AA, A G) 1) DSI ,,
j 2)sall (AE, AA) 2) DSI 77 1117-11 1/2 117-0 - (14-8 1/2) C Mainsteam 1) sall ( AE, AG) 1) DSI
+ ; 2)sall (AA, A G) 2)DSI f
78 i117-9 3/8 117-0 -(14-6 3/8) C n'ainsteaa 1) Wall (AG, A E) 1)DSI 2)F1 El 141-0 2)DSI l
79 127-9 3/4 116-3 30-2 1/2 C sainsteam 1)sall (AJ, A N) 1)DSI 8
jl28-03/4 116-0 30-2 1/2 C mainstems 1)Rall (AJ, A N) 1) DSI f0 '
2)F1 El 141-0 2)DSI 81 117-7 9/16 118-8 38-11 1/2 C Bainsteaa 1) Wall (AJ, A N) 1)DSI 82 117-7 9/16 118-5 38-8 1/2 C sainsteam 1) DER-004-60-4 1) Note F, SPI l ' ' 2) Note F, SPI
- 2) 1 SFC-0 06- 109- 4 i
j 83 118-10 1/8 116-5 14-8 C Main steam 1) Platf El 114'-0" 1)DSI i j 2)15CS-1G33-MOYF046 2) Note F l 3)18CS-003-121-4 3) Mote F, SPI i ' 4 318CS-750-22 9-4 4)NRS j 5)18CS-004-116-3 5) Note F, SPI I f
- A endment 16 4 of 6 February 1985 i .
I d
i i' ! EBS FSAR TABLE 3.6A-27b (Con t) 1 .-I .
- Piping System
- Bain Steas Drain Piping (Auxiliary Building)
Piping Lise Numbers: 1DTa-003-78-4, 1DTB-003-79-4, 1 DTR-0 0 2-7 6- 4, IDTR-002-74-4, l35
, 1DTR-002-7 5-4 consegaeace of Piping Failure: Pipe whip J
) Btgak Location Break .Bloudown P rote ction Break ___El I Z Types Source Beas ur es Evaluation 1
. } Poigt Jfg:, 1gL fft-ial Jft-int (13 _
(a3 Taroot s (a) (e) Remark s
, , 84 119-1 1/8 116-5 14-5 C nainsteam 1)sall ( AG, AJ) 1) DSI 82 ! '
124-4 7/8 116-5 6-11 C Eainsteam 1)Platf El 123'-9" 1)DSI
- 2) 1 NCS- 1 G33-MOT F046 2) Note F
{ / 3 31 W CS- 0 03- 121- 4 3) Note F, SPI 4)1NCS-750-229-4 4)MES 5).15CS-0 04-116-3 5) Note F, SPI lf 6)sall (AG, AJ) ,
- 6) DSI 86 126-7 7/8 116-2 6-11 C Mainsteam 1)Rall (AG,*AJ) 1)DSI i
87 j l26-7 7/8 115-3 13/16 6-11 C Kainsteam 1) Wall (AG, AJ) 1)DSI 48 .
126-7 7/8 .
115-0 13/16 6-8 C mainsteam 1)sall (ks, AJ) 1)DSI
, s .
89 '
126-6 115-0 13/16 -(7-0 3/8) C sainsteam 1)sall ( AG, A E) 1)DSI 90 126-6 115-3 13/16 -(7-3 3/8) C mainsteam 1)sall (AG, A E)
' 1)DSI j . >
94 '
110-1 15/16 152-0 - (14-8) C Mainsteam 1)F1 El 1048-6" 1)DSI 2)Sall 2)DSI
' fI l 3)1DTR-001-148-4 3)NRS
- 4)1DTR-001-149-4 4) Mas 2
5)1 DER-004-60-4 5) Note F, SPI 95 110-5 138-10 - (14-8) C mainsteam 1)F1 El 114'-0" 1)DSI i' 2)1DTa-150-106-2 2) Note F 3)1DTs-150-107-2 3) Note F 4)1DTM-001-112-4 4)NRS I
5)1DTM-001-113-4 5)NRS 6)1DTu-004-60-4 6) Mote F, SPI Amendment 16 5 of 6 February 1985 i.
i, I
a t
2;S FSAR TABLE 3.61-27b (Cont) ii !
j Piping System: Main Steam Drain Piping (Auxiliarf Building)
Piping Line Seabers: I DT A- 003-78-4, IDTM-003-79-4, IDTM-002-76-4, 1DTu-002-74-4, l 35 i 1 DTE-002- 7 5- 4 consequence of Piping Failure: Pipe whip Break location Break Blowdova Protection Sceak El I Z Types Source Measures Evaluation cm3 cm3 (3) (*)
R2181 lif:1gt 111:1g1 fit-int TgIggts gggggts 96 110-5 7/16 138-5 - (14-8 ) c sainsteaa 1)P1 El 1148-0" 1)DSI f .
2)1DTR-150-106-2 2) Mote F i 3)1DTM-150-107-2 3) Note F is j ! 4) 1DTR- 0 01- 112-4 4)NES l ; } 5)1DTR-001-113-4 5) pBS 4
6)1DTB-004-60-4 6) mote F, SPI 97 115-10 3/16 117-0 - (12-6) C Rainsteam 1)5SS*PRB-924 1)DSI
-
- 923
! t e i I
i 'h l
l I !
DOTE: Enabered footnotes follow Table 3.61-51.
Amendeemt 16 6 of 6 February 1985 1 '
i
, i 5
, e I'
i TABLE 3.61-27c t t
' l
- SUMa&BY OF PIPING FAILUPE ANALYSIS Pipics System
- Main Steam Drain Lines System (Steam Tunnel)
- Piping Line Numbers
- 1 DTR- 150 -104 -2, 1 DTM- 150 - 105-2, 1 DTR- 150- 106-2, 1 DTM - 150- 107- 2, 1DTR-003-108-2 l36 i
CIasequence of Piping Failure: Pipe whip t
i ft '
Break. Location Break Blowdown Protection Break ,El I 1 Types Source Beasures Evaluation y Egist lit-Lat- fft-ial (ft-ial (a) (a) ___.74rgets (3) (*3 gemarks
- , i .
1, 125-7 107-9 1/2 - ( 14-8) C R 1)Platf El 123e gn ignsz 2)1DT5-150-105-2 2) Mote F, SPI l 3) 1 DT B-001 -112- 4 3)NRS *
[ 4)1DTM-001-113-4 4)NRS
- 5) 1 MS S-02 4-5-2 5) Note F, SPI 4 125-5 122-6 - ( 17- 1 3/4) C R 1)Talve.1E12*TF050B 1)DSI
- 2) 1 DTH- 150-10 5- 2 2) Note F
, 3)1 MSS-024-60-2 3) Note F, SPI
! 4)Platf El 1238-9" 4) DSI 4:
- 5)Platf El 124'-9" 5) DSI i
5 125-5 l 122-8 1/4 - ( 17- 4) C R '1)Platf El 1238-9a 1)DSI
1, r j 2)1DTH-150-105-2 2) Note F, SPI
, 10 ' 111-3 ,1/16 127-6 3/4 - ( 17-4) C E 1) 1 MSS-02 4-5-2 1) Note F, SPI l , 2) 1 DT5-001 -14 6- 4 2)NRS
- 3) 1 DTM-00 3-110-4 3) Note F, S PI 11 111-3 1/16 '
127-9 - (17- 1 3/4) C B 1)Struct col for plat f 1)DSI
, , 2)1DTR-003-110-4 2) Mote F, SPI
.12 f l 111-3 1/8 127-9 - ( 16-9) C R 1]Struct col for platf 1) DSI i
l l 211 DT M-003-110-4 2) Note F, SPI i
i 125-7 15 107-9 1/2 .- (14- 1) C R 1)Platf El 123'-9a 1)DSI
- 2) 1 MSS-02 4-5-2 2) Note F, SPI
, 3) 1 DT M-001- 112-4 . 3) NRS
- 4) 1 DTR -001 -113- 4 4)NRS 19 125-5 123-3 7/8 16-5 3/64 C B 1)Platf El 123'-9" 1)DSI and 124a.9n l l 2)Yalve 1E12*TF050B 2)DSI
! 3) 1 NSS-024-5-2 3) Note F, SPI
- ! 4)1DTM-150-104-2 4) Note F, SPI 5 l Areadaent 16 f 1 of 3 February 1985 i
ii !
1
. i 1 .
i
, TABLE 3. 6&-27c - (Cont) i, !
j . PiPiag Systen: Nain Steam Drain Lines System (Steam Tunnel)
.1 Piping Line Numbers: 1 DTu- 150- 104- 2, IDTM-150-105-2, 1 DTM- 150- 106- 2, 1DTa - 150-107-2, 1 DTM-0 03-108-2 l35
.4 Crasegmence of Piping Failure: PiP e whip i- 4 REggi Location Break Blowdows Protection i
Break ___lE X Z Types Source Neasures Evaluation 9131 J11-131 lit-ial 111-1g1 cm3 can . Targets can c.) gggggis
{j 20 125-2 3/4 123-5 16-7 C R 1) 1 MS S-02 4-6-2 1) Mote F, SPI
', 1
- 2) 1DTM-001 - 112- 4 2) NRS
! 3) 1 DT M-001 -113-4 3)NRS 4)1R85-010-14-2 4) Note F, SPI
. . i 5 ) 1 DTn-001-14 7-4 l1; '
e 6)1RHS-008-45 5)NRS
- 6) Note F, SPI
' 'l l l 7)1NSS*PRR-924 7) DSI
!.i i1 :
' 23 ' ' 111-3 1/8 126-9 - ( 16-7) C 9 1) 1 DTM-001- 147- 4 1) NRS i
- 2) 1 NSS-02 4 2 2) Mote F, SPI i
3)1 MSS *PER-924 3)DSI 46 ; 111-3,1/8 127-1/2 - (16-7) C B 1) 1 DTM-001- 14 7- 4 1) NRS l i 2)155S-024-5-2 2) Note F, SPI
'3)1NSS*PRR-924 3)DSI as 53 115-0 .3/8 135-5 - (16-7) C R 1)1DTN-001-113-4 1)NRS
,j 2) 1 MSS-02 4-5-2 2) Note F, SPI 1 2; 3) 1 DTM-001 -147- 4 3)NRS l
4 ) 1 DTM-001-14 6-4 4)NRS j 5) 1 DTR-001 -112- 4 5) NRS j 6)1NSS*PRB-924 6) DSI
- I 25 i 125-7 l 107-9 1/2 14-1 C B 1) Platf El 123'-9" 1) DSI j ! i 2)1sSS-024-7-2 2) Note F, SPI
<j 32 111-2 13/16 128-6 - ( 16- 5) C R 1) 1 DTu-150-10 7-2 1) Note F, SPI j 2) 1 DTM-001- 148- 4 2)NRS 1
- 3) 1 DT M-001-149-4 3) NRS 4)1 DER-004-60-4 4) Mote F, SPI i'
- 5) Equip rea plugs 5)DSI j ,
El 1148-0" j 35 l 125-7 107-9 1/2 14-8 C E 1)Platt El 123'-9" 1)DSI l 2)1 MSS-024-7-2 2) Note F, SPI i .
Amendment 16 ; 2 of 3 February 1985
^
1 r
J t 1 e i
i I ass FSaa it i !
i
- ; TABLE 3.6A-27c (Cont) 4 i t, f-I
{ Pipite PipingS{Lstem:I me Nambers: naia Steam Drain Lines System 1Drn-150-104-2, (Steam Tunnel) 1DTE-150-105-2, 1DTu-150-106-2, 1 DT N- 150- 107-2, IDTM-003-108-2
. Cr sequence of. Piping Failure: Pipe ship lis i t .
.o
, , Break legation Break Blowdova P rotect io n prock El I 2 Types Source seasures Evaluation g cm3 ca) 03 (*)
)
221R1 lli-1BL 111-151 111-151 Tatsgls ggattig l 42 ! 111-2 13/16 129-1 - ( 16-5) C B 1) 1 DT M-15 0-107-2 1) Mote F, SPI
! ! 2) 1 DTR-001- 148- 4 2)NRS i l. j' 3) 1 DT M-001-149-4 3) NES
+
l i .
- 4) 1 DER-004-60-4 4) Note F, SPI
- 5) Equip rea plugs 5) DSI I
)< J
{ El 1148-0" l
. 18 125-5 123-1 -(16-0 3/4) c a 1) F1 El 123'-9" 1) DSI j ', I i
l! and 1248-9" j 2)Talve 1E12*TF050B 2)DSI
' e 3)1RSS-024-5-2 3) Note F, SPI is l2 4)1DTB-150-104-2 4) Note F, SPI l4 24 125-5 123-2 1/2 - ( 16-4 1/2) c n 1) F1 El 123'-9" 1)DSI 4
- r. and 1248-9" j j 2) Talve 1E12*TF050B 2) DSI i 3) Mote F, SPI i 3) 1 ASS-02 4-5-2 l l 4) 1 DTR- 15 0-104- 2 4) Note F, SPI
?
i I
iI f
1 1 1
(
!4 i l t t NOTE: Numbered ;
footnotes follow Table 3.61-51. ,
l l i 4 Ame;dmen t 16, 3 of 3 February 1985 l ;
i l i
i i 1
j BBS FSAR i j '
, TABLE 3.61-36b f
l3 ,
SUMMARY
OF PIPING FAILURE AN ALYSIS f
Piping Systes:- Control Rod Drive System (Fuel Building)
! Piping Line Numbers: 1RDS-025-17-4
!CA: sequence of Piping Failure: Pipe Whip I
i t l Break L2ER11on j Break- J- I 2 Break Protection h 1 PO$nt MtigL (ft-igl ift-in) DESC13 Taragts gggggrgg $ Evaluation (*) 1333 @
) t i !
$! ,l 1! !
72-1 1/2 127-6 80-5 1/2 C 1) Wall 1) DSI i , 21 72-1 1/2 127-6 81-7 C 1) sall 1) DSI 3 7 -3 l/2 127-6 81-9 C 1) Floor El 70'-0" 1) DSI
- 2) Ceiling 2) DSI
- 4 t 74-9 127-6 81-9 C 1) Floor El 70'-0" -
- 1) DSI I 2) Ceiling 2) DSI 5 .
74-6 127-8 81-9 C 1) Wall 1) DSI 6 7 -6 123-2 81-9 C 1) vall 1) DSI I l 8 j74-8 123-4 81-9 C 1) Floor El 70'-0" 1) DSI
- 2) Ceiling 2) DSI
- 9 89-1 123-4 81-9 C 1) Floor El 70'-0" 1) DSI t 2) Ceiling 2) DSI I
10 i'81-3 123-4 81-7 C 1) Hall 1) DSI i
!11 I 81-3 ' 123-6 66-5 C 1) vall 1) DSI
! ! t f 12 '. 81-3 123-4 66-7 C 1) sall 1) DSI i 13 81-3 132-2 66-5 C 1) Hall 1) DSI i
13 81-3 129-2 66-5 C 1) vall 1) DSI I 133 81-3 123-4 69-5 C 1) Floor El 70 '-0" 1) DSI
- 2) Ceiling 2) DSI 37 81-3 132-4 66-7 C 1) sall 1) DSI i
l '38 ' 81-3 l 132-4 68-9 C 1) Wall 1) DSI
~1 2 Amendment 16 ! 1 of 8 February 1985
- i 1,
l.
r 5 i
-4 BBS FSAR
- l TABLEs 3.6A-36b (cont)
? s Pipl19 STstem: Control Rod Drive System (Fuel Building) #
Piping Line Numbers: I B DS-0 25- 17-4 #
- Corsequence of Piping Failure Pipe Ship s
_ _ _IIRAIL.12 Sat io n Break- __El_ I 2 Break Protection 4
291JLt_} 'lil-1Bl Ift*iBl M1*ill 'Ilgesta3 Tagggts jetaggggif1 ETaluation(*3 Rega_gM 39 ' 81-3 132-2 68-11 C 1) vall 1) DSI f0 81-3 130-4 68-11 C 1) Ball 1) DSI- #
J . ! . .
41 ! .81-1; 130-2 68-11, C 1) Floor El 708-0a 1) DSI
{ 2) Ceiling 2) DSI 02 f76-8 '
130-2 68-11 C 1) Floor El 70'-0" 1) DSI i i -- 2) ceiling 2) DSI 1 -
I
.f .
5 l I ,
4 >
I .
E< ;
[
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TABLE 3.64-36b ' (Cont) j- t i
't
-l Piping System: Control Rod Drive System (Fuel Building) 3 Piping Line Numbers: 1BDS-025-18-4
, 3Consegeence of Piping Failure: Pipe Whip i .t 3
,I Break Location Break- __El _ I Z Break . Protection point J11-int Jft-int litial II2gs(t) Taraets geggggggis! 3 valuation (*) Besa rks 18' 81-3 129-2 65-3 C '1) Hall 1) DSI 19 81-1 1 129-2 65-1 C 1) Floor El 708-0" 1) DSI 4
- 2) Ceiling 2) DSI 20' 76-9 ; 129-2 65-1 C 1) Floor El 70'-0" 1) DSI
- 2) Ceiling 2) DSI l
I. ,' I J i l
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, 1331daent 16 3 of 8 February 1985 l
i 1
4
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, .} : BBS FSAR r
f_ TABLE 3.64-36b (Cont) l I l Piping System: . Control Rod Drive System (Fuel Building)
.! Pipiaq Line Naabers: 1RDS-002-225-4 Consequence of Piping Failure: Pipe Whip l' {
Bgggk Location j Br:ak- __31__ ___1__ 2 Break Protection j poia$ lil:1gt ift-igt ift-ini IIpe s( 18 Targgts Reassges(33 Ivaluation(*) De ma r ks I .t
! 21; 76-7 '
129-2 65-1 C 1) Floor El 708-0" 1) DSI l,
- 2) Ceiling 2) DSI 22 75-0 129-2 65-1 .c 1) Floor El 70 8-0" 1) DSI
- 2) Ceiling 2) DSI l 23 74-1 0 129-2 64-11 C None -
- +
- 1 .
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I i
i Assadment 16 4 of 8 February 1935
- i i i
!. I
a i BBS FSAR TABLE 3.64-36b (Con t)
I
' Piping S yste m: Control Pod Drive System (Fuel Building)
. Piping Line Numbers: 1RDS-025-11-4 Cr sequence of Piping Failure: Pipe Whip I
Break T.gcation Brcck- __31__ Y Z Break Protection point ift-ini Type s( t )
Tarcels Egg 33Eggi31 EeggEAR
.(11::igt (ft-int Evalu atlon( * )
25 72-1 1/2 127-6 .68-1 1/2 C None -
l,25 72-1 1/2 127-6 69-3 C None -
l l27:
72-3 1/2 127-6 69-5 C 1) Floor El 70 8-0" 1) DSI
- 2) Ceiling 2) DSI i
4 28. , 74-4 127-6 69-5 C 1) Floor El 70'-0" 1) DSI
{'l
{ 2) ceiling 2) DSI 3 29l 74-6 127-8 69-5 C 1) Wall * -
- 1) DSI g : I j 31 74-6 123-2 69-5 C 1) Wall 1) DSI 33 74-8 123-4 69-5 C 1) Floor El 70'-0" 1) DSI
- 2) Ceiling 2) DSI i' i ;
i !-
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I
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l
! &ae-daent 16 5 of 8 February 1985 t
4
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s BBS FSAR
. t- .
l i TABLE 3.61-36b (Cont)
. t IPiping Systen: Control Rod Drive System (Fuel Building)
}Pipiaq Lise Numbers: 1RDS-002-21-4
, Coa.segeence of Piping Failure: Pipe Whip
! Break Logglion Break- _JA__ I Z Break Protection goint ,111:1gL fft-int fft-in) II2e st a ) s Tagggig jgagages(3) Evaluation (*) Eggggig i
h'50- .77-0 132-6 64-4 1/2 C 1) vall 1) DSI i {
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. _ _ _ . . m._-- - - . - . _ . . . _ . . . _. .. . _ - . _ _ _ . .
I
- TABLE 3. 6&-36b (Cont)
- i
+
j' j Fiping System: Control Bod Drive System (Feel Building)
' Piping Line Numbers: -1EDS-002-19-4 C::csequence of Piping Failure: _ Pipe Whip r
I agggg_ h gglics
, Brack- J __ I _ 2
- Break Protection point _igi-igL fit-ial ift-in) IgaggiM Tarcelg Egggggggid IIglgg11ont*3 Egggrig 56' 74-10 -129-2 62-11 C 1) Wall 1) DSI 57 74-10 130-0 62-9 C 1) Wall 1) DSI 59 77-0 129-0 61-9 C 1) Wall 1) DSI i 2) Floor El 70'-0" 2) DSI
- 3) Ceiling 3) DSI 89: ! 107-0 72-5 2-83/4 C 1) Hall 1) DSI I I 90 72-7 2-6 3/4 C 1) Wall -
- 1) DSI If7-0 91[ 107-0 73-1 2-6 3/4 C 1) vall 1) DSI i I 92l 107-2, 73-3 2-6 3/4 C 1) Floor El 95'-0" 1) DSI
- 2) Ceiling 2) DSI i
94' 115-0 73-3 2-6 3/4 C 1) Floor El 95s.o= 13 asz
, 2) Ceiling 2) DSI 95i 115-10 73-3 :2-6 3/4 C 1) Floor El 9 5'-0" 1) DSI
- 2) Ceiling 2) DSI 96; 116-0~ 73-1 :2-63/4 C 1) Hall 1) DSI
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i Ameidment;16 7 of 8 February 1985 i
1
',4-
1 i t i TABLE 3.64-36b (Cont) i I ji . Piping System: Control Rod Drive, System (Fuel Building) a Piplaq Line numbers: 1RDS-002-22-2
- CrJ; sequence of Piping Failure
- Pipe ship s
, f Break Lgcation area k- _LIl__ - I Z Break Protection 29hi_ ' El 131. (f t-131, ift-ini TYP9sI83 Ttf49tg jggggggg @ Mutti on( * ) gggdg 116-0 70-8 2-63/4 C Mone -
- {S;
-f
.$9 116-0 68-11 1/2 2-6 3/4 C rose -
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50TES: 1. C = Circumferential break L = Longitudinal breal
- 2. R = Bloudoet from RPY only
} H = Bloudonc from other end (i.e., header or pump side) 130tdaeat 16 8 of 8 February 1985 h
6 L
I t BBS FSAR 1
1
- i TABLE 3.64-37b 1 ,
SUMMARY
OF PIPING FAILURE ANALYSIS l
i i
Piping System: Reactor Water Cleanup System (Outside Containeest)
Piping Line Numbers: INCS-006- 11-3 ls C:csequence of Piping Failure: Pipe whip
. +
! l
, Break Location Break B.ovdown Protection Becak El I E Type s Source Beasures Evaluation Polat ,{ft-int <a3 ca3 Tgaets (a3 c+3
.iftial ift-ial EREMIE t1 116-0 107-9 1/2 4-3 C R Nome I '
i H 1)F1 El 1148-0" 1)DSI !'
i 2)1RHS-008-36-2 2) SPI 3' 1'15-3 -109-5 4-3 C 0 1)J?t impingement 1)DSI sakl '
2)1RHS-008-36-2 2) SPI I H 1)F1 El 114'-0" 1) DSI ls
, 2) IICS- 0 06 1 2) SPI I
g as i
5 106-9 108-10 1/3 3-8 1/2 C 9 1) South & vest walls 1)DSI i
2)F1 El 114'-0" 2) DSI j ,H 1) South 5 east valls 1) DSI l 1s g j 2) RHS-014-176-2 2) SPI
!. 3 ) IICS-00 6 1 3) SPI t j
- 4) R HS-018-55-2 4) SPI l 15 7A' 106-9! 95-9 0-0 C R 1) South 5 east valls 1) DSI ls i
! 2)IICS-006-7-1 2) SPI l 3) Yeat duct 3)NSS l 1*
i H 1) East wall 1)DSI 3' l
- 2) Vent duct 2) NES I
I Ar.endment 16 j 1 of 10 February 1985 I
t
- l i abs rsae i
f! ! . TABLE 3.61-37b (Cont)
.i I
- .Pipiaq System
- . Reactor Water Cleanup system (Oatside Containment) lu
-Piping Line Numbers: 19CS-003-13-3 -
1 Coasequence of Piping Failure: Pipe whip
[- i }
i l i
+
Break
_k. El Break Location 1
Break Types Blowdova Source Protection I Measures Evaluation i EgM hint Jft-int fft-ial (83 (23 Tarcets ( a) (en ggggg,g i 201 1 )S-54 79-0 3-5 1/16 C a 1)r1 El 114'-0" 1)DSI 2s i !
H None
}t 30l 97-9 77-6 8-10 C a 1) Pump room vall 1)DsI j B some
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~A2c daeat 16 2 of 10 February 1985
.i .
BBS FSAR 1
i , . TABLE 3.64-37b (Cont)
Piping System: Beactor Water Cleanup System (Outside Containment) l15 Piping Line Numbers: 15CS-003-12-3 Consegmence of Piping Failure: Pipe ship
! l1 ;
Break Location Break Blowdown Protection
< Break El I Z fypes Source Beasures Evaluation Point El-int .[ft-ial (ft-in) (a) (a) Taggets (33 (*3 Regatkg i 4.
t '36! 98-1 1/2 84-0 3-5 C R 1)F1 El 114 8-0" 1)DSI l l' t' ,
H 1)F1 El 95'-9" 1)DSI
! , ts l
(43' 97- p, 85-6 1/2 8-7 C R 1) Pump room ceiling 1)DSI B N one
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l Amendment 16 3 of 10 February 1985 i
TABLE 3.6&-37b (Cont;
}, }
. iis Piping System Reactor Water Cleanup System (Outside containment) I Pipiaq Line Members: INCS-004-16-3 Consequence of Piping Failure: Pipe whip I: f
! ! Break Location Break Blowdown Protection 1 Break .El I Z Types Source Measures Evaluation I
, Mini f(t-igt ift-in) ift-La) (3 ca3 Taggets (33 (*3 ggggggs i . ~
t t
' CO 1 } 7- 6 l 107-10 10-6 C R None l
- 2) 1R HS- 008-36-2 2) SPI i , 3)1ICS-restraint 3) SPI lt5 i
. C5 1' 7- 6 , 108-11 10-6 C 3 None a H 1) IICS-0 08-4-2 '
- 1) SPI lta 2)1RHS-008-36-2 2) SPI 1
3)1ICS-restraint 3) SPI 46 117-0i 109-5 10-6 C R 1) Jet impingement PRR-902 PRR i, i ! i ; vall
- j 2)IICS-008-40-2 2) SPI 1
H 1)F1 El 1148-0" 1) DSI l
i :
524 106 92-4 11-3 C R 1) Ea'st wall 1) DSI i i ,
- 2) IICS-0 0 6-7-3 2) SPI 55 l } H 1) West wall 1) DSI
- 2) Tent duct 2)NRS 57 ! 1C 6-9 81-5 5-5 C R 1) Eest wall 1) DSI l i 2)F1 El 1148-0" 2) DSI is
- 3) Tent duct 3)MRS H 1)F1 El 1148-0" 1)DSI l 2) Pump room ceiling 2) DSI s 3)1ICS-006-11-3 3) SPI i -
4 L 1 l '
l Amendmen t .16 4 of 10 February 1985 a
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j t
, BBS PSAR
- i
! ii .
TABLE 3.6A-37b (Cont)
{
i :
' PiPiaq System: Beactor Bater Cleanup System (Outside Containeest) l 3*
- g. Piping Lise gambers: 15CS-004-20-3
- q. Cassequence of Piping Pailure: Pipe whip i'
I Break Location Break Blowdova Protection Break i El . 1 2 Types source seasures Evaluation Point j{1:igt (ft-ial lit-ini gas cas Taraets (3) (*3 Rg3RIL3 i
, f 58'[ 106-9 80-11 4-11 C 885 1)P1 El 1148-0* 1) DSI **
- 2) Pump room ceiling 2) DSI I
! B 1)P1 El 114'- 0" 1)DSI j 2) Pump room ceiling 2)DSI as i
1
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i Amendmen tl16 5 of 10 February 1985 4
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t'
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i i TABLE 3.64-37b (Cont)
I, 5 l !Pipiaq System Beactor Water Cleanep Systes (Ostside Costalaseat) l 16 j Pit tsg Lise susbers: 15CS-403-15-3
, consegeance of PiFing Fallare: Pipe whip
, e I ; areak Location Break Blowdova Protection Break Ei 1 1 Types Soerce seasures Evaluation Po$at JitiBL f f t-ial fit-int (a) (23 Tareets (3) (O Remark a l 72 9 -10' 77-11 9-2 C R&B 1) Pump roce wall 1)DSI
. E Nome i
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i Ameadaest'16 6 of 10 February 1985 t
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i BBS FSAR
$ TABLE 3.6A-37b (Cont)
(
t
,- Piping Systems Beactor sater Cleanup
'* System (Ostside Containeest) lts
[
- Fiping Line Beebers: 18CS-003-14-3
(
4 Coasequence of Piping Failure: Pipe ship
+
Break Location Break Blowdova Protection i Break 21 E 1 Types Source seasures Evaluation
, Po4st Jgtigt Jf$-ial lit-lat can (a) Tareets ( a) ces les4Ek s 1
87 - 94-10 86-1 9-3 C 88 4
, BS E 1) Pump roca vall 1)DSI e E None
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AmMust 16 7 of 10 February 1985 h 1 e t
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i
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( ! , TABLE 3.64-37b (coat) i Pigi~g System: Beactor Bater Cleanup System (Outside Containeest) las Piping Line members: 15CS-004-171-2 Consegmence of Pipias Failure: Pipe ship r , i areak Location Break Blowdows Protection Break El I E Types Source sensures Evaluation 2g131 Jgt-igt fit-ial ift-int caa ca3 Taraets (al i*3 Rgaggg3 L -
J 90_ 117-9 1/2 107-11 0-0 C 8 Bone
.D 1)F1 El 114'-0" 1) DSI ps
, 2)1RHS-008-36-2 2) SPI ii 331rvS-020-63-2 3) SPI i !r 2
A
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i .
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4 i
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- &mendment 16 8 of 10 February 1985 l'
6i
ans rsaa TABLE 3.61-37b (Con t)
I I' Cipirq Systen: Beactor Water Cleanup Systen (Outside Containment) l Pipiaq Line unabers: 15CS-004-173-2 Consequence of Pipiaq Failure: PiP e whip l
[
Break f.ocation Break Blowdova Protection
- Break El 1 1 Types Soerce seasures Evaluation Po&a$ Jitigt Jft-ial fft-ini caz can Taraets (3) to gemarkg 1 904 1h6-0 1/2 116-3 - (2-0) C a i ! t i i D
I 985 117-9,1/2 116-6 7/8 2-0 C a i
i
- 108 1 'l4- 9 , 121-5 3/4 6-8 5/8 C a 1') Platf El 1238-9e ,
1)DSI D pose I '
)
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12endaeat 16 9 of 10 February 1985 4
.a
BBS FSAR 4 i 1
TABLE 3.6A-37b (Coat)
I.
!I Piping System: Pecctor Water Cleanup System (Outside Containneat) ls
- Pipiaq Line Naabers: I BCS-004-022-2 (2)
}
Co sequence of Piping Failure: Pipe whip Break Location Break Blowdown Protection Crack El X Z Types Source seasures Evaluation Point Jit-int Jft-ial ift-ial (O (23 Taraets ca> <*) y,gergg
- 117 124-9, 120-6 1/8 -(6-6 7/8) C E 1)F1 El 1238-9" 1)DSI is f ;
, D Nome i ,
i 4
t .
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1 l l l
! l l
i b
1 Ardment 16 10 of 10 February 1985
BBS FSAR 7
! TABLE 3.6A-40b t . SUNNatY OF PIPING FAILUBE AN ALYSIS i
' Pipi:q system: Nain Steam Drain System (Auxiliary Building)
Piping Line puebers: 1 - DT N-003 4 Coasequence of Piping Failure: Jet Impingement
___, Break Leg 3tient*3 Break Protection Braak El I E Types seasures Evaluation point ift-igt Jit-in) fft-int (a) Tagggts (33 (*3 Besarks l' 115-0 7/16 107-9 1/2 - (4-3) C None 13 115-0 3/8' 117-0 - (15-7 1/2) C Later is
? ; t 97 ! 114-10 3/16 117-0 - (12-6) C None I'
t: t i t
t
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t i
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! Ase:daent 16 1 of 8 February 1985 i
i
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i
2 BBS FSAB
,l l ; TABLE 3.6A-40b (Cont)
Piplag System: sain Steam Drain System (Auxiliary Building)
- Piping Line Numbers: 1-DTR-003-79-4 Consequence Of Piping Failure: Jet Impingement I
I Break LocationC*) Break Protection
! Break El I Z Types Measures Evaluation Point M1-it), fit-int ift-ial cas TaIggis (33 (*) IgagE&g 10, 114-3 1/8 117-3 3/8 - (5-9) C None 18 112-4 7/8 117-8 -(9-7) C Moae
,19 112-0 3/8 118-0 1/2 - (9-7) C 1) 1-DTR-150-106-2 1) Note F ll !
- 2) 1-DTa- 150- 107-2 2) Note F I20. 111-8 11/16 136-9 1/2 - (9-7) C 1) 1-DTa-150-106-2 1) Note F a l 2) 1-DTR-150-107-2 . 2) Note F 21 111 . 3/16 137-2 - (9-7) C some
- 22. 110-10 5/8 137-2 - (9-7) C None 62 110-10 3/4 136-3 1/2 - (9-7) C 1) 1-DT8-150-106-2 1) Note F
- 2) 1-DTa-150-107-2 2) Note F i <
l l e i
i 6 i
! 4 i
e A mendmen t 16 2 of 8 February 1985
> t ,,
l TABLE 3.6A-40b (Cont) i t i i
^
[! l[
I Fipiaq Systes': Main Steam Drain System (Auxiliary Building)
Pipiaq Llae Numbers: 1-DTB-003-110-4 '
CCCaegeeace' of Piping Failare: -Jet Impingeneat i e i
I Break Lggg11ga(*3 Break Protection Break El . I 1 Types Beasures Evaluation Faint, .ill-igt E t-in) fft-igt (*3 Tags (33 (*3 Rgggggs
+
67 110-3 3/4 149-5 - (9-7) C sone -
1 94 110-1' 15/16 152-0 - (14- 8) C Nose -
! Jt is 95 110-5 138-10 - (14 -8) C some -
. ' ii 96' 110-5' 7/16 138-5 - (14- 8) C sone -
i g<
4
, I 4
i
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I Amesdaent 16 3 of 8 February 1985 i
1 1 1 !
1 BBS FS&R t
I '
'f T&BLE 3.'61-40b (Cont) f
' Fiping System: sein Steam Drain System (&asiliary Building)
Fiping Line Baabers: 1-DTR-002-77-4 Commequence caf Piping Failure: Jet Impingeneat i
Break igggtioat
- 3 Break Protection
.i Break El I 1 Types Neasures Evaluation t
Point _(f t-i nt Jft-ial fft-ini ca) Taraets (33 (*3 Resack s
't i
- 27 114-10. 1/4 117-0 -(13-3 1/2) C some
- I I 28 119-9 1 17- 0 - (13-3 1/2) C Nome t t i 29 120-0 117-0 -(13-0 1/2) C Mone 4 i !
M 34' 114-7 9/16 120-5 38-11 1/2 C some
- i +
t i 81 118-8 38-11 1/2 C uome 117-7l 9/16 .
82 117-7, 9/16 118-5 38-8 1/2 C Mone 83 118-10 1/8 116-5 14-8 C None 84 119-1 1/8 116-5 14-5 C uose is t
- 85; 126-4 7/8 116-5 6-11 C nome
, < , 1 !
86 126-7 7/8 116-2 6-11 C 1) ICC817BG7 (feedwater 1) Note F
- l systea valve IFWS* ROV 7B i ! conduit) 87 126-7 7/8 115-3 13/16 6-11 C 1) 1CC8178G7 (feeduater 1) Note F t systes valve 1FWS*sOV7A conduit) 88 126-7 7/8 115-0 13/16 6-8 C some 83 126- 6 115-0 13/16 -(7-0 3/8) C Nome i
90 126-6' 115-3 13/16 -(7-3 3/8) C 1) 1CC8178G8 (feedwater 1) Note F systen valve 1FWS*80V7B i
cond uit)
' &aendment 16 4 4 of 8 February 1985 t
6
BBS FSAR TABLE 3.64-40b (Cost) i !
! Piping System: saia Steam Drain System (Anziliary Bailding)
Fiping Line Waabers: 1-DTM-002-76-4 consegaeace of Pipiaq Failare Jet Ispiegement i
Break Locatinaco) Break Protection Break . El Z 1 Types seasures Evaluation
,_ Point hial i f t-imi fft-ini ca) Taraets c as ces Besarts i' 35 114-10 5/16 117-0 -(13-10 1/2) C some C3 , 127-9 1/2 118-5 30-2 1/2 C Nome n i
79 i
127-9.3/4 116-3 30-2 1/2 C Mone t
80 128-0 3/4 116-0 30-2 1/2 C some t
{
0 6
< f I
3 i
4 l t l
l Amendeest 16 5 of 8 Febraary 1985 e
I
F
, . BBS F5&B l <
TABLE 3.64-40b (Coat)
Piping Piping 5btes:' sais steam L e sesbers: Drain systes (Auxiliary 1-DTa-002-75-4 Building)
Comanganace of. Piping Failures Jet Impingement areak LocationE*3 Break Frotection Broek El I 1 Types seasures Realuation Fo t J1L-13L ift-int tit-ial ca3 Tareets E33 (*3 Besarkg 44 114-10, 3/8 117-0 - (14-5 1/2) C some 52 127-10 1/2 118-5 - (30-2 1/2) c some i !
73 127-10 1/2 117-10 - (30-2 1/2) c some
, 74 128-1 1/2 117-7 - (30-2 1/2) c some i I 15 133-0 117-7 - (30-2 1/2) c some 76 133-3 117-7 -(29-11 1/2) c 1) KK809BC6 (sain 1) sote F steaa line isolatios i .
valve seal systes valve
{ g I
i 1E33*F028 conduit)
, 2) MC8645&1 (mais 2) sote F
, i steam line isolation
?
valve seal systen valve
{ '
1E33*F028 coadsit)
- 3) 1CCS68842 (saia 3) sote F steam line isolation
, ' valve seal systen valve 1E33*F027 condait) i 4) WC817BJ1 (mais 4) Note F i
~
steam line isolation valve seal systen valve 1E33*F027 condait) .
- 5) 1CC817BJ2 (mais 5) sote F steam line isolation valve seal systen valve 1E33*F028 condait)
- 6) EC939BB2 (sais 6) sote F steam line isolation valve seal systee valve 1E33*F028 coadmit) 77 117-11 1/2 117-0 - (14-8 1/2) C some 4eesdaee t 16 6 of 8 February 1985
r-BBS FSAB h
TasLE 3.64-40b (Coat)
Fiping systes: Bain stone Drain system (assiliary Beiiding)
Pipsag Line seabers: 1-ME-002-75-4 Cosmogeence of Piping Failure: Jet Impingement f
f' 4
areak Locatient
- 3 Break Protection Break El I 1 Types seasures Evaluation M fft-igl fit-ial ift-ini (83 Tareets (33 (*3 gag 3Eig 78 117-9 3/8 117-0 -(14-6 3/8) C some l1s I i i
l i .
}e f f .
I f
I -
E
. f i
aseedeemt 16 7 of 8 February 1985
?
t
k RBS FS&R
. i TABLE 3.64-40h (Cont)
! k Pipiaq System: saia steam Draia Systes (Angiliary Building)
Fiping Line Seabers: 1-975-902-74-4
} Consegeesce of Piping f ailure: Jet Impingenest treak Locatimmt43 Break Protection Break El I 1 Types Neasures Evaluation Polat JItigt fit-131 fft-la) (a) Tagggis can ces pesarks 53 114-10 7/16 117-0 -(15-0 1/2) c some 60 114-7 9/16 120-5 -(38-11 1/2) c mone is 69 114-7 9/16 121-0 -(38-11 1/2) C some
!70 114-10 9/16 121-3 -(38-11 1/2) C some i t i -
til 119-1 9/16 1 16- 2 -(38-11 1/2) c some .
72 118-4 9/16 115-11 -(38-11 1/2) C 1) 1CCS17BJ2 (main steam 1) Note F line isolation valve seal systen valve 1E33*F028
! j conduit) 4
- 2) 1Cc817BJ1 (saia steas 2) Note F t'
isolation valve seal system i valve 1E13*F027 coadsit) t i
\
BOTE: sesbered footnotes follow Table 3.64-51.
Amendaeat 15 8 of 8 sovember 1984
i ,
- . TABLE 3.6&-40c SUANARY OF PIPIBG FRILUBE AN ALYSIS i !
Piping System: Naia Steaa Drain System (Steam Tunnel Area)
Pipiaq Lise seaters: 1DTa-150-104-2
- Cossegeance of Piping Failure: Jet Impingement i
Break location Break Protection
. Break El I 2 Types seasures Evaluation 19111 El-int Jft- Lal fft-int (83 Eggggtial Tstggts (a) (*) gggggkg 1 125-7 107-9 1/2 - (14- 8) C 1)ICI939513 (area temperature 1) Note L
- - s -
monitor 1LDS*RTD2A conduit) 2)1cI939TA3 (area temperature 2) Note L i nomitor 1LDS*RTD2B conduit) f 4 125-5 122-6 - (17-1 3/4) C 1)1CK809Bcz (main ateam 1) Note F valve 182*MovF0988 condait) ,
5 125-5 122-8 1/4 - (17-4) C some -
10 111-3 1/16 127-6 3/4 - (17-4) C some -
11 111-3 1/16 127-9 - (17-1 3/4) C 1)IcK809BC2 (main steam valve 1) Note F 1821*MYF0988 conduit) 12 111-3 1/8 127-9 . - (16-9) C 1)IcK809Bc2 (main steam valve 1) Note F 1521*novF0988 conduit) i . ,
i t-i 1
4 Amendaeat 16 1 of 5 February 1985 i
6 4
[
. >~
TABLE 3.61-40c (cost)
- Pipiaq system: saia steam prain System (Steam Tannel Area) pipiaq Line snabers: 1DTa-150-105-2
, comanganace of Piping Failare: Jet IaPiagement Break location Break Protection f Break El 1 1 Types Measures Evaluation Point jil ,Lgl f ft-int fft-131 (83 Egggatial targets (a) (e) p TEE M
,15 12 5-7 107-9 1/2 - ( 14- 1) c 131cI939513 (area temperature 1) Note L soaitor 1LDS*nTD2 A conduit) 2)1CI939TA3 (area temperature 2) Note L
. monitor IIDS*DTD2B conduit) i i 18l 125 *. 123-1 ; -(16-0 3/4) c 1)1cK809BC2 (main steam 1) Note F j valve 1821*s0TF098B condait) I'
?
19 12 5- 5 123-3 7/8 16-5 3/64 C None -
! I2 ;
20 125-2 3/4 123-5 16-7 c 1)Icc8178G1 (conduit to junction 1) Note F t box controls main steam valves
- IB21*s0TFC981,D, 8 feedvater
, g valves ,1FES*s0Y7A 6 B) 23' 111-3 1/8 126-9[ -(160-4 1/2) c Wome -
1 !
l 2')l 125-5 123-2 1/2 - (16-4 1/2) C sone -
. + .
i; : I, I!
.l v
4 Amendment 16 2 of 5 February 1995
^
N
BBS FSAR TABT.E 3.6A-40c (Cont)
. SDNNARY OF PIPING FAILURE AN ALYSIS
- Pipiaq System Nain Steam Drain System (Steam Tammel Area)
Piping Line Numbers: 1 DTa-150-106-2 Consequence of Piping Failure: Jet Impingement t
4 IItAll9C1112g Brea k Protection Break ' El t I 1 Types Measures Evaluation
' E21R1 111-itt Mkini Mt-ial can Essential Targgis (3) (*) neaarks
.25 l 125-7 ~ 107-9 1/2 14-1 C 1)1CZ939514 (area temperature 1) Note L u i 4 , monitor 1LDS*RTD2C conduit) l j 2)1CI939fA4 (area temperature 2) Note L ll i t
-g nomitor ILDS*PTD2D conduit) 33, 111-2 13/16 120-6 - ( 6- 5) c Wome -
l 4
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i !
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10emdaent 16 3 of 5 February 1985 I
i t e
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{ - TABLE 3.6A-40c (cont) j Piping S ystem: Bain Steam Drain System (Steam Tunnel Area)
Piping Line Neabers: 1 DTM-150- 107-2 I C pmequence of Piping Failure: Jet Impingement I Brg3L_lggation Break Protection Besak El I 1 Types Measures Evaluation E21R1 .lil-iRL jft-ip) (ft-igt (t) Eggggtial Targgts (3) (*3 _ 3cearks 35 '12 5-7 107-9 1/2 14-8 C 1)1CI9390A4 (area temperature 1)pote L is li aonitor 1LDS*RTD2C conduit) 2)1CI939fA4 (area temperature 2) Mote L j j monitor 11DS*RTD2D conduit)
. I t
111-2 13/16 129-1 - ( 16- 5) C sone -
[42 6 i l' I t I .
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i l Ansidment 16 4 of 5 February 1985 l
i
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TABLE 3.61-40c .(Cont) t Pipite System: Main Steam Drain System (Steam Tunnel Area)
Piping Line Numbers: IIUM-003-108-2 ~
C,tecequence of Piping Failure: Jet Impingement Break Legation Break Protection Break KL I Z Types Heasures Evaluation 291B1 M1-iRL Mi-1RL M 1:lal (83 EfftR11al IAEy ts (3) (*) Enarks as t
53 115-0 3/8 135-5 - ( 16-7 ) c 1)1CI939S13 (area temperature 1) Rote L sonitor 1LDS*PTD2A conduit) i 2)1CI939TA3 (area temperature 2) Mote L
! monitor 1LDS*STD2B conduit) t
,- i :
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i NOTE: Eumber footnotes follow Table 3.6 A-51.
&Ostdaent 16 5 of 5 February 1985 i; Ii >
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i i RBS FSAR TABLE 3. 6 A-49b i
SUNNARY OF PIPING FAILUPE ANALYSIS 1
Pipicq System Control Rod Drive System (Fuel Building)
Piping Line Musbers: 1RDS-025-17-4 C qsequence of Piping Failure: Jet Impingement krC0k- __31_._[IRAg_Locat I ion Z Break Protec tion
. 22 1- 1 itl fft-iRL J11. int IIgggit,){ Eggggligl.,Iaggeta Heaggreso) Evaluation (*> Eetatti lj 72-1 1/2 127-6 80-5 1/2 C None -
2 72-1 1/2 127-6 81-7 C None -
t I 3 73-3 1/2 127-4 81-9 C None -
1 4 7 -4 127-6 81-9 C None ,
5 79 127-8 81-9 C None -
l !
6 74-6 123-2 81-9 C None -
I i 8 7 -8 123-4 81-9 C None ,
.'9 81-1 123-4 '1-9 o C None -
. }
+ 10 ,
81-3 123-4 81-7 C None -
l 11; 81-3 123-6 66-5 C None -
1 12l 81-3 123-4 66-7 C None -
13 ! 8j-3 132-2 66-5 C Wone -
i l i 15 '
8}-3 129-2 66-5 C None -
( 34' 81-3 123-4 69-5 C None -
r 37 81-3 132-4 66-7 C None -
38 81-3 132-4 68-9 C None -
I !
+ 39 81-3 132-2 68-11 C Mone -
I i j 40 81-3 130-4 68-11 C None -
i A Dced men t .16 1 of 8 February 1985 t
t
}+
i I i !
! i i
BBS FSAR TABLE 3.64-49b (Cont) i s
' ! Piping System: Control Bod Drive System (Fuel Building)
, Piping Line Numbers: IE DS-0 25- 18-4 C?nsequence of Pipiaq Failures Jet Impingement
_IItak Logglion Br;Gk , __Il __ I Z Break Prot ec tion Point Ifi-1BL fit-int Jft-int 12g33111 Igggglial_IREggig Eggggges(8) IIgl3atign111 EgERE11 1 41 8,1 -1 130-2 68-11 C None -
42 76 i 130-2 68-11 C None -
. i '
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t 1 i ; I t
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1001dment 16 2 of 8 February 1985 i
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[, I BBS FS19 L .1 i
, TABLE 3.61-49b (Cont)
.. _ i.,
Piping System: Control Rod Drive System (Fuel Building)
Pipits Line guabers: 1RDS-025-18-4
. Consequence of Piping Failure: Jet Impingement lL gggak Location Br=k- ._ Il__ I 2 Break Protec tion
. 221R1 .ill-iRL _fft-int fft-int Zyges(13 Issential Targgig gggsares t s ) Evgluatiggill gegarks 18 i 81-3 ;. 129-2 65-3 C sone -
i 19 i 81-1 129-2 65-1 C None -
1 20 9 129-2 65-1 C None -
i
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E Arsidsent 16 3 of 8 February 1985 J
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f f TABLE 3.6A-49b (Cont)
Piping System: Control Rod Dri've System (Fuel Building)
. . Fiping Line Numbers: 1R DS-002-225- 4
! Consequence of Piping Failure Jet Impingement i
___ regal _L22stion
'sBrock- __11__ Y Z Break Protection
, point litigt (ft-int 111-int IIgggill Esgaglial_IgEggig ligggggggifl IIsinglion(*) Pfe.garti j 21 ]6-7j 129-2 65-1 C None -
22 75-01 129-2 65-1 C None _
! 23, 74-10 129-2 65-11 e None -
I i ,
a
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t
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A3Gadaent 16 4 of 8 Februsry 1985 I
i t
I
-; i
. , i TABLE 3.61-49b (Cont)
'I i Pipi2g System: Control Nod Drive System (Fuel Building)
Pipitg Line Numbers: INDS-025-11-4 CEasequence of Piping Failure: Jet Impingement
{ I! !
jreak Legation Brock-' __Z1__ I 2 Break Protection Re&R1- Mi-itt If t-iRL Mi-1RL IIERRill gss_en_tigl_Igrgets Neasurestal Igaluation(*) nemarks i 1 25 i. 7 -1 1/2 127-6 68-1 1/2 C None -
26 : 72-1 1/2 127-6 69-3 C None -
27 ' 72-3'1/2 127-6 69-5 C None -
t 28 ! : 74-4' 127-6 69- 5 C None -
1 , i j 29 l ! 7 -6 127-8 69-5 C None -
31 , 7 -6 123-2 69-5 C None -
33 ! 7i-8 123-4 69-5 C None -
i I
i I.
I i l-i I
l Ano dnent'16 5 of 8 February 1985 l
I
ki fj
,- l TABLE 3.6A-49b (Cont)
, i Piping Systems Control Rod Drive System (Fuel Building)
. Piping Line .Neabers: 1 B DS-0 02-21-4
- ' ' Consequence of Piping Failure: Jet Impingeneat i! '
l
- __e_IIRAI_L2SA112R
'Breat- __J1_; ___I__ Z Break Protection Inoint Mtigt (ft-int #1-131 Iggggill gssentigl._Iggggig Jea2SESE M II113gti2gi+2 gggggks 3
50i 77-0 132-6 64-4 1/2 C None -
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Ar.idment 16 6 of 8 February 1985
, i : I 3
. . - _ _ _ . .~ __ - -
_~ _ _ _ . _ . _ _ - _ . -- ,-
i
- EBS FSAR
{
I
' 1 i'
TABLE 3.6A-49b (cont) .
i e
! j
! Piping System: Control Rod Drive System (Fuel Building) 4 PipiEg Line Numbers: 1RDS-002-19-4
. p CoIsequence of;' Piping Failure: Jet Impingement t ,
i
__ IISAk 12 cation l Brsck . __31__ t ___I__ z Break Protection i 29111_ 11 int i J11-1RL f f t -int Typesta) gggggtial Tgroets gggggges(3) Evglua112B(*) Penggtg 56 74 10 f 129-2 62-11 C None -
. i 57 74-10 j 130-0 62-9 C None -
59 :
77 0 129-0 61-9 C None -
, I i
' 89 l 107-0 72-5 2-8 3/4 C None -
{
i 4l{
! 90 l
107-0 , . 72-7 2-6 3/4 C 1)1cI601BA (service water 1) Note N flow transmitter '
1SEP*FT59B, 60B conduit) i 2)1cc918BA (cunduit 2) NES I . between switchgear
, and terminal cabinet l for RCS system) 91 107-0 73-1 2-63/4 C None -
92 107-2 e 73-3 2-6 3/4 C 1)1TL602P (fuel building 1) Note R
{ ventilation system f an l } HTF*FN3B, 7B cable tray) l 2)1Tc602B (various HTF flow 2) Note R
- I switches and air operated
- damper cable tray) t t i i i
3)1TI602B (various resistant 3) Note R temperature detector and I i flow switches
, HTF cable tray) 94 115-0 73-3 2-63/4 C None -
i I 95 115-10 73-3 2-6 3/4 C None -
96 116;-0 73-1 2-6 3/4 C None -
l I
. 1 1
Asocdment 16 7 of 8 February 1985
, t i
i l . i )
i
I s
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RBS FSAP d
i I-TABLE 3.6A-49b (Con t)
Piping System: Control Rod Drive' System (Fuel Building) i Piping Line Numbers: 1PDS-002 2 i Cy.: sequence of Piping Failures Jet Impingement t
ij' l I __aBERAll2sation _
Break- __31__. I Z Break Protection Roigt fit-int 111-int (ft-int IIgesta) Egggnilal Tggggig gggsur es ( 3 ) 31glggliont*) oggarti i I 98 11 -0 70-8 2-6 3/4 C uone -
{ 99 116-0 , 68-11 1/2 2-6 3/4 C None -
5! !l
!lt Il L
f 4
- l*
i ! !;i o' t 1 I k i .
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- ; !; i II .
i
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NOTE: Numbered footnotes follow Table 3.61-51.
Ansgdaest 16 8 of 8 February 1985 l
i l
l
l TABLE 3.61-50b
SUMMARY
- OF PIPING FAILURE ANALYSIS h
4 6 1 l
IPiping System: Peactor Water Cleanup System (Outside Containment) -
ls l Piping Line Numbers: 1-WCS-006-11-3 ic2psequence of Piping' Failure: Jet Impingement i j
,i !
BERAL_1ggation Break Protection i El j Brati I Z Types Measures Evaluation goint Igt-ial lI1: int lil:ini (*) ____Isstalial_IaIstis (3) (*) Remarks t
1 116- 0 107-9 1/2 4-3 C None
- i. 3 115-3 109-5. 4-3 C None l
j5, 136-9; 108-10 1/3 3-8 1/2 C 1) 1CC 814R A (reactor core 1) Note F isolation cooling systen l valves 1E51*F059, 013, j
046 conduit) i 2)1CK827RA (RCIC fill pump 2) Note F l
- actor 1E51C003 con $uit)
!71:' 1.)6-9 ' 95-9 0-0 C 1)1TC814R' (reactor core 1) Note
! ! isolation cooling system as
! valve 1E12*F023 cable tray) l l 2)1C1809BS (leak detection 2) Note N 1E31FTN0771 conduit) 3)1CI809BS1 (leak detection 3) Mote N
,, 1E31FTN075A conduit) l' 4)1CIB17BF2 (UCS 4) Note Q thermocouple IE31*T/CN040B
, i conduit)
}
5)1CI817BF3 (WCS thermocouple 5) Mote 0
~' 1E31*T/CNO37B conduit) 6)1CI817BF4 (WCS thermocouple 6) Note P 1E31*T/CNO39B & 42B conduit) 7)1CC814RA (reactor core iso- 7) Note F l
1ation cooling systen valves 1 E51*F059, 013, 0 46)
- 8)1CK827BA (RCIC fill 8) Note F pump motor 1E51C003 conduit) i i
Amenda en t 16 1 of 11 February 1985 i
+ 'EBS FSAR t TABLE 3.61-50b (Cont)
, i Piping System: Beactor. Water Cleanup System (Outside Containment) ls l' i Pipiaq Line Numbers: 1-NCS-004-16-3
! Conseqaeace of Piping Failure: Jet Impingement t
Break L2gation Break Protection
. Bestk i El I Z Types Measures Evaluation ERiR1 jf1-int Jft-ial 111:131 (*) Esaggilal_Iggggts (8) (*) Remarks I
4 g
C4 17-6 107-10 10-6 C None 45 117-6 108-11 10-6 C None 46 '
117-0 109-5 10-6 C None i
j 521 106-9 92-4 11-3 C None 4 . l
' ' 57 106-9 81-5 5-5 C 1)1CI939B1 (tesidual beat 1) Mote F
, removal conductivity element l 1E12*CEN001 A conduit) y 2)1CC825BE (reactor core 2) Note F i isolation cooling system valve 1E51*F013 conduit)
, 3) 1CI817BF3 (WCS thermocouple 3) Note Q 16 1E31*T/CN037B conduit)
, l 4)1CI809R0 (VCS thermocouple 4) Note 0 1E31*T/CNO371 conduit) ti ~5)1TK8258 (RCIC valves 5) Note F j cable tray)
temperature element) i 8)IE31*T/CN039B (WCS 8) Note D
{ temperature element) t'
}
i 1
A;cadmen t 16 2 of 11 February 1985 I
i -
! 'i I f BBS FS&P i
i' ~
TABLE 3.6&-50b (Cont)
Piping S ystem: Reactor Water Cleanup System (Outside Containment) l 3, Pipi;g Line Numbers: 1-WCS-004-20-3 Cx;sequencg of .P1 Ping Failure: Jet Impingement i ;
i
.. __RERAk_12E1112R Break Protection Break El Z Z Types Measures Evalua tion Reint fit-ial ift-tal lit-lat 88) ____Insta11al_Tarsst a (85 (*) - Eenaria 58 l 100-9 80 4-11 C 1)1CL820BD (reactor core 1) Note F
- i isolation cooling system i
I valve lE51*F013 conduit)
I'
- 2) 1CK820Bn (reactor core ,
- 2) Note F i ; isolation cooling system valve 1E51*ro68 conduit)
[ 3)1CL820BC (reactor core 3) Note F i isolation cooling system 1
valve 1E51*F013 conduit) i i i
f 1 .
I i
- I l
49e;dnent ' 6 3 of 11 February 1985 l
! I
1 i
} TABLE 3.61-50b (Cont)
Piping S ystes: . Reactor Water Cleanup System (Outside containment)
Piping Line Numbers: 1-WCS-003-14-3 l ts -
consequence of Piping Failure: Jet Impingement.
J Break _L9 cation Break Protection Break El I z Type s neasures Evaluation 19151 lit-1B). litrial 111-151 883 EEEggtial Tagggis (33 (*3 Eggarks 7; ,98'-10 86-1 9-3 C None
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- i g B j AQaJdsent 16 4 of 11 February 1985
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'i.;
TABLE 3.6 A-50b (Con t)
Piping System: Beactor Water Cleanup System (Outside Containeest) l15 Pipitg Line Numbers: 1-WCS-003-13-2 CA seque nce of Piping Failure: Jet Impingement r
1 1 Break- Protection Bi aa k -El_____ Break Legation I E Ty pes Measures Evaluation j E9131 fft-Agt Jft-ini J11-int (8) Essentigl_IgEggts (a) (e) Eggerks 38 j ,
204 105-5 79-0 3-5 1/16 C None i
i t
l t 1 i' 1 1 s
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1 4 4
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4 ctdaent 16 5 of 11 February 1985 l I i
I' i . RBS FSAP I '
I TABLE 3.6A-50b (Cont)
Piping System: Reactor Water Cleanup System (Outside Containment) l 16 Piping Line Numbers: 1-DCS-003-13-3 Crgsequesce of Piping Failure: Jet Impingement ,
, e l
t i i Break Protection Break ___l___4_DERAh_1ggation E I 1 Types Measures Evaluation E21R1 f f t-iRL - lfi-ill 111-131 (13 Essential Targets (3) (*) _
9emarks is 30 9 -9
- 77 8-10 C None i; -
i i
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i A30Cdeen t 16 6 of 11 February 1985
, I I
I i
, i Ik ! BBS FSAR
{ TABLE 3.61-50b (Cont)
Piping System: Beactor ' Water Cleanup System (Outside Containment) l us Fiping Line Numbers: 1-WCS-003-12-3
.C:ssequence.of Piping Failures Jet Impingement i t i I
_._. RISAK_LEEg11gn Break Protection IBreak i El 1 Z Types Measures Evaluation lEgini ($t . int J11-ini fft-int cal Essggtial_Igggets (3) (*) gegarks
- , j36; 98-1' 1/2 84-0 3-5 C None is
, 43 97-9 85-6 1/2 8-7 C None
! i 4 i
l I i
4 4
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Ameidaent 16 7 of 11 February 1985 I s
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e :S w
-- h RBS FSAR-
! TABLE 3.6A-50b (Cont) -
i
! Pipitg System: Reactor Water Cleanup System (Outside containment) hs
[ Pipirq line Numbers: 1-WCS-003-15-3 Co sequence of Piping Failure: Jet Impingement i
d, Break Lgq3*, ion Break Protection i Brock - El 1 3 Types Neasures Evalua tion E91JL1 lil:1Rl lidBl 11L Esgggligl 3 Ege),s (3) (*3 Rggarks II.1, *.19L
.* 72 l 98-10 77-11 9-2 C Mone
.k 1
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4l t'
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i 6
j $3&Sdeent 6 8 of 11 February 1985 i
+ ,
I 4
si $
g }! TABLE.3.6A-50b (Con t)
' Piping System: Peactor Water Cleanup System (Outside Containment)
Piping Line Nunters: 1-BCS-004-171-2 ls Crasequence of Piping Failure: Jet Impingement f
RIgag_ Legation Brea k Protection i Break El I E Types Measures Evaluation Zaint lit: int JIt:lal 111:1E1 (*) Isstalial_Iarsets (3) (*) ** marks 90 117-9.1/2 107-11 0-0 C 1)1CC8175G5 (main steam valve 1) Note F
' 1B21*N0YF09BC conduit) t
' 2)1CC817BG4 (main steam valve 2) Mote F 1B21*50TF098A conduit) 3,
- 3) 1CC 8178 G7 (feedvater valve 3) Note F 1FUS*MOY7A conduit) 4)1CC817BG8 (feedwater valve 4) Note F
[ 1FWS*N0Y7B conduit) 90p 176-0 1/2 .116-3 - (2-0) C None
! I l 988 117-9i1/2 116-6 7/8 2-0 C None
?-
l
- l. .
i i
A;cndaen t,16 9 of 11 February 1985 i
l l
h , RBS FS&P
- j. ;
TABLE 3.61-50b (Cont)
Piping System: Beactor Water cleanup System (Outside Containment) l' Piping Lise Numbers: .1-NCS-004-173-2 CSasequence 'of Piping Failure: Jet Impingement
!i
_i REtik_12G1112R Break Protection Break i El X 1 Types Measures Evaluation
'Eglai .Ilh13L- (ft-131 fft-int ca) ____XEERR1181. Targets t3) (*) -Pesarks
- i is 108 124 121-5 3/4 6-8 5/8 C Mone t
I i, I
1 2 e t
i i
?
, i I
10endment !16 . 10 of 11 February 1985 i
t l
>l r
j FBS FS&W i
TABLE 3.61-50b (Con t)
, I !
t I Reactor Water Cleanup System (Outside Containment)
, 'Pipitq Piping SystesLine Nembers: t 1 -WC S- 00 4- 22 -2 l ts l Conseqsence of Piping Failure: Jet Impingement
!l i
- ' Bgggk_Lgcation Break Protection
-Break Ei_. I 1 Types Measures Evaluation Egini lit: int litzial Jft-ia) (*) Egsggligl_Iggggts (3) (*) Eggarks t - i
!117 124-9 120-6 1/8 -(6-6 7/8) C 1)1CL824BB (feedwater valve 1) Mote F ts i
i 1FES*ROY78 conduit) i !'
2)1CC817BG8 (feedvater valve 2) Note F i
- 1FWS*MOY7B conduit)
!I
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A mendmen t .16 11 of 11 February 1995 i
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,_ _ _ _ . - - ~ ~
i I
}~ NOTES TOR TABLES 3.~ 6A-25 THROUGH 3. 6A-51 '
~~~
]"
(15C = Circumferential break L = Longitudinal break ca>R = Blowdown from RPV only H = Blowdown from other end (i.e., header or pump side)
D = Blowdown from a dead end such as a normally closed is valve (3' Protection measures include:
- a. Pipe whip restraint
- b. Protective structures (i.e., impacted structures are designed for pipe rupture loads in accordance h SRP 3.6.1)
- c. Redundant safety systems
- d. Separation and isolation by plant arrangement. l1s
( 4 ' ACI = System affected by pipe whip or jet impinge-
. ment is required for containment isolation. Is Analysis of the system indicates that the i system requirement can be met.
3.
DSS = System impacted by a whipping pipe or by the jet diccharging from a ruptured pipe is a system required for plant safe shutdown,
) and has been designed or analyzed to withstand 3, 1,3 the impact loading. 1 DSI = System impacted by the whipping pipe or by the jet has been designed to maintain structural integrity and to prevent pipe break initiation l1s if the impacted target is a piping system.
NRS = System affected by pipe whip or jet impinge- 4
- ment is not required for safe shutdown. Is Failure consequence is acceptable.
PRR = Target is protec,ted by pipe rupture restraint (s).
RL = Rupture line impacts its own piping, component, 15 or support. No failure consequence needs to be considered.
LSS = System affected by pipe whip or jet impinge-ment is a system required for safe shutdown. 3, However, the failure consequ2nce is acceptable since alternative systems are available to shut Amendment 16 1 of 4 February 1985 c.
. _ . _ . . _ _ ~ _ . - - _ -
--down-the plant even-if-loss-of-site power and is single active-failure were considered to be -
coincident with the rupture event.
SPI = Piping, piping component, or pipe support impacted by a whipping pipe or by the jet discharging from l a ruptured pipe is of smaller or equal pipa size is and smaller or equal wall thickness. No tailure consequence of the impacted pipe needs to be considered.
Note A: Of. the.four resistance temperature detectors (RTDs) associated with post-accident monitoring (1 CMS *RTD41A, B, C, and D), the failure of one of
-them due to jet impingement from a high energy line is break .(HELB) is acceptable. Since this failure and a worst single active or passive failure will cause a maximum of three of the four RTDs to be inoperative, at least one RTD will remain in L service.
~
Note B: The failure of one hydrogen igniter in the drywell
' due to jet impingement from a HELB is acceptable r since this failure and a worst single active or i passive failure will not affect the safety function of this system.
Note C: Since the break has the equivalent flow area of approximately two' times the flow area of a safety 4
~ relief valve, the failure of two safety relief valves if the HPCS is available or- the failure of one safety relief valve if HPCS is unavailable, is-acceptable.
Note D: It is. acceptable to fail this reactor pressure vessel (RPV) level and pressure instrument . piping-because. of jet impingement from a HELB since this instrumentation, even though- associated with the ECCS . instrumentation, is -not required to
. automatically initiate the ECCS, provided' this instrument pressure leg piping fails as a break and not as a crimp.
Note E: The failure of .this containment penetration isolation valve to close because of jet impingement from a . main steam .HELB is acceptable-since the piping inside the containment associated with this
-penetration will remain full.of water from'the RPV and thereby provide a water _ seal.
Amendment 16 2 of 4 -February 1985
1 7- ..
. _ . _ . . _ _ . ~ ' ~ ~ ~ ~
- RBS FSAR Note ~F: The portion ~of the essential system is not required for safe shutdown.
Note G: Jet impingement restraint is incorporated in the plant design such that the line will accept the jet impingement load.
J Note H: A more detailed review of the jet shows that the
( item is either outside the jet cone or shielded by existing design.
Note I: Total failure of this line is acceptable since the drywell sample flow will be maintained.
Note J: A failure of the 3/4 in instrument branch line will not degrade the ECCS function.
. Note K: A shield is incorporated into the design, and/or the I item is relocated to mitigate the jet consequence.
I 16 I
Note L: These items are not required to isolate the subject break and are nonessential. Their failure will automatically trip the reactor protection system (fail safe).
f Note M: Failure of these flow transmitters is acceptable for the associated HELB. These items monitor flow from the Division 2 standby service water pumps and flow into the standby service water system cooling tower.
The operator can verify flow by monitoring the pump discharge pressure and pump motor run current that is indicated in the main control room.
Note N: These flow transmitters, which detect leakage based upon high flow, are not required once the break has occurred since the area temperature monitors will detect and isolate the break.
Note P: The redundant area ambient temperature elements in each volume-will provide the automatic breakpoint isolation. The differential temperature elements in each volume are no't required for the HELB event.
Note Q: The temperature element served by this conduit is not in the postulated break location volume.
Note R: A failure of these cable trays is acceptable since
the fuel building ventilation system (HVC) cables requried to power the ventilation fans and air-operated dampers (AODs) can be repaired within 4 hr.
Amendment 16 3 of 4 February 1985 4
- - - - n -- - . , - - , - ~- m. , , - e,. ,-, , , . ..
The --spent-fuel-pool-cooling -system pumps that are -
cooled by these fans may be shut down for 16 approximately 4 hr before an unacceptable spent fuel pool temperature is reached.
i Y
)-
)
i_.
).
l.
1 .
L Amendment 16 4 of 4 February 1985 L_
A NOTES:
- 1. BREAK LOCATIONS ARE DESIGNATED BY.h
- 2. PIPE BREAK RESTRAINTS ARE DESIGNATED BY 1 MSS *PRR XXX__ /
- 3. STRESS RESULTS ARE GIVEN IN TABLE 3.6A-18b CORRESPONDING TO THE NUMERICAL BREAK POINTS l SHOWN HERE. I
- 4. SYMBOLS FOR THE TYPES OF BREAKS l
. X -CIRCUMFERENTIAL BREAK ONLY e .CIRCUMFERENTIAL & LONGITUDINAL BREAK i l
C11 *VF021'B f0 37 /
l 38 ( ', %2.pj, ,
' g, @ @ 02 -1. +
7 C11*VF020A',h1C11*V 002 225-4 -
21 042 9$
C11-VF020B
' </
o # @D003A%@
FLT h p- 025-11 -4' 10' 29 FLTD003
'~ '
a' -
Q Vi .
,7
'C11-PC001B
, 2 CRD PUMP t
( -
._-___..____.__v....__...- .
UP, ,
t N' h E, i r y,,
1RDS*PRR806 "O" GAP ,/ w,
_y 3; 1C11*MOVF083, DN, i 7,
@ '< 002-22-2!
8l h 98 gg Af CONTAINMENTj WALL _p-4.,;._, '
O92<, .
~
91 N (
~
- 70. l 7 PEN.1KJB*Z29 \
Y'e AZ.178*, EL.116'-0"]i _
. 1
. Q :'l .a< ,
TI -
APERTURE i
% 73q, CARD
{
N I ep ,
16h;~a. j r
>I 4
Also Available On i Aperture Card [
I u
'. .J a -
3 mw 85022101204 0(
- MP , FIGURE 3.6A-24c1 HIGH ENERGY PIPE BREAKh
, CONTROL ROD DRIVE PIPINGl
- FUEL BUILDING fi RIVER BEND STATION j.
FNAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT ,[
'~
AMENDMENT 16 FEBRUARY 1985
k i
SHIELD BUILDING WALL Z7
{
UP (FIG. 3.6A-23) #, ) )
d g/ 1G33*W CALLED %
NORTH N 4
- -1-WCS-006-19-3 6
EL 106'-9" r i // 1 AUX. BUILDING ROOF EL 104'-3"-
l ]
1-WCS-003-13-3 > "
1G33-VF043B 1G3 i
Also Available On
, Aperture Cef S. EL 97'-9" l
/
' ~
- STAT-1B -*- ST) 1G33 VF005A RWCU PUMP
%. EL 97'-9" 1G33-C001 A 9. EL 97'-9" RWCU PUMP 1G33-C001B
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
, - . . - - . - -- - -- ---- - - ~~ ~ ~~ ~~
l r
(<
L_
t
,i r
1-WCS*PRR 901 (ZERO GAP) i JET IMPINGEMENT WALL '
l 1-WCS-006-11-3
- E -T -
OVF004 3 ! . EL 116*-0" FL EL 114'-0"
~-
_-] r- t I
=
BREAK EXCLUSION REGION
~
w f
^
x3" RED ELB (TYP) ;
T. EL 106'-9" ANCHOR 5
- EL 106'-9" I
f NOTES:
-- 1-WCS-003-12-3 1. BREAK LOCATIONS ARE DESIGNATED BY -
- 2. PIPE BREAK RESTRAINTS ARE DESIGNATED BYIXXX*PRRXXX
- 3. STRESS RESULTS ARE GIVEN IN TABLE
)-VF043A 3.6A-20 CORRESPONDING TO THE NUMERICAL BREAK POINTS SHOWN HERE
- 4. SYMBOLS FOR THE TYPES OF BREAKS:
( Q. EL 97'-9" M CIRCUMFERENTIAL BREAK ONLY
/- e CIRCUMFERENTIAL AND LONGITUDINAL I
BREAK !
T-1 TI i APERTURE CARD 8502215120 01 FIGURE 3.6A-26
- HIGH ENERGY PIPE BREAK +
~.s REACTOR WATER CLEANUP PIPING - OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT L
RIVER BEND STATION FNAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT l
f AMENDMENT 16 FEBRUARY 1985
Z-129 M 1G33*MO (FIG. 3.6A-29) ; _ '. _)W
,, ! SLEEVE UP SHIELD BUILDING h WALL CALLED 3 NORTH 4 1-WCS-004-20-3 4"x3' EL 106'-9" g O
AUX. BUILDING ROOF EL 104'-3" _
1G33-VF013A 1G33-)
1-WCS-003 15-3 1-WCS 1G33-VF012A 1G33-VF012B EL 99'-10-1/4" r , EL 99'-10-1/4" 3"x2" RED (TYP) 3"x2" RED (T l
4r h
ij RWCU PUMP EL 97 RWCU PUMP /
k EL 97* 1G33-C001 A 1G33-C001B /
I
) ._.
1WCS*PRR902 JET IMPINGEMENT CALL x .
(ZERO GAP)
- F054 "
< EL 117'-6" :
0 1],8 ,
FL EL 114'-0"
< J C ..
BREAK EXCLUSION
- REGION 1-WCS-004-16-3
/
EL.106'-9" RED ELB (TYP)
ANCHOR NOTES:
- 1. BREAK LOCATIONS ARE DESIGNATED BY 7013B
- 2. PIPE BREAK RESTRAINTS ARE DESIGNATED BY IXXX* PRRXXX
- 3. STRESS RESULTS ARE GIVEN IN TABLE ;
j 3.6A-20 CORRESPONDING TO THE NUMERICAL BREAK POINTS SHOWN HERE
- 4. SYMBOLS FOR THE TYPES OF BREAKS:
X CIRCUMFERENTIAL BREAK ONLY
- CIRCUMFERENTIAL AND LONGITUDINAL
!003-14-3 BREAK _
1
( Also Avanam on 1 A Perture Card l i
FP)
TI 8502210120--03 l FK3URE 3.6A-27.
APERTURE CARD HIGH ENERGY PIPE BREAK ,
REACTOR WATER CLEANUP PIPING - OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT.
RIVER BEND STATION FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS FEPORT AMENDMENT 1'6! F5BRUARY 1985 ' l
-- - ~ - ^ '
V..-_,...-----~----
1 i
i ~
BREAK EXCLUSION _
~
REGION I
SHIELD BLDG WALL I l
l 4
' I SLEEVE IG33*MOVF039 '-
IWCS-004-171 2 l
{' Z4 g
^
~
- ' l h (FIG. 3.6A-29) ' q EL117-91/2" l
' IG33* FEN 040 5 DIA 6"X 4" RED 90 f
'lWCS-005 136-2 s
IWCS PRR91 (ZERO GAP) 5 DIA 180*
_ _ _ _ _ -~. . . . _ _ . . _ _
.p .
f UP 3 DIA 180* 1 RHS-010-14-2 h !
[ m (EL 12T 91/2" / EL 126'-0-1/2" IG33*VF0528
( EL 124*-9" ,
eIG33*VF052A Q EL 124" 9"
- -IWCS 004-173-2 JETIMPINGEMENT WALL 1-RHS010-65 2 V172 y5 DIA f 4"X 4" TEE Q EL 117-91/2" Q EL11T-91/2- IWCS-004-22 2 IG33*VF051 h
NOTES:
- 1. BREAK LOCATIONS ARE DESIGNATED BY
- 2. PIPE BREAK RESTRAINTS ARE DESIGNATED BY 000t*PRRJ00(
- 3. UPON COMPLETION OF PIPE STRESS ANALYSIS,SOME BREAKS AND/OR RESTRAINTS MAY BE ELIMINATED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CRITERIA DESCRIBED IN SECTION 3.6.2A
- 4. STRESS RESULTS ARE GIVEN IN TABLE 3.6A-20 CORRESPONDING TO THE NUMERICAL BREAK POINTS SHOWN HERE
- 5. SYMBOLS FOR THE TYPES OF BREAKS
)( - CIRCUMFERENTIAL BREAK ONLY Also Avallable On
_ . . . . . . . _ _ - _ _ _ AMure Cad 85 02210120 -of FIGURE 3.6A-28 i APERTURE CARD HIGH ENERGY PIPE BREAK REACTOR WATER CLEANUP l
I PIPING OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT RIVER BEND STATION FNAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT AMENDMENT 16i FEBRUARY 1985 i "
l l
WP Q EL13 1 DTM-002-75 4 WP Q EL133' 15/8" WP Q EL 130'-9" WP Q EL133' 5 3/4" W
1-DTM-002-76-4 89 BREAK EXCLUSION AREA / yp I! s
! EL 120'-0 28 JET IMPINGEMENT WALL 88 wpg 27 44 y
) EL 116'-7 7/8 ' 35 GUARD PIPE "-
1 DTM-003-5211 WP Q EL h WP 5 -DTM-003 78-4 120' 03/4" 1821 =. WPQE DIA MOV
/ 1821 *M OVF085 F020 l[ 18 ,,
p,- , -, -
1821.MOVF019 , W( 1 1/2" 1DTM-003 523-2 1-MSS-024-47 4 WPQ EL 1DTM PRR-921 v 6 WAYS ZERO GAP p, - WP ( EL 12T-91/2" WP G EL114' 3 79 1-DTM-002-77-4 WP Q EL 114'-111/3' WP Q EL12T 9 3/4" 82 _/
81 WP Q EL11T-79/16" 1-M SS-024-48-4 4 34 b WP y EL114* 79/16"
a E 1 DTM-002-74-4 ~
a _.
WP Q EL120' 5 5/8" \
M u ( WP Q EL 118'-0 7/8" -
~
] WP Q EL 114'-7 9/16" h 424-46-4 1 MSS-024-45-4 WP Q EL 12T 101/2" s PWP Q EL 120'-31/16" '
>CP Q EL 110' ,
PWP Q EL11T-119/16" WP(EL11T-111/2" >
OP ( EL114'-10 7/16" WP Q EL 111'-101/8" ._
WP ( EL 111'-9 9/16" '
( EL 114*-103 /8" WP q EL 110'-4 9/16- TURBINE BLDG >
WP Q EL 111'-811/16" i EL114' 10 5/18" g WP EL 110'-5 7/16*
114' 10 1/4" b112'-0 3 / 8" 5 DIA \g 1 0'37/16" h
w j j
[
l ^] 5 DIA 4 18~
hl '
I s7 1 DTM-003110-4 l 1 DTM-003 79-4 WP Q EL 110~-41/4" L WP Q EL 110'-41/8" WP (EL 110' 3 3/4" f 98" WP Q EL 111' 10 3/4"
~
. . - i
_ APERTURE !
~
norss- h Ave w CARD
- 1. BREAM LOCATIONS ARE DESIGNATED BY , Aperture Ord 2 PPE BREAK RESTRAINTS ARE DESIGNATED BY 1XXX*PRRXXX 3.UPON COMPLETION OF PIPE STRESS ANALYSIS, SOME -
8502210120~D WIEAKS AND/OR RESTRAINTS MAY BE EUMINATED IN i ACCORDANCE WITH THE CRITERIA DESCRIBED IN _
j SECTION 3.6.2A !
4 sinESS RESULTS ARE GIVEN IN TABLE 3.6A 17b FIGURE 3.SA-33C' i' CORRESPONDING TO THE NUMERK:AL BREAK POINTS sHOWN HERE. HIGH ENERGY PIPE BREAK :
O, SYMBOLS FOR THE TYPES OF BREAKS MAIN STEAM DRAIN PIPING IlL AUXIUARY BUILDING h M - CIRCUMFERENTIAL BREAK ONLY e -CIRCUMFERENTIAL & LONGITUDINAL BREAK RIVER BEND STATION FINAL SAFETY ANALYS8S REPORT !
AMENDMENT 16 \ FEBRUARY 19851 l