ML20106D496
| ML20106D496 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Pennsylvania State University |
| Issue date: | 10/06/1992 |
| From: | Voth M PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV., UNIVERSITY PARK, PA |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20106D498 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9210130027 | |
| Download: ML20106D496 (6) | |
Text
_ --
k I
PENNSTATE EC'i%m i College of Enpr;eering Bre.ucale Nudear Reactor Bailding Radution Science and Enpneering Cei. r lhe Pennsylvania State Unisersity Un.scrsity Park. PA 16802 2301 Annual Operating Repon, FY 91-92 PSBR Technical Specifications 6.6.1 License R-2, Docket No. 50-5
~ - '
October 6,1992 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attention: Document Control Desk Washington, D. C. 20555
Dear Sir:
Enclosed please find th' Annual Operating Report of the Penn State Breazeale Reactor (PSBR). This report covers the period from July 1,1991 through June 30,1992, as required by technical specifications requirement 6.6.1. Also included are any changes applicable to 10 CFR 50.59.
The Safety Analysis Report applicable to this license was amended during the previous reporting period (April 19,1991) for two reasons. First,it described the new reactor control system that was installed in August and September 1991 (this reporting period).
Second,it incorporated changes so as to update the SAR as of the date of tbc amendment.
Changes to the S AR made since April 19,1991 are enclosed. _
A copy of the Thirty-seventh Annual Progress Report of the Penn State Radiation Science and Engineering Center is included as supplementary information.
Sincerciv yours, Ma Wus/6% 1. Voth Director, Radiation Science and Engineering Center Enclosures cc: Region I Administrator U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission D. A. Shirley 1
08000i 921013o027 921oo6 / l PDR ADOCK 05000005 //L i
\
l' R An Equal opportunity Universay PDR / Q
.)
/
1 PENN STATE IIREAZEALE REACTOR Annual Operating Report, FY 91-92 PSBR Technical Specifications 6.6.1 License R-2, Docket No. 50-5 -i Reactor Utilization The Penn State Breazeale Reactor (PSBR) is a TRIGA Mark 111 facility capable of 1 MW steady state operation, and 2000 MW peak power pulsing operation. Utilization of the reactor and its associated facilities falls it.to three major categories:
EDUCATION utilization is primarily in the wnn of laboratory classes conducted for graduate and undergraduate students and numerous high school science groups. These classes vary from neutron activation analysis of an unknown sample to the calibration of a reactor control rod. in addition, an average of 2000 visitors tour the PSBR facility each year.
RESEARCH accounts for a large pnm oficactor time which involves Radionuclear Applications, Neutron Radiograpy, a myriad of research programs by faculty and graduate students throughout the University, and various applications by the industrial sector.
TRAINING programs for Reactor Operators and Reactor Supervisors are continuously offered and are tailored to meet the needs of the participants.
Individuals taking part in these programs fall into such categories as power plant operating personnel, graduate students, and foreign trainees.
The PSBR facility operates on an 8 AM - 5 PM shift, five days a week, with an occasional 8 AM - 8 PM or 8 AM - 12 Midnight shift to accommodate reactor operator-training programs or research projects.
Summary of Reactor Operating Experience.
Technical Specifications requirement 6.6.La.
Between July 1,1991 and June 30,1992, the PSBR was critical for 431 hours0.00499 days <br />0.12 hours <br />7.126323e-4 weeks <br />1.639955e-4 months <br /> or 1.7 hrs / shift suberitical far 541 hours0.00626 days <br />0.15 hours <br />8.945106e-4 weeks <br />2.058505e-4 months <br /> or 2.1 hrs / shift used while shutdown for 436 hours0.00505 days <br />0.121 hours <br />7.208995e-4 weeks <br />1.65898e-4 months <br /> or 1.7 hrs / shift not available 187 hours0.00216 days <br />0.0519 hours <br />3.091931e-4 weeks <br />7.11535e-5 months <br /> or 0? hrs /shif t Total usuage 1595 hours0.0185 days <br />0.443 hours <br />0.00264 weeks <br />6.068975e-4 months <br /> or 6.L rs/ shift The reactor was pulsed a total of 92 times with the following reactivities:
less than $2.00 61
$2.00 to $2.50 30 greater thr.n $2.50 1 The square wave mode of operation was used 68 times to power levels between 100 and 500 KW.
Total energy produced during this report period was 211 MWil with a consumption of 11 grams of U-235.
4
- 2 Unscheduled Shuflowns Technical Speufications freuirement 6Mb. s The 9 un?lanned scrams during the July 1,1991 to June 30,1992 perimi are describet below, '
July 23,1991 A loss of electrical power to the building during a tnunderstonn caused a tractor scram from 1 KW.
October 9,1991 - Reactor scram (RSS hard wired reactor safety system) while at i MW but no indication of the cause.
October 10,1991 Reactor scram (RSS) while at 1 MW but no indication of the f cause. Two relays in the RSS were replaced since they could have intennittent ;
fail"~s causing the scrams. Noise was also found on the wide range channel.
Subequent tests showed the noise magnitude sufficient to cause a scram. The RSS
, scram circuit was changed so that scrams latch. A filter was installed in the wide tante monitor to prevent scrams due to noise.
Octooer 18,1991 - Reactor wide range sciam at - 1080 KW. Operator was manually moving the transient ud using shod bumps upon reaching 900 KW power level while in auto 3 male. The computer scans the keyboard to see if the rod up or down buttons art depressed; depending on the computer scanning rate and the opera:or bump rate, the computer may see the button as constantly depressed and therefort will be ramping the nxl at an arreasing rate towards its maximum withdrawal rute. - As a result of the investigation, the transiert nxi up maximum vehicity and ramp veloc.ity were set for 50'7e of their previous values and training on proper ud movement was done for the licensed staff.
February 13,1992 Reactor wide range scram at 1060 KW while leveling power at 1000 KW. Circumstances and investigative results were the same as the October 18,1991 event described above. Additional training concerning proper nxi movement was done for the licensed staff.
March 5,1992 - Reactor wide range scram at 1040 KW. A udent operator in a Nuclear !!ngineering laboratory class had used a O period in auto mode to shut down from a previous operation. A student then did a startup and failed to insen a new period request before he enten:d auto. Reactor anwer increased from i KW to 1040 KW on a 0.4 second period as the auto control er was unable to handle the situation. On March 6, the staff conducted varicus startups (using a O period and changing the control system's deviation limiter) to study how the control system tracted to certain demands on it. llased on those findings, adjustments were made to the deviation limiter and period interlock to prevent the same event from recurring. Following further testing by the reactor staff and AECL (system designer)in April of 1992, permanent tuning changes were made to the control system software to prevent another March 5,1992 type of senun and improve overall system perfonmmee.
March 10,1992 A reactor scram occurred due to a " transient nxi interlock validation failure", as the transient rod approached its upper limit during a nxi calitiration. An investigation revealed that the two Transient Rod UP EOT (end of travel) switches don't always close at the same time; therefore, the hard wired -
safety s,vtem and the DCC-X control computer don't always simultaneously sense the axl n, up (this is compounded by the fact that DCC X only senses events on a cycle basis). New parts were ordered for a redesign of the switches and mount.
The staff was instructed on this problem; normally nmning the rod continuously for
__ _ , _ , . _ . _ _ _ . ., ._ _ , . _ . ~ _ . _ . - _ , -
3 the last 1(K) units (assuming this is desirable from a reactivity point of view) will .
assure the scram does not occur. The nxi was being bumped m very small increments towards its upper limit when the scram occurred. Nonnally, the transient rod is only ndsed to its upper limit during rod calibration, usually once or twice a year. New EOT switches were installed July 30,1992.
April I ,1992 - Reactor scram at I watt while increasing power; Shim, Safety and Transient Up Interlock Validation Failure indications. The regulating rod up button ;
was being pushed at the time of the scram. The regulating rod up pushbutton utilizes several sets of contacts; one set goes to the RSS hard wired tractor safety system and one set goes to the DCC-X control computer. One set was stuck and the validation failure resulted since both sets were not activated at the r,ame time; this was determined using the DCC-X control computer's bar chan display to determ switch status. The event could not be repeated and the switch was examined for mechanical or electrical problems but none was identined.
April 15,1992 - Reactor scram at 2 watts while increasing power; same circumstances and investigative rsults as the A 1ril 1,1992 scram described above.
Again no mechanical or electrical problem couk be seen with the regulating rod up pushbutton swit<;h but it was replaced.
Slajor Sluintenance With Safety Significance Technical Specifications reauirement 6.6.1.c.
No major preventative or corrective maintenance operations with safety signiGeance have been perfonned during this report period. ;
Major Changes Reportable Under 10 CFR 50.59 Technical Specifications reouirement 6 6.1.d.
Facility Changes ,
August 12,1991 to October 7,1991 A new reactor control ar i safety system was >
installed and tested. This system is described in be Safety Analysis Report (April 19,1991) submitted during the last reporting period. This installation was donc under a license amendment rather than a 50.59 change.
October 28,1991 - The evacuation alarm system was changed from a horn system to a medium toned whoop on the Public Address (PA) system. The PA system, which provides complete building coverage,is now continuously on an UPS (Unintemiptable Power Supply). Previously, only three horns of the old evacuation alann system could be on UPS because of the large current demand; thus building covempe was limited during power outages.
December 19,1992 The new reactor control and safety sy> tem consists of a DCC-X control computer and a I?CC Z monitoring computer. D(,C Z can communicate via a kical area network (LAN) to remote monitors. To tak vjvantage of this system feature, a LAN monitor was installed in the reacto Nilding west stairwell, the normal re-entry point following a building evacuation. The west stairwell LAN monitor displays reactor parameters such as control rod position, power level, pool level infonnation and readouts from the major radiation monitorii , equipmcnt.
Software was developed during June to August 1992 that will allow historical trends to be displayed on the LAN so past events can be analyzed. This I W monitor replaced a light panel system which only indicated that a certain type of monitor had cat d an evacuation.
~ . . _ _ , , ,- _ _ _ _ _ _ - . _ - _ _ . _. __
4 February 17 19,1992 Two reactor bay area monitors, two reactor bay particulate .
air monitors, one reactor bearn lab atra monitor and one cobalt 60 facility area monitor (all Victorten brand) were replaced with new liberline brand instrumentation.
Old System New System llay East 1-10e7 ml%r (lon) 0.1-10e4 nilMr (GM)
Ilay West 1 10e7 ml%r (lon) 0.1 10v4 mR/hr (GM) 1-10c4 R/hr (lon)
Beam Lab 0.1 10e4 mR/hr (GM) 0.1 10e4 mR/hr (GM)
Cobalt 6011ay 0.1 10e4 mR/hr(GM) 0.1 10e4 mlOr (GM) ,
Air East 10-10e6 CPM (GM) 10-10e5 CPM (GM)
Air West 10-10e6 CPM (GM) 10-10e5 CPM (GM)
June 30,1992 - A new system was installed to provide facility alanus to Police '
Services via telephone lines. The system can send 17 (with capability for expansion to 64) individual coded alanns to Police Services (i.e. pool level low, intrusion alann, cast bay radiation high, etc.). With the previous system, Police Services could not distinguish, for example, between a radiation alann and pool . -
level low alarm As a pan of this system installation, all alanns to Police Services are hard wired. Previously, only a few were hard wired; most alanus te Police Services were initiated through the DCC X control computer prior to this change. ,
Procedures All prxedures are Irviewed as a minimum biennially, and on an as needed basis.
Changes during the year were numerous and no attempt will be made to list them.
A current copy of all facility procedmes will be made available on request, Pmeedare changes considered major were done to directly reflect Tech Spec changes associa:c4 with se April 19,1991 license amendment. .
New Tests and lixperiments None having safety significance.
Radioactive Effluents Released Technical Snecifications rmuirement 6 61.c.
Liquid There were no liquid efnuent releases under the reactor license for the report period. ,
Liquid from the regeneration of the reactor demineralizer is evaporated and the distillate recycled for pool water makeup. The evaporator concentrate is dried and the solid salt residue is disposed of in the same manner as other solid radioactive waste at the University.
Liquid radioactive waste from the radioisotope laboratories at the PSBR is under the .
University byproduct materials license and is transferred to the llealth Physics Office for disposal with the waste from other campus laboratories. Liquid waste disposal techniques include storage for decay, release to the sanitary sewer as per i _10 CFR 20, and solidification for shipment to licensed disposal sites.
l l1 lL
- - . - , , , - -- --.n . ,, . . . . - , , ,,. x ~.v . , , n , , , , - - <
7 5 .l l
Gaseous ;
The only gaseous efnuent is Ar-41, which is released from disolved air in the ;
-reactor pool water, dry irradiation tubes, and air leakage from the pneumatic sample i transfer systems. ;
The amount of Ar-41 released from the reactor pool is very dependent upon the !
operating power level and the length of time at power. The release per MF4 a highest for extended high power runs and lowest for intennittent low powe .uns.
The concentration of Ar-41 in the reactor bay and the bay exhaust was raeasured by >
the llealth Physics staff during the summer of 1986. Measurements were made for conditions oflow and high power runs simulating typical operatin;; cycles. Based on these measurements, an annual release of between 156 mci and 473 mci of Ar-41 is calculated for July 1,1991 to June 30,1992, resulting in an average concentration at the building exhaust between 10% and 29% of the MPL for umrstricted areas. These values represent the extremes, with the actual mlease being between the two values. The maximum fenceline dose using only dilution by the im/s whd into the lee of the building is on the order of 0.11 % to 0.33 % of the >
unrestricted area MPC During the report periN!, sevemi irradiation tubes were used at high enough power levels and for long enough runs to pmduce significant amounts of Ar 41. The calculated annual production was 68 ::1Ci. Since this production occuntd in a stagnant volume of air confined by close fitting shield plugs, most of the Ar 41 decayed in place befor: being released to the reactor bay. The reported releases fro ; dissol,ed air in the reactor pool are based on measurements made,in pa t, whe. 1 dry irradiation tube was in use at high lower levelr, the Ar-41 releases from the tunes are pan of rather than in addition to t 1e release figures quoted in the previous paragraph.
The use of the pneumatic transfer systems was minimal during this period and any Ar-41 releases would be insignificant since they operate with CO-2 and Nitrogen as fill gases.
Environmental Surveys Technical Soccific.ations reauirement 6.61 f.
The only environmental surveys performed were the routine TLD gamma-ray dose measurements at the facility fenceline and at control points in residential areas several miles away. This reporting year's measumments (in millirems) tabulated '
below represent the July 2,1991 to June 30,1992 period. A comparison of the North, West, East, and South fenceline measurements with the control measurements at ilouserville (1 mile t.way) and Bellefonte (10 miles away) show the differences to be similar to those in the past. .
Ist Orr 2nd Otr 2n' QR 4th Otr Ietal Fence North 17.89 21.64 20.23 18.57 78.33 Fence West 18.93 22.04 19.03 18.07 78.07 Fence East 21.75 24.41 21.39 21.61 89.16 Fence South 20.27 20.12 18.15 16.06 74.69 Control-Bellefonte 21.27 21.0" 21.19 18.10 81.56 Control-llouserville 15.69 le 1 16.66 14.31 66.15 Personnel- Exposures Technical Soccifications requirement 6.6.1.g.
No reactor personnel or visitors mceived dose equivalents in excess of 25% of the
- pennissible limits under 10 CFR 20.
7 _. __ - _
-p yr-p w. - - - ,- m-eE----., e - - - . ,- - , --- - ,r _. - y---m. - -= '