ML20104B249

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Proposed TS Table 4.3-1,Notation 3 Re Comparison of in-core to ex-core Axial Imbalance Above 15% Rate Thermal Power
ML20104B249
Person / Time
Site: Beaver Valley
Issue date: 09/02/1992
From:
DUQUESNE LIGHT CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20104B241 List:
References
NUDOCS 9209150186
Download: ML20104B249 (12)


Text

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ATTACHMENT A-1 Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit No. 1 i

Proposed Technical Specification Change No. 196 j

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Revise the Technical specification as follows:

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TABLE 4.3-1 (CONTINUED)

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NOTATION With the reactor trip system breakers closed and the-control. rod drive system capable of rod withdrawal.

e (1) -

If not performed in previous 7 days.

Heat balance only,-above 15% of RATED THERMALiPOWER.

(2)

M least once eVv'y 3i GHeeBye. Fu// hwer bays (EFP&

(' Compare incore to excore axial imbalance above'15% of-' RATED l

(3)

E THERMAL POWER.

Recalibrate if absolute-difference p_ 3 i

percent.-

(Not Used)

(4)

Each train. tested every other month.

(5)

Neutron detectors may be excluded from CHANNEL CALIBRATION.

.(6)

(7)

Below P-10.-

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(8)

E P-6.

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Regt...Od only when below Interlock Trip'Setpoint.-

.(10) -

Tr.e CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST _shall independently. verify the OPERABILITY of.the undervoltage.and shunt trip circuits'for

.the Manual-- Reactor-Trip Functien..

The: test shall also-verify

.the

. OPERABILITY of-the ' Bypass ' Breaker trip circuit (s).

The CHANNEL - FUNCTIONAL TEST shall independentlyiverify t.he (11)

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' OPERABILITY:~of tte undervoltage and shunt-trip'attacnments of-.the-Reactor Trip Breakers.

l (12)

Local manual shunt trip. prior to. placing] breaker-in service.

13)

Autoenatic undervoltage trip.,

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BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 1 3/4 3-13 g g g g*

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l 4-I ATTACHMENT A-2 l

l Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit No. 2 Proposed Technical Specification Change No. 63 i

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j Pevise the Technical Specification as follows:

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' $.F' n TABLE 4.:s-1-(Continued) f3 I

TABLE NOTATION q

With the reactor trip systes breakerir closed and the control rod-

. drive system capable of rod withdrawal.

4 (1)

If not performed in previous 7; days.-

I (2) -

Heat t,alance only, above 15% of RATED THERMAL POWER.

31 Effx.Me Fad /ber be s (Effh)

> Af has ence ever

" Compare. ncore to-ex[ ore axial imbalance above-55% of RATED TNERMAL l

(3)

POWER. Recalibrate if absolute difference > 3 percent.

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(4)

(Notused)

Each train tested every other month on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS.

(5):

Neutron detectors may be excluded:from CHANNEL-CALIBRATION.

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(6) f (7)

Below P_-10.

Below P-6i i

(8)

(9)

Required only when below Interlock Trip'Setpoint, i

The CHANNEL FUNCTIONI.LtTEST shall independently verify the --

(10)-

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OPERABILITY of the undervoltage-and shuat trip circuits-for the Manual Reactor Trip Functione 'The-test shall also verify-the' 0PERABILITY of the: Bypass Breaker trip circuit (s)..

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(11)-

The CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TESTL shallz independently. verify. the i

OPERABILITY of the.undervoltage and shunt trip attachments of the

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Reactor Trip Breakers.

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(12)-

Local-manual shunt trip prior to placing breaker-in service.

The specified surveillanceLinterval (13)-

Automatic:endervoltage trip.

- be extended to coincide with duri the first fue.-cycle comp 1 tion of the;first refuel ng outage.

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ATTACHMENT D Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2 Proposed Technical Specification Change No. 196/63 REVISION OF TABLE 4.3-1 NOTATION (3)

't 4

.d A.

DESCRIPTION OF AMENDMENT REQUEST The proposed amendment would modify the frequency specified for Table 4.3-1 Notation (3) from

" monthly" to "31 effective full power days" (EFPD).

B.

BACKGROUND Most surveillances which require a flux map are performed on a frequency of once per 31 EFPD, however, Table 4.3-1 specifies monthly (31 calendar days) for determining the incore to excore axial imbalance.

Modifying. the frequency for Table 4.3-1 Notation (3) from once per 31 calendar days to once per 21 EFPD will allow this surveillance to be performed on a frequency consistent with other surveillances associated with incore flux 2

maps.

C JUSTIFICATION Table 4.3-1 Potation (3) requires comparing the incore to excore axial imbalance.

Changing the frequency from once per 31 calendar days to once per 31 EFPD will ensure this surveillance is performed at the same time the flux maps are performed that verify the power distribution requirements are met.

Performing these surveillances simultaneously will reduce the number of flux maps required and decrease future wear on the incore flux. mapping components.

D.

SAFETY ANAL'rSIS Flux mapping is required by various technicel specifications to verify peaking factors are within the limits at least once per 31 EFPD and as required by other specifications.

One of these other specifications, Table 4.3-1 Notation (3), requires comparison of the incore and excore imbalance on a

monthly frequency and requires recalibration of the excore detectors if the absolute difference is greater than or equal to 3 percent.

Monthly is defined in the technical specifications as 31 days and is equivalent to 31 EFPD at 100 percent power.

A flux map is required to obcain the incore data to compare the incore to excore axial imbalance.

To ensure ill surveillances that require r

flux maps on a

regular basis are on the same frequency, Table 4.3-1 Notation (3) has been modified to specify a frequency of once per

$1 EFPD.

This will ensure eil surveillances that require a

flux ' map on a regular basis are performed at the same frequency and will eliminate additional flux maps that would otherwise have to be performed to satisfy the one surveillance with a monthly frequency.

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1 ATTACHMENT B, continued j

4 Prop.osed Technical Specification Change Nos. 196/63 l

Page 2 If the core was operated for an extended time period at low power the effect on incore to excore axial imbalance would be a fraction of the effect observed at full power operation.

The i

effects on incore to eycore axial imbalance due to operation at low pcwer for extended periods are bounded by technical specification rod insertion and delta fl.tx limits.

At low power, boron and exposure are-homogeneous effects while the control rod positior.

in the core could affect axial offset.

However, since the rod insertion and delta flux technical specificationn limit allowable rod positions, the effects are bounded by these limits, If a

difference greater than_ the allowable difference weve to

exist, the reactor trip setpoint is reduced and durir.g a

transient a

reactor trip will occur prior to reaching the design trip setpoirt.

This change will not affect the UFSAR accident analyses and plant safety is inherent in the system design, 3

therefore, changing this surveillance to a 31 EFPD frequency will not reduce the safety of the plant.

E.

NO SIGNIFICANT IUs2ARDS EV1 LUATION The no significant hazard considerations involved with the proposed amendment have been evaluated, focusing on the three standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92(c) as quoted below:

^

The Commission m3.y make a final determination, pursuant'to the procedures in paragraph 50.31, that a proposed. amendment to an operating license for

-a facility licensed under paragraph 50.21(b) or paragraph 50.22 oor for a testing facility involves no significant hi.'ards consideration, if operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not:

l (1)

Involve a

significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; or (2)

Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or (3)

Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

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kTTACHMENT B, continued Proposed Technical Specification Change Nos. 196/63 Page 3 The following evaluation is provided for the no significant hazards consideration standards.

1.

Does the change involve a

significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?

Incore flux mapping is performed in accordance w:h various technical specifications to verify the core is operating within the design limita and to verify the operability of the excore detectors.

Comparison of the incore and excore axial imbalance is required monthly in accordance,with Table 4.3-1 Notation (3) and requires res.alibration of the excore detectors if the absolute difference is greater than or equal to 3 percent.

Flux maps are required to perform this surveillance and this change preposes to modify the monthly surveillance frequency to once per 31 EFPD to ensure all surveillances that require flux maps on a regular _ basis are performed on the same frequency.

This will eliminare additional flux maps that would otherwise be performed tc satisfy tPis one surveillance with a monthly frequen,y.

The effects on incore to excore axial imbalance due to operation at low power for extended periods are bounded by control rod and delta flux limits.

At low power, boron and exposure are homogeneous effects while -the control rod position in the core could affect axial offset.

However, since the rod insartion and delta flux technical specifications limit allowable rod insertion, these effects are bounded by the limits.

If a

difference greater than tne allowable difference were to

exist, the reactor trip setroint in.-aduced-and during a transient a

reactor trip will occur prior to reaching the deuign trip setpoint.

The change will not affect the UFSAR accident.analysesLand plant safety is inherent in the system

design, therefore, changing this surveillance to a 31 EFPD frequency will not involve a

significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

.dTTACHMENT B, continued Proposed Technical Specification Change Nos. 196/63 Page 4 2.

Does the change create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any acnident previously evaluated?-

The proposed change will not significantly affect the overall method and manner of plant. operation and can-be accomodated without compromising

.the performance or qualification of cafety-related equipment.

This change will not adversely aifect the reliability of the reactor protection systnm or the excore detectors, therefore, this change will not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previourly evaluated.

3.

Dces the change involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety?

The surveillance frequency for comparing the incore to excore axial imbalance has been modified to be consistent with other: surveillances that require flux maps.

The proposed change does not af#ect any plant operating limits and is intended to reduce the potential for equipment failures due.to unnecessary testing.

Plant operation will be maintained within _ required limits to ensure that the plant design basis is met, thers tor a, the-proposed change does not involve a

significant reduction in a margin of safety.

F.

NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION DETERMINATION Based on the considerations expressed above, it'is concluded that the activities associated with this license amendment request satisfies the no significant hazards consideration standards of 10 CFR SG.92(c)

and, accordingly, a

no significant hazards consideration finding is justified.

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a ATTACHMENT C-1 Beaver Valley Power Station, Unic No. 1 Proposed Technical Specification Change No. 196

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DPR-66 TABLE 4.3-1 (CONTINUf1&

11QTATION With the reactor trip system breakers closed and the control rod drive system capable of rod withdrawal.

(1)

If not performed in previous 7 days.

(2)

Heat balance only, above 15% of RATED THERMAL POWER.

every 31 Effective Full Pover Days (EFPD)

(3)

At least once to excore axial imbalance above 15% of RATED l compare incare THERMAL POWER.

Recalibrate if absolute difference 23 percent.

(4)

(Not Used)

(5)

Each train tested every other month.

(6)

Neutron detectors may be excluded from CHANNEL CALIBRATION.

(7)

Below P-10.

(8)

Below P-6.

(9)

Required only when below Interlock Trip Setpoint.

(10)

The CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST shall independently verify the OPERABILITY of the undervoltage and shunt trip circuits for the Manual Reactor Trip Function.

The test shall also verify the OPERABILITY of the Bypass Breaker trip circuit (s).

(11)

The CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TECT shall independently verify the OPERABILITY of the undervoltage and shunt trip attachments of the Reactor Trip Breakers.

(12)

Local manual shunt trip prior to placing breaker in service.

(13)

Automatic undervoltage trip.

BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 1 3/4 3-13 Amendment No.

PRCPOSED

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ATTACHMENT C-2 l

Beaver Valley Power Station,' Unit No. 2 j

Proposed Technical Specification Change No. 63 4

4 Typed Page:

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NPF-73 IAELE 4.3-1 (Continued) f TABLE NOTATION i.

With the reactor trip system breakers closed and the control i

rod drive system capable of rod withdrawal.

If not performed in previous 7 days.

(1) 4 i-Heat balance only, above 15% of RATED THERMAL POWER.

j (2)

I (3)

At least once every 31 Effective Full Power Days (EFPD) l compare incore to excore axial imbalance above 15% of RATED THERMAL POWER.

Recalibrate if absolute difference 23

.l percent.

l (4)

(Not Used) l (5)

Each train tested-every other month on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS.

Neutron' detectors may be excluded from CHANNEL CALIBRATION.

(6)

Below P-10.

_(7)

(8)

Below P-6.

2

{

(9)

Required only when below Interlock Trip Sctpoint.

(10)

The CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST shall independently verify the i

OPERABILITY of the undervoltage and shunt trip circuits for the Manual Reactor Trip Function.

The test shall also verify the OPERABILITY of the Bypass

. Breaker trip circuit (s).

l-

-(11). -

The CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL _ TEST shall independently verify Cie-OPERABILITY of the undervoltage and shunt trip attachments.

of the Reactor Trip Breakers.

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(12)

Local manual shunt trip prior to placing breaker in service.

I (13)

Automatic undervoltage. trip.

The specified surveillance interval during the. first. fuel cycle l may_be extended to L

coincide with completion of the first refueling outage.

i BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 2 3/4 3-13 Amendment No.

PROPOSED 1

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