Text

Forwards Response to Sections 2.2,2.3 & 2.4 of DG Eisenhut Re NUREG-0612, Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants & Generic Ltr 81-07
	ML20104A882
Person / Time
Site:	Sequoyah
Issue date:	01/24/1985
From:	Domer J; TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
To:	Adensam E; Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
	REF-GTECI-A-36, REF-GTECI-SF, RTR-NUREG-0612, RTR-NUREG-612, TASK-A-36, TASK-OR GL-81-07, GL-81-7, NUDOCS 8502010553
	Download: ML20104A882 (119)
	v • d • e

{{#Wiki_filter:- TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY CHATTANOOGA. TENNESSEE 37401 400 Chestnut Street Tower II m - January 24, 1985 Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Attention: Ms. E. Adesam, Chief Licensing Branch No. 4 Division of Licensing U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Connission Washington, D.C. 20555

Dear Ms. Adensam:

In the Matter of ) Docket Nos. 50 -32 7 Tennessee Valley Authority ) 50 -328

References:

1. D. G. Eisenhut's letter chted December 22, 1980 regarding NUREG-0612, Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Plants. 2. D. G. Eisenhut's letter dated February 3,1981 l regarding Control of Heavy Loads (Generio Letter 81-07). TVA's msponse to Section 2.1 of Enclosure 3 to mferences 1 and 2 was submitted to you for our Sequoyah Nuclear Plant by L. M. Mills' March 1, 1982 letter. A draft technical evaluation report (TER) on the control of heavy loads for our Sequoyah Nuclear Plant was transmLtted to TVA by your June 30, 198 2 letter to H. G. Parris. A subsequent telephone conversation was held with NRC staff members on December 3,1982 to discuss TVA comments on the draf t TER. A supplemental response, which' provided additional information and connitments, as mquested by the NRC in the December 3,1982 telephone conversation was submitted on February 25, 1983 As requested by your June 30, 1982 letter to H. G. Parris, additional comments to guidelines Sa, 7a, and 7b were provided to you by the l February 28, 1984 letter- from L. M. Mills. An additional response to guideline.4 of the NRC TER regarding special lifting devices and a revision to footnote 1 for guideline 7a was provided to you by the December 7,1984 letter from J. W. Hufham. Enclosed is TVA's maponse to sections 2.2, 2 3, and 2.4 of references 1 and 2. go33-g1 h- > 0 0 327 P PDR An Equal Opportunity Employer ' g ( m

i Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation January 24, 1985 l If you have any questions concerning this matter, please get in touch with Jerry Wills at FTS 858-2683 Very truly yours, TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

7/I&

J. A. Domer Nuclear Engineer Sworn tgg.d subscr bed before me thi d1 - day of. 1985 Notary Public y g My Commission ExpiresO' O Enclosure oc: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (Enclosure) Region II Attn: Mr. James P. O'Reilly Administrator 101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900 Atlanta, Georgia 30323 ~N,

RESPONSE 'It) INGOSURE 3 TO NRC LETTER DATED DECEMBER 22, 1980 QUESTION 2.2 hBREG 0612 - CONTROL OF HEAVY LOADS AT ?CEEAR POWER P'. ANTS SHlUOYAH hVCLEAR PLANT

REFERENCES 1. Crano Manufacturer Association of America, Inc. Specifications for Electrical Overhead Traveling Crane s. C.M. A. A. Spe cifica tion Number 70. 1971. 2. American Welding Society, Inc. Specifications for Welded Highway and Railway Bridges. AW S D2.0-6 9, 1969. 3. U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants. NUREG-0612. 1980. 4. U. S. Regulatory Commi ssion. Singl e-Failure-Proof Crane s for Nuclear Power Plant s. NUREG-0554. 1979. 5. Tenne ssee Valley Authority. Design Criteria for Reactor Building Polar Cranes. SQ N-D C-2.6. 1970 6. Tenne ssee Valley Authority. Design Criteria f or Auxiliary Building Crane. SQ N-D C-V-1.1.3. 1970. 7. U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Sei smic Design Classifica tion. Regul atory Guide 1.29. 1973. 8. Tenne s see Vall ey Authority. Preoperational Test for 125 Ton Auxiliary Building Crane. TV A-43 B. 1979. 9 Tenne ssee Valley Authority. Preoperational Test f or 17 5 Ton Pol ar Cr ane. IVA-43 A. 1979. O. Tennessee Valley Authority. Acceptance Test for 125 Ton Auxiliary Building Crane. 1979. 1. Tenne ssee Valley Authority. Acceptance Test for 175 Ton Polar Crane, 1978. 2. Tenne ssee Valley Authority. Final Saf ety Analysis Report. Sequoyah Nuclear Plant. Section 3.8.6 Ca te go ry I Cra ne s. 1984. 3. The American Society of Mechanical Engineers. i Overhead and Gantry Cranes. ANSI B30.2.0-1976. 4. The American Socie ty of Mechanical Engineers. F 51are Analysis of a Redundant Reeving Holst. No. 76-DE-21. 5. The American Society of Mechanical Engineers. Dynamic Testing of a Redundant Reeving Holst. No. 76-WA/DE-6. 1 N 9

2.2-1 RFAUEST ' ' Identify by name,. type, capacity... and equipment de signa tor, any crane s - phy si cally capabl e - ( i. e., ignoring interlocks, moveable mechanical stops, or operating procedures) of carrying loads which could, if dropped, land or-f all into the spent f uel pool.

RESPONSE

The only crane capable of carrying heavy loads in the vicinity of the spent fuel pool.is the auxiliary building crane which is an overhead crane with a 125-ton capacity using the main hoist and a 10-ton capacity using the auxiliary hoist. 2.2-2 RFAUEST - Justify. the exclusion of any cranes in this area f rom.the above category by verifying that they are incapable of carrying heavy loads or are permanently prevented f rom movement of the hook centerline closer then 15 feet to the pool boundary, or by-providing a suitable analysis demonstrating that f or any failure mode, no heavy load can f all into the f uel-storage pool.

RESPONSE

The auxiliary building crane cannot be excluded from the category identified in reque st 2.2-1. 2.2-3 REQUEST 2 Identify any cranes listed in 2.2-1, above, which you have evaluated as having sufficient design f eatures to make the' likelihood of a load drop extremely small for all loads to be carried and the basis for this evaluation-(i.e., complete compliance with NUREU-0612, Section 5.1.5 or partial compliance supplemented by suitable alternative or additional design features). For each crane so evaluated, provide the load-handl ing-sy st em ( i. e., cr ane-load-combina tion) information specified in.

RESPONSE

The following is in response to items 1 through 5 of attachment 1 to enclosure 3 of the NRC transmittal letter for NURHi-0612 dated December 22, 1980. These responses describe sufficient design f eatures for the auxiliary building crane or appropriate corrective actions to be - taken to make the likelihood of a load drop extremely small. -l 'l j

SINGLE-FAILURE-PROOF HANDLING SYSTEMS (2.2-3 Response) Item 1. Provide' the name of the manuf acturer and the de sign rated load (DRL). If the maximum critical load (MCL), as defined in NUREG 0554, is not the same as the DRL, provide this capacity. Resnonse Manufacturer: Crane Holst Engineering Company. DRL: 125 Tons - Main Hoist 10 Tons - Auxililary Holst MCL: - 100 Tons - Main Hoist 10 Tons - Auxiliary Holst Item 2. Provide a detailed evaluation of the overhead handling system with respect to the. f eatures of design, fabrication, inspe ction, testing, and operation as delineated in NUREG 0612, Appendix C. This evaluation must include a point-by-point comparison for each section of NURBG 0554.~ If the alternatives of NUREG 0612, Appendix C, are used for certain applications in lieu of complying with the recommendation of NUREG 0554, this should be explicitly stated.. If. an alternative to any of tho se contained in NUREG 0554 o'r NUREG 0612, Appendix C, is proposed, details must be provided on the proposed alternative to demonstrate its equivalency. Responso Attachment A provides an enumeration of NURBG-0554 requirements based on NRC's interpretation provided to TVA in the Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant draf t Technical Evaluation Report (TER) C5257-181.. Refer to Table A for the evaluation of the Sequoyah auxiliary building crane. Item 3. With respect to the seismic analysis employed to demonstrate that the overhead handling system can retain the load during a seismic event equal to a saf e shutdown earthquake, provide a description _of.the method of analysis, the assanptions used, and the mathematical model evaluated in the analysis. The description of assumptions should include the basis for selection of trolley and load' position.

Response

Refer to Attachment B. 4

~ _ h SINGLE-FAILURE-PROOF HANDLING SYSTEMS j (2.2-3 Re apon se) I t em 4. Provide an evaluation of the lif ting devices for each single f ailure proof handling system with respect to the guidelines of NURHi 0612, sec tion 5.1.6. Resoonse 4 A response to item 4 cannot be provided until the items. identified as "E" are accepted by NRC. Item '5. . Provide an evaluation of the interf acing lif t points with respect to the guidelines of NUREG 0612, section 5.1.6.

Response

'A response to item 5 cannot be provided until the items identified as "E" are accepted by NRC. ATTACHENT A SPECIFIC MIREG 0554 RBQUIREMENTS ( AS PRESENTED IN 'IER C5257-181 - BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT) j ] i 2. Specification and Desian Criteria 2.1 Construction and Operatina Periods 1. When an overhead crane handling system will be used during the plant construction phase, separate performance specifications may be needed j to reflect the duty cycles and loading requirements for each service. 2. The allowable design stress limits for the crane intended for plant operation should be those indicated in Table 3.3.3.1.3-1 of ORAA Specification No. 70 and reflecting the appropriate duty cycle in CMAA Specifica tion No. 70. 3. The sua total of simultaneously applied loads (static and dynamic) should not ' result in stress levels causing permanent deformation other 4 than loca* ized strain concentration.. 4. The ef fects of cyclic loading induced by jogging or plugging an uncompensated hoist control system should be included in the design spe c ifica tion. 1. f

'2.2 Maximum Critical Load

1. ' The crane. should be designed to handle the maximum critical load (MCL) tha t"will be impo sed.

2. A slightly ' higher design load _ should be selected for component parts that are subj ect to degradation due to wear and exposure. An increase of approximately 15% of the design'1oad for these component parts would be a reasonable margin. 3. The MCL rating should be clearly marked on the crane. 4.- The DEL rating should be marked on the crane separately from the MCL marking. 2.3 Doeratina Environment 1. The operating environment, including maximum and minimum pressure, maximum rate of pressure increase, tempe ra tur e, humidi ty, and emergency corrosive or hazardous conditions,.should be specified for the crane and lif ting fixtures. For cranes inside the containment structure, the closed box sections of the crane structure should be vented to avoid collapse during containment pressurization. Drainage should be provided. 2.4 Material Properties 1. The crane and lif ting fixtures for crane already fabricated or operating may be subjected to a cold-proof test consisting of a single dummy l oad te s t a s f oll ows : s. Metal temperature of the structural members essential to the st ructur al integrity of the crane handling system should be at below the minimum operating taaperature. b. The corresponding dummy load should be equal to 1.25 times the MCL. c. The cold proof test should be followed by a nondestructive examination of welds whose f ailure could result in the drop of a critical load. d. The nondestructive examination of critical areas should be repeated at 4 year 14tervals or less. 2. Cranes and lif ting fixtures made of low-alloy steel such as ASTM A514 should be cold proof te sted in any ca se. 3. Ca st iron should not be used for load-bearing components. .l -,

2.5 Seismic Desian 1 The crane should be designed and constructed in accordance with regulatory position 2 of Regulatory Guide 1.29. 2. The NCL plus operational and seismically induced pendulum and swinging ~ load ef fects on.the crane should be considered in the design of the trolley, and they should be added to the trolley weight for the design of the bridge.- 2.6 Lameller Tearina 1.. All weld joints whose f ailure could result in the drop of a critical load should be nondestructively examined. 2. If any of these weld joint geometries would be susceptible to lamellar tearing, the base metal at the j oints should be nondestructively e x ami ne d. 2.7 Structural Fatiano 1. A f atigue analysis should be considered for the critical Ioad-bearing structures and component s of the crane handling system. The cumulative f atigue usage f actors should reflect effects of the cyclic loading from both the construction and operating periods. 2.8 Weldina Procedures 1. Preheat temperatures and postweld heat-treatment (stress relief) temperatures for all weldnents should be specified in the weld procedure. 2. Welds described in the recommendations of Section 2.6 should be postweld heat treated in accordance with Subarticles 3.9 of AWS D1.1, " Structural Welding Code? 3. Safety Features 3.1 General 3.2 Auxiliary Systems 1. All auxiliary hoisting systems of the main crane handling system that are amployed to lif t or assist in handling critical loads should be single f ailure proof. 2. Auxiliary systems or dual components should be provided for the main hoi sting mechani sm so that, in case of subsystem or component f ailure, the load will be retained and held in a stable or immobile safe po si tion..

3,3 Electrical Control Systems

1..The automatic controls and limiting devices should be designed so that,

.when l disorders due to inadvertent operator action, c ompone nt - mal fun ction, or disarrangement of subsystem control functions occur singly or in combination during the load handling, and assuming no component s have f ailed in any subsy st em, these disorders will not prevent the handling system from stopping and holding the load. 2. An emergency stop button should be added at the control station to stop all motion.. 3.4' Emermency Ronalrs 1. Means should be provided for using the devices required in repairing, adj us ting, or replacing the f ailed component (s) or subsystem (s) when f ailure of an active component or subsystem has occurred and the load is supported and retained in the safe position with the handling system immob il e. i 4. Holstina Machinery L 4.1 Reevina System 1. Design of the rope reeving system (s) should be dual with each system providing separately the load balance on the head and load blocks through the configuration of ropes and rope equalizer (s), i 2. The maximum load (including static and inertia forces) on each individual wire rope in the dual reeving system with the MCL atrached i should not exceed 10% of the manufacturer's published breaking strength. 3. The anximum fleet angle f rom drum to lead sheave in the load block or between individual sheaves should not exceed 0.061 rad (3-1/2 ) at any point during hoisting except that for the last 1 meter of maximum j lif t elevation the fleet angle may increase sl igh tly. The use of reverse bonds for running wire ropes should be limited. 4. The equalizer for stretch and load on the rope reeving system may be either beam or sheave type or combinations thereof. A dual rope reeving system with individual attaching points and means for balancing or distributing the load between the two operating rope reeving systems 3 will permit either rope rystem to hold the critical load and transf er the critical load without excessive shock in the case of f allare of the jl other rope sy s t em. j 5. The pitch diameter of running sheaves and drums should be selected in accordance with the recommendations of CNAA Specification No. 70. 1 i i I I 5 d b +- 4 y ry.-

6. The dual rosvizg systes ccy b2 a single rope f ras each ced of a dran terminating at one of the blocks or equalizer with provisions for . oqualizing beam-type load and rope stretch, with each rope designed for .the total' 1oad. Alternately, a 2-rope system may be used from each ~ drum or separate. drums using a sheave equalizer or beam equalizer or any.other' combination that provides two separate and complete reeving systems. 4.2 Drum Sannort ~ 1. The load hoisting drum on-the. trolley should be provided with structural and mechanical safety devices to limit the drop of the drum and thereby prevent it f rom disengaging f rom its holding brake system j if the drum shaf t or bearings were to f all or fracture. 4.3 Head and Load Blocks The head and load blocks should be designed to maintain a vertical load 1. balance about the center of lif t f rom load block, through head block i and have a reeving system of dusi design. The load-block assembly should be provided with two load-attaching 2. points (hooks or other means) so designed that each attaching point will be able to support a load of three times the load (static and r dynamic) being handled without permanent deformation of any part of the load-block assembly other than localized strain concentration in areas for which additional material has been provided for wear. 3. The individual components of the vertical hoisting system components, which include the head block, rope reeving system, load block, ard dual load-attaching device, should each be designed to support a static load of 200% of the MCL. 4 A 200% static-type load test should be performed for each load-l attaching hook. Measurements of the geometric configuration of the hooks should be made before and af ter the-test and should be followed by a nondestructive examination that should consist of volumetric and surf ace examinations to verify the soundness of f abrication and ensure the integrity of the hooks. The load blocks should be mondestructively examined by surf ace and volumetric. techniques. 4.4 Holstina Speed t 1. Maximum hoisting speed for the critical load should be limited to the given in the " slow" column of Figure 70-6 of CNAA Specificiation No. 70. Conservative industry practice limits the rope line speed to 1/4 m/s ( 50 f pm) a t - the drum. l l

... ~ - -.-- 4.5 Desian Amainst Two-Blockins 1. The mechanical and structural components of the complete hoisting system should have the required strength to resist f ailure if the l hoisting system should "two-block" or if " load hangap" should occur during hoisting.- 2. As an alternative, the protective control system to prevent the hoisting system from two blocking should include as a minimum: o Two independent travel-limit devices of different designs and activated by separate mechanical means. o These devices should de-energize the hoist drive motor and main power supply.

i 3.

The protective control system for load hang-up, a part of-the overload . protection system, should consist of load cell systems in the drive train or motor-current-sensing devices or mechanical load-limiting devices.. 4. The mechanical holding brakes and their controls should include the capability to withstand the maximum torque of the driving motor if a malfunction occurs and power to the driving motor cannot be shut of f. 5. The auxiliary hoist should be equipped with two independent travel-limit switche s to prevent two-blocking. I 4.6 Liftina Devices 1. Lif ting devices should be conservatively designed with a dual or 4 auxiliary device or cambination thereof. Esca device should be i designed or selected to support a load of three times the load (static and dynamic) being handled without pennanent deformation. 4.7 Wire Rope Protection 1. If'sideloads cannot be avoided, the reeving system should be equipped with a guard that would keep the wire rope properly located in the groove s on the drum. 4.8 Mschinery Aliansent 1. Where gear trains are interposed between the holding brakes and the l hoisting drum, these gear trains should be single f ailure proof and should be of dual design. j _ p_ i I ,,.--_,I

4.9 - Boint Brakins System 1. The minimum hoisting braking system should include one power control braking. system (not mechanical or drag brake type) and two holding brakes. - The holding brakes should be applied when power is off and 'should be automatically applied on overspeed to the full holding position if a malfunction occurs. Each holding brake should have a torque rating not less than 125% of the full-load hoisting torque at point of applica tion.- 2. The minimum number of braking systems that should be operable for emergency lowering af ter a single brake f ailure should be two holding ~ brake s f or stopping and controlling drum rotation. 3. The holding. brake system should be single f ailure proof, i.e., any ~ component or gear ~ train should be dual if interposed between the holding brakes and the hoisting drums. 4. ' Provision for manual operation of the hoisting brakes should be included in the design conditions. 5. Bridae and Trolley-f 5.1 Brakina Canacity

1. - The maximum torque capability of the driving motor and gear reducer for trolley motion and bridge motion of the overhead bridge crane should not exceed the capability of gear train and brakes to stop the trolley or bridge from the maximum speed with the DEL attached.

. Control and holding brakes should each.be rated at 100n of maximum drive torque that can be developed at the point of application. I 2. If two mechanical brake s, one for control and one for holding, are prov ide d, they should be adjusted with one brake in each system leading the other and should be activated by release 1or shutoff of power. This applie s to both ' trolley and bridge. 3. The brakes should-also be mechanically tripped to the "on" or " holding" g position in the event of a malfunction in the power supply or an i overspeed condition. 4. Provisions should be made for manual maergency operation of the brakes. 5. The holding brake.should be designed so that it cannot be used as a f oot-operated slowdown brake. t - 6. Drag brake s should not be ' used..

7'. Opposite-driven wh3els os bridas cr trc11ey that sepport bridgs er _ trolley. on.their runways should be matched and should have ' identical di ame ter s. 8. Tro11eyfand bridge spee? should Lbe limited. The' speed limits indicated l for slow operating speeds 'for trolley and bridge in Specification CMAA No. 70 are recommended for handling MCLs. I 5.2. Safety Stoos 1 I 1. Limiting devices, mechanical and/or electrical, should be provided to control or prevent overtravel and overspeed of the trolley and bridge. Buffers for bridge and trolley travel thould be included at the end of the _ rail s. _ 2. Saf ety devices such as limit-type switches provided for malfunction, inadvertent operation action, or f ailure should be in addition to and separate f rom the limiting means or control devices provided for opera tion. l 6. Drivers and Controls 6.1 Driver Selection 1. The maximum torque capability of the electric motor. drive for hoisting should not exceed the rating of capability of the individual component of the hoisting system required to hoist the NCL at the maximum design hoist speed. 2. It is essential that the controls be capable of stopping the hoi sting movement within amounts of movement that damage would not occur. A j maximum hoisting movement of 8 en (3 in) would be an acceptable stopping distance. 3. For elaborate control systems, railo control, or ultimate control under unforeseen conditions of distress, an " emergency stop button" should be placed at ground level to remove power from the crane. independently of the crane controls. 6.2 Driver control Svstems 1. The control system (s) provided should include consideration of the r hoisting -(raising and. lowering) of all loads,. including the rated load, i and the ef fects of the ' inertia of the rotating hoisting machinery such 1 as motor armature, shaf ting and. coupling, gear reducer, and drum. 2. If the crano is to be used for lif ting spent fuel elements, the control system should be. adaptable to include interlocks that will prevent trolley ~and bridge movements while the load'is being hoisted ' free of a reactor vessel or. a storage rack, as may be recommended in Regulatory Guide 1.13. a -

6.3 :Nalfunction Protection (Drivers) 1. Means should be provided in the motor control circuits to sense and respond to such items as excessive electric-current, excessive motor temperature, overspeed, overload, and over-travel. 2.- Controls should be provided'to absorb the kinetic energy of the rotating machinery and stop the hoisting movement reliably and safely - through a combination of electrical power controls and mechanical - braking systems and torque controls if one rope or one of the dual reeving systems should f ail or if overloading or an overspeed condition should occur. a 6.4 Slow Speed Drives 1. If jogging or plugging is to be used, the control circuit should include features to prevent abrupt change in motion. 2. Drif t point in the electric power gystem when provided for bridge or trolley movement should be provided only for the lowest operating s pe e ds. 6.5 Safety Devices 1. Saf ety device s such as limit-type switches provided for malfunction, inadvertent operator action, or f ailure should be in addition to and separate f rom the limiting means or control devices provided for ope ra tion. 6.6 Control Stations 1. The complete operating control system and provisions for emerganqr controls for the overhead crane handling system should preferably be located'in a cab on the bridge. 2 Additional operator stations should have control systems similar to the main station. 3 Manual controls for hoisting and trolley movement may be provided on the trolley, while manual controls for the bridge may be located on the bridge. 4. Cranes that use more than one control station should be provided with electrical interlocks that permit only one control ~ station to be operable at any one time. - f l 1 l I ~

= - 7. Installation Instructions 7.1 - General 1. Installation instructions provided by the manuf acturer should include a - full' emplanation of the crane handling system, its control s, and the limitations for the system and should cover the requirements for installa tion, -testing, and prepara tion for operation. 7.2 Construction and Operattua Periods 4 1. Af ter construction ase, the crane should be thoroughly inspected by nondestructive.ezamination and load tested for the operating phase. The extent of nondestructive examinations, the procedures used, - and the ~ 4 acceptance criteria should be defined in the design specification. -2. If allowable design stress limits for the plant operating service are to be exceeded during the construction phase, added inspection-supplementing that. described in Section 2.6 should be specified and developed. 8 Testina and Preventative Maintenance 8.1 General 1. .Information concerning proof testing on components and sub-systems that ~was required and performed at the manuf acturer's plant to verify the j ability of components or subsystems to perform should be available for ~ the checking and testing performed at the place of installation of the crane system. i 8.2 Static and Dynamic Load Tests 1. The crwne system should be static load tested at 129% of the NCL. The tests ghould include all positions generating maximum strain in the bridge and trolley strucures and other positions as recommended by the designer and manufacturer. 4 I 4 2. The crana handling system should be given full performance tests with i E100% of the MCL for all speeds and motions for which the system is j 4- ' designed. 3. The f eatures provided for manual lowering of the load and manual movement of the bridge and trolley during an emergency should be tested with the MCL attached to demonstrate the ability to function as intended. 8.3 Two-Block ' Te s t 1. When equipped with an energy-controlling device between the load and head blocks, the complete hoisting machinery 'should be allowed to two-block' during the hoisting test (load block limit and safety devices ~ are bypassed).. A .n

t l2. 'Tho complots hoistics cashicory shocid be tested fer ability to s:stois a load hangap condition by a teri ? m which the load-block-attaching point s are secured to's fixed ancaor.or an excessive load. - 8.4 h tina Tests

1.. Operational tests of crane systems should be performed to verify the proper f anationing of limit switches and other saf ety devices and the ability to perform as designed.

att 8.5 Maintenance The MCL rating of the crane should be established as the rated load 1. capacity, and the design rating for the degradable portion of the headling system'should be identified to obtain the margin available for the maint,enance program. .N. 2. The MG,'should7bep1,ainly marked on each side of the crane for each hoisting unit. ' /1:f 9. Operatina Manual 1. The crane designer and manuf acturer: should provide a manual of information and procedures for use in checking, testing, and operating the crane. 2. The operating requirements for all travel movements (vertical and horizontal movement s or rotation, singly or in combination) incorporated in the design for permanent plant cranes should be clearly defined in the operating manual for hoisting and for trolley and bridge travel. 10. Quality Assurance l 1. A quality assurance program should be established to the extent i necessary to include the recommendations of this report for the design, f fabrication, installation, testing, and operation of crana handling , ' f.i j r ~'U'. systems for safe handling of critical loads. 3

4 TABLE A C='Complitnce' SINGLE FA1 LURE-PROOF CRANE COMPLIANCE.. E= Equivalency NUREG 0554 COMPARISON N= Noncompliance 125/10 TON AUXILIARY BUILDING CRANE - NA= Not Applicable 2.2-3 RESPONSE -NUREG 0554 TVA'S SECTION POSITION COM1ENTS/IWLEEMATION RECOP9ENDATIONS , 2.1-1 C-Separate performance specifications (for construction and plant operation) are not required for this crane,Lsince the design specification. considered both phases of operation. -2 E This crane was not specifically designed in accordance with table 3 3.31.3-1 of 01AA specification No. 70. However, the allowables~used-for. the bridge and trolley structures as.mquired in the design criteria are less than those stated in the table. -3 C The specified allowable stress levels for similtaneous' applied loads are half the materials yield strength necessary to cause permanent deformation. -4 E The crane is compensated with stepless regulated speed control for smooth ' { acceleration and deceleration of all' motions. Slowdown is also attainst by i controlled jogging cr plugging as mquired in the design specification. 2.2-1 C This crane was designed. for 125 tons load. The maximum critical load (MCL) is the spent fbel shipping cask which weighs 100 tons.. -2 C The design load is 25 percent higher-than the actual MCL. Refer to 2.2 above. -3. C The MCL for.the main and auxiliary hoists will be displayed on~ the crane. -4 C The design rated load (DRL) is clearly marked on the crane. 2.3-1(a) C Considerations for etvironment (temperature, humidity, pressure, etc.) were - specified in the design criteria. 1'

~' TABLE A SINGLE FAILURE-PROOF CRANE COMPLIANCE C= Compliance NUREG 0554 COMPARISON E= Equivalency N= Noncompliance. 125/10 TON AUXILIARY BUILDING CRANE NA= Not Applicable 2.2-3 RESPONSE NUREC 0554 TVA'S COMMENTS /IMPLEENTATION RECOMNDATIONS .SECTION PMITION -1(b) NA This crane is not located in the containment area. 2.4-1 a-d E Specific considerations for brittle fracture were not made during design, and a cold-proof test has not been performed. In lieu of a cold-proof test, a minimum operating temperature will be established based on NDIT+30 0 F criterion for critical lifts governed by NUREG-0612. -2 C No low-alloy steel was used in the structural components of this crane. 2.4-3 C Cast iron was not used on.this crane as mquimd in NUREG 0554. 2.5-1 C The crane was designed in accordance with mgulatory position 2 of - Regulatory Guide 1.29. -2 C The MCL olus operatioral and seismically induced pendulum and swinging load were considered in the design of trolley and bridge.' 2.6-1 C All critical load carrying welds were tested by nondestructive examination -(NDE) methods, such as magnetic particle, ultrasonic or radiography inspections. -2 C All critical weld joints were NDE tested. DD.

....__ ___.~. .m - 9 i n ,.s TABLE A SINGLE FAILURE-PROOF CRANE COMPLIANCE 1 C= Compliance f 5' E=. Equivalency NUREG 0554 COWARISON ' N: Noncompliance-125/10. TON : AUXILIARY BUILDING CRANE. w o q.- ~ -NA: Not Applicable 2.2-3 RESPONSE. ~ M-l I I - NUREG 0554 - TVA'S 4. E CTION POSITION. cot 9ENTS/IWLEENTATION. EC099ENDATIONS 2.7-1 E - A fatigue analysis was not conducted on.all critical.'. load-bearing structures - 1 and components; however, design stress levels for theseioritical areas are. lower than the < endurance lidts' (405 of material's tensile strength) for': the various materialc. 2.8-1 C The crane manufacture: submitted'_ approved. welding. procedures for:each' type; of.. weld joint specifying. preheat.and stress - relief temperatures. : These- . procedures were performed in ~ accordance with AWS D2.0-691" Welded Highway and. Rai.1way Bridges". g .. -2 .E. Critical. weld joints were postweld heat treated in accordance with: AW5'. 4-D2.0-69.. L 3.2-1 E The auxiliary hoist is dual reeved' with a 6.9:1 safety factor on the' . wire ropes. A redundant drive train with the ability to continue a lift. I . af ter : a single. failure.is also incorporated., All drive components are ' - designed to a 5:1 safety factor. Two different over-hoist limit switches of:- ,j ~ different design are provided. E A subsystem or component failure will not' result in' a' load drop for either ' 3.2-2. ,the main _ e: auxiliary hoist..However, failure of one of the; dual' ropes on' 2 - the auxiliary hoist would result in a unstable load at the moment"of : "i -failure. ;This instability for the auxiliary hoist presents no apparent hazard. v f i. - ? 6

TABLE A C= Complitnce SINGLE FAILURE-PROOF CRANE COMPLIANCE E= Equivalency NUREG 0554 COMPARISON N= Noncompliance 125/10 TON AUXILIARY BUILDING CRANE NA= Not Applicable 2.2-3 RESPONSE NUREG 0554 TVA'S SECTION POSITION COMMEPUS/IMPLEENTATION RECOt91ENDATIONS 3.3-1 C Automatic controls and limiting devices are properly designed to stop' and hold any load, as mquired in the design specification, under all identified inadvertent disorders. -2 C An emergency stop pushbutton is located in the cab and three are located at the floor level. 3.4-1 C All vulnerable active componets can.be repaired or mplaced while supporting the MCL for the main and auxiliary hoist. (See Active.Compone t Replacement Guide of Tables A1 and A2). However, in some cases an in-place repair or replacement of failed componets other than active componets is impractical and a defined alternate means of moving the load to a safe laydown area is unavailable. A method will be developed and implemented for the manual emergency movement of the bridge and trolley. 4.1-1 E Dual meving and equalizing systems are used for the main and auxiliary hoist s. Load balancing through cross-reeving is not used for either hoist. -2 E Th'e maxinum load on each individual wim rope for the main and auxiliary hoists does exceed 10% of the manufacturer's published breaking strength with their respective maximun critical load (MCL) attached. However, all ropes exceed the requimments of 04AA 70 with the following factors of - safety with the MCL's attached: Main Hoist - 7.6. to 1; Auxiliary Hoist - 6.9 to 1. During routine naintenance, as mplacement of wim rope is requimd,. extra extra improved plowed steel wim rope will be used which will yield a minimum of 15% increase in the factory.of safety. 't [ [Yh Y TABLE A. ' x SINGLE FAILURE-PROOF CRAE COMPLIANCE C= Compliance - NUREG 0554 COMPARISON lE= Equivalency-N= Noncompliance 125/10 TON AUXILIARY BUILDING CRANE NA= Not Applicable. 2.2-3 RESPONSE y C l NUREG 0554 TVA'S S CIION POSITION C0!9EES/INLEENTATION RECOlGENDATIONS I l ~ -3 C The maxiasm fleet angle for the main'a auxiliary hoist is. 3 5. degrees - which complies.with this NUREG. There are ro reverse' bends on these hoist s. -4(a)' cc The main hoist equalizer consist of a double ended double acting hydraulic cylinder designed to equalize the-tw> ropes and prevent droppirg the load in - case of a single rope failure. -4(b) E The auxiliary. hoist was not designed with an automatic equalizer in the reeving system. - Since this is a two part 'dimot reeved hoist,.an equalizing' system is not employed. A loss of one line will not impart severe shock.to : the system or severe swinging because of the short span trunnion. 4.1-5 .C The pitch diameter of the running sheaves and drums were selected' in accordance with CMAA Specification No. 70 ' -6(a) C The main hoist.is provi.ded with a redundant reeving and hydraulic equalizer l_ system as presented 'in the plant FSAR. 1 I .-6(b) E The auxiliary hoist tweving system is a single rope from each end of the ,i drum terminating at the block with adjustment provisions for rope stretch at the trunnion.. 4.2-1 C-No drop plates were provided for either' hoist. Drop plates will be ' designed .and ' installed for both hoists in' accordance with 4.2-1 of NUREG 0554 and any other appropriate industry standards. ... ~. ~

_ _ _ _ - - -- _ _ _ ~ _ _ - _ _ _. - - - _ _ _ _ ___ 2 - TABLE A - SINGLE FAILURE-PROOF CRANE C0WLIANCE ,C Compliance NUREG 0554 COWARISON-E= Equivalency 125/10 TON AUXILIARY BUILDING CRANE .N=, Noncompliance. - 2.2-3 RESPONSE NA= Not Applicable NUREG 0554 TVA'S.. COMENTS/IWLEIENTATION' ECOMENDATIONS .E CTION. . POSITION The main hoist reeving system. is of hal' design.and s the equalizing cylinder 4.3-1(a) C maintains vertical balance and alignment.with both Popes: intact. Auxiliary hoist is not equipped with an equalizing system; however, it does 4.3-1(b). E have dual ropes.and the auxiliary hoist, rope exceeds the requirements of CHAA-70 with the M(1 attached. -This crane was not equipped with &al attaching points. However, the 4.3-2 E crane hooks were designed and' manufactured in accordance with CMAA 70, and are nondestructively exanined periodically in accordance with ANSI-B30.10-1971. The mechanical parts for this crane are designed for five times the Design; -3 C Rated Load (DRL) under normal conditions. The DRL is 25 percent greater than the MCL for this crane. -4(a)- E The. hooks,were proottested to 200 percent-of the DRL and examined by.. ultrasonic and magnetic particle testing methods.

The : load blocks were not rendestructively examined by surface and volumetric-

-4(b) 'E . te&niques. However, the load block is visually inspected annually,in accordance with ANSI B30.2.0-1976. If the forthcoming visual inspection warrant disassembly of the block,. the block will' be nondestructively examined by surface and ; volumetric techniques, and necessary replacements made. i TABLE A C= Complitnce SINGLE FAILURE-7R00F CRANE COMPLIANCE l E Equivalency NUREG 0554 COMPARISON N= Noncompliance 125/10 TON AUXILIARY BUILDING CRANE NA= Not Applicable 2.2-3 RESPONSE NUREG 0554 TVA'S SECTION POSITION COMMENTS /IMPLEENTATION RECOMMENDATIONS 4.4-1(a) C The main noist speed is a maximum at 5 FPM which satisfies the requirement in figure 70-6 of 04AA Specification No. 70. -1(b) E The auxiliary hoist speed is greater than the required speed in Figure 70-6 of 04AA Specification No. 70 (25.2 FPM vs 20.0 FPM). However, we believe this difference is insignificant considering that critical lifts using this hoist are administratively controlled. -1(c) C The line speed for the main and auxiliary hoists are less - than the required 50 FPM. 4.5-1 NA NUREG 0554 provides altematives to the requimments of this section in section 4.5-2 below. These will be aralyzed for compliance. 4.5-2 C To protect against two-blocking, two upward travel limit switches of different design and acting independently were installed on both hoists. -3 C Botn noists are equipped with motor-current sensing devices for overload protection. -4 C The holding brakes' torque capacity exceeds the maxinum torque of the driving motor (stall). -_-

r l TABLE A C= Compliance SINGLE FAILURE-PROOF CRANE C0i4PLIANCE E= Equivalency NUREG 0554 C0t@ARISON N: Noncompliance 125/10 TON AUXILIARY BUILDING CRANE NA= Not Applicable 2.2-3 RESPONSE NUREG 0554 TVA'S SECTION POSITION C0tfENTS/IMPLE!ENTATION REC 0ffENDATIONS -5 C The auxiliary hoist is equipped with two independer travel limit switches of different design to prevent two blocking. 4.6-1 NA TVA is myiewing the design of critical lifting devices for compliance with NUREG 0612 as mquested by the NRC. Refer to our report from L. M. Mills to E. Adensam dated March 1, 1982, for compliance. 4.7-1 C No critical lifts mquire sideloading; nonetheless, a bar guard was employed on both hoists. 4.8-1 C Both hoists have gear trains that are interposed between the holding brakes and detas. Vendor drawings illustrate that the gears are single-failure-proof and of dual design. 4.9-1 C Both hoists are equipped with overspeed controls, emergency dynamic braking, holding brakes (each set at 150 percent of the full load torque) and regenerative lowering. -2 C Single ~ failure of the regmerative braking system on the main and auxiliary hoists will activate two holding brakes for stopping and controlling the [ load. il' -3 C As stated in sections 4.8-1 and 4.9-2; both hoist holding brake systems are single-failum-proof. l l I t

TABLE A l SINGLE FAILURE-PROOF CRANE COMPLIANCE C= Compliance E: Equivalency NUREG 0554 COMPARISON N: Noncompliance. 125/10 TON AUXILIARY BUILDING CRANE NA= Not Applicable 2.2-3 RESPONSE NURSG 0554 TVA'S COe9 ENS /IWLEPENATION RECOPMENDATIONS - SECTION POSITION All brakes are equipped with a manual mlease feature as mquired in the 4.9-4 C design specification. 5.1 -1 C The capability of the gear train and brakes, as.mquired on the veridor drawings, exceeds the maximm torque capability of the driving motor and gear reducer for trolley and bridge : notion. -2(a) E The bridge is equipped with a hydraulic manually _ operated foot control brake and a spring set, electrically released holding brake. The holding brake will activate when a release or shutoff of power occurs. -2(b) C The trolley is equipped with two brakes that are adjusted with one brake as the primary and the other as a back up or secondary brake. These brakes will activate when a release of the control handle or shutoff of power occurs. -3 C All brakes are set upon the interruption of power for any mason. Additionally, the system has undervoltage protection which keeps the brakes set after power is momentarily interrupted. -4 C All holding brakes have provisions for manual emergency operation. -5 C The hydraulic control brakes are foot operated, however, the holding brakes-as stated previously are electrically actuated. -

l.. l TACLE - A J l-C= Complinnee SINGLE FAILURE-PROOF CRANE COMPLIANCE.. -E= Equivalency. . NUREG 0554 COMPARISON l. N= Noncompliance 125/10 TON AUXILIARY BUILDING CRANE NA= Not Applicable 2.2-3 RESPONSE t. l; NUREG 0534 TVA'S i- ~E CTION-POSITION COMENTS/IMPLE!ElfrATION RECOMENDATIONS l-l -6 C No drag brakes are. used. -7 C All bridge and trolley wheels are machined in pairs. - .-8 C Both bridge and trolley speeds comply with the requimments of O(AA 70 as t stated in the vendor calculations. L 5.2-1 C The bridge and trolley are equipped with several lidt switches that control l-movements of the crane around the -spent fuel pit. Spring-cushioned bumpers. are provided for the trolley and bridge travel limit-stops. , 5.2-2 C - All liutt switches, overspeed switches, overcurrent miays, etc. are f-provided as safety backup devices and are not intended for normal operating use. 6.1 -1 C The calculated power mquirement and the motor rating for the main hoist are ~ identical-at 50 horsepower. The auxiliary hoist ~ motor is rated at 20 - horsepower and the calculated ' mquimment is '18.3 horsepower.. -2 -C The maximum stopping distance for these hoists has been established. -3 C. TVA electrical drawings show three emergency stop pushbuttons located at l ground level.which are independent of the crane controls. l l l l i [

TABLE A C= Compliance SINGLE FAILURE-PROOF CRANE COMPLIANCE E= Equivalency NUREG 0554 COMPARISON N= Noncompliance 125/10 TON AUXILIARY BUILDING CRANE NA= Not Applicable - 2.2-3 RESPONSE NUREG 0554 TVA'S SECTION POSITION COMMENTS /IMPLEEfffATION RECOMNDATIONS 6.2-1 C The main and auxiliary hoists are equipped with overspeed' stitches, emergmcy dynamic braking, torque limiting devices,- overcurrent protection and undervoltage protection all of which are designed to provide a safe hoisting operation. -2 C As shown on vedor and TVA drawings there are limit switches which prevent the trolley and bridge movements over the spent fuel pit. '6.3-1 C Motor control circuits sense and mspond to overcurrent, overspeed, motor overload, motor temperature, and over travel as mquired in the design specification. -2 C Controls are provide 1 to absorb.the kinetic energy of the rotating machinery - and to stop the hoisting movement safely and mliably. 6.4-1 C Slow down by controlled plugging is mquired in the design specification for the bridge ard trolley. The hoist has control features such as smooth acceleration and deceleration, stepless mgulated speed control and static reversing which protects the hoist mechanism from the harmful effects of plugging or jogging. -2 E Design specification does mquire drift control for the crane; however, this provision was not limited to the lowest speed, but the critical lifts.are adminstratively controlled. TABLE A SINGLE FAILURE-PROOF CRANE COMPLIANCE C= Compliance NUREG 0554 COMPARISON E: Equivalency N= Noncompliance 125/10 TON AUXILIARY BUILDING CRANE 2.2-3 RESPONSE NA= Not Applicable NUREG 0554 TVA'S C0ffENTS/IMPLE)ENTATION RECOMMENDATIONS SECTION . POSITION The limit switches provided for malfunction cr inadvertent operator action. 6.5-1 C are supplied in addition to and separate from the cont;*ol devices provided. for normal operation. (Refer to Section 5.2 of this table.-) 6.6-1 C The bridge mounted cab has complete operating and emergency controls. 6.6-2 NA No additional. operator _ stations were provided for this crane. -3 NA -4 NA No additional stations were provided. 7.1-1 C An operating and maintenance manual satisfying the intent' of this requirement was supplied by the crane manufacturer. 7.2-1 E Although the main and auxiliary hoists were load tested to 125 percent of the Design Rated Load -(DRL), no nondestructive Examination. (NDE), except a. visual inspection, was performed. In lieu of a one time full NDE, accessible welds are visually inspected annually in accordance with ANSI B30.2.C-1976. 7.2-2 C No predetermined loads exceeded allowable design stress limits established for the plant operating service 'during the construction phase. -8.1-1 C Any information concerning work performed at the crane manufacturers' plant was doctanented by the TVA Inspection and Testing Branch Inspection Report and is on file at Sequoyah. Nuclear Plant. - -

. ~. -. - - -. -. -.. ~ -. -. -., _ _.. - -.. ~.. - - -. - -. ~. - TABLE A . C: Compliance SINGLE FAILURE-PRDOF CRANE COMPLIANCE ~ t ?- E= Equivalency NUREG 0554 COWARISON ~ f i' N= Noncompliance - 125/10 TON AUIILIARY BUILDING CRANE ]- .NA=;Not Applicable 2.2-3. RET ONSE ^ ~ c j-NUREG 0554 TVA'S S CTION POSITION COMEffrS/IWLE!ENTATION ECOMENDATIONS -)

8.2-1' C-The Acceptance Test mquires a-complete performance &eck of the crane after -

f load tests are performed at.ro load,' 50 percent,.100 percent, and 125 . percent of the DRL. . C All speeds and motions for which the crane was~ designed were testet with- ~ 100 percent of the DRL attached. The DRL is 25 percent greater than' the. a M1. -3 C As stated in section 4.9-4 'or this report, the hoist holding" brakes can beI manually released for, lowering the load. However, no means for emergency.- manual _' movement of the bridge or trolley with the.MCL attached was ' , provide!.. A method will be developed - and implemented for emergency ^ movement of the bridge or. trolley with the Ma attached.7 Additiormily, a'~ test -for verification. of this function will be performed. 8.3-1 E No two-blocking test-was performed; however, Appendix C of NUREG 0612 allows t functioral-verification of the limLt-switches in lieu of an actual' s two-blocking test. The Pmoperational Test verified these: limit switches to-- . be. functional. -2 E-No. load hang-up test was performed; however, the crane is' designed for stall.- 1, loadings and will be equipped'.with a load readout system and an overload , warning device set at =100 percent.of DRL. - Additionally, a load linLter.. set at:125. percent of the DRL which will shut off power to the crane if this-4 setting is exceeded, will be installed. - I 4 -

t

'i l-1 ~ 2

TABLE A C= Compliance SINGLE FAILURE-PROOF CRANE COMPLIANCE E= Equivalency NUREG 0554 COMPARISON N= Noncompliance 125/10 TON AUXILIARY BUILDING CRANE NA= Not Applicable 2.2-3 RESPONSE NUREG 0554 TVA'S SECTION POSITION COMMENTS / IMPLEMENTATION RECOMMENDATIONS 8.4-1 C In addition to Acceptance and Preoperational Tests performed after installation and prior to fuel load, respectively, periodic operatiomi tests and visual inspections are made, in accordance with ANSI B30.2 - 1976, to demonstrate safe performance of the crane. 8.5-1 C The DRL is 25 percent greater than the MQ, and the crane was designed to CMAA Specification No. 70 class C (moderate service); whereas, operationally 'it should be designed to class A1 (standby service) crane rating. -2 C As previously stated in this report (section 2.2-3), the MCL will be installed on the crane. 9.1-1 C The crane manufacturer supplied a~ set of operation and instruction anuals. -2 C The operating mquirements for all travel movements are clearly defined in the crane operation and instruction manual. 10.1-1 E This crane was designed, fabricated, installed, tested, and initially operated under an approved Quality Assurance program that was prior to the issuance of NUREG 0554. The requirements used to manufacture and operate this crane in addition to the satisfactory completion of the recormnendations contained herein should satisfy the intent of NUREG 0554. TABLE Al i ACTIVE COMPONENT REPLACEIGNT GUIDE . 2.2-3 RESPONSE ( 5 ' 7EG 0554 - SECTION 3.4) Lif t System: 125/10 Tom Auxiliary Building ane Main Holst Repai r De si gn Set Co nt. or Spare Factor Dow n Lif t. . Repl ace Parts of Ca pa-Ca pa-Ca pa-Av a il-Saf e ty bil ity bil ity bil ity able ACTIVE COMPONENT 1. Holst Notor NA Yes No Yes Yes 2 Primary Holding Brake .(6) Yes Ye s Ye s N/A -3. Secondary Holding Brake (6) Yes Yes Ye s N/A 4. Primary Gear Reducer (7) Ye s(1) Yes Ye s N/A ~ ^ 5. Secondary Gear Reducer (7) Yes(2)- Yes .Yes N/A 6 Primary Pinion / Drum Gear 7.6 :1( 8) Ye s(1) Ye s(1) Ye s/No(1) N/A 7. Secondary Pinion /Drun Gear 7.6:1(8) Yes(2) Yes(2) Ye s/No(2) N/A 8. Wire Rope Drum 6.4:1(8) No No No N/A 9. Wire Rope Drum Shaft 7.4 :1( 8) No No No N/A 10. Wire Rope 7.6:1(8) Yes(3) Yes(3) Yes Yes I 11. Drive Couplings NA Yes Yes Yes Yes 12; Primary Pinion Shaf t Bearings NA Yes(1) Yes(1) Yes Yes 13. Secondary Pinion Shaf t Bearings NA Yes(2) Ye s(2) Yes N/A i 14 Drum Support Bearings NA Ye s No Ye s Yes 15. Power Track (Festoon) System NA No(4) No Ye s N/ A(5) NA - Not Applicable Special Conditions: 1. Postuiste single component f ailure. 2. Disabled trolley or bridge can be physically moved by. portable winches tied to appropriate structures. f w c.e,

TABLE Al i . ACTIVE COMPONENT REPLACEMENT GUIDE 2.2-3 RESPONSE (MIRBi 0554 - SECTION 3.4) SBT. L of 2 Lif t System: I 125/10 Tom Auxiliary Building Crane Main'Holst e F00TN0'IES (1) Remove primary pinion '(2) Remove secondary pinion (3)- Based on studies performed by the University of Tennessee Mechanical Engineering Department ( ref er to ASIE papers No. 76-DE-21 and No. 76-WA/DE-6), continued lif ting and lowering of the load af ter a single rope f ailure is' po s sibl e. This study was modeled f rom 'a 125 ton f uel' ca sk handling crans' composed of a dual non-crossed twelve,part reeving system. (4) When a power f ailure occurs there is no upward hoisting movement possible. Ev en though the manual release provided on the holding brake will allow lowering of the load, the hook (with'ioad attached) could be in a physical location that would require upward motion before the load could be moved laterally 'to a saf e laydown area. (5) A temporary power supply will be used. (6) 150% of in11 load motor tore.ne (7) Vendor supplied and designed in accordance with AGMA (8) Based on a MCL ra ting of 100 tons i I i 1 4 f I -3 0-E i a

e

TABLE A2 ACTIVE CONPONDIT REPLAGNENT GUIDE 2.2-3 RESPONSE (NURED 0554 - SECTION 3.4) SBT.,,,1_ of 2 Lif t Syatem: 125/10 Tom Auxiliary Building Crane Annility Noist Repai r De si gn Set Cont. or Spare Factor Down Lift Replace Parts of Ca pa-Ca pa-Capa-Av a il-s Saf e ty bility bil ity bil ity able ACTIVE COMP 0"NT 1. Holst Motor NA Yes No Yes Yes 2. Primary Holding Brake (6) Yes Ye s Yes N/A 3. Secondary Holding Brake (6) Yes Yes Yes N/A 4. Primary Gear Reducer (7) Yes(1) No Ye s Yes 5. Secondary Gear Reducer (7) Yes(2) Yes Yc 1 N/A 6. Primary Pinion /Drus Gear 10.4:1(8) Yes(1) No Ye s/No(1) N/A 7. Secondary Pinion /Drus Gear 10.4 : 1( 8) - Yes(2) Yes(2) Yes/No(2) N/A 8. Wire Rope Drum 5.3 :1( 8) No No No N/A 9. Wire Rope Drna Shaft 5.2:1(8) No No No N/A 10. Wire Rope 6.9:1(8) Yes(3) Yes(3) Yes(3) Yes 11. Drive Coup 11 ass NA Yes No Yes Yes 12. Primary Pinion Shaf t Bearings NA Yes(1) No Yes Yes 13. Secondary Pinion Shatt Bearings NA Yes(2) Yes Yes N/A 14. Drum Support Bearings NA Ye s No Yes Yes 15. Power Track (Festoon) System NA No(4) No Ye s N/A(5) NA - Not Applicable Special Couditions: 1. Postulate single component f ailure. 4 2. Disabled trolley _ or bridge can be physically moved by portable winches tied to appropriate structures.,

i TABLE A2 ACTIVE CDNPONENT REPLACEMENT GUIDE 2.2-3 RESPONSE (MIRIE 0554 - SECTION 3.4) SBT. 2 of 2 Lift System: 125/10 Tom Anziliary Building Crane Auxiliary Holst F00'IN(TTES (1) Remove primary pinion (2) Remove secondary pinion (3) Remove damaged rope - Use remaining good side (4) When a power f a!!ure occurs there is no upward hoisting movement possible. Even though the manual release provided on the holding brakes will allow lowering of the lead, the hook (with load attached) could be in a physical. location that would require upward motion before the load con 1d be moved laterally to a ~ saf e laydown area. (5) A temporary power supply will be used. (6) 150% of full load motor torque (7) Vendor supplied and designed in accordance with NINA (8) Ba sed on a NCL of 9.9 tons a h i i l 1 4 i I -3 2-

ATTAMIENT B - Me thod of Seismic Analysis Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Anni 11ery Building Crane 2.2-3 Response The analysis was performed aslag idealized linsped-mass models. Since the mass of the - equipment attached to each girder is not the same, each girder was analysed separately. Three loading conditions of the creme were considered in the smalysis. The ' hoist trolley. is assumed to provide a rigid comaection between the crane girders for motion la the horizontal direction. The three loading conditions are as f ollows : Londlas condition 1 assened the trolley with the live load to be at the wheel stop. Load!as condition 2 assumed the trolley with the live load to be at the-third point of the span. Loading condition 3 assumed the trolley with the live load to be at the midpoint of the spam. For the lateral analysis, the support points of the crane girder were assumed to be fixed for transistion and restralmed from rotation by a spring, the stif fness, of which was the rotational stiffness of the mala girder-end girder joint. The two parallel sirders were connected at the ends and at the trolley positian by a transistional spring, the stiffness of which was the longitudinal stiffness of the end girder. The ef fect of the live load, a mass hung by a long cabl e which would act as a pendulum of very low frequency, was neglected. Spe ctret accelerations were taken f rom TVA Report GB 80-20, "Dynesia Earthquake Analysis of the Auxiliary-control Building and Response Spectra for Attached Equipment," uslag 1-percent structural damplag. For the longitudinal direction, parallel to the main girder axis, the crane girder is assumed to be ' rigid. For the vertical analysis, the crane girders were assumed to be simply supported and act inde pende ntly. The ef fect of the live load, idealized as a weight hung by a spring and attached to the cease was considered. The live load was taken as 125 tons and the hoist cables were extended the maximum length. The vertical spectral accelerations were taken from the same report as the lateral analysis. i l J

RESPONSE 10 INEOSURE 3 TO NRC LETI1R DATED SEPTElWER 22, 1980 QUESTION 2.3 WREG 0612 - CONTROL OF HEAVY LOADS AT MIEEAR POWER PLANTS SEQUOYAH WCLEAR PLANT l l -3 4- \\ i

RRFREMGS i 1. Crane Manuf acturer Associa tion of America. Inc. Specifications for R1ectrical Overhead Traveling Cranes. C.M. A. A. Specifica tion Number 70. 1971. 2. American Welding Seelety, Inc. Specifications for Welded Highway and Railway Bridges. ANS D2.0-69. 1969. 3. U. S. Nucl e a r Re sul a t o ry Commi s sion. Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants. NUREG-0612. 1990. 4. U. S. Re gul a t ory Commi s sion. Single-Failure-Proof Crane a for Nuclear Power Plant s. MIREG-0554. 1979. i 5. Tomme ssee Valley Authority. Design Criteria for Reactor Building Polar Cranes. SON-DC-2.6. 1970.. 6 Tenne ssee Valley Authority. 1 Design Criteria for Auxiliary Building Crane. SQ N-DC-V-1.1.3. 1970. 7. U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Seismic Design Classification. Regulatory Guide 1.29. 1973. 8. Tennessee Valley Authority. Preoperational Test for 125 Tom Auxiliary Building Crane. TV A-43 B. j 1979. 9. Tenne ssee Valley Authority. Preoperational Test for 175 Toa Polar Crane. TVA-43 A. 1979. 10 Tenne ssee Valley Authority. Acceptance Test for 125 Tom Auxiliary Building Crane. 1979. f

11. Tennessee Valley Authority.

Acceptance Test for 175 Tom Polar Crane. 1978. 12. Tenne ssee Valley Authority. Final Saf ety Analysis Report. Sequoyah Nuclear Plant. Section 3.8.6 Ca te gory I Crane s. 1984. 4 13, 7he American Society of Mechanical Engineers. Overhead and Cantry Cranes. ANSI B30.2.0-1976. 4 l 14. The American Society of Nechanical Engineers. Failure Analysis of a Redundant Reeving Holst. No. 76-DE-21. 15. The American Society of Nechanical Engineers. i ] Dynamic Testing of a Redundant Reeving Noist. No. 76-WA/DE-6. i : ---r 4 .r - - - --r .y-, m, .,y _.,e., y

_ ~ 2.3 -1 REQUEST c I Identify by name,. type, capacity, and equipment de sigma tor, : any crane a physically capable (i.e., taking no credit for any interlocks or operating procedures) of carrying heavy loads over the reactor vessel. a RESPON8E ~ The only creme capable of carrying heavy loads over the reactor vessel is the reactor building crane which is an overhead polar crane with a 175 - ton capacity using the main hoist and.a 35-ton capacity using the amalliery hoist. 2.3-2 RBQUEST l 4 Justify the exclusion of any cranes la this area' f rom the above category by verifying that they are incapable of carrying heavy loads, or are permanently _ prevented from the movement of any load either directly over the reactor vessel or to such a location where in the event of any load-hand 11ag-system f ailure, the load may land la or on the reactor vessel.

RESPONSE

l j- ..He. reactor building crane cannot be excluded f rom the category identified in reque st 2.3-2. i .I 2.3 RBQUEST l Identify any cranes listed in 2.3-1, above, which you have evaluated as ( having suf ficient design f eatures to make the likelihood of a load' drop i' extremely small for all loads to be carried and the basis for this i evaluation (i.e., complete compliance with NURIE 0612, Section 5.1.6, or j partial compilance supplemented by suitable alternative or additional r design features). For each crane so evaluated, provide the load-i handling-system ( i. e., crane-load-combina tion) information specified in I j RESPON8E i j The following is in response to items 1 through 5 of attachment 1 of

of the NRC transmittal letter for MIREG-0612 dated December 22, 1980. These response s describe suf ficient design f eatures of the Reactor Building Crane or appropriate corrective actions to be taken to make the likelihood of a load drop extremely small.

J t 'f 1 a ~ -. ~ -. -.,,.

SINGLE-FAILURB-PROOF HANDLING SYSTEMS (2.3-3 Re sponse) Item 1. Provide the name of the manuf acturer and the design rated load (DEL). If the maximum critical load (NCL), as defined in NUREG 0554, is not the same as the IMLR, provide this capacity: l

Response

) Manufacturer: Star' Iron and Steel Company DEL: 175 Tons - Main Holst 35 Tons - Auxilit ary Holst NCL: 165 Tons - Main Holst f . 28 Tons - Auxiliary Holst l Item 2. Provide a detailed evaluation of the overhead handling system with respect to the f eatures of design, fabrica tion, inspe ct ion, testing, i and operation as delineated in NUREG 0612, Appendix C. This evaluation must include a point-by point comparison for each section of NUREG l 0554. If the alternatives of NUREG 0612, Appendix C, are used for certain appilcations in lieu of complying with the recommendation of NUREG 0554, this should be explicitly stated. If an alternative to any of those contained in NUREG 0554 or NUREG 0612, Appendix C, is proposed, details must be provided on the proposed alternative to demonstrate it s equivalency. Resnonse Attachment C provides an enumeration of NUREG-0554 requirements based on NRC's interpretation provided to TVA in the Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant draf t Technical Evalua tion Report (TIR) C5257-181. Refer to Table B for the evaluation of the Sequoyah reactor building crane. Item 3. With. respect to the seismic analysis employed to demonstrate that the overhead handling system can retain the load during a seismic event equal to a saf e shutdown earthquake, provide a description of the method of analysis, the assanptions used, and the mathematical model evaluated in the analysis. The description of assumptions should include the ' basis for selection of trolley and load position. Resnonse Refer to Attachment D. SINGLE-FAILURB-PROOF HANDLING SYSTEMS (2.3-3 Re s pon se) Item'4. Provide an evaluation of the lif ting devices for each single f ailure proof handling system with respect to the guidelines of MIREG 0612, section 5.1.6. 'Resnonse A response to item 4 cannot be provided until the items identified as "E" are accepted _by NRC. Item 5. Provide an evaluation of the interf acing lif t points with respect to the guideline s of NUREG 0612, section 5.1.6. Rossonse A response to item 5 cannot be provided until the items identified as "E"' are accepted by NRC.- l 4 d: -3 8-

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C'i wo

ATTAGENT C SPECIFIC NUREG 0554 RBQUIREMENTS ( AS PRESENTED IN TER C5257-181 - BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PL.OIT) i 2 Snecification and Desian Criteria 2.1 Construction and Operatina Periods 1. When an overhead crane handling system will be used during the plant construction phase, separate performance specifications may be needed to reflect the duty cycles and loading requirements for each service. 2. The allowable design stress limits for the crane intended for. plant operation should be those indicated in Table 3.3.3.1.3-1 of CMAA Specification No. 70 and reflecting the appropriate duty cycle in CMAA Specifica tion No. 70. 3. The som total of simultaneously applied loads (static and dynamic) should not result in stress levels causing permanent deformation other than localized strain concentra tion. 4. The ef fects of cyclic loading induced by jogging or plugging an uncompensate d hoist control system should be included in the design specificatie at 2.2 Naximum Critical Load 1. The crane should be designed to handle the maximum critical load (MCL) that will be imposed. i 2. A slightly higher design load should be selected for component parts 1 that are subj ect to degradation due to wear and exposure. An increase of approximately 15% of the design load for these component parts would be a reasonable margin. 3. The NCL rating should be clearly marked on the crane. 4. The DRL rating should be marked on the crane separately from the MCL marking. ' 2.3 Operatina Environment 1. The operating environment, including maximum and minimum pressure, maximum rate of. pressure increase, tempe ra tur e, humidity, and emergency corrosive or hazardous conditions, should be specified for the crane and lif ting fixtures. For cranes inside the containment structure,' the closed box sections of the crane structure should be vented to avoid collapse during contalanent pressurization. Drainage should be provided. l l l -3 9- -l

2.4 - Material Fronerties 1. The crane and lif ting fixtures for crane already fabricated or operating may be subj ected to a cold-proof test consisting of a single dummy l oad te st a s f ollows : a. Metal temperature of the structural members essential to the structural integrity of the crane handling system should be at below the minimum operating temperature, b. The corresponding dummy load should be equal to 1.25 times the NCL. c. The cold proof te st should be followed by a nondestructive examination of welds whose f ailure could result in the drop of a critical load. i d. The mondestructive examination of critical areas should be repeated at 4-year intervals or less. 2. Cranes and lif ting fixtures made of low-alloy steel such as ASTM A314 should be cold proof tested in any case. 3. Cast iron should not be used for load-bearing components. 2.5 Seismic Desian 1. The crano should be designed and constructed in accordance with regulatory position 2 of Regulatory Guide 1.29. l 2. frhe NCL plus operational and seismically induced pendulum and suinging load effects on the crane should be considered in the design of the trolley, and they should be added to the trolley weight for tha de sign of the bridge. 2.6 Lamellar Tearina 1. All weld joints whose f ailure could result in the drop of a critical load should be nondestructively examined. 2. If any of these weld joint geometries would be susceptible to lamellar tearing, the base metal at the joints should be mondestructively e x amine d. 2.7 Structural Fatiane 1. A f atigue analysis should be considered for the critical load-bearing structures and components of the crane handling system. The cumulative f atigue usage f actors should ' reflect ef fects of the cyclic loading f rom both the construction and operating periods. . _40_ 4

2.8 Weldina Procedures

1.. Preheat tanperatures and postweld heat-treatment (stress relief) tanperatures for all weldments should be specified in the weld proce dere.

) 2. Welds described in the recommendations of Section 2.6 should be postweld heat treated in accordance with Subarticles 3.9 of ANS DI.1, " Structural Welding Code. " 3. Safety Features 3.1 General 3.2 Auxiliary Systems 1. All auxiliary hoisting systems of the main crane handling system that ' are amployed to lif t or assist in handling critical loads should be 3 single f ailure proof. 2. Auxiliary systems or dual components should be provided for the main hoisting mechanism so that, in case of subsystem or component f ailure, l the load will be retained and held in a stable or immobile safe po si tion. 3.3 Electrical Control Systems 1. The automatic controls and limiting devices should be designed so that, when disorders due to inadvertent operator action, component mal function, or disarrangement of subsystem control functions oc:ur singly or in combination during the load handling, and assuming no components have f ailed in any subsystem, these disorders'will not prevent the handling system from stopping and holding.the load. 2. An emergency stop button should be added at the control station to stop all motion. 3.4 Emermency Donairs 4 .1. Means should be provided for using the devices required in repairing,- adjusting, or replacing the f ailed component (s) or subsystem (s) when i f ailure of an active component or subsystem has occurred and the load is supported and retained in the saf e position with the handling. system immob il e. 4. Holstina Machinery 4.1 Reevina System 1. Design of the rope reeving system (s) should be dual with each system providing separately the load balance on the head and load. blocks through the configuration of ropes and rope equalizer (s). 2. The maximum load (including static and inertia forces) on each individual wire rope in the dual reeving system with the NCL attached should not exceed 10% of the manufacturer's published breaking

strength, i

l ;

_~ 3. The maximum fleet angle f rom drum to lead sheave in the load block or between individual sheaves should not exceed 0.061 rad (3-1/2-) at any point during hoisting except that for the last 1 meter of maximum lif t elevation the fleet angle may increase slightly. The use of reverse bonds for running wire ropes should be limited. 4. The equalizer for stretch and. load on the rope reeving system may be i either beam or sheave type or combinations thereof. A dual rope reeving system with -individual attaching points and means for balancing or distributing the load between the two operating rope reeving systems will permit either rope system to hold the critical load and transfer the critical load without excessive shock in the case of f ailure of the v other ~ rope system. 5. The pitch diameter of running sheaves and drums should be selected in ac'ardance with the recommendations of CMAA Specification No. 70. l 6. The dual reeving system may be a single rope f rom each end of a drum terminating.at one of the blocks or equalizer with provisions for-equalizing beam-type load and rope stretch, with each rope designed' for the total load. Al terna tely, a 2-rope system may be used from each-drum or separate drums using a sheave equalizer or beam equalizer or any other combination that provides two separate and complete reeving e systems. 4.2 Drum Suonort 1. The load hoisting drum on the trolley should be provided with structural and mechanical safety devices to limit the drop of tho drum and thereby prevent it f rom disengaging from its holding brake sy stem if the drum shaf t or bearings were to f ail or fracture. 4.3 Head and Load Blocks j 1. The head and load blocks should be designed to maintain a vertical load i balance about the center of lif t f rom load block, through head block and have a reeving system of dual design. 2. The load-block assembly should be provided with two' load-attaching points -(hooks or other means) so designed that each attaching point will be able to support's load of three times the load (static and dynamic) being handled without permanent deformation of any part of the load-block assembly other than localized strain concentration in areas-for which additional' material has been provided for wear. i 3. The individual components of the vertical. hoisting system components, which include the head block, rope reeving system, load block, and dual 1 load-attaching device, should each be designed to support a static load of 200% of the MCL. i + 4 _. k 4 -.+ < w 3

-~ i 4. A 200% static-type Icad tost should b3 perfernsd fcr each iced-attaching hook. Measurements of the geometric configuration of the hooks should be made bef ore and af ter the test and should be followed by a mondestructive examination that should consist of volumetric and surf ace examinations to verify the soundness of f abrication and ensure the integrity of the hooks. The. load blocks should be nondestructively examined by surface and volumetric techniques. 4.4 Holstina Sneed 1. Maximum hoisting speed for the critical -load should be limited to the given in the '" slow" column of Figure 70-6 of CNAA Specificiation No ' 70. Conservative industry practice limits the rope line speed to 1/4 m/ s (50 fpm) a t the drum. 4.5 Desian Aasinst Two-Blockins 1. The mechanical and structural components of the complete hoisting system should have the required strength to resist f ailure if the hoisting' system should "two-block" or if " load hangup" should occur during hoisting. 2. As an alternative, the protective control system to prevent the hoisting system from two blocking should include as a minimum: o Two independent travel-limit devices of different designs and activated by separate mechanical means. o These devices should de-energize the hoist drive motor and mais power supply. 3. The protective control system for load hang-up, a part of the overload protection system, should consist of load cell systems in the drive train or motor-current-sensing devices or mechanical load-limiting devices. 4. The mechanical holding brakes and their controls should include the capability to withstand the maximum torque of the driving noter if a i malfunction occurs and power to the driving motor cannot be shut off. 5. The auxiliary hoist should be equipped with two independent travel-limit switches to prevent two-blocking, 4.6 Liftina Devices 1. Lif ting devices should be conservatively ' designed with a dual or i auxiliary device or combina tion thereof. Each device should be designed or selected to support a load of three times the load (static and dynamic) being handlet without permanent deforma tion. 1 4

4.7 Wire Rose Prote* ties 1. If sideloads cannot be avoided, the reeving system should be equipped with a guard that would keep the wire rope properly located in the ~ grooves on the drum. 4.8 Machinery Aliansent i 1. Where gear trains are interposed between the holding brakes and the hoisting drum, these gear trains should be single f ailure proof and should be of dual design. 4.9 Holst Brakins System l 1. The minimma hoisting braking system should include one power control braking system (not mechanical yor drag brake type) and two holding brakes. The holding brakes.should b; :; plied when power is off and should be automatically applied on.overspeed to the full holding position if a malfunction occurs. Each holding brake should have c. torque rating not less than 125% of the full-load hoisting torque at point of applica tion. 4 2. The minimum number of braking systems that should.be operable for emergency lowering af ter a single brake f ailure should be two holding brakes for stopping and controlling drum rotation. 3. The holding brake rystem should be single f ailure proof, i e., any component or gear train should be-dual if interposed between the holding brake s and the hoisting drums. 4. Provision for manual operation of the hoisting brakes should be ~ included in the design conditions. 5. Bridae and Trollev 5.1 Brakins Capacity 1. The maximum torque capability of the driving motor and scar' reducer for trolley motion and bridge motion of the overhead bridge crane should not exceed the capability of gear train and brakes to stop the trolley or bridge from the maximum speed with the DEL attached. Control and holding brakes should each be rated.at 100% of maximum drive torque that can be developed at the point of application. 2. If t<wo mechanical brakes, one for control and one for holding, are provided, they should be adjusted with one brake in each system leading. the other and should be activated by release or shutof f of power. This applies to both trolley and bridge. r-y

3. The brekos shceld also bs eschanically tripped to the "ca" or "hsiding" position in the event of a malfunction in the power supply or an overspeed condition. 4. Provisions should be made for manual energency operation of the brakes. 5. The holding brake should be designed so that it cannot be used as a f oot-operated slowdown brake. 6. Drag brakes should not be used. t 7.. Opposite-driven wheels on bridge or trolley that support bridge or trolley on their runways should be matched and should have identical di ame t er s.

8. - Trolley. and bridge speed should be limited. The speed limits indicated for. slow operating speeds for trolley and bridge in Specification CMAA No. 70 are recommended for handling NCLs.

5.2 Safety Stons 1 1. Limiting devices, mechanical and/or electrical, should be provided to control or prevent overtravel and overspeed of the trolley and bridge. Buf fers for bridge and trolley travel should be included at the end of the rails. 2. Saf ety devices such as limit-type switches provided for malfunction, inadvertent operation action, or failure should be in addition to and separate f rom the limiting means or control devices provided for opera tion. 6. Drivers and Controls 6.1 Driver Selection 1. The maximum torque capability of the electric motor drive for hoisting should not exceed the rating of capability of the individual component of the hoisting system, required to hoist the MCL at the maximum design hoist speed. 2. It is essential that the controls be capable of stopping the hoisting movement within amounts of movement that damage would not occur. A-maximum hoisting movement of 8 ma (3 in) would.be an acceptable stopping distance. 3. For elaborate control systems,: radio control, or ultimate control under - unforeseen conditions of distress, an emergency stop button should be placed at ground level to remove power from the crane -independently of the crane controls. l.--

i 6.2 Driver Control Syste's 1. The control system (s) provided should include consideration of the hoisting (raising and lowering) of all loads, including the rated load, and the effects of the inertia of the rotating hoisting machinery such as motor annature, shaf ting and coupling, gear reducer, and drum. 2. If the crane is to be used for lif ting spent fuel elements, the control system should be adaptable to include interlocks that will prevent j trolley and bridge movements while the load is being hoisted free of a reactor vessel' or a storage rack, as may be recommended in Regulatory Guide 1.13, i 6.3 Malfunction Protection (Drivers) 1. Means should be provided in the motor control circuits to sense and respond to such items as excessive electric current, excessive motor t empera ture, ov ers pe e d, overload, and over-travel. 2. Controls should be provided to absorb the kinetic energy of the rotating machinery and stop the hoisting movement reliably and safely through a combination of electrical power controls and mechanical braking systems and torque controls if one rope or one of the dual reeving systems should f all or if overloading or an overspeed condition should occur. i j 6.4 Slow Speed Drives 1. If jogging or plugging is to be used, the control urcuit should include features to prevent abrupt change in motion. 2. Drif t point in the electric power system when provided for bridge or trolley movement should be provided only for the lowest operating speeds. 6.5 Safety Devices 1. Saf ety devices such as limit-type switches provided for malfunction, inadvertent operator action, or f ailure should be in addition to and separate f rom the limiting means or control devices provided for operattun. i 6.6 Control Stations I 1. The complete operating control system and provisions for emergency controls for the overhead crane handling system should preferably be i located in a cab on the bridge. .2. Additional operator stations should have control systems similar to the - main sta tion. 3. Manual controls for hoisting and trolley movement may be provided on the trolley, while manual controls for the~ bridge may be located on the i bridge. I I l l 1 l l l

4. - Cranes that use mere then cza ocatrol station shculd be previdsd with electrical interlocks that permit only one control station to be operable at any one time.

7.- Installation Instructions J 7.1 General 1 Installation instructions provided by the manuf acturcr should include a i full explanation of the crane handling system, its control s, and the limitations for the system and should cover the requirements for installa tion,. te sting, and preparation for operation. 7.2 Construction and Operatina Periods 1. Af ter construction use, the crane should be thoroughly inspected by nondestructive examination and load tested for the operating phase. The extent of nondestructive examinations, the procedures used, and the acceptance criteria should be defined in the design specification. 2. If allowable design stress limits for the plant operating service are to be exceeded during the construction phase, added inspection supplementing that described in Section 2.6 should be specified and d evelo pe d. 8. Testina and Preventative Maintenance 8.1 General 1. Information concerning proof testing on components and sub-systets that was required and performed at the manuf acturer's plant to verify the ability of components or subsystems to perform should be available for the checking and testing performed at the place of installation of the crane sy s t em. 8.2 Static and Dynamic Load Tests 1. The crane system should be static load tested at 12Sn of the NCL. The tests should include all positions generating maximum strain in the bridge and trolley strucures and other positions as recommended by the designer and manufacturer. 2. The crane handling system should be given full performance tests with 100% of the MCL for all speeds and motions for which the system is de si gne d. 3. The f eatures provided for nanual lowering of the load and manual movement of the bridge and trolley during an emergency should be tested with the MCL attached to demonstrate the ability to function as intended. 8.3 Two-Block Test

1.. When equipped with an energy-controlling device between the load and

. head blocks,. the complete hoisting machinery. should be allowed to two-block during the hoisting test (load bicck limit and safety devices are bypa s sed)., 2

2.' Ths cccplete hoisting cachinory chsuld ba' tested fer. ability to sustain a load hangup condition by a test in which the load-block-attaching points are secured to a fixed anchor or an excessive load. 8.4 Ooeratina Tests 1. Operational tests of crane systems should be performed to verify the proper functioning of limit switches and other safety devices and the ability to perform as designed. i 8.5 Maintenance 1. The MCL rating of the ' cts a should be established as the rated load. capacity, and the design rating for the degradable portion of the handling system should be identified to obtain the margin.available for the maintenance program. 2. The NCL should be plainly marked on each side of the crats for each ~ hoisting unit'. 9. Operatina Manual 1. The crane designer and manuf acturer should provide a manual of information and procedures for use in checking, testing, and operating the crane. 2. The operating requirements for all travel movemente (vertical and horizontal movements or rota tion, singly or,in combination) incorporated in the design for permanent plant cranes should be clearly defined in the operating manual for hoisting and for trolley and bridge trav el. 4 10. Quality Assurance 1. A quality assurance program should be established to the extent necessary to include the recommendations of this report for the design, fabrication, installation, testing, and operation of crane handling i systems for safe handling of critical loads. I ? ' l' l L.

TABLE B C= Compliance-SINGLE FAILURE-PROOF CRANE. COMPLIANCE E= Equivalency NUREG 0554 COMPARISON N= Noncompliance 175/35 TON POLAR CRANE - REACTOR BLDG. NA= Not Applicable 2.3-3 RESPONSE . NUREG 0554 TVA'S SECrION . POSITION COMMENTS / IMPLEMENTATION RECOMMENDATIONS 2.1 - 1 C The crane specifications for normal use include consideration for special loading conditions during construction. (i.e., Construction load of - 450-tons on girder). The design specification is typical of a CMAA Specification No. 70 class C (moderate service) crane; whereas, the actual normal use is typical of a CMAA No. 70 class A1 - (standby service) crane. -2 E Crane was not designed to the requirements of the referenced table in CMAA No. 70; however, the crane's allowable design stress limits and appropriate-4 duty cycles are less than those limits in the referenced table. -3 C The designal allowables for simultaneous applied' loads are half the material's yield necessary to cause permanent deformation. -4 E Both hoists' drive systems are compensated stepless DC adjustable voltage drives with mgmerative braking and static mversing incorporated which eliminates the effects of cyclic loading through acceleration control. 2.2-1 C The crane was designed to safely lift and transport the Design Rated Load (DRL) and to control that load during a seismic event. The DRL is 65 greater than the established Maximum Critical Load (MCL). -2 E A slightly higher design load for componet parts, that are subject to possible degradation, was not included for this crane; however, the DRL is ' approximately 6% higher than the MCL. Additionally, this crane was designal to CMAA No. 70 Class C (moderate service) standards, whereas plant operation requires a Class A1 (standby service) crane. . l e

TABLE B C= Compliance SINGLE FAILURE-PROOF CRANE COMPLIANCE E= Equivalency' NUREG 0554 COMPARISON N= Noncompliance 175/35 TON POLAR CRANE - IEACTOR BLDG. NA= Not Applicable 2.3-3 RESPONSE NUREG 0554 TVA'S SECTION POSITION COMMENTS / IMPLEMENTATION RECOMMENDATIONS - -3 C The MCL rating for the main and auxiliary hoists will'be displayed on the crane. -4 C The DRL is clearly shown on the crane. 2.3-1 E The sivironmental conditions of the crane are specified in the plant safety. amlysis mport which is mferenced in the Design Criteria and was used to - establish adverse conditions in containment. These potentially adverse conditions were taken into account while specifying the paint, insulation, and electrical components. Closed box sections of the crane are equipped with vents and drain holes to eliminate possible collapse during containment pressurization. 2.4-la-d E Crane has not been cold proof tested. In. lieu of a cold-proof test, a minimum operating temperatum will be established based on NDTT+30

F -

criterion for critical lifts governed by NUREG-0612. -2 C No low-alloy steel was used in the structural components of this crane. -3 C No cast iron is used for any load bearing members. 2.5-1 C The design is in accordance with Regulatory Position 2 of Reg. Guide 1.29 -2 C The MCL plus operatiomi and: seismically induced pendulum and swinging loads were considered in.the design of the bridge and trolley..

TABLE B C= Compliance SINGLE FAILURE-PROOF CRANE COMPLIANCE E= Equivalency NUREG 0554 COMPARISON N= Noncompliance 175/35 TON POLAR CRANE - REACTOR BLDG. NA=.Not Applicable 2.3-3 RESPONSE NUREG 0554 TVA'S SECTION POSITION COMNTS/ IMPLEMENTATION REC 0HNDATIONS 2.6-1' C Nondestructive testing was performed during fabrication on all critical load bearing welds. -2 C All welds. in critical areas were nondestructively tested to ensure lamellar tearing had not occurred in the base metal. 2-7-1 E A fatigue aralysis was not conducted on all critical load-bearing structures and components; however, design stress levels for these critical areas are lower than the mdurance limits (40% of material's tensile strength)'for the various materials. '2.8-1 C Specification required all welding to be done in accordance with AWS D2.0-1969, which delineates preheat and stress mlief temperature requimments. -2 E Critical welds were postweld heat treated in accordance with AWS D2.0-1969 3 2-1 E The mtim auxiliary hoisting system in its present configuration is not single-failum-proof; however, duality of the hoist mechanism and meving, established. quality assurance of the rendual lower block and hook, and the fact that the MCL is 80% of the DRL substantiates an equivalent system. -2 C The main hoisting system is dual acting;. consequently, the system is able to retain and hold the load in a stable position in case of a subsystem or componmt failure. c TABLE. B C=. Compliance SINGLE FAILURE-PROOF CRANE COMPLIANG ~: E= Equivalency NUREG 0554 COMPARISON 175/35 TON POLAR CRANE - EACTOR BLDG. - N= Noncompliance. NA= Not! Applicable. 2.3-3 RESPONSE ~ ' NUREG 0554 TVA'S SECTION POSITION cot 9ENTS/IMPLEtENTATION. REC 0teENDATIONS. 3.3-1 ~ C Automatic controls and limiting devices are properly designed to'stop-and hold any load under all identified inadvertent disorders. -2 C, Control station is equipped with an emergency stop pushbutton. 3.4-1 C All vulnerable active componets can be repaired or replaced while - supporting the MCL for the main and = auxiliary hoist. (Refer to Active Component Replacement Guide of Tables B1 and B2). However, in some cases an-in-place repair.or mplacement of failed components other than active - components is impractical, and an alternate means of moving the load to, a' safe laydown area is unavailable. A method will be developed and implemmted for the manual emergency movement' of the bridge and trolley. 4.1 -1 E - Dual meving and equalizing systems are used for the main and auxiliary hoists. Load balancing through cross-reeving is not used for either hoist. -2(a) E For the main hoist, the maximum load on each individual wire rope with the t - M(L attached exceeds 10% of the manufacturer's published breaking strength. However,.the main hoist wire ropes exceed the requirements of 04AA 70 with a factor of safety, of 6.6 to 1-with the MCL attached. During routine maintenance as mplacement of wire rope -is mquired, extra extra improved ~ plowed steel wire rope will be' used which will yield a 155 increase in the factory of safety. -2(b)' C For.the auxiliary hoist, the maximum load on each individual wire rope with the MCL attached. doea not exceed 10% of the manufacturer's published breaking strength. ~ I 1 . - + -s'-- m. a

TABLE B C= Compliance'. SINGLE FAILURE-PROOF CRANE COMPLIANCE E= Equivalency NUREG 0554 COMPARISON N= Noncompliance 175/35 TON POLAR CRANE - REACTOR BLDG. NA= Not Applicable 2.3-3 RESPONSE NUREG 0554' TVA'S COMNTS/IMPLEENTATION. RECONNDATIONS SECTION POSITION The maxistan fleet angle for the main hoist is 3 7, with the load block in. -3(a) E the low block position. This angle is a minor deviation from the maximum allowable by NUREG 0554, and is considered insignificant since the crane is designed to CMAA No. 70 Class C standards. No mverse bends are used in this meving system. The maximum fleet angle for the auxiliary hoist is.less than 3 5. No -3(b) C. reverse bends are used in this reeving system. -4 C The equalizing device is a. double-ended, double-acting hydraulic cylinder that will prevent dropping the load in case of single failure. This is true for both the main and auxiliary hoists. Pitch diameter of running sheaves and drums were selected in accordance with -5 C CMAA No. 70. 4.1-6 .C A two rope system off the drum with a hydraulic equalizer is used for both the main and auxiliary hoists. Neither main nor auxiliary hoists are equipped with structural or mechanical 4.2-1 C safety devices to limit the drop of the load hoisting drum in Lthe case of a failure. Both hoisting systems will be equipped with plates to prevent the drums from dropping sufficiently to permit pinion / drum gear separation during bearing or shaft failure. -

TABLE B C= Compliance SINGLE FAILURE-PROOF CRANE COMPLIANCE E= Equivalency NUREG 0534 COMPARISON N= Noncompliance 175/35 TON POLAR CRANE - REACTOR BLDG. NA= Not Applicable 2.3-3 RESPONSE NUREG 0554-TVA'S SECTION POSITION COPEENTS/IMPLEtENTATION RECOM1ENDATIONS -4.3-1 C The. head and load blocks for both the main and auxiliary hoists are dual' reeved and designed to maintain a true vertical load balance. i -2 E Dual attaching points are rot provided for either the main or auxiliary ' hoist load block assemblies. However, the main hook was designed and manufactured in accordance with CMAA 70; and is nondestructively examined periodically in accordance with-ANSI B30.10-1971. -3 C' Crane was nominally designed with a factor of safety of 5:1 on the DRL. -4(a) E - The hooks were prooftested-to 200 percent of the DRL and examined by ultrasonic and magnetic particle testing methods. -4(b) The load blocks were not nondestructively examined by surface and volumetric techniques. However, the load block is visually inspected annually in accordance with ANSI B30.2.0-1976. If the forthcoming visual inspection warrant disassembly of the block, the block will be rondestructively examined by surface and volumetric techniques, and necessary replacements made. 4.4-1(a) C The maximum hoisting speed for the main hoist is less than the " slow" speed shown in figure 70-6 of CMAA No. 70. Additionally, the rope line speed for the main hoist at the drum is 31.2 FPM. 1.

TABLE B C= Compliance - SINGLE FAILURE-PROOF CRANE COMPLIANCE E= Equivalency KUREG _0554 COMPARISON - N= Noncompliance 175/15 TON POLAR CRANE - REACTOR BLDG. NA= Not Applicable 2.3-3 RESPONSE NUREG 0554 TVA'S ~ SECTION. POSITION COMMENTS /IMPLE)ENTATION RECOMMENDATIONS 4.4-1(b) E The maximum hoisting speed for the auxiliary hoist' is more.. than the " slow" speed shown in. figure 70-6 of O(AA No. 70. The rope line speed at the drum for the auxiliary hoist is greater than 50 FPM.- The maximum hoisting speed will be limited to the " slow" speed for critical-lifts by ackninistrative control using plant maintenance procedures. 4.5-1 NA The design to prevent tn-blocking is presented in the following'section as an altemative. -2 C Two. independently operated limit switches of different design are used in series to limit the upward travel of each hoist hook. A lever-type limit switch is _ used on the wire rope and a rotary-type limit switch is used on the hoist machinery. Both types of limit switches are designed to de-energize the drive motor and main power supply for main and auxiliary hoists. -3 C The protective control system for both main and auxiliary hoists includes a motor-current sensing device. -4 E Two independent limit switches protect against the possibility of two-blocking. The brake electrical control circuit is separate from the hoist control circuit therefore, a double failure of the control contactors-would be required to prevent brake setting. Motor stall conditions' produce 850 ft.-lbs. torque which is less than the 1100 ft. lbs. torque dual brake capability. Brakes have 29% design margin above stall requirements. --

TABLE B , C= Compliance ' SINGLE FAILURE-PROOF CRANE COMPLIAN04 E= Equivalency NUREG 0554 COMPARISON N= Noncompliance 175/35 TON POLAR CRANE - REACTOR BLDG. NA= Not Applicable 2 3-3 RESPONSE NUREG 0554 TVA'S SECTION POSITION COMMENTS / IMPLEMENTATION RECOMMENDATIONS -5 C Auxiliary hoist is equipped with two independent travel limit switches, as described in the comments to 4.5-2. 4.6-1 NA TVA is reviewing the design of critical lifting devices for compliance with NUREG 0612 as requested by the NRC. Refer to our report from L. M. Mills to E. Adensam dated March 1, 1982, for compliance status. 4.7-1 C No critical lifts require sideloading, nonetheless, a bar guard is employed on both hoists. 4.8-1 C The gear trains are interposed between the hoisting drums and the holding brakes consist of two separate gearing systems designed as single-failure-proof, for both the main and auxiliary hoists. 4.9-1 C Each hoisting braking system (main and auxiliary ) consists of the following: Two holding brakes each rated at 150% of.the full-load hoisting torque; regenerative braking, and emergency dynamic braking. -2 C Single failure of the regenerative braking system will result in two holding brakes for stopping and controlling the load, for both main and auxiliary hoists. -3 C The holding brakes, for both hoists, are single-failure-proof and' or dual design. -4 C Design conditions included provisions for the manual operation of the hoisting brakes. TABLE B SINGLE FAILURE-PROOF CRANE COMPLIANCE C= Compliance E= Equivalency NUREG 0554 COMPARISON N: Noncompliance 175/35 TON POLAR CRANE - REACTOR BLDG. NA= Not' Applicable 2.3-3 RESPONSE NUREG 0554 TVA'S COMMENTS / IMPLEMENTATION RECOMMENDATIONS SECTION . POSITION The brakes and gear train are designed to stop bridge and trolley travel-5.1 -1 (a ) .C from the maximum speed with the.DRL attached. 5.1-1(b) E Holding brakes for both bridge and trolley motion and control braking for. bridge motion are rated at least 100%.of:the maximum drive torque at the point of application. The trolley does not have control braking; however, a stepless regulated speed control system serves to slow trolley motion. -2(a) C The bridge is equipped with two ; electric holding brakes and two manual hydraulic control brakes. The electric brakes are activated by a release or loss of power. The hydraulic brakes are independent of electrical control. -2(b) C The trolley is equipped with one electric holding brake and automatically. sets in the event of a power loss. -3 C All electric brakes are actuated on interruption of power for, any reason. -4 C The electric holding brakes can be manually operated during an emergency. -5 C The holding brakes for bridge and trolley are designed so that they cannot be foot operated. The hydraulic control brakes on bridge are independent. -6. C No drag brakes are. used.

TABLE B C= Compliance SINGLE FAILURE-PROOF CRANE COMPLIANCE E: Equivalency NUREG 0554 COMPARISON N= Noncompliance-175/35 TON POLAR CRANE - IEACTOR BLDG. NA= Not Applicable 2.3-3 RESPONSE NUREG 0554 TVA'S SECTION PmITION . COMMENTS /IMPLE!ENTATION REC 0tMENDATIONS _ , C All bridge and trolley wheels are machined in pairs to the same diameter. -8 C Trolley and bridge speeds are limited and the same as the " slow" speeds indicated in Figure 70-6 of 04AA No. 70. ' 5.2-1 C Polar crane does not have bridge overtravel limiting devices. Trolley does not use mechanical or electrical interlocks; however, the crane is equipped with bumpers,. designal to absorb impact at maximum speed with maximum suspended load. The speed of the bridge and -trolley is controlled by a speed regulation static device. 5.2-2 C All limit switches, overspeed switches, current relays, etc., are provided as safety backup devices and are' rot intended for normal operating use. 6.1-1 C The calculated power requirement and the. motor rating for the main and auxiliary hoists are identical at 50 horsepower. It is the basis for. design of all driving and braking components. -2 E Specification requires a maxinun hoisting movement of 6-inches at fbil speed with MCL attached. During Preoperational Tests both main and - auxiliary hoists satisfied this requirement. 4 -3 C There are three " Emergency Stop Buttons" located at floor level. 6.2-1 C. The control system complies fully with' item 6.2 of NUREG 0554.,

__._____.. m _. - a 1 1 TABLE B C= Compliance ' SINGLE FAILURE-PROOF CRANE COMPLIANCE ' 3 L E= Equivalency NUREG 0554 COMPARISON.. N= Noncompliance 175/35 TON POLAR CRANE - REACTOR BLDG. . NA=. Not Applicable - 2.3-3 RESPONSE ' L NUREG 0554 TVA'S' SECTION. POSITION C0t9 EMS /IlfLEtErfATION RECOt9ENDATIONS -2. C Polar crane does nct handle -spent fbel elements._ t 6.3-1' 'C Means are provided in the motor control' circuits to sense and mspond ;to adverse conditions. .-2 <C Controls are provided. to absorb the kinetic mergy of the rotating machinery .and to stop' the hoisting movement safely and :mliably. j 6.4-1~ C These features are : inherent in the'G'eneral-Electric ~ Company's maxspeed' DC. . adjustable voltage systems used on both. hoist and trolley drives.

-2L E

Drift point is provided in the electrical power system for this crane; '. however, this. provision was not linLted to the lowest speed, but the critical lifts are administratively controlled. .6.5-1' C.

All safety devices are provided as backup safety, devices and are. rot available for controlled use by. the operator.

6.6-1'

C:

' Bridge-mounted cab has complete operating.and, emergency controls, with the, exception of emergency manual control brake operation. -2~ NA No other crane operator stations' exist in the Reactor Building. -3 NA. .Not a requirement. ..l' O ! i 's'

TABLE B C= Compliance SINGLE FAILURE-PROOF CRANE COMPLIANCE E= Equivalency NUREG 0554 COMPARISON N= Noncompliance 175/35 TON POLAR CRANE - EACTOR BLDG. NA= Not Applicable. 2 3-3 RESPONSE. NUREG 0554 TVA'S SECTION P M ITION COMMENTS /IMPLEEffrATION ECOMMENDATIONS -4 NA There are m other operator stations. 7.1-1 C Operation and instruction manuals were supplied. by the manufacturer and include all pertinmt information to satisfy this mquirement. 7.2-1 E After construction use a preoperational load test.was performed; however, no provisions are in.the preoperational-test mr were any mndestructive examination of welds performed prior to operational use. In lieu of a one time full NDE, all accessible welds are visually inspected annually in accordance with ANSI B30.2.0-1976.. -2. C-No predetermined loads exceeded allowable-design stress limits established for the plant operating service during the construction phase. 8.1-1 C All work performed at the vedor's facilities was acceptable and is documented and available. 8.2-1 C Acceptance tests included complete performance tests at m load, 50%, ' 100%, and 125% or DRL (DRL is greater than MCL). -2 C' The crane was given full performance tests with 100% of DRL for all speeds and motions.

~ TABLE B C= Compliance SINGLE FAILURE-PROOF CRANE COMPLIANCE E: Equivalency - NUREG 0554 COMPARISON N= Noncompliance 175/35 TON POLAR CRANE . REACTOR BLDG. NA= Not_ Applicable 2.3-3 RESPONSE NURCG 0554 TVA'S SECTION POSITION COMMENTS / IMPLEMENTATION REC 0t91ENDATIONS -3 C No test was performed on the emergency manual movement of tne bridge and trolley with the MCL attached. A method will be developed and implemented for the manual emergency movement of the bridge and trolley. A functioml. test will be performed for the verification of these movements. 8.3-1 E No two-blocking test was performed; however, Appendix.C of NUREG 0612 allows for functiomi verification of the limLt switches in' lieu of an-actual two-blocking test. The Preoperatiomi Test verified _ these limit switches to be functioml. -2 E No load hang-up test was performed; however, the crane is designed for 275% stall loadings and is equipped with a 1255 load limiter and load readout systems. The functiomi testing and acceptance of these systems provides alternative compliance of Appendix C, NUREG 0612. 8.4-1 C In addition to Acceptance and Preoperatioml Tests performed after installation and prior to fuel load, respectively, periodic operatioml ' tests and visual inspections are made to demonstrate safe performance of. the crane. 8.5-1 C This crane's MCL is 6% less than the DRL: and the crane was designed to CMAA No. 70 Class C (moderate service) standards whereas operatiomily it should be class A1 (standby service). These factors lead to the crane being continuously maintained above rormal requirements.

.~. ( TABLE B C= Compliance SINGLE FAILURE-PROOF CRANE COMPLIANCE. E= Equivalency ~ 175/35 TON POLAR CRANE - REACTOR BLDG. NUREG 0554. COMPARISON N= Noncompliance NA= Not Applicable 2 3-3 RESPONSE NUREG 0554 ' TVA'S SECTION POSITION COMMENTS /IMPLEENTATION REC 0fffENDATIONS.- -2 C As previously stated in this mport (section 2.2-3), the McL will be installed-on the crane. 9.1-1 C The specification required and the crane manufactume supplied a set of operation and instruction manuals. 9.1-2 C The operating mquirements for all travel movements are clearly definsi in the crane operation and instruction manual. 10.1-1 E This crane was designed, fabricated, installed, tested, and initially operated under an approved Quality Assurance ' program that was prior to the issuance of NUREG 0554. The requirements used to manufacture, maintain, and operate this crane in addition to the satisfactory completion of the recommendations contained herein should satisfy the intent of NUREG 0554..

TABLE B1 ACTIVE CORPONENT REPLACEMENT GUIDE 2.3-3 RESPONSE (MIREG 0554 - SECTION 3.4) Lif t System: 175/35 TON POLAR CRANE MAIN HOIST Repai r De si gn Set Cont. or Spare Factor Down Lift Repl ace Parts of Capa-Ca pa-Ca pa-Av ail-Safety bil ity bility bil ity abl e Acr1VE COMPONENT 1. Holst Motor NA Yes No Yes Ye s 2. Primary Holding Brake (6) Yes Yes Yes N/A 3. Secondary Holding Brake (6) Yes Yes Ye s N/A 4. Primary Gear Reducer (7) Ye s (1) Yes Yes N/A 5. Secondary Gear Reducer (7) Yes(2) Yes Yes N/A 4 6. Primary Pinion / Drum Gear 8.0:1 ( 8) Yes(1) Ye s(1) Yes/No(1) N/A 7. Secondary Pinion / Drum Gear 8.0:1 ( 8) Yes(2) Ye s(2) Ye s/No(2) N/A 8. Wire Rope Drum 5.5:1 (8) No No No N/A 9. Wire Rope Drum Shaft (9) No No No -N/A 10. Wire Rope 6.6:1(8) Yes(3) Yes(3) Yes Yes l 11. Drive Couplings NA Ye s Ye s Ye s Ye s 12. Primary Pinion Shatt Bearings NA Yes(1) Yes(1) Yes Yes 13. Secondary Pinion Shaf t Bearings NA Ye s(2) Yes(2) Yes N/A 14. Drum Support Bearings NA Yes . No Yes Yes 15. Power Track (Festoon) Sy st em NA No(4) No Ye s N/A(5) l N/A - Not Applicable Special Conditions: 1. Postulate single component f ailure. 2. Disabled trolley or bridge can be physically moved by portable winches tied to appropriate structures. -

TABLE B1 ACTIVE 00NPGil!NT REPIACEMENT GUIDE . 2.3-3 RESPONSE (NURHi 0554 - SECTION 3.4) SHT. 2 of 2 Lif t System: 175/35 Ton Polar Crane Main Holst F00'INOTES l (1) Remove primary pinion (2) Remove secondary pinion (3) Based on studies performed by the University of Tennessee Mechanical Engineering Department ( ref er to ASE papers No. 76-DE-21 and No. 76-WA/DE-6), continued lif ting and lowering of the load af ter a single rope f ailure is po s sibl e. This study was modeled from a 125 ton fuel cask handling crane composed of a dual non-crossed twelve part reeving system. (4) When power f ailure occurs there is no upward hoisting movement possible..Even though the manual release provided on the holding brake will allow lowering of the load, the hook (with load attached) could be in a physical location that l would require upward motion before the load could be moved laterally to a saf e laydown area. (5) A temporary power supply will be used. (6) 150% of full load motor torque (7) Vendor supplied and designed in accordance with AGNA. 4 ( 8) Based on a MQ, of 165 tons ( 9) The materials mechanical properties cannot be verified. A field test to 4 determine the actual properties is being conducted. Ref erence ~1VA's response to Sequoyah draf t TER No. C5257-449 for further details. ~ i i i a 4 i r 1 l 1 -64 ' 1 i l i

TABLE B2 ACTIVE 00NONENT REPLACEMENT GUIDE 2.3-3 RESPONSE (NUREG 0554 - SECTION 3.4) SHT. 1 of 2 Lif t System: 175/35 Ton Polar Crane Auxiliary Holst Repai r Design Set

Cont, or, Spare Fa ct or Down Lift Repl ace Parts of Ca pa-Ca pa-Capa-Av ail-Saf e ty bility bil ity bil ity abl e ACTIVE COMPONENT 1.

Holst Motor NA Ye s No Yes Ye s 2. Primary Holding Brake (6) Yes Ye s Yes N/A 3. Secondary Holding Brake (6) Yes Yes Ye s N/A 4. Primary Gear Reducer (7) Yes(1) Yes Yes N/A 5. Secondary Gear Reducer (7) Yes(2) Yes Yes N/A 6. Primary Pinion / Drum Gear 7.9:1(8) Yes(1) Ye s(1) Ye s/No(1) N/A 7. Secondary Pinion / Drum Gear 7.9 :1( 8) Yes(2) Ye s(2) Yes/No(2) N/A 8. Wire Rope Drum 8.6: 1( 8) No No No N/A 9. Vire Rope Drum Shatt 8.9:1(8) No No No N/A 10. Wire Rope 10.0:1(8) Yes(3) Yes(3) Yes Yes 11. Drive Couplings NA Yes Yes Yes Ye s 12. Primary Pinion Shaf t Bearings NA Yes(1) Yes(1) Yes Yes 13. Secondary Pinion Shatt Bearings NA Yes(2) Ye s(2) Yes N/A 14. Drum Support Bearings NA Ye s No Yes Yes 15. Power Track (Festoon) Sy st em NA No(4) No Ye s N/A(5) N/A -- Not Applicable Special Conditions: 1. Postulate single component f ailure. 2. Disabled trolley or bridge can be physically moved by portable winches tied to appropriate structures..

l TABLE B2 ACTIVE 0)NPONENT REPLACEMENT GUIDE 2.3-3 RESPONSE (NURHi 0554 - SECTION 3.4) SHT. 2 of 2 Lif t System -175/35 Ton Polar Crane Auxiliary Holst R)01N01ES l (1) Remove primary pinion (2) Remove secondary pinion (3) Based on studies performed by the University of Tennessee Mechanical Engineering Department (ref er to ASIE papers No. 76-DE-21 and No. 76-WA/DE-6), - continued lif ting and lowering of the load af ter a single rope f ailure is po s sibl e. This study was modeled from a 125 ton fuel cask handling crane ~ ccaposed of a' dual.non-crossed twelve part reeving system. (4) When power f ailure occurs there is no upward hoisting movement po s sibl e. - Even though the manual release provided on the holding brake will allow lowering of the load. The hook (with load attached) could be in a physical location that would require upward motion bef ore the load could be moved laterally to a safe l aydown ares.. (5)~ A temporary power supply will be used. (6) 150% of in11 load motor torque (7) Vendor supplied and designed in 'accordance with AGNA. ( 8). Ba sed on a NG, of 28 tons. 9... -

ATTAGIENT D Mbthod of Seismic Analysis Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Reactor Building Polar Cranes 2.3-3 Response The: analysis was performed using idealized lumped-mass models. Both girders .were modeled for the horizontal load case in order to simulate the interaction be tween the girders. The small dif ferences in the masses of the beams were model ed. For the vertical case, only the girder with the weight of the cab - included was analyzed. The Three loading conditions of the crane were considered in the analysis. hoist trolley is assumed to provide a rigid connection between the crane girders , for motion in the. horizontal direction. The three loading conditions are as f oll ows : ' Loading condition 1 assumed the trolley and live load to be at the support. Loading condition 2 assumes the trolley and live load at the third point of the span. Loading condition 3 assumes the trolley and live load at the midpoint of the span. For the lateral analysis, the support points of the crane girder were assumed to be fixed for translation and restrained from rotation by a spring, Che stiffne ss of which was the rotational stif fness of the main girder-end girder j oin:. The ef f ect of ' the live load, a mass hung by a long cable, which would act as a pendulum of very low frequency, was ne glected. Spectral accelerations were taken f rom TVA Report MB-80-23 " Dynamic Earthquake Analysis of the Interior Concrete Structure and Response Spectra f or. Attached Equipment," using 1 percent structural damping. For the longitudinal direction, parallel to the main girder axis, the crane girder is assumed to be rigid. For the vertical analysis, the crane girder was assumed to be simply-supported. The ef fect of the live load, idealized as a weight hung by a spring and attached to Che crane, was considered in this analysis. The live load was taken as 175 tons and the hoist cables were extended to the maximum length. The vertical spectral accelerations were taken f rom the same report as the lateral analysis.

, _ = -

RESPONSE TD INEOSURE 3 TO NRC LETTER DATED DECEMER 22, 1980 QUESTION 2.4 EREG 0612 - CONTROL 0F HEAVY LOADS AT WEEAR POWER PLANTS SBQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT i e 9

2.4-1 REQUEST Identify any crane s listed in 2.1-1, above, which you have evaluated as having auf ficient design f estares to make the likelihood of a load drop extremely small for all loads to be carried and the basis for this evalua tion (i. e., complete compliance with NUREG 0612, Section 5.1.6, or partial compliance supplemented by suitable alternative or additional de sign f eatures). For each crane so evaluated, provide the load-handling-sy st em ( i. e., crane-load-combina tion) information specified in attachment 1.

RESPONSE

The f ollowing cranes (lif t systems) are listed in 2.1-1 and were not excluded by section 2.1-2. Lift System 1. 125/10 Ton Auxiliary Building Crane - Addressed in Response 2.2-3. 2. 175/35 Ton Reactor Building Polar Crane - Addressed in Response 2.3-3. 3. 4 Ton Monorail w/4 Ton Holst and Trolley - Auxiliary Building 4. 5 Ton Monorail w/5 Ton Holst and Trolley - Auxiliary Building 5. 3 Ton Jib Crane - Reactor Building 6. 20 Ton Hydraulic Pedestal Crane - ERCW Pumping Station Items 3 through 6 above do not meet the criteria of single-failure-proof. nor do they qualify for partial. compliance with supplements. These items are evaluated in section 2,4-2. 2.4-2 REQUEST For any crane s identified in 2.1-1 not de signa ted a s singl e-failure-proof in 2.4-1, a comprehensive hazard evaluation should be provided which include s the following informa tion: a. The presentation in a matrix format of all heavy loads and potential impact areas where damage might occur to safety-related equipment. Heavy loads identification should include designa tion and weight or cross-ref erence to information provided in 2.1-3-c. Impact areas should be identified by ' construction zone s and eleva tions or by saae other me thod such that dhe impact area can be located on the plant general arrangement drawings.

RESPONSE

a. Ref er to Table C for evaluation. -6 9-

i REQUEST + b. For each interaction identified, indicate which of the load and impact area combinations can be eliminated because of separation and redundancy of safety-related equipment, mechanical stops and/or electrical interlocks, or other site-specific con sidera tion s.

RESPONSE

b. Refer to Table C for evaluation. Note Hazard Elimination Categories listed below, i Hazard Elimination Cateaories A. Crane travel for this aroa/ load combination prohibited by electrical interlocks or mechanical stops. B. System redundancy and separation precludes loss of capability of. system to perf orm it s safety-related f unction following this load drop in this area. C. Site-specific considerations eliminate the need to consider l oad/ equipuent combi na tion. D. Likelihood of handling system f aliure for this load is extremely small (i.e.,10:1 safety factor f or specific lif t). E. Analysis demonstrates that crane f ailure and load drop will not dama ge safety-related equipment. 2.4-2.b(1) REQUEST For loaditarget combinations eliminated because of separation and redundancy of safety-related equipment, discuss the basis

for determining that load drops will not af fect continued system opera tion ( i. e.,

the ability of the system to perf orm its saf ety-related function). i

RESPONSE

i b(1) TVA has established the bases f or elimination of those items appearing in Table C in accordance with its quality procedures. 'Ibese bases are designated as Office of Engineering (OE) Calculations and are maintained as auditable records. l I' I l 70_

~. ~ 2,4-2.b(2) REQUEST Where mechanical stops or electrical interlocks are to be provided, present details showing the areas where crane travel will be prohibited.. Additionally, provide a discussion concerning the procedures that are to be used for authorizing the bypassing of interlocks or removable stops,. for verifying that interlocks are functional prior to crane use, and for verifying that interlocks are restored to operability af ter operations which require bypassing have been completed. b(2) RESPONSE Of the cranes listed under 2.4-1 only the 125 ton auxiliary building crane has mechanical-stops or electrical interlocks to prevent travel over critical areas. - 'nese limited areas are depicted upon '1VA drawings 44N304 and 441005-1 ( see figure s 1 and 2). Procedures will be included in the plant instructions manual for authorizing bypassing of interlocks, or stops, and for verifying ' that interlocks are functional before operations and restored to operability af ter operations requiring bypassing are complete. 2.4-2(c) REQUEST For interactions not eliminated by the analysis of 2.4-2.b, above, identify any handling systems for specific loads which 4 you have evaluated as having suf ficient design features to make the likelihood of a load drop extremely small and 'the basis l'or this evalua tion ( i. e., complete compliance with NUREG 0612, section 5.1.6, or partial compliance supplemented by suitable alternative or additional design features). For each crane so evaluated, provide the load-handling-system (i. e., crane-load-combina tion) inf orma tion specified in attachment 1.

RESPONSE

None of these systems' comply with section 5.1.6 of NURBG 0612 or have a suitable alternative and we can therefore not eliminate any specific loads by use of this method.- i i

1 i

e --y- ,,r- + - - -

s TABLE C ' LOAD / IMPACT. MATRIX FOR: 125 Ton /10 Ton Overhead Crane (Main Hoist) . Drawing - 44N300 2.4-2a and b Response LOCATION Auxiliary Building (47W200-1 through 47W200-9) IMPACT Refueling Deck . AREA Column A5-A11 @ U-Y Hazard Hazard- . LOADS Safety-Related Elimination Safety-Related. Elimination' Elevation Equipment Catego ry Elevation Equipment Category - Reactor Building. 734.0 Spent Fuel . A, D (RB) Equipment Pit ' Hatch Plug A (50 Tons) 48N1341 Mk. 1 734.0 Instrumentation D

Panels 0-L-221, 235, 243, 244, 389, 390, 428, 429

-734.0 Sense Lines, D Sample Lines, Control Air Lines RB. Equipment 734.0 Spent Fuel A, D Hatch Plug B Pit. -(50 Tons)- 48N1341 Mk..I 734.0 Instrumentation D Panels 0-L-221, 235, 243, 244, 389, 390, 428, 429 RB Equipment 734.0 Spent Fuel .A,D Hatch. Plug C

Pit (50 Tons) 48N1341 Mk. I 734.0 Instrumentation D

. Panels.0-L-221,7 235,.243, 244, 389, 390, 428, 429~ 734.0 . Sense Lines,. .D Control Air. Lines, Sample Lines

U. 1 TABLE C LOAD / IMPACT MATRIX FOR: 125 Ton /10 Ton Overhead Crane (Main. Hoist) Drawing 44N300 2.4-2a and b Response LOCATION Auxiliary Building (47W200-1 through 47W200-9) . IMPACT Refueling Deck AREA-Column AS-All @ U-Y Hazard Hazard-LOADS Safety-Related Elimination Safety-Related Elimination Elevation Equipment Category Elevation Equipment Category Spent Resin Liner .734.0 Spent Fuel . A, D (10.4. Tons) Pit See Footnote 8 734.0 Instrumentation D Panels 0-L-221, 235, 243, 244, 389, 390, 428, 429 734.0 Sense Lines, D Sample Lines, Control Air Lines Spent Fuel 734.0 Spent Fuel A Shipping Cask Pit (100 Tons) 734.0 Instrumentation See Footnote 1 Panels 0-L-221, See Footnote 2 235, 243,.244, 389, 390, 428, 429 .734.0 Sample Lines, Sense Lines, See Footnote 2 Control Air Lines Miscellaneous 734.0 Spent Fuel A, D(3) Equipment Pit (60 Tons Mar.) 734.0 Sample Lines D(3) Sense Lines, Control Air Lines 734.0 Instrumentation- . D(3) Panels 0-L-221, 235, 243, 244, 389, 390, 428, 429 1

TABLE C . LOAD / IMPACT MATRIX FOR: 125 Ton /10 Ton Overhead Crane (Auxiliary Hoist) Drawing - 44N300 2.4-2a and b Response LOCATION Auxiliary Building (47W200-1 through 47W200-9) IMPACT Refueling Deck AREA Column A5-All @ U-Y Hazard Hazard Safety-Related Elimination ' Safety-Related-Elimination LOADS. Elevation Equipment Ca tego ry Elevation Equipment Category Pool Divider Gate 734.0 Spent Fuel . A, D (2 Tons) Pit - 44N330 734.0 Instrumentation D Panels 0-L-221, 235, 243, 244, 389, 8 390, 428, 429 734.0 Sense Lines, D Sample Lines, Control Air Lines Fuel Transfer 734.0 Spent Fuel A, D c' ' Canal Gate Pit (2 Tons)' 734.0 Instrumentation. D 44N330 Panels 0-L-221, 235, 243, 244, 389, 390, 428, 429 734.0 Sense Lines, D Sample Lines, Control Air Lines Irradiated 734.0 Spent Fuel A, D Specimen Shipping Pit Cask-(3.2 Tons) 734.0 . Instrumentation D See Footnote 9 Panels 0-L-221, 235, 243, 244, 389, 390, 428, 429 '734.0 Sense Lines, .D .ControlJAir Lines, Sample-Lines j '

TABLE C LOAD / IMPACT MATRIX FOR: 125 Ton /10 Ton Overhead Crane (Auxiliary Hoist) Drawing - 44N300 2,4-2a and b Response LOCATION Auxiliary Building (47W200-1 through 47W200-9) IMPACT Refueling Deck -AREA Column AS-All @ U-Y Hazard Hazard l. LOADS Safety-Related Elimination Safety-Related Elimination i Elevation Equipment Category Elevation Equipment Category New Fuel Shipping 734.0 Spent Fuel . A, D Container - Empty Pit (1.7 Tons) 734.0 Instrumentation D See Footnote 10 Panels 0-L-221, 235, 243, 244, 389, 390, 428, 429 734.0 Sense Lines, D Sample Lines, Control Air Lines New Fuel Shipping 734.0 Spent Fuel A, D -Container - w/ Fuel Pit .(3.3 Tons) 734.0 Instrumentation D See Footnote 10 Panels 0-L-221, 235, 243, 244, 389, 390, 428, 429 734.0 Sense. Lines, D Sample Lines, Control Air Lines Failed Fuel D4.0 Spent Fuel A Container Pit' l See Footnote 1 734.0 Instrumentation Panels 0-L-221, See Footnote 235, 243, 244, 389, 2 390, 428, 429 i . 734.0 Sense Lines, Control Air Lines, See Footnote 2 I Sample Lines V.

.l TABLE C LOAD / IMPACT MATRIX FOR: 125 Ton /10 Ton Crane (Auxiliary Hoist) Drawing - 44N300 2.4-2a and b Response LOCATION Auxiliary Building (47W200-1 through 47W200-9) IMPACT Refueling Deck AREA-Column AS-All @ U-Y Hazard Hazard LOADS Safety-Related Elimination . Safety-Related. Elimination Elevation ~ Equipment Catego ry Elevation Equipment Category Fuel Transfer 734.0 Spent Fuel A, D - Carriage (1.6 Tons) Pit 68C60-91934. 734.0 Instrcmentation D 940J332 Panels 0-L-221, 235, 243, 244, 389, 390, 428, 429 734.0 Sense Lines, D Sample Lines, Control Air-Lines Fuel Cask 734.0 Spent Fuel A, D Decontamination Pit Hatch Cover (1.2 Tons) 48N1230 Mk 8 734.0 Instrumentation D 4 Panels 0-L-221, 235, 243, 244, 389, 390, 428, 429 734.0 Sense Lines, D . Sample Lines, Control Air Lines Fuel. Cask 734.0 Spent Fuel - A, D . Decontamination Pit - Hatch Cover 734.0 Instrumentation D (1.3 Tons) . Panels 0-L-221, 48N1230 Mk 9 235,-243, 244, 389, 390, 428, 429 734.0 Sense Lines, D Sample Lines, Control Air Lines m TABLE C LOAD / IMPACT MATRIX FOR: 125. Ton /10 Ton Overhead Crane (Auxiliary Hoist) Drawing - 44N300 2.4-2a and b Response LOCATION Auxiliary Building (47W200-1 through 47W200-9) IMPACT -Refueling Deck AREA Column AS-All @ U-Y Hazard-Hazaro ' LOADS Safety-Related Elimination Safety-Related, Elimination ~ Elevation Equipmant Category Elevation Equipment Category N-tw Fuel 734.0 Spent Fuel . A, D Vault Cover Pit (3.7 Tons) 734.0 Instrumentation D 48N1249 Mk 3 Panels 0-L-221, 235, 243,'244, 389, 390, 428, 429 734.0 Sense Lines, D Sample Lines, Control Air Lines Containment Spray 734.0 Spent Fuel A Heat Exchanger Pit Shield Plug 734.0 Instrumentation (9.9 Tons) Panels 0-L-221, See Footnote 2 48N1262-1 235, 243, 244, 389, 390, 428, 429 734.0 Sense Lines, Sample Lines, See Footnote 2 Control Air Lines Residual Heat 734.0 Spent Fuel A, D Exchanger Shield Pit Plug (3.7 Tons) 734.0 Instrumentation D 48N1262-1 Panels 0-L-221, 235, 243, 244, 389, 390, 428, 429 734.0 Sense Lines, .D Control Air Lines, Sample Lines -TABLE C LOAD / IMPACT MATRIX FOR: 125 Ten /10 Ton overhead Crane (Auxiliary Hoist) Drawing - 44N300 2.4-2a and b Response LOCATION Auxiliary Building (47W200-1 through 47W200-9)- IMPACT . Refueling Deck AREA Column A5-A11 @ U-Y Hazard-. 1 Hazard Safety-Related Elimination Safety-Related Elimination Elevation -Equipment Catego ry Elevation Equipment Category LOADS 4 Containment Spray 734.0 Spent Fuel A,' D ' Heat Exchanger Pit Shell-(4.4 Tons) 734.0 Instrumentation D 71C30-92645 _ Panels 0-L-221, F-6662-2 and

Panels 0-L-221, F-6663 235, 243, 244, 389, 390, 428, 429

~734.0 Sense Lines, D Sample Lines, -Control Air Lines Transfer Cask 734.0 Spent Fuel A Fully Assembled Pit (5.9 Tons) 734.0 Instrumentation 44N394 -Panels 0-L-221,- See Footnote 2 235, 243, 244, 389, 390, 428, 429 .734.0 Sense Lines, Sample Lines, See Footnote 2 Control Air Lines Drum Cask (for. 734.0 Spent Fuel-LA 55 gallon drum) Pit (8.1 Tons) 734.0 Instrumentation 44N394-3 Mk 22 Panels 0-L-221, See Footnote-2 235, 243, 244, 389, 390,'428, 429 734.0 . Sense Lines, Control Air < Lines, See Footnote 2-Sample Lines _ J

r t TABLE C LOAD / IMPACT MATRIX FOR: - 125 Ton /10 Ton Overhead Crane (Auxiliary Hoist) Drawing - 44N300 l 2.4-2a and b Response LOCATION Auxiliary Building (47W200-1 through 47W200-9) I . IMPACT Refueling Deck AREA Column A5-All @ U-Y . Hazard ^ Hazard E LOADS Safety-Related Elimination Safety-Related Elimination' Elevation Equipment Category Elevation Equipment Category Drum Cask (for 55 734.0 -Spent Fuel .A gallon drum) Pit (6.3 Tons) 44N394-3 Mk 23 734.0 Instrumentation Panels 0-L-221, See Footnote 235, 243,.244, 389, 2 390, 428, 429 734.0 Sense Lines, Sample Lines, See Footnote Control Air Lines 2 Drum Cask (for 30 734.0 Spent Fuel A,.D gallon drum) Pit (3.5 Tons) 734.0 Instrumentation D 44N394-4 Panels 0-L-221, 235, 243,-244, 389, 390, 428, 429 734.0 Sense Lines, D Sample Lines, Control-Air Lines Miscellaneous 734.0 Spent Fuel A, D(3) Equipment Pit (5 Tons Max.) 734.0 Instrumentation D(3) Panels 0-L-221, 235,-243, 244, 389, 390, 428, 429 734.0 Sense Lines, . D(3) -Control Air. Lines, Sample Lines.

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TABLE C LOAD / IMPACT MATRIX FOR: 4 Ton Monorail w/4 Ton Hoist and Trolley -Drawing 44N389 and 48N1348 Mk 224 2.4-2a and b Response j } CATION Auxiliary Building (47W200-1 through 47W200-9) Floor Slabs IMPACT Floor Slab AREA. -Column A2 @ T-U Column A2 @ T-U. Hazard: Hazard LOADS Safety-Related Elimination Safety-Relatedf Elimination - Elevation Equipment Category Elevation Equipment Catesory Component Cooling 690.0 Component Cooling .B 683.0 24" Diameter Pipe-A,C(11) Pump IB-B. Pump 2B-B .From RWST to SIS,RHR, (3.8 Tons) CS & CVC Systems 47W464-3,-9,-14 690.0 Component Cooling. .B 669.0 Auxiliary Feedwater B Pump Motor Pump 1A-S and Piping 2B-B 690.0 Instrumentation 669.0 Conduit Panels 1-L-58, 68 See Footnote 2A-2PL 4518B (LG-B) See' Footnote 2 2A-2PL 4508A-(MS-A). 2 ~ 4 - 690.0 and Sense Lines, 669.0 Miscellaneous Conduit B 669.0 Sample' Lines, See Footnote Control Air Lines 2 Component Cooling - 690.0 Component Cooling B 683.0 24" Diameter Pipe A,C(11) Pump Motor IB-B Pump 2B-B RWST to SIS RHR, (2.4 Tons) CS & CVC Systems. 47W464-3,-9,-14 690.0 _ Component Cooling B 669.0 Auxiliary Feedwater B Pump Motor.2B-B . Pump 1A-S and Piping 690.0 Instrumentation 669.0 Conduit . Panels 1-L-58, 68 See Tootnote 2A-2PL 4518B (LG-B) See Footnote. 2 2A-2PL 4508A (MS-A) 2 690.0 and Sense Lines, 669.0 Miscellaneous Conduit B ' 669.0 Sample Lines, See Footnote 4 -Control Air Lines 2, 9

I -4 Ton Monorail w/4 Ton Hoist and Trolley TMG C LOAD / IMPACT MATRIX FOR: Drawing 44N389 and 48N1348 Mk 224 I 2.4-2a,and b' Response l LOCATION Auxiliary Building Floor Slab IMPACT Floor Slab Column A2 @ T-U AREA Column A2 @ T-U Hazard Hazard LOADS Safety-Related Elimination Safety-Related Elimination Elevation ~ Equipment Category' Elevation Equipment Category Component-Cooling 690.0 Component Cooling .B 683.0 24" Diameter Pipe A.C(11). to SIS, RHR, CS Pump 2B-B Pump 1B-B & CVC Systems (3.8 Tons) 47W464-3,-9,-14 690.0 Component Cooling B 669.0 Auxiliary Feedwater B Pump Motor Pump 1A-S and Piping '1B-B 690.0 Instrumentation 669.0 Conduit Panels.1-L-58, 68 See Footnote 2A-2PL 4518B (LG-B) See Footnote 2 2A-2PL 4508A (MS-A) 2 690.0 and Sense Lines, 669.0 Miscellaneous Conduit B 669.0 Sample Lines, .See Footnote Control Air Lines 2 Component Cooling 690.0 Component Cooling B 683.0 24" Diameter Pipe A,C(11) . Pump Motor 2B-B Pump IB-B to SIS, RHR, CS (2.4 Tons) &.CVC Systems 47W464-3,-9,-14 690.0 Component Cooling B .669.0' Auxiliary Feedwater B -Pump Motor IB-B Pump 1A-S and Piping 690.0 Instrumentation 669.0 Conduit Panels 1-L-58, 68 See Footnote 2A-2PL 4518B (LG-B) See Footnote 2 2A-2PL 4508A (MS-A) 2 690.0 and Sense Lines, 669.0 Miscellaneous Conduit -B ~ 669.0 Sample Lines, See Footnote Control Air Lines 2 \\,

TABLE C LOAD / IMPACT MATRIX FOR: 4 Ton Monorail w/4 Ton Hoist and Trolley l Drawing 44N389 and 48N1348 Mk 221 2.4-2a and b Response LOCATION Auxiliary Building (47W200-1 through 47W200-9)

IMPACT Floor Slab AREA Column A3 @ S-T Hazard l-Hazard LOADS Safety-Related Elimination Safety-Related Elimination i

Elevation Equipment Category Elevation Eouipment Category l Component Cooling 690.0 Component Cooling .B Pump 1A-A Pump Motor (3.8 Tons)' 1A-A L 47W464-3,-9,-14 .690.0 Instrumentation Panels 1-L-58, 68 See Footnote 2 690.0 Sense Lines, Sample Lines, See Footnote Control. Air Lines 2 Component Cooling 690.0 Component Cooling B Pump Motor IA-A Pump 1A-A (2.4 Tons) 47W464-3,-9,-14 690.0 Instrumentation Panels 1-L-58, 68 See Footnote 2 690.0 Sense Lines, Sample Lines, See Footnote . Control Air Lines 2 = l TABLE C LOAD / IMPACT MATRIX FOR: 4 Ton Monorail w/4 Ton Hoist and Trolley Drawing 44N389 and 48N1348 Mk 223 2.4-2a and b Response LOCATION Auxiliary Building (47W200-1 through 47W200-9) IMPACT-Floor Slab AREA Column A2 @ S-T L Hazard Hazard LOADS Safety-Related Elimination Safety-Related Elimination Elevation Equipment Category Elevation Equipment Category-Component Cooling 690.0 Component Cooling .B Pump 2A-A Pump Motor -(3.8 Tons) 2A-A l 47W464-3,-9,-14 690.0 Instrumentation Panels 1-L-58, 68 See Footnote 2 l 690.0 Sense Lines, Sample Lines, See Footnote Control Air. Lines 2 Component Cooling 690.0 Component Cooling B Pump Motor 2A-A Pump 2A-A (2.4 Tons) 47W464-3,-9,-14 690.0 Instrumentation Panels 1-L-58, 68 See Footnote. 2 690.0 Sense Lines, 669.0 Sample Lines, See Footnote Control Air Lines 2 l 1

l

+

TABLE C ' LOAD / IMPACT MATR : FOR: 4 Ton Monorail.w/4 Ton. Hoist and Trolley Drawing 44N3rs and 48N1348 Mk 222 2.4-2a and b Response LOCATION Auxiliary Bui'. ding (47W200-1 through 47W200-9) IMPACT-Floor Slat- -AREA Column A2 @ S-T Hazard Hazard LOADS Safety-Related Elimination Safety-Related' . Elimination-Elevation Equipment Category Elevation Equipment-Category Component Cooling. 690.0 Component Cooling .B Pump CS Pump Motor CS (3.8 Tons) '47W464-3,-9,-14 690.0 Instrumentation Panels 1-L-58, 68 See Footnote 2-690.0 Sense Lines, Sample Lines, See. Footnote Control Air Lines 2 Component Cooling 690.0 Component Cooling B Pump Motor CS Pump CS (2. 4.. Tons ) 47W464-3,-9,-14' 690.0 Instrumentation ' Panels 1-L-58,.68 See Footnote 2 690.0 -Sense Lines, Sample-Lines, See Footnote Control Air Lines 2 l I-

r 3-TABLE C' ' LOAD / IMPACT MATRIX FOR: '20 Ton Hydraulic Padestea Crane Drawing 34N230 s 2.4-2a and b Response LOCATION ERCW Pumping Station (31W211) IMPACT Roof Deck AREA South End ' Hazard- . Hazard . LOADS. Safety-Related Elimination' Safety-Related: . Elimination -Elevation Equipment-Category' Elevation Equipment'- ' Category - ~ ERCW Pump JA-720.0 -ERCW Pump B . Motor (6.1 Tons) KA Motor 75K31-83725' 720.0 Local 992C876 Instrumentation See Footnote 2 Panels 720.0 Sense Lines See' Footnote 2 -ERCW Pump JA Head, 720.0 ERCW Pump B -Column, and Bowl KA Motor (Equipment Removed in sections, the 720.0 Local heaviest is 2.9 Instrumentation See Footnote 2 . Tons). Panels 75K31-83725 H-5149-DN 720.0 Sense Lines See Footnote 2 .ERCW Pump-JA Disch 720.0 -ERCW Pump B -Head KA Motor I (1.3 Tons) ~ .75K31-83725- .H-5149-DN 720.0 Local Instrumentation See Footnote Panels 720.0 Sense Lines See Footnote 2 L

. _. - ~ -. TABLE C- ' LOAD / IMPACT MATRIX FOR: ~ 20 Ten Hydraulic Pedastal Crane Drawing 34N230 2.4-2a and b Response LOCATION ERCW Pumping Station (31W211) IMPACT Roof Deck AREA South End Hazard Hazard Safety-Related Elimination Safety-Related Elimination LOADS . Elevation Equipment Category Elevation Equipment' Category' ERCW Pump JA 720.0 ERCW Pump B ' Column Sect. KA Motor (1.4 Tons) 75K31-83725 H-5149-DN 720.0 Local. . Instrumentation See Footnote 2 Panels .720.0 Sense Lines See Footnote 2 ERCW Pump JA 720.0 ERCW Pump B Bowl Assembly KA Motor (2.9 Tons) 75K31-83725. H-5149-DN 720.0 Local Instrumentation See Footnote 2 Panels 720.0 Sense Lines See Footnote 2 ERCW Pump KA 720.0 -ERCW Pump B Motor (6.1 Tons)' JA Motor. '75K31-83725 .992C876 720.0 . Local i Instrumentation See Footnote 2 i Panels 4 720.0 Sense Lines See Footnote 2 i J f

TABLE C LOAD / IMPACT MATRIX FOR: 20 Ten Hydraulic Crane Drawing 34N230 2.4-2a and b Response LOCATION ERCW Pumping Station (31W211) IMPACT Roof Deck AREA South End Hazard . Hazard LOADS Safety-Related Elimination Safety-Related. Elimination Elevation Equipment Catego ry Elevation Equipment Category ERCW Pump KA 720.0-ERCW Pump B Head, Column & JA Motor . Bowl 720.0 Local See Footnote 2 .(Equipment removed Instrumentation in sections, the Panels heaviest is 2.9 720.0 Sense Lines See Footnote 2 Tons) 75K31-83725 H-5149-DN ERCW Pump KA. 720.0 ERCW Pump B Disch Head JA Motor (1.3 Tons) 75K31-83725 H-5149-DN 720.0 Local Instrumentation See Footnote 2 Panels 720.0 Sense Lines See Footnote 2 ERCW Pump KA 720.0 ERCW Pump B Column Sect. JA Motor (1.4 Tons) 720.0 Local-See Footnote 2 75K31-83725 Instrumentation H-5149-DN Panels 720.0 Sense Lines-See Footnote 2 TABLE C LOAD / IMPACT MATRIX FOR: 20 Ton Hydraulic Pedestal Crane Drawing 34N230 2.4-2a and b Response LOCATION ERCW Pumping Station (31W211) IMPACT Roof Deck AREA South End Hazard Hazard LOADS Safety-Related Elimination Safety-Related Elimination Elevation Equipment Category Elevation Equipment Category ERCW Pump KA .720.0 ERCW Pump B Bowl Assembly JA Motor (2.9 Tons) 75K31-83725 H-5149-DN 720.0 Local Instrumentation See Footnote Panels 2 720.0 Sense Lines See Footnote 2 i ? ! t I

'.(; ' l'. TABLE C l: ' LOAD / IMPACT MATRIX FOR: 20 Ton Hydraulic Pedestal Crane l-Drawing 34N230 2.4-2a and b Response LOCATION ERCW Pumping Station (31W211) -{ J IMPACT Roof Deck - -AREA North End Hazard Hazard LOADS Safety-Related . Elimination Safety-Related. . Elimination Elevation Equipment Category Elevation Equipment Cetesory L .,ERCW Pump QA 720.0 ERCW Pump .B Motor (6.1 Tons) RA Motor / 75K31-83725 992C876 720.0 Local-Instrumentation See Footnote Panels 2 720.0 Sense Lines See Footnote 2 ( ERCW Pump.QA_ Head 720.0 ERCW Pump B -Column and Bowl RA Motor l .(Equipment removed in sections, the l heaviest ~is 2.9 720.0 Local l tons) . Instrumentation See Footnote .75K31-83725 Panels 2 H-5149-DN l 720.0 Sense Lines See Footnote 2 ERCW Pump QA .720.0 ERCW Pump B l Disch Head-RA Motor (1.3 Tons) 75K31-83725 H-5149-DN 720.0 Local instrumentation See Footnote Panels 2 See Foo'tnote 2 720.0 Sense Lines s L L t

TABLE C I LOAD / IMPACT MATRIX FOR: 20 Ton Hydraulic. Pedestal Crane Drawing 34N230 2.J-2a and b Response LOCATION ERCW Pumping Station (31W211) IMPACT Roof Deck AREA North End Hazard Ha:ard LOADS -Safety-Related Elimination Safety-Related' Elimination Elevation -Equipment Category Elevation Equipment Catemory-ERCW Pump QA 720.0 ERCW Pump B Column Sect. RA Motor (1.4 Tons) i. 75K31-83725 l- -H-5149-DN . 720.0 Local Instrumentation See Footnote Panels 2 720.0 Sense Lines See Footnote 2 ERCW Pump QA 720.0 ERCW Pump B Bowl Assembly RA Motor (2.9 Tons) -75K31-83725 l H-5149-DN-' 720.0 Loca1 Instrumentation See Footnote Panels 2 720.0 -Sense Lines See Footnote 2 l ERCW Pump RA 720.0 ERCW Pump B l Motor QA Motor (6.1 Tons) 75K31-83725 992C876 720.0 Local . Instrumentation See Footnota Panels 2 720.0 Sense Lines See Footnote 2 l- - l t

l -TABLE C -LOAD / IMPACT MATRIX FOR: -20 Ton. Hydraulic Padestal Crane Drawing 34N230 2.4-2a and b Response LOCATION ERCW Pumping Station (31W211) [- IMPACT Roof Deck AREA -North End Hazard l Hazard ~ Elimination LOADS Safety-Related Elimination Safety-Related Elevation Equipment Category-Elevation Equipment ~ Catesory .ERCW Pump RA Head 720.0- . -ERCW Pump B - Column & Bowl QA Motor _(Equipment removed i:n sections, the . heaviest is 2.9 720.0 Local tons) Instrumentation See Footnote 75K31-83725 Panels 2 H-5149-DN .720.0 Sense Lines See Footnote 2 ERCW Pump _RA, 720.0 ERCW Pump B Disch Head QA Motor (1.3 Tons) 75K31-83725 - H-5149-DN 720.0 Local -Instrumentation See Footnote Panels 2 ^ 720.0 Sense Lines See Footnote 2 ERCW Pump RA 720.0 ERCW Pump B Caliumn Sect. QA Motor (1.4 Tons) - 75K31-83725 ~720.0 Local. H-5149-DN Instrumentation See Footnote Panels-2 . See Footnote 2 ~ 720.0 . Sense Lines ,m-, ____j --7, -,.--rg-

.a IABLE C LOAD / IMPACT MATRIX FOR: 20 Ton Hydraulic Pedestal Crane Drawing 34N230 2,4-2a and b Response LOCATION ERCW Pumping Station-(31W211) IMPACT Roof Deck AREA . North'End

Hazard Hazard LOADS Safety-Related.

Elimination . Safety-Related' Elimination, Elevation . Equipment Cateaory Elevation Equipment Catesory ERCW Pump RA-720.0 'ERCW Pump ..B " Bowl Assembly QA Motor- .(2.9 Tons) 75K31-83725 H-5I49-DN 720.0 Loca1 Instrumentation -See Footnote Panels 2 720.0. . Sense Lines See Footnote-2 r e, s

m .-.3, TABLE C VJ LOAD / IMPACT MATRIX FOR: 20 Ton Hydeculic Pedestal Crsne Drawing 34N230 .,. y 2.4-2a and b Response ., s LOCATION ERCW Pumping Station (31W211) IMPACT . Roof Deck / AREA Middle of Ituilding Hazar'd Hazard r r LOADS. Safety-Related Elimination ut -- Sa fety-Related Elimination Elevation Equipment Category Elevation Equipment Category ~ ERCW Pump LB. .720.0 ERCW Pump B Motor'-(6.1 Tons) MB Motor 75K31-83725-992C876 720.0 Local Instrumentation See Footnote Panels 2 720.0 Sense Lines See Footnote 2 ERCW Pump LB Head 720.0 ERCW Pump B . Column and Bowl 'MB Motor. (Equipment remove'd in sections, the heaviest is 2.9 720.0-Local . tons) Instrumentation See Footnote 75K31-83725-Panels 2 .H-5149-DN 720.0 Sense Lines See Footnote 2 ERCW Pump LB 720.0 ERCW Pump B Disch Head MB Motor ~(1.3 Tons) 75K31-83725 H-5149-DN 720.0 ' Local Instrumentation See Footnote l Panels 2 .720.0 Sense Lines See Footnote 2 u---- --- =----

TABLE C iLOAD/ IMPACT MATRIX FOR: '20 Ton Hydraulic P2d:stal Crane Drawing 34N230 2.4-2a and b Response LOCATION ERCW Pumping Station (31W211) IMPACT ' Roof Deck AREA. Middle of Building Hazard Hazard _ LOADS. Safety-Related Elimination Safety-Related Elimination Elevation Equipment' Category Elevation Equipment Category .ERCW Pump LB- .720.0 ERCW Pump B Column Sect MB Motor ~(1.4 Tons)- .75K31-83725 -H-5149-DN 720.0 Local Instrumentation See Footnote Panels 2 .720.0 Sense Lines See Footnote 2 ERCW Pump LB 720.0 ERCW Pump B . Bowl Assembly MB Motor (2.9' Tons)- 75K31-83725' H-5149-DN 720.0 Local Instrumentation See Footnote Panels 2 720.0 Sense Lines See Footnote 2 ERCW Pump _MB 720.0 ERCW Pump B -Motor (6.1 Tons) LB Motor 75K31-83725 .- 992C876 720.0 Local Instrumentation See Footnote Panels 2' .720.0 Sense. Lines See Footnote 2 i

TABLE C LOAD /IMPJ.CT MATRIX FOR: 20 Ten Hydraulic Padestal Crane Drawing 34N230 2.4-2a and b Response LOCATION ERCW Pumping Station (31W211) IMPACT Roof Deck AREA Middle of Building Hazard Hazard LOADS Safety-Related Elimination Safety-Related Elimination Elevation Equipment Category Elevation Equipment Category ERCW Pump MB Head,- 720.0 ERCW Pump B Column & Bowl LB Motor. (Equipment removed in sections, the heaviest is 2.9 720.0 Local tons) Instrumentation See Footnote 75K31-83725 Panels 2 H-5149-DN 720.0 Sense Lines See Footnote 2 ERCW Pump MB. 720.0, ERCW Pump B Disch Head LB Motor (1.3 To'ns) 75K31-83725 H-5149-DN 720.0 Local Instrumentation See Footnote Panels 2 720.0 Sense Lines See Footnote 2 ERCW Pump MB .720.0 ERCW Pump B Column Sect. LB Motor (1.4 Tons) 75K31-83725 H-5149-DN 720.0 Local Instrumentation See Footnote Panels 2 720.0 Sense Lines See Footnote 2

7 TABLE C LOAD / IMPACT. MATRIX FOR: 20 Ten Hydreulic Prdestal Crane Drawing 34N230 2.4-2a and b Response LOCATION ERCW Pumping Station (31W211) IMPACT Roof Deck AREA Middle of Building Hazard Hazard ' LOADS Safety-Related Elimination Safety-Related. Elimination Elevation Equipment Category Elevation Equipment Category ERCW Pump MB 720.0 ERCW Pump B Bowl Assembly LB Motor (2.9 Tons) 75K31-83725 H-5149-DN 720.0 Local Instrumentation See Footnote Panels 2 720.0 Sense Lines See Footnote 2 ERCW Pump NB_ 720.0 ERCW Pump B. Motor (6.1 Tons) PB Motor 75K31-83725 .992C876 720.0 Local Instrumentation See Footnote Panels 2 720.0-Sense Lines See Footnote 2 ERCW Pump NB Head 720.0 ERCW Pump B Column & Bowl PB Motor (Equipment removed in sections, the' heaviest is 2.9 720.0 Local tons) Instrumentation See Footnote 75K31-83725 Panels 2 H-5149-DN 720.0 Sense Lines See Fo$tnote 2

~ TABLE C LOAD / IMPACT MATRIX FOR: 20 Ton Hydrsulic Padestal Crane Drawing 34N230 2.4-2a and b Response LOCATION ERCW Pumping Station (31W211) IMPACT Roof Deck AREA . Middle of Building Hazard Hazard . LOADS Safety-Related Elimination Safety-Related Elimination Elevation Equipment Category Elevation Equipment Category ERCW Pump NB-720.0 ERCW Pump B Disch Head PB Motor (1.3 Tons) 75K31-83725 'H-5149-DN 720.0 Local Instrumentation See Footnote Panels 2 720.0 Sense Lines -See Footnote 2 ERCW Pump NB .720.0 ERCW Pump B-Column Sect. PB Motor (1.4 Tons). 75K31-83725 H-5149-DN 720.0 Local Instrumentation See Footnote Panels 2 720.0 Sense-Lines See Footnote 2 ERCW Pump NB 720.0 ERCW Pump B-Bowl Assembly PB Motor (2.4 Tons)- 75K31-83725 H-5149-DN 720.0 Local Instrumentation See Footnote Panels 2 720.0 Sense Lines- . See Footnote 2

TABLE C ' LOAD / IMPACT MATRIX FOR: -20 Ton Hydraulic Pzdestal Crane Drawing 34N230 '2.4-2a and b Response LOCATION ERCW Pumping Station (31W211) IMPACT Roof Deck-AREA . Middle of Building Hazard Hazard LOADS. . Safety-Related Elimination Safety-Related Elimination Elevation Equipment Category Elevation-Equipment Category ERCW Pump.PB. 720.0 ERCW Pump B Motor (6.1 Tons) NB Motor 75K31-83725 992C876 720.0 Local Instrumentation See Footnote Panels 2 720.0 Sense Lines See Footnote 2 ERCW Pump PB Head 720.0 ERCW Pump B Column'and Bowl NB Motor (Equipment' removed in sections, the. heaviest.is 2.9 720.0 Local tons)- . Instrumentation See Footnote 75K31-83725 Panels 2 H-5149-DN 720.0 Sense Lines See Footnote 2 ERCW Pump PB 72G.0 ERCW Pump B Disch Head NB Motor (1.3 Tons). 75K31-83725 H-5149-DN 720.0 Local Instrumentation See Footnote Panels. 2 .720.0 Sense Lines . See Footnote 2 r TABLE C LOAD / IMPACT MATRIX FOR: 20 Ten Hydraulle Pzdestal Crane Drawing 34N230 2.4-2a and b Response LOCATION ERCW Pumping Station (31W211) IMPACT. Roof Deck-AREA. -Middle of Building Hazard Hazard Elimination Safety-Related Elimination LOADS' Safety-Related' Category Elevation'- Equipment Category ' Elevation Equipment ERCW Pump PB. 720.0 ERCW Pump B Column' Sect. NB Motor (1.4 Tons) 75K31-83725 1 .H-5149-DN' 720.0 Local. l Instrumentation See Footnote Panels 2 .720.0 Sense Lines .See Footnote 2 ERCW Pump PB -720.0 ERCW Pump B Bowl Assembly NB Motor (2.9 Tons) 75K31-83725 H-5149-DN 720.0 Local Instrumentation See Footnote ' Panels 2 720.0 Sense Lines See Footnote 2 -100-

TABLE C

LOAD / IMPACT MATRIX FOR: '20 Ten Hydraulic Pzdrstal Crane Drawing 34N230 2.4-2a and b Response LOCATION ERCW Pumping Station (31W211)

IMPACT Roof Deck AREA Hazard Hazard LOADS Safety-Related Elimination Safety-Related Elimination Elevation Equipment Category Elevation Equipment Category Traveling Water. 720.0 Screen Wash B Screen A-A Pump A-A Motor _(Heaviest sections removed for main-tenance 720.0 Local .2.1 Tons) Instrumentation See Footnote 76K35-87201 Panels 2 'H96057-1,-2,-3, -4, & -40 720.0 Sense Lines See Footnote 2 Traveling Water 720.0 Screen Wash B Screen B-B. Pump B-B Motor (Heaviest sections . removed for main- 'tenance 720.0 Local 2.1 Tons) Instrumentation See Footnote 76K35-87201 Panels 2 .H96057-1,-2,-3, -4, & -40 720.0 Sense Lines See Footnote 2 Traveling' Water 720.0 Screen Wash B Screens C-B ' Pump C-B Motor (Heaviest sections-removed for main-tenance 720.0 Local 2.1: Tons) Instrumentation See Footnote 76K35-87201 Panels 2 H96057-1,-2,-3, -4,'& -40 720.0 Sense Lines See Footnote 2 -101-

TABLE C' LOAD / IMPACT' MATRIX FOR: 20 Ton Hudraulic Pedestal Crane Drawing 34N230 2.4-2a and b Response LOCATION ERCW Pumping Station (31W211) IMPACT Roof Deck AREA' Hazard Hazard LOADS Safety-Related Elimination Safety-Related Elimination. Elevation Equipment Category Elevation Equipment Category Traveling Water -720.0 Screen Wash B Screen D-A Pump D-A Motor (Heaviest sections removed for main- .tenance-720.0 Local 2.1 Tons) Instrumentation See Footnote 76K35-87201 Panels 2 H96057-1,-2,-3, -4, & -40 720.0 Sense Lines See Footnote 2 -102-

- ~.... -4 TABLE C LOAD / IMPACT' MATRIX F R: 20 Ton Hydraulic Pedestal Crane Drawing 34N230

2.4-2a and b Response LOCATION ERCW Pumping Station (31W211)

IMPACT-Roof Deck Mechanical Equipment Room l . AREA.- Hazard Hazard LOADS : Safety-Related Elimination Safety-Related-

Elimination.

Elevation-Equipment Category ~ Elevation' Equipment-Category Screen Wash- ._720. 0 - Traveling C(5)- 688.0 ERCW Strainer .C(5) Pump A-A Water AIA-A-(2.0 Tons) ' Screen A-A

76K35-820227 H-5517-DN and

.720.0 -Local 688.0 Local ~ 992C888-1-- Instrumentation See Footnote Instrumentation See Footnote Panels 2 Panels 2.- 720.0 -Sense Lines See. Footnote 2 688.0 . Sense Lines See Footnote 2 Screen Wash. .720.0 Traveling C(5) 688.0 ERCW Strainer C(5) Pump B-B ~ Water BIB-B .(2.0 Tons) Screen B-B 76K35-820227 H-5517-DN and 720.0 Local -688.0 Local 992C888 Instrumentation See Footuote Instrumentation See Footnote Panels-2- Panels. 2 720.0 Sense Lines See Footnote 2 688.0-Sense Lines See Footnote 2 sScreen. Wash 720.0

Traveling C(5) 688.0 ERCW Strainer C(5)

Pump C-B. Water B2B-B

-(2.0 Tons)

Screen C-B 76K35-820227 688.0 Local-H-5517-DN.and 720.0 . Local. Instrumentation. 'See Footnote 992C888-1 Instrumentation'- See Footnote

Panels

.2 Panels 2 720.0 .. Sense Lines- . See Footnote 2 688.0 Sense Lines-See Footnote 2 ~ -103-

.r TABLE C LOAD / IMPACT MATRIX FOR: 20 Ton Hydraulic Pedestal Crane Drawing 34N230 2.4-2a and b Response LOCATION ERCW Pumping Station'(31W211) Mechanical. Equipment Room ~ IMPACT Roof. Deck AREA Hazard Hazard LOADS Safety-Related Elimination Safety-Related ' Elimination' Elevation Equipment Category Elevation Equipment Category -Screen Wash. 720.0 Traveling . C(5) 688.0 ERCW Strainer C(5) 'A2A-A ' Pump D-A Water (2.0 Tons) Screen D-A 76K35-820227 H-5517-DN and 720.0 Local 688.0 Local 992C888-1 Instrumentation See Footnote Instrumentation See Footnote Panels. 2 Panels. 2 720.0 Sense Lines See Footnote 2 688.0 Sense Lines See Footnote 2 -104-

TABLE C LOAD / IMPACT MATRIX FOR: 20 Ton Hydraulic Pedestal Crane Drawing 34N230 2.4-2a and b Response LOCATION ERCW Pumping Station (31W211) IMPACT Mechanical Equipment Room Roof Deck AREA Hazard Hazard LOADS Safety-Related Elimination Safety-Related Elimination Elevation Equipment Category Elevation Equipment ' Category ERCW Strainer 690.0 and.. Instrumentation 720.0-Screen Wash B 674.0 Panels 0-L-144, See Footnote Pump A-A Motor. A1A-A .(7.8 Tons) 145, L-386, 387 2 76K36-820061 17661 Rev. C and 690.0 and Sense Lines See Footnote 2 5622D11 sub XX4 674.0 ERCW Strainer 690.0 and Instrumentation 720.0 Screen Wash B. A2A-A 674.0 Panels 0-L-144, See Footnote Pump D-A Motor (7.8 Tons) 145, L-386, 387 2 76K36-820061 17661 Rev. C and 690.0 and Sense Lines See Footnote.2 5622D11 Sub XX4 674.0 ERCW Strainer 690.0 and Instrumentation 720.0 Screen Wash B BIB-B 674.0 Panels 0-L-144, See Footnote Pump B-B Motor. (7.8; Tons)~ 145, L-386, 398 2- '76K36-820061 .17661 Rev. C and 690.0 and Sense Lines See Footnote 2 5622D11 Sub XX4 '674.0 -105-

TABLE C

LOAD / IMPACT MATRIX FOR: 20 Ton Hydraulic Pedestal Crane Drawing 34N230 2.4-2a and b Response LOCATION ERCW Pumping Station (31W211)

IMPACT Mechanical Equipment Room Roof Deck AREA Hazard Hazard- - LOADS-Safety-Related Elimination Safety-Related Elimination Elevation Equipment Category Elevation ' Equipment Category ERCW Strainer 690.0 and. Instrumentation 720.0 Screen Wash-B B2B-B 674.0 Panels 0-L-144, See Footnote Pump C-B Motor (7.8 Tons) 145, L-386, 387 2 -76K36-820061 17661 Rev. C and 690.0 and Sense Lines See Footnote 2 -5622D11 Sub XX4. .674.0 Transformer.1A-A 688.0 ERCW Strainer B 720.0 Screen Wash B (2.0 Tons) AIA-A Pump A-A Motor 35W312 688.0 ' Instrumentation Panels'0-L-144, See Footnote 145, L-386, 387 2 r 688.0 Sense Lines See Footnote 2 Transformer IB-B 688.0 ERCW Strainer B 720.0 Screen Wash B (2.0 Tons) BIB-B Pump B-B Motor 35W312 688.0 Instrumentation Panels 0-L-144, See Footnote 145, L-386, 387 2 688.0 Sense Lines Sce Footnote 2 -106-

TABLE C . LOAD / IMPACT MATRIX FOR: 20 Ton Hydraulic Pedestal Crane Drawing 34N230 2.4-2a and b Response LOCATION ERCW Pumping Station (31W211) IMPACT Mechanical Equipment Room. Roof Deck AREA Hazard Hazard LOADS Safety-Related Elimination Safety-Related Elimination Elevation Equipment Category Elevation Equipment- ~ Category Transformer.2B-B 688.0 ERCW Strainer .B 720.0 Screen Wash B (2.0 Tons) B2B-B Pump C-B Motor -35W312 688.0 Instrumentation Panels 0-L-144, See. Footnote 145, L-386, 387 2 688.0 Sense Lines See Footnote 2

Transformer 2A-A 688.0 ERCW Strainer B

720.0 Screen Wash B (2.0 Tons) A2A-A Pump D-A Motor '35W312 688.0 Instrumentation Panels 0-L-144, See Footnote 145, L-386, 387 2 688.0 Sense Lines See Footnote 2 -107-

TABLE C LOAD / IMPACT MATRIX FOR: 20 Ton' Hydraulic Pedestal Crane ' Drawing 34N230 2.4-2a and b Response LOCATION ERCW Pumping Station (31W211) IMPACT Roof Deck AREA Hazard Hazard LOADS Safety-Related Elimination Safety-Related Elimination Elevation Equipment Category Elevation Equipment ~ Category Missile Shield-720.0 ERCW Pump B (7.7' Tons) ' Motor-38N342 thru 38N346 720.0 Screen Wash B Pump Motor 720.0 Traveling Water B Screen Stoplog- _ 720.0 . Traveling Water B (4.1 Tons) Screen 34N215-1 and !34N215 MCC Board 1A-A 720.0 Screen Wash-C(5) .-(1.6 Tons) Pump A-A Motor .35W312- .MCC Board IB-B 720.0 Screen Wash C(5) (1.6 Tons) Pump B-B Motor 35W312 MCC Board 2B-B-720.0 Screen Wash C(5) 35W312 Pump C-B Motor

1.6 Tons)

MCC Board'2A-A 720.0 Screen Wash C(5) '(1.6 Tons) Pump D-A 35W312 -108-

TABLE C LOAD / IMPACT' MATRIX.FOR: 175 Ton /35 Ton Polar Crane (Main Hoist) Drawing 44N230 2.4-2a and b Response > LOCATION Reactor Building (47W200-2, -11,-12, -13) IMPACT Inside Crane Wall Inside Crane Wall-AREA Hazard Hazard-LOADS Safety-Related Elimination Safety-Related Elimination Elevation Equipment Category Elevation Equipment-Category

Missile Shield 702.0 Reactor Vessel C(12) 715.0 CRDM C(12)

(92 Tons) Head and Pipe 41N741-2 and 48N935 Mk. 7 702.0 Local Instrumentation See Footnote Panels 2 702.0 Sense Lines, Sample Lines, See Footnote Control Air Lines 2 . Missile Shield 702.0 Reactor Vessel D, C(6) 715.0 CRDM C(12) (73 Tons) Head and Pipe 41N741-2 and 48N935 Mk. 6 702.0 Local D Instrtunentation Panels 702.0 Sense Lines, D Sample Lines, Control Air Lines Missile. Shield 702.0. Reactor Vessel D, C(6) 715.0 CRDM C(12) -(56 Tons) Head and Pipe 48N935 Mk. 8 41N741 702.0 Local-D Instrumentation Panels-702.0 Sense Lines, .D Sample Lines, Control Air Lines -109-

TABLE C LOAD / IMPACT MATRIX FOR: 175 Ton /35 Ton Polar Crane (Miin Hoist) Drawing'44N230 2.4-2a and b Response LOCATION Reactor Building (47W200-2, -11, -12, -13) IMPACT Inside Crane Wall Inside Crane Wall AREA Hazard Hazard LOADS Safety-Related Elimination Safety-Related . Elimination Elevation Equipment Category Elevation Equipment Catego ry Canal Gate 702.0 Reactor Vessel . D, C(6) 715.0 CRDM-C(12) (41 Tons) Head and Pipe 48N934 Mk. 1 41N741-1 702.0 Local D Instrumentation Panels 702.0 Sense Lines, D Sample Lines, Control Air Lines Canal Gate 702.0 Reactor. Vessel D, C(6) 715.0 CRDM C(12) (41 Tons) Head and Pipe 48N934 Mk. 2 41N741-1 702.0 Local D Instrumentation Panels 702.0 Sense Lines, D Sample Lines, Control Air Lines Canal Gate 702.0 Reactor Vessel D, C(6) 715.0 CRDM C(12) (41 Tons) Head and Pipe 48N934 Mk. 3 41N741-1 702.0 Local D Instrumentation Panels 702.0 Sense Lines, .D Sample Lines, Control Air Linss -110-

TABLE C LOAD / IMPACT MATRIX FOR: 175 Ton /35 Ton Polar Crane (Main Hoist) Drawing 44N230 2.4-2a and b Response LOCATION Reactor Building (47W200-2, -11, -12, -13) IMPACT Inside Crane Wall AREA Hazard Hazard LOADS Safety-Related Elimination Safety-Related Elimination-Elevation Equipment Category Elevation Equipment Category Upper Internals 702.0 Reactor Vessel C(12) (102.3 Tons) Pipe and Lower 68C60-91934 Internals 686J256 Sht. 4 693.0 Local Instrumentation See Footnote Panels 2 693.0 Sense Lines, Sample Lines, See Footnote Control Air Lines 2 Lower Internals-702.0 Reactor Vessels C(7) (164. Tons with Pipe and Lower Lift Rig) Internals 68C60-91934 686J256 693.0 Local Instrumentation See Footnote Panels 2 693.0 Sense Lines, Sample Lines, See Footnote Control Air Lines 2 Reactor-Coolant 700.0 Reactor Coolant D, C(6) . Pump Motor and Pump and Piping Motor. Support (41.9 Tons) 693.0 Local D 637F784 and Instrumentation 638F232 Panels 693.0 Sense Lines, D Sample Lines, Control Air Lines -111-

) TABLE,C-LOAD / IMPACT MATRIX FOR: 175 Ton /35 Ton Polar Crane (Main Hoist) ' Drawing 44N230 2.4-2a and b Response LOCATION Reactor Building (47W200-2, -11, -12, -13) IMPACT Inside Crane Wall AREA Hazard l Hazard LOADS Safety-Related Elimination Safety-Related .Tlimination. Elevation Equipment' Category Elevation Equipment Category Reactor. Vessel 695.0 . Reactor Vessel C(12) Head Upper Internals (165 Tons) 68C60-91934. 693.0 Local See Footnote - 30616-1061 Instrumentation 2 Panel 693.0 Sense Lines Sample Lines See Footnote Control Air Lines 2 Reactor Coolant-695.0 RC Pump, Motor, D, C(6) Pump Plug and Piping (13.3 Tons) 41N741-1; 693.0 Local D Instrumentation Panels D 693.0: Sense Lines,. Sample Lines, Control Air Lines 4 Lower Compartment 733.0 RC Pump, Motor D, C(6) -' Access Plug Piping, and Press- . (Equipment Hatch) 'urizer Relief Tank (10 Tons)_ 41N741-1 693.0 -Local D Instrumentation Panels 693.0 Sense. Lines, .D Sample Lines, Control Air Lines -112-

TABLE C LOAD / IMPACT MATRIX FOR: 175 Ton /35 Ton Polar Crane (Auxiliary Hoist) Drawing 44N230 2.4-2a and b Response LOCATION Reactor Building (47W200-2, -11, -12, -13) IMPACT Inside Crane Wall Inside Crane Wall AREA Hazard-Hazard LOADS Safety-Related Elimination Safety-Related Elimination-Elevation Equipment Category Elevation Equipment Category Nozzle Shield Plug 727.0 . Hydrogen .B,D 703.0 CRDM D (1.8 Tons) Igniter '44N268 Mk 1 727.0 Local D Instrumentation Panels 727.0 Sense Lines, D Sample Lines, Control Air Lines Nozzle Shield Plug 727.0 Hydrogen B, D 703.0 CRDM D -(2.1 Tons) Igniter 44N268 Mk 2 727.0 Local D Instrumentation Panels 727.0 Sense Lines, D Sample Lines, Control Air Lines Nozzle Shield Plug 703.0 CRDM D, C(6) (1.9 Tons) 44N268 Mk 3 703.0 Local D Instrumentation Panels 703.0 Sense Lines, .D Sample Lines, Control Air Lines, Seal Table v -113-

.: a TABLE C.

LOAD / IMPACT MATRIX FOR: -175 Ton /35 Ton Polar Crane ~(Auxiliary Hoist) Drawing 44N230 2.4-2a and b. Response LOCATION Reactor Building (47W200-2, -11, -12, -13). .' IMPACT ' Inside Crane Wall AREA Hazard Hazard LOADS. Safety-Related Elimination' . Safety-Related. Elimination Elevation Equipment. Category Ele _vation - Equipment: Category-Reactor' Coolant 695.0 Reactor Coolant . D, C(6) Pump. Internals' Pump Piping (27.6 Tons) 68C60-91934 618J940 and 693.0 Local D ' 618J941. Instrumentation F Panels 693.0 Sense Lines, D Sample Lines, Control Air Lines -114-t

i no i y dt r rao ang zie amt HialC E de' ta l t en Re-m yp tieu f q aE S no i tave l E e e n t t oy o o di r n n rt o t t aag o o zne o o ) ait F F 3 Hma 1 iC e e l e e 5 1 E S2 S2 1 2 1 tn 1 e 1 m s s e p e e s i n n u d i i n o 2 q-e L L p E t t s s s 0 k an er er e e 0 rc l e ni ni n4R 2 ao em iA iA a8 W eL Rp L L r3b 7 N i l l CN 4 l yu eo eo 4d ( t e t q l r l r b4 n nn eE pt pt i a g en f mn mn CJg n mo a' ao ao na, i ns# S SC SC Eni2 d iro L ow-l ae! BTa4 i tP0 A r u n 7 T3D2 B od2 n C n o r ah i o e t t 3 3 R t dhu a w6 w6 O c icm .v o o F a sti e l6 l6 e naz l e4 e4 X R IHA E B6 B6 I .RTAM )s T s C s e .A u L P T r o M CA e) e r I AE vs nt o ./ N PR on an D O MA C o l es A I I T1 l mn O T S h 2 epo L A D c 6. N cit 9 C A t su O O a18 i q3 L L H(4 ME(

TABLE C LOAD / IMPACT MA1RIX F001 NOTES 2.4-2 a and b Sheet 13 of 53 1. Will be leased when neededp equipment does not exist at this time. 2. These items are field routed and require a field investigation to determine if they can be eliminated f rom the Matrix. We recommend that NUC PR prov ide this information to OE or authorize OE to obtain this inf romation such that a complete 7.4 response can be provided. 3. Miscellaneous restrictionsp 10 to 1 saf ety factor for the particular crane in que stion. 4. This load is less than 2000-Ibs and therefore is not considered a heavy ) load. 5. This equipment is repaired in maall sections of which are less than 2000-Ibs, and therefore is not considered a heavy load. l l 6. Equipment is in cold shutdown when this lif t is performed. 7. All fuel is removed before lif t is performed. 8. Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant drawing PSS2-M-D-102-R3 (two sheets), typical drawin g. 9. Drawing in SQNP Fuel Handling Instruction Manual, Vol.16, figures I and J. 10. Leased f rom Westinghouse, drawing No.1553 E30,1596E24 sheets 1 and 3, and 15 96 E25. 11. Lif ts may be made by one of the following yard cranes, depending on av ailabilil ty : a. 15-ton Gallon 150-A truck crane 74P35-6487 or b. 40-ton Lorain MO-680 truck crane 77K31-821156-2 (14N206) or c. 140-Ton Manitowoc 3900-T truck crane 72C36-99967 t n YU AR % [ hg mm f&9* % pre @ss !?! O gm Efs = $@M ! -116-QWhi \\ us;-.i dTyifi( b j $$ $ - l}}

ML20104A882

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ML20104A882

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Dear Ms. Adensam:

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