ML20102C389
| ML20102C389 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Hope Creek  |
| Issue date: | 02/28/1985 |
| From: | Mittl R Public Service Enterprise Group |
| To: | Schwencer A Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| TASK-2.D.1, TASK-TM NUDOCS 8503060194 | |
| Download: ML20102C389 (7) | |
Text
"
O PS G Company Pubhc Serwce Electnc and Gas 80 Park Plaza, Newark, NJ 07101/ 201430 8217 MAILING ADDRESS / P.O. Box 570, Newark, NJ 07101 Robert L. Mitti General Manager Nuclear Assurance and Regulation February 28, 1985 Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission 7920 Norfolk Avenue Bethesda, Maryland 20814 Attention:
Mr. Albert Schwencer, Chief Licensing Branch 2 Division of Licensing Gentlemen:
EQUIPMENT QUALIFICATION HOPE CREEK GENERATING STATION DOCKET NO. 50-354 Pursuant to Public Service Electric and Gas Company's letter of February 1, 1985, (from R.
L.
Mittl to A.
Schwencer) regarding equipment qualification, attached is PSE&G's response to Item No. 3 of Enclosure 2,
" Performance Testing of BWR Safety / Relief Valves."
This completes PSE&G's response to the Request for Additional Information -
Equipment Qualification dated November 21, 1984.
Should you have any questions in this regard, please contact us.
Very truly yours, lll h
A Attachment C
D.
H. Wagner USNRC Licensing Project Manager (w/ attach.)
A. R.
Blough KO USNRC Senior Resident Inspector (w/ attach.)
[g I
The Energy People
% 4'117 f 4VI 1 F )
ENCLOSURE 2 REQUEST.FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION BY THE EQUIPMENT QUALIFICATION BRANCH TMI ACTION II.D.1 Question #3 The purpose of the test program was to determine valve performance under conditions anticipated to be encountered in the plants.
Describe the events and anticipated condi-tions at the plant for which the valves are required to operate and compare these plant conditions to the conditions in the test program.
Describe the plant features assumed in the event evaluations used to scope the test program and compare them to the features at your plant.
For example, describe high level trips.to-prevent water from entering the steam lines under high pressure operatinc conditions as assumed in the test event and compare them to trips used at your plant.
Response
The purpose of the S/RV test program was to demonstrate that the Safety Relief Valve (S/RV) will open and reclose under all-expected flow conditions.
The expected valve operating conditions were determined through the use of analyses of accidents and anticipated operational occurrences referenced in Regulatory Guide 1.70, Revision 2.
Single failures were applied to these analyses so that the dynamic forces on the safety and relief valves would be maximized.
Test pressures were the highest predicted by conventional safety analysis procedures.
The BWR Owners Group, in their enclosure to the September 17, 1980, letter from D.
B. Waters to R. H.
Vollmer, identified 13 events which may result in liquid or two-phase S/RV inlet flow that would maximize the dynamic forces on the safety and relief valve.
These events were.
identified by evaluating the initial events described in Regulatory Guide 1.70, Revision 2, with and without the additional conservatism of a single active component failure or operator error postulated in the event sequence.
It was concluded f rom this evaluation that the alternate shutdown cooling mode is the only expected event which will result in liquid at the valve inlet.
Consequently, this was the event simulated in the S/RV test program.
This conclusion and the test results applicable to HCGS are discussed below.
M P85 27/06 4-cag l
l t
=
ENCLOSURE 2 (CONT'D) 2 Response (Cont'd)
The S/RV inlet fluid conditions tested in the BWR Owners Group S/RV test program, as documented in NEDE-24988-P, are 15' to 50' subcooled liquid at 20 psig to 250 psig.
These
- fluid conditions envelope the conditions expected to occur at HCGS in the alternate cooling mode of operation.
The BWR Owners Group identified 13 events by evaluating the initiating events described in Regulatory Guide 1.70, Rev i-sion 2, with the additional conservatism of a single active component failure or operator error postulated in the events sequence.
These events and the plant-specific features that mitigate these events, are summarized in Table 1.
Of these t
13 evm :s, only 10 are applicable to the HCGS plant because of itr design and specific plant configuration.
Three events, namely 5, 6, and 10 are not applicable to the HCGS plant for the reasons listed below:
1.
Events 5 and 10 are not applicable because HCGS does not have an HPCS System.
2.
Event 6 is not applicable because HCGS does not have RCIC head sprays.
For the 10 remaining events, the HCGS specific fe atures,
such as trip logic, power supplies, instrument line configu-ration, alarms and operator actions, have been compared to the base case analysis presented in the BWR Owners Group submittal of September 17, 1980.
The comparison has demon-strated that in each case, the base case analysis is applic-able to HCGS because the base case analysis does not include any plant features which are not already present in the HCGS design.
For these events, Table 1 demonstrates that the l
HCGS specific features are included in the base analyses presented in the BWR Owners Group submittal of September 17, 1980.
It is seen from Table 1, that all plant features assumed in the event evaluation are also existing features in the HCGS plant.
All features included in this base case analysis are similar to plant features in the HCGS design.
Fu rthe rmore, the time available for operator action is expected to be longer in the HCGS plant than in the base case analysis for each case where operator action is required.
l l
M P85 27/06 5-cag i
4
3 ENCLOSURE'2.(CONT'D).
1 Response (Cont'd)
Event 7, the. alternate shutdown cooling mode of operation, is.the only expected. event which will result in liquid or two-phase fluid.at the S/RV inlet.
Consequently, this event was simulated in the. BWR S/RV test program.
In HCGS, this event-involves-flow of subcooled water (approximately 20*F-subcooled).at a. pressure of approximately 50 psig., The tes t conditions clearly envelope tr.ese plant-conditions.
As discussed above, the BWR Owners Group evaluated transi-ents including single active failures that would maximize the dynamic forces on the safety relief valves.
As a result of this evaluation, the alternate shutdown cooling mode is
[
the only expected 1 event involving' liquid or two-phase flow.
Consequently this event was tested in the BWR S/RV test e
program.
The fluid conditions and flow conditions tested in the BWR Owners Group' test program conservatively envelope the HCGS plant specific fluid conditions expected for the alternate'shudown. cooling' mode of operation.
4 J
4 l
4 t
l i
M P85 27/06 6-cag i
i-
(l
(
(
(
(
(
(
'IOSI MJB *JaeAo s333 'ygI gig X
X X
X X
X X
202a3 JOaeaedo
'*aeAo S333 Q
R 9 *sseadea 'V99 ZTu X
X eanITed d J1 8'I IDdH
(
(
(
(
T
'IDdH 'VHS TT#
X X
X X
dV ION d J1 8'I S3dH eanIIed T
'snau 'v99 nTu eanIIed d al 8'I DIDH
(
(
(
(
(
(
T SInN 'ves 6#
X X
X X
X X
DSO Ma8 7SW 8#
(
X eIqeITe^eun uOTaonS uMOpanyS
'SuTToon umooanus *2TV /t O
r.a
- 2dS 3IEVD1'I :dV ION y
- pu nimw luotsucar 94 o
d sanITed d J1 8'I S3dH 3',IEVDI'I dV ION T
'sadu auotsueal, qu l
d al 8'I DIDH
(
(. (
(
(
(
eanTied T
'nInn auersusaf, en X
X X
X X
x eanIIed d J1 8'I IDdH k
(
(
(
(
T X
X X
X X
I 8TNau 'lueTSueaT. re
.-4 m
m ca N
N X
X j
- TTea +6ew *sseaa 7a u:
m m
e aanIIed d J1 8'I Md N
N N
T
- TTe3 *1uon MA Tt X
X X
.-4 e-4 D
e4 3
,-4 c
>e O
O k
3 E
C
>i w
c h
4 0
.c Q
I E
M o
L M
e4
.c 4
4 Z
O 9-4 O
- r4
=r4 4
W M
C Z
3 d
O O
N m
c c
c m
a a
a H
c O
O 0
O I
Seangeed QueId j
f y
y q
g,
,r.
c D.
d b
H H
H>
M O
I k
U0 m
- 4 rn c0 4
a-i P
CO CD 03
%1
- e4 4
c e-4 4
4
.-4 e
D C
03 c-4 e-4 M
'O k
.e4
=c4 Ch o
O 3
0 0
0 CO C0 M@
o N
M
>i H
cM
- e4 W
.e4 4 0
h C.
L 0
0 0
4 3
c3 N
N 3
O 1
J
>J t/) 3 f/) m H ua 44 0
N Nm W
W tt)
.C
.c
.4 O
f/)
H H 3 H e U 0) e.
co G
G H
U U
UO Uk NW Z
A
d
- 4 3
0 A
Q.
1 A 04 O O.
M Z
Z D.
M Z
Z l2:
I Z
Ca E
l 2
N 2
2 2
H W
H M
F F
W H t/)
t/3 H tti C
O
2:
$H H
3H M
M Q vs M
QC we (
3<
H<
7 O
@T C
C CO i
U1 M
V Un un
@m w
O U) C M
D* %
m ft 3
4 MO U 3 EM M
j PJ N MO O
O M
O, 3 CU WG C@
~4 C)
WW w
MH w<
v.
M Un et its M tt)
N O
rt O O
MO
+1 V
33:
@ un 6<
Un i
O w
C tt) it)
@ its M
C v<
H MC tC i
m W
MC C
U) C N'
O C
M M
@M
^
m
@M M
U) M V
D rt 7 M*
FG H@
W W
C CD 0
V H
I N
O 3:
CD M
T y@
M Plant Features 3
i O
D' VW O
@ 01 W
3:
3:
t"
@V F
t')
Un C
w-w.
O its tD 3M O
its H C
C C
its W
Q, tD C
H CD 7
7 CD O
v= U) 3 M w*
H w
X M in (13 W
@ et it)
TJ)
C U
C C
tt w
rt rt M
3:
M tD M O
N' W
7 M-rt W
tt W
W w=
C (A
1 w.
rt v.
3 3
D 7
(A O
v.
O C
U) 3 O
3 4
M F
M w
a C
F O
O D
O C
O D
3 C
H D
tD w
o.
W x
x 3
x
- 1 FK Cont. Fail.,
)
)
)
FW L8 Trip Failure 3
g M
0
- 2 Press. Reg. Fail.
x x
x N
N N
m 03 tt3 v) w x
)
HPCI L8 Trip Failure g<
x
)
RCIC L8 Trip Failure Q
HPCS LS Trip Failure NOT API'LICABLE C
N NOT API'LICABLE Spr.
- 7 Alt. Snutdown Cooling,
Shutdown Suction Unavailable x
x x
)
g g
)
RCIC L8 Trip Failure.
1 10 SBA, HPCS, NOT API'LICABLE HPCS L8 Trip. Failure x
HPCI L8 Trip Failure x( 12 SBA, Depress..&
D ECCS Over.,
Operator Error x
x h
ht 13 LBA, ECCS Overf. Brk Isol.
1nnT krB.frevO SCCE,ABL 31#
D D
D x
x x
rnrrP rntarann
,.revO SCCE D
&.sserpeD, ABS 21#
x eruliaF pirT 8L ICPH D
,ICPH, ABS 11#
x eruliaF pirT 8L SCPH ELBACIL):PA TON
,SCPH, ABS 01#
eruliaF pirT 8L CICR D
CICR, ABS 9#
x CSO krB LSM 8#
D D
x x
elbaliavanU noitcuS nwodtuhS
,gnilOOC nwodtuhS.tlA 7#
o
.rpS ELBACIL?:PA TON N
.dH CICR tneisnarT 6#
$~
C H
eruliaF pirT 8L SCPH ELBACIL?:PA I'ON
, SCPH tneisnarT 5 #
~
d eruliaF pirT 8L CICR
,CICR tneisnarT 4#
O
~
te m
eruliaF pirT 8L ICPH I
, ICPH tneisnarT 3#
5 eH w
D D
D
- 3
.liaF.geR.sserP 2#
x x
x tr "
CO erul,iaF pirT 8L WF D
a 3 3
.liaF.tnOC WF 1#
x OO er 'tr 55 D
00 D
0 0
Mmm O
D M
M w
w Q
@HH
=v
=W C
C tt H
't tr M
W m
W G
Wl i M
x 5
k d
m O
a G
D n
W M
n C
N D
O w
O N
OH H w
aM M
m E
MQQ 7
tr 4
7 7
'D M
C H
C C
C D D( O C
C C
O M
v v
O O *t *t O
.H H
Z 2
- 2:
- 2l "t
0
- 2l pc
.I serutaeF tnalP EE O
na I
o 3
9
=!
3 3
5 mC w
N N
N S
S S
S S
b$
5 C
O O
O O
o o
m>
e o
b
'k M
M M
M M
M M '
H M
MO M
M Mc M
N N
M n
O O te O
O om O
OH st tr tr.H tr tr tr ot tr e M
m 0
0D O
O O Dr O
O<
e.
oC H
W mO W
m mM
,D Do
- 2l T
M o
o3 D(
e D( w G
GF x
x x
x x
x x
x x
m 1
l