ML20101N143

Forwards Suppl Info to LER 265/95-008 Informing NRC of Root Cause for HPCI Speed,Flow & Discharge Pressure Oscillations

ML20101N143
Person / Time
Site:	Quad Cities
Issue date:	03/11/1996
From:	Pearce L COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
LWP-96-024, LWP-96-24, NUDOCS 9604080261
Download: ML20101N143 (6)

Text

1 o,mmonw cann i a, son compan3 Quad Litics ( cncraung Station

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Cordoui.11. 612 al 9 a0 l

Tcl 309M s 22 6 l LWP-96-024 March 11. 1996 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission l

Document Control Desk Washington D.C.

20555

Reference:

Quad Cities Nuclear Station Docket Number 50-265. DPR-30. Unit Two

Subject:

Licensee Event Report (LER) 265/95-008 Supplemental Information.

As stated in LER 265/95-008. supplemental -information is being provided i

and is enclosed as Attachment 1.

This information constitutes revision l

01 to the original LER documentation. is a reproduction of the criginal text of LER 254/95-001.

If there are any questions or comments concerning this letter, please refer them to Nick Chrissotimos. Regulatory Assurance Administrator at I

309-654-2241, ext. 3100.

The following commitments are being made by this letter:

1.

U-1 HPCI FC testing 2651809500805.

l 2.

Review event as part engineering training 2651809500806.

Respectfully.

COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY l

QU ITIE UCLEAR STATION f(bLL lt..W. Pearce Station Manager - L'IR Supplemental Information l - LER 265/95-008 (copy) l l

010134 cc:

P. Piet C. Miller INP0 Records Center NRC Region III 9604080261 960311 PDR ADOcK 0500o265 t(

l S

PDH G

y i

OCAP 2300-26 UNIT 1(2)

I REVISION 2 l

l.

ATTACHMENT B l

REVISION TO LER i

LER NO.

i STA UNIT YEAR NO 04

'2 95 008 PART 1 TITLE OF EVENT OCCURRED Unit Two HPCI Speed. Flow and Discharge Pressure Oscillations Inlet Drain Pot High Level Alarm 10/18/95 1642 and Failure of the 2-2301-28 valve.

DATE TIME REASON FOR REVISED REPORT i

i Inform NRC of the root cause for the HPCI Soeed. Flow and Discharae Pressure Oscillations.

l PART 2 ACCEPTANCE BY ONSITE REVIEW f.

b btfind w.2

/'

m i

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT APPROVED l

AND AUTHORIZED FOR DISTRIBUTION I

STATION MANAGER DATE 4

i i

10 LER265\\95W)8St.WPF

Qu:d Cities System Engineering Transmittal To:

N. Chrissotimos Date:

March 12,1996 h

Prepared by:

J. Swales From:

D Craddick System Engineer Supervisor System Engineer

Subject:

Supplemental LER Report for LER 2-95-oo8 ATTACHMENT 1 SUPPLEMENTAL EVENT DESCRIPTION During Unit 2 start-up on November 22, 1995 the reactor pressure was held below 150 psig to further troubleshoot pressure oscillations noted before shutdown.

The HPCI system was successfully run at this low pressure with no osu llations noted.

The reactor pressure was then increased to approximately 250 psig to demonstrate HPCI system operability.

Operability was demonstrated with no speed, flow or discharge pressure oscillations noted.

On November 23. 1995 with reactor pressure at approximately 920 psig the HPCI system was again run to demonstrate operability in accordance with OCOS 2300-1 as required by Technical Specification 3.5.C. During this test the HPCI system had speed, flow and discharge pressure oscillations when started up.

The flow controller was taken to manual and the oscillations stopped. A slight adjustment was made to the proportional band on the flow controller and t1e system was placed back into the automatic flow control mode.

No oscillations were noted.

Step changes were then made in the flow af d discharge pressure to try and induce oscillations.

No oscillations could be induced. A decision was made to shut the system down and perform another start-up to verify that the problem with oscillations had been eliminated. This start-up transient would be the most severe test of the flow control system and verify that the oscillations had been eliminated. The test was completed with no oscillations noted.

On November 30, 1995 the HPCI system was again being tested on an increased frequency in accordance with QCOS 2300-1 when speed, flow and discharge 3ressure oscillations were noted. However, in this case as on November 23, 1995, the iPCI system did fulfill its design function in that pump flow was always greater than 5000 gpm despite the oscillations.

An investigative team consisting of System Engineering. Instrument Maintenance Corporate Engineering and an outside Industry Expert on the HPCI system was formed. They reviewed the available strip chart data which had been collected during the HPCI runs in October and November 1995.

The team reached the conclusion that the oscillations were caused by the particular test conditions and the settings on the HPCI flow controller. The test condition set up had the 2-2301-10 valve open far enough so that the pump discharge 3ressure on start-up was about 580 psig.

The reactor pressure du^ing test conditiens is aetween 920 psig and 1005 psig. This set-up is considered a low turbine loading condition due to the high steam inlet pressure and relatively low pump discharge pressure.

With this low turbine loading condition the mechanical turbine linkages located in the front standard and the electronic flow control system had approximately the same time response.

This was theorized to be the cause of the flow oscillations.

The investigation team implemented a testing program to verify this theory and eliminate other possible causes.

1.ER265\\95WO8St.WPF Page 1 of 4

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Quid Cities System Engineering Transmittal To:

N. Chrissotimos Date:

March 12,1996 gf53144 From:

D. Craddick Prepared by:

J. Swales System Engineer Supervisor System Engineer

Subject:

Supplemental LER Report for LER 2-95-008 ATTACHMENT 1 On December 2,1995 several tests were run on the HPCI system to gather data and verify the root cause. The first test was run with the 2-2301-10 valve further closed causing a higher pump discharge pressure on system start-up.

It was predicted with the higher turbine loading no flow oscillations would occur.

When tested there were no flow oscillations as expected. The next test set-up was the same as on November 30. 1995 when flow oscillations were observed. Again with low turbine loading the flow oscillations occurred. The third test was to verify that the 2-2301-10 valve was not oscillating thereby causing the flow oscillations. The turbine was started up with the flow controller in manual to see if oscillations occurred, they did not.

This eliminated the 2-2301-10 valve as a possible cause.

The team next directed the Instrument Maintenance Department to adjust the flow controller. The controller proportional band and reset were adjusted to make it slower to respond to changes during HPCI operation.

These adjustments effectively changed the time response of the flow controller so that it would be different from the time response of the turbine mechanical linkages.

It was predicted that this would eliminate the flow oscillations at all turbine start-up conditions.

The fourth test run was with the 2-2301-10 valve in its normal position causing a pump discharge pressure of approximately 580 psig on start-up. HPCI o)eration showed no oscillations during this test after the adjustments had been made.

T1e fifth and final test on December 2,1995 was with the 2-2301-10 valve further open causing a pump discharge pressure of approximately 500 psig on start-up. Again no flow oscillations occurred. This proved that the adjustments to the flow controller had eliminated the oscillations at low turbine loading conditions.

Since the flow controller adjustments could have caused a change in the cold start-up time i

for HPCI it was necessary to perform the HPCI Cold Fast Start procedure OCOS 2300-13 after a 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> cooling off period. This test was performed on December 6, 1995.

The pump discharge 3ressure came up to approximately 1100 psig on turbine start-up and the test passed wit 1 a start-up time of 26 seconds.

No flow oscillations were observed.

unusw5mossi.wrF Page 2 of 4 I

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Qu:d Cities System Engineering Transmittal l

l To:

N. Chrissotimos Date:

March 12,1996

@ p /0 YA From:

D. Craddick Prepared by:

J. Swales System Engineer Supervisor System Engineer

Subject:

Supplemental LER Report for LER 2-95-008 ATTACHMENT 1 It had now been demonstrated that no flow oscillations would occur from 500 psig to 1100 psig pump discharge pressures.

The industry expert assisting in the investigation affirmed that at lower steam pressures the HPCI turbine mechanical linkages have an entirely different time response such that flow oscillations would not occur at these lower pressures. Additionally, the HPCI system is r ot normally operated at these conditions.

The only time low turbine loading occws is on start-u) during testing due to the position of the 2-2301-10 valve. On November 23. 1995 during t1e second start-up the oscillations were not induced because the 2-2301-10 valve was slightly further closed causing a higher pump discharge pressure.

Normal operating procedures require the pump discharge pressure to be 100 to 150 psig above reactor pressure thereby preventing a low turbine loading condition.

The investigative team's review of the flow data during oscillations connr.med that the flow was always above 5000 gpm during oscillations. This is the required design flowrate.

Therefore the system would have performed its design function.

For these reasons the Licensee Event Report associated with the event on November 30, 1995 was cancelled.

SUPPLEMENTAL APPARENT CAUSE OF THE EVENT The root cause of the HPCI speed, flow and discharge pressure oscillations associated with this event was the low turbine loading conditions set up by the change to the HPCI test flow path.

When the position of the 2-2301-10 valve w5s changed during the refuel outage (02R13) to a slightly further o)en position, a low HPCI turbine loading condition was set up which was not present when t7e new Yogagawa Flow Controller was installed.

The flow controller therefore needed to be adjusted for this different test operating condition.

This is believed to be an isolated event.

SUPPLEMENTAL CORRECTIVE ACTIONS Corrective action #3 (NTS #2651809500803) which was the inspection of the inlet drain pot level switch under NWR #95010214402 has been completed.

The following additional corrective actions are being implemented:

1.

Check the tuning on the Unit 1 HPCI flow controller and adjust it if necessary. (NTS

1. 2651809500805. SED). This will be completed no later than the start-up following i

l the next refuel outage on Unit 1 and will resolve whether the Unit 1 HPCI system may be subject to the same speed flow and discharge pressure oscillations as have been observed on the Unit 2 system.

2.

Review this event as part of the lessons learned program for the engineering departments.

(NTS# 2651809500806. TRN). This will be completed by June 30, 1996.

1 LER265\\95\\008St.WPF Page 3 of 4 1

l Qu:d Cities System Engineering Transmittal Tc:

N. Chrissotimos Date:

March 12,1996 From:

D. Craddick Prepared by:

J. Swales % II' System Engineer Supervisor System Engineer

Subject:

Supplemental LER Report for LER 2-95-008 ATTACHMENT 1 SUPPLEMENTAL COMPONENT FAILURE DATA 1.

Component

Description:

Electronic Flow Controller Manufacturer / Type:

Yokogawa Corporation of America Y006 Part Number:

SLPC-271 2.

Component

Description:

Level Switch Manufacturer / Type: Magnetrol International Incorporated M040 Part Number:

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LER265\\95W8St.WPF Page 4 of 4

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ATTACHMENT 2 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

Form Rev. 2.0 Facdity Name (1)

Docket Number (2)

Page (3)

Quad Cities Unit Two 0l5l0l0l0l2l6l5 1 l of l 0 l 6 Title (4)

Unit Two IIPCI speed, Flow and Discharge Pressure Oscillations Inlet Drain Pot liigh Level Alarm and Failure of the 2-2301-28 Valve.

Event Date (5)

Li7 Number (6)

Report Date (7)

Other Facilities Involved (b)

Month Day Year Year Sequential Revision Month Day Year Facility Docket Number (s)

Number Number Names 0l5l0l0l0l l

l 1l0 1l8 9l5 9l5 0l0l8 0l0 l

9 5

0l5l0l0l0l l

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C PERATIN 3

~I1115 REPORT IS SUBM,1Itu PU GUANT TO T TE REQULREN ENTS OF 10CFR MODE (9)

(Check one or more of the following) (11) 4 20.402(b) 20.405(c) 50.73(a)(2)tiv) 73.71(b) l POWER 20.405(aXXXi) 50.36(cXI)

T50.73(ax2xv)

-73.7i(c)

LEVEL 20.405(aXIXii) 50.36(cX2) 50.73(aX2 Xvii)

Other (Specify (10) l8l 7

-20.405(aXIXiii)

-50.73(aK2Xi) 50.73(aX2)(viiiXA) in Abstract 20.405(aXIXiv) 50.73(aX2Xii) 50.73(aX2XviiiXB) below and in

"""""20.405(aXIXv) 50.73(aX2Xiii) 50.73(aX2)(x)

Text)

LICENSEE CON TACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME TELEPliONE NUMBER AREA CODE i

Nick Chrissotimos, Regulatory Assurance, Ext. 3100 3

0l9 6l5l4l-l2l2l4l1 COMPLLTb ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REP)RT (13) i CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER REPORTABLE CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT M ANUFACTU RER REPORTABLE TO NPRDS TO NPRDS j

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SUP 'LEMENTAL REPORT EXPEc s tu (14)

Expected Mondt Day Year Subrnission

]YES (if res, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)

]O Date (15) l l

l AB5 TRACT (Lunu to 1400 spaces, s.c., appronunately fifteen smgle-space typewrinen hnes)(16)

ABSTRACT:

At 1642 hours0.019 days <br />0.456 hours <br />0.00271 weeks <br />6.24781e-4 months <br /> on 10/18/95, Unit Two(U-2) was in the Run mode at 87% of rated core thermal i

power, at which time the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) monthly surveillance OCOS l

2300-1, " Periodic HPCI Pump Operability Test" was started.

I At 1655 hours0.0192 days <br />0.46 hours <br />0.00274 weeks <br />6.297275e-4 months <br /> the Unit Two HPCI was manually tripped from the control room and declared inoperable due to HPCI flow and discharge pressure oscillations.

l An Engineering Root Cause Team was formed to investigate this concern. The cause of the event is still under investigation.

A Supplemental LER will be submitted when the final root cause(s) of the failure has been identified.

l LER265\\95WO8St.WPF 95//G'1WBPP

l ATTACHMENT 2

?

l LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION Form Rev. 2.0

(

FACILITY NAME (1)

DOCKET NUMBER (2)

LER NUMBER (6)

PAGE (3) l Year Sequennal Revision Number Number Quad Cities Unit Two 0l5l0l0l0l2l6l5 9l5 0l0l8 0l0 2 lOFl 0 l 6 TEXT Energy Industry Idenuhcanon System (EIIS) codes arc idenufied m the text as [XX)

PLANT AND SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION:

General Electric - Boiling Water Reactor - 2511 MWt rated core thermal power.

EVENT IDENTIFICATION: Unit Two HPCI Speed. Flow and Discharge Pressure Oscillations Inlet Drain Pot High Level Alarm and Failure of the 2-2301-28 Valve.

A.

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO EVFNT:

Unit:

Two Event Date:

October 18, 1995 Event Time:

1642 Reactor Mode: 4 Mode Name:

Run Power Level:

87 This report was initiated by Licensee Event Report LER 265\\95-008.

RUN (4) - In this position the reactor system pressure is at or above 825 psig. and the reactor protection system is energized, with APRM protection and RBM interlocks in service (excluding the 15% high flux scram).

B.

DESCRIPTION OF EVENT:

At 1642 hours0.019 days <br />0.456 hours <br />0.00271 weeks <br />6.24781e-4 months <br /> on 10/18/95, the monthly surveillance for the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system was being performed.

The reactor (Rx) was in the run mode at 87% of rated core thermal power. At 1655 the Unit Two (U-2) HPCI demonstrated unexplained speed. flow and discharge oscillations. At 1655 hours0.0192 days <br />0.46 hours <br />0.00274 weeks <br />6.297275e-4 months <br /> the U-2 HPCi was manually tripped from the control room and declared inoperable and OCOS 2300-2 "HPCI Outage Report" was com)leted.

Event Notification to the NRC was transmitted at 1811.

i On 10/18/95 at 1655 PI; 95-2673 was generated and Action Requests on the A0-2-2301-28

(#180174) and HPCI (#180187) were written. A 14 day Limiting Condition of Operation (LCO). per Tech Spec section 3.5.C.3. was entered. A Probabalistic Risk Assessment (PRA) evaluation for Core Damage Frequency was completed, which indicated a Yellow condition at 16.27 times nominal.

An Engineering Root Cause Investigation Team was formed on 10/19/95.

Three (3) Teams were established to address the three (3) issues:

HPCI Oscillations HPCI A0-2-2301-28 failure HPCI Drain Pot High Level Alarm Investigations including troubleshooting were underway on 10/21/95 when at 2158 hours0.025 days <br />0.599 hours <br />0.00357 weeks <br />8.21119e-4 months <br />. U-2 was manually shutdown due to a SCRAM Discharge Volume (reference LER 1 l 007) design issue.

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LER265\\95WO8St.WPF

0 ATTACHMENT 2 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION Form Rev. 2.0

' FACILITY NAME (1)

DOCKET NUMBER (2)

LER NUMBER (6)

PAGE (3)

Year Sequential Revision Number Number i Qutd Cities Unit Two 0l5l0l0l0l2l6l5 9l5 0l0l8 0l0 3 lOFl 0 l 6 TEXT Energy Industry Idenuficanon System (EIIS) codes are identified in the text as [XX]

C.

APPARENT CAUSE OF THE EVENT:

Although the exact failure mode (s) has not been determined, it is apparent the following information is relevant to the problems identified.

HPCI OSCILLATIONS The HPCI oscillations were a contributing factor in declaring the HPCI system inoperable.

Prior to U-2 being shut down, a turbine line set was performed in which the travel of the various lever arms and pistons in the turbine front standard were measured.

The secondary operating cylinder on the turbine moved five (5) times greater than the specification recommended by the Vendor. This increased gain in the mechanical Jortion of the system 'may' be a contributing reason for the instabilities that were o) served.

The decision was made to wait until the U-2 start-up to test this theory.

It is planned to run HPCI at a pressure below 150 psig in order to adjust the speed control components in the front standard. When satisfactory pressure and flow performance has been obtained, reactor pressure will be increased to greater than 150 psig to aerform the required operability testing. A Supplemental report will be issued when tie root cause for these oscillations is identified.

HPCI A0-2-2301-28 VALVE FAILURE l

The HPCI Steam Line to Drain Pot Drain Valve. 2-2301-28, failure was identified while i

using the Quad Cities Annunciator (0CAN) procedures. Approximately one (1) minute into the surveillance, the Drain Pot High Level alarm. 902-3-B-11 annunciated and i

the control room personnel entered the OCAN's to resolve this anomaly. The procedure calls for the manipulation of the A0-2-2301-29 and A0-2-2301-30 valves prior to manipulating the A0-2-2301-28 valve. When the procedure called for the operator to manipulate the A0-2-2301-28. the valve failed to respond. This failure calls for the l

operator to terminate the operation of HPCI.

PIF# 95-2687 and Action Request # 950058458 were generated on 10/20/95 to evaluate whether the Unit One (U-1) HPCI A0-1-2301-28 valve would consistently and reliably I

perform it's design function. An Issue Screening, performed on 10/21/95, verified that required design functions were met and no concerns existed.

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LER265\\95V)08St.WPF

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ATTACHMENT 2 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION Form Rev. 2.0 l

FACILITY NAME 0) dom 1 NUMBER (2)

LER NUMBER (6)

PAGE (3) l Year Sequential Revision Number Number Quad Cities Unit Two 0l5l0l0l0l2l6l5 9l5 0l0l8 0l0 4 lOFl 0 l 6 TEXT Energy Industry Idenuficauon System (EIIS) codes are adenufied m the text as [XX]

I As the investigation on U-2 progressed, it was determined that the 2-2301-28 valve was mechanically stuck in the closed position. Testing / stroking of the valve revealed that the plug hesitated and " jerked" coming off the seat.

Upon disassembly it was discovered that the plug was being forced into the valve seat in a manner i

which deformed the seating surfaces causing a ' burr' to form.

This deformation was causing the " jerking" motion.

It is postulated that high instrument air pressure (96 psig) was applying excessive force on the plug, thereby forcing the plug into the seat.

Recommended air 3ressure per the manufacturer valve data sheet is between 62 and 91.2 psig. The lac ( of control to ensure the pressure regulator was set within manufacturer recommendations caused the valve to fail.

Following this event Unit One and Unit Two HPCI air operated valve presure regulators were inspected and found to be within the vendor recommended settings.

HPCI DRAIN POT HIGH LEVEL ALARM Troubleshooting / testing has indicated the A0-2-2301-31. HPCI Steam Sup)ly Drain Line Trap Bypass valve, opens and closes with the actuation of the HPCI Hig1 Level Drain Pot Level switch per design. This testing was performed by draining the water that had collected in the pot while observing the control room alarm and 2-2301-31 valve i

movement. The Root Cause Team generated a test that provided confidence in the l

existing switch.

One possible root cause of this event is that the existing switch binded slightly. This could have been caused by corrosion on the switches lever l

assembly. This corrosion could have come from a steam leak at the root of the l

Magnetrol. This leak was re) aired by seal-welding the magnetrol to the drain pot during an earlier outage.

Tie Electrical maintenance personnel evaluated the switch to be fully functional so no repairs or replacement was necessary. On 11/14/95 the Drain Pot level switch was tested under OCOS 2300-15 PFC# 1831. Drain Pot Level Switch Test, and found to be functioning properly.

This test allowed the operator to l

fill and drain the drain pot four(4) times, each time verifying the proper l

functioning of the A0-2-2301-31 and the B-11 annunciator. All transitions performed as expected. This portion of the troubleshooting indicates that the level switch is working properly at this time.

Another, second possible root cause, is that corrosion materials inside the drain pot caused binding between the magnetic picku) plug and the nonmagnetic tubing casing.

Further investigation by looking inside t1e drain bowl with a boroscope might determine if the condition of the drainbowl itself.

je. rust etc., might have contributed to the binding of the plug.

This boroscope inspection is included in the scope of work within NWR# 950102144 task #02.

This is I

a prior to startup work request.

Unit One HPCI was run on 11/9/95 to verify operability of the system and it's components.

No problems with the drainpot or the level switch were noted.

l LER265\\95'008St.WPF 1

e ATTACHMENT 2 i

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION Forn, Rev. 2.0 j

FACILITY NAME (1)

DOuti NUMBER (2)

LER NUMBER (6)

? AGE (3)

Year Sequennal Revision Number Number Quad Cities Unit Two 0l5 0l0l0l2l6l5 9l5 0l0l8 0l0 5l0fl0l6 TLAI Energy Industry Idenuficanon System (EIIS) codes are identifed m the text as AAJ D.

SAFETY ANALYSIS OF EVENT:

The safety significance of this event was minimal due to the availability of backup and support systems.

Technical Specifications require that if the HPCI system is i

found to be inoperable, continued reactor operation is permissible for fourteen (14) days providing that backup systems are available.

i Throughout this event, the backup systems, i.e. Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) [BN]. Automatic Depressurization System (ADS)[RV]. Core Spray (CS) [BM] and Low Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI) [B0] mode of Residual Heat Removal (RHR) system 4

were available to provide adequate core cooling in the event of a design basis _

accident.

Unit One HPCI remained operable during this event.

E.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS COMPLETED 1.

Repairs have been made to the 2-2301-28 valve and air 3ressure has been reestablished to within Vendor recommended settings.

Jnit One A0-1-2301-28 was evaluated as fully functional.

Remaining HPCI Unit One and Unit Two air operated pressure regulators were inspected and found to be within the vendor recommended settings.

2.

The Magnetrol level switch was successfully tested and evaluated under QCOS 2300-15 PFC# 1831 to be fully functional.

3.

Ran Unit One HPCI un 11/9/95 to verify system and component operability and availability.

No problems with the drainpot or level switch were noted.

LER265\\95WO8St.WPF

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ATTACHMENT 2 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION Form Rev. 2.0 FACILITY NAME (1)

DOutl NUMBER (2)

LER NUMBER (6)

PAGE (3)

Year Sequennal Revision Number Number Quad Cities Unit Two 0l5l0l0l0l2l6l5 9l5 0l0l8 0l0 6 lOFl 0 l 6 TEXT Energy Industry Identincauon System (Ell 5) codes are identifed m the text as [XXj 1

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO BE COMPLETED l

1.

HPCI oscillation testing will be completed during U-2 start-up.

(NTS #-

2651809500801. SED.12/13/95 Hutchinson.Swales) l 2.

A program to control and document the instrument air pressure settings for selected Air Operated valves will be established. (NTS # 2651809500802.

SES.12/31/96 Hutchinson. Arnold)

(

3.

Com)lete Unit Two HPCI Drain Pot inspection under NWR #950102144 task #02 prior l

to Jnit Two startup.(NTS # 2651809500803. SED.12/13/95 Hutchinson.Swales) l 4.

Initiate an increased testing frequency on both Unit One and Unit Two HPCI systems in order to increase confidence in the system and determine if any other system components are near failure.(NTS # 2651809500804. OPS 12/13/95. Cook.

Cook) i l

l A Supplemental LER will be submitted when the final root cause(s) of the failure has i

been determined.

F.

PREVIOUS EVENTS:

l LER 1-94-007. HPCI 1-2301-63B Restricting Orifice Found 95% Plugged With Slag Due to an Unknown Cause LER 1-94-008. HPCI Flow Oscillation During Operability Run Due to Broken j

Instrumentation Wire G.

COMPONENT FAILURE DATA:

1.

Data for HPCI Oscillations will be provided in a supplemental report when the root cause(s) is (are) identified.

2.

Component

Description:

Air Operated Valve Manufacturer / Type:

. Copes Vulcan Company / Drain Pot Vent to Condenser Serial Number:

6710-58363-17 Part Number:

139740K (plug) 129309MKD (stem) 3.

Data for the HPCI Drain Pot Level Switch event will be provided in a supplemental report when the root cause(s) is (are) identified.

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1. 266/80 9500FQK Source Document:

- (It> be filled in by Reg Assurance)

Mdklenho/1 Uwa/&S Due Date: 6 / 3// 96 Assigned to:

Department Manager Implementor Commitment

Description:

Mo /Me flo w codroller fes +ma on U-l 1IPCT clue,n o

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ACCEPTANCE SECTION accept responsibility of the above listed action and due date:

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Department Manager Signature

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DUE DATE/ EXTENSION / TRANSFER RESPONSIBILITY REQUESTS Approved by:

Extend to Date Request By/Date Dept Mgr/Date Station Mgr/Date l

Reasons:

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Transfer Resp. To Request by/Date Dept Mgr/Date Recipient /Date

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • AAAAAAAAAA*AAAAAA********************

COMPLETION SECTION

• Does this item contain radiological, hazmat, or environmental issues?

No Yes (Items checked Yes must be reviewed and signed by the Rad-Chem. Superintendent) f Completion Date:

Close-out Documents:

Comments:

Rad-Chem. Superintendent (Signature)

Date:

Completed by:

Implementor (Signature)

Date:

Reviewed by:

Supervisor (Signature)

Datel Reviewed by:

Department Mar.ager (Signature)

Date:

l Approved by:

Station Manager (Signature)

RA\\CAF

LER 2-95-dof Red 266 ign 9Eoo 80 6 Source Document:

~(To be filled in by Reg Assurance)

/dudalb CSF/n,ck Due Date:

6/ 30/96 Assigned to:

Department Manager implementor Comm'tment

Description:

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ACCEPTANCE SECTIOW o

e above listed action and due date:

I entand and accept reppensib

!//dV Department Manager Signature f/

DUE DATE/ EXTENSION / TRANSFER RESPONSIBILITY REQUESTS Approved by:

Extend to Date Request By/Date Dept Mgr/Date Station Mgr/Date Reasons.

Approved by:

Transfer Resp. To Request by/Date Dept Mgr/Date Recipient /Date c*********** ************** ; ; ; ;. ;. ;. ; ;. ; ; * ;. ; ;. ; ; ;. ;. ;. ; ; ; ;. ;. ;. ;, ;. ;. ;. ; ; ;.****************** ; ; ;. ; ; ; ;

• COMPLETION SECTION

• Does this item contain radiological, hazmat, or environmental issues?

No

~

Yes (Items checked Yes must be reviewed and signed by the Rad-Chem. Superintendent)

Completion'Date:

Close-out Documents:

Comments:

Date:

• Reviewed by:

Rad-Chem. Superintendent (Signature)

Date:

Completed by:

Implementor (Signature)

Date:

Reviewed by:

Supervisor (Signature)

Datel Reviewed by:

Department Manager (Signature)

Date:

Approved by:

Station Manager (Signature)

..-.-