ML20101H791
| ML20101H791 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palo Verde  |
| Issue date: | 12/14/1984 |
| From: | Van Brunt E ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE CO. (FORMERLY ARIZONA NUCLEAR |
| To: | Kirsch D NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| References | |
| ANPP-31490-TDS, DER-84-101, NUDOCS 8412280344 | |
| Download: ML20101H791 (4) | |
Text
rT-N Arizona Nuclear Power Project P.O. box 52034
- PHOENIX. ARIZONA 85072-2034 l[ !U} d- [ 7 December 14, 1984 ~ c....
- U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region V 1450 Maria Lane - Suite 210 Walnut Creek, California 94596-5368 Attention: Mr. D. F. Kirsch, Acting Director Division of Reactor Safety and Projects
Subject:
Final Report - DER 84-101 A 50.55(e) Reportable Condition Relating To Containment Purge Valve.
File: 84-019-026; D.4.33.2
Reference:
A) Telephone Conversation between P. Narbut and L. Spiers on December 4, 1984
Dear Sir:
Attached is our final written report of the Reportable Deficiency under 10CFR50.55(e) referenced above.
Very truly yours, Cll.L OLlk E. E. Van Brunt, Jr.
APS Vice President Nuclear Production ANPP Project Director EEVB/TRB/nj Attachment cc: See Page Two 8412280344 841214 PDR ADOCK 05000529 8
PDR T6->7 h t
A j-I e
Mr. D. F. Kirsch DER 84-101
, Page ' Two..
cct-Richard DeYoung,. Director.
Office of Inspection and Enforcement U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C.
-20555 T. G. Woods, Jr.
D. B. Karner W. E.-Ide D. B. Fasnacht A. C. Rogers L. A. Souza D. E. Fowler T. D. Shriver C. N. Russo B. S. Kaplan-J. R. Bynum J. M. Allen A. C. Gehr W. J. Stubblefield W. G. Bingham R. L. Patterson R. W. Welcher H. D. Foster D. R. Hawkinson R. P. Zimmerman-L. Clyde M. Matt T. J. Bloom D. N. Stover J. D. Houchen J. E. Kirby D. Cansdy Records Center Institute of Nuclear Power Operations 1100 Circle 75 Parkway, Suite 1500 Atlanta, GA 30339
..I FINAL REPORT - DER 84-101 DEFICIENCY EVALUATION 50.55(e)
ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY (APS)
PVNGS UNITS 1, 2, 3 I.
DescIlption of Deficiency During testing of the containment purge system valve IJ-CPB-UV-0005B failed to open but the operator local and remote indication showed the valve to be open.
Investigation by Bechtel under Startup Work Authorization (SWA) No. 26883 found that the driven gear on the valve shaft had become direngaged from the shaft. This valve, including its Limitorque operator, is supplied by Henry Pratt Company under project specification 13-JM-605.
Evaluation The valve driven gear spline adapter and key are secured to the Limitorque operator drive shaf t by a force fit, together with the use of Locktite Grade AV-271 or 277.
Evaluation of this condition has shown it occurred as a result of two factors.
1.
The use and application of Locktite may not have been consistently applied during the original assembly at the factory, or during a subsequent removal and reinstallation at the site.
Due to the nature of the condition, a definitive assessment cannot te established.
2.
This particular inst.11ation has the valve oriented so that the Limitorque operator is below the valve which, allowed by gravity, the gear spline adaptor to become disengaged from the 3 rive shaft.
A survey has identified five (5) valves installed in a position where the operator is below the valve as in this condition.
The supplier and Bechtel Engineering have evaluated this condition as an isolated case based on previous experience' with these valves in many similar installations at different locations.
The Project has previously made plans, for reasons other than this condition, to replace the Limitorque operator on all 8"
containment purge system valve operators.
The revised design will use pneumatic valve operators.
Failure of the Containment Purge System Valve to operate would result in a loss of the valve control and would prevent the valve from closing on Containment Isolation Actuation Signal (CIAS) and Containment Purge Isolation Actuation Signal (CPIAS) signals.
Consequently, an excessive release of radioac*.ivity from the containment could occur during certain operating conditions.
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Final Report DER 84-101 Page Two
-II.
Analysis of Safety Implications.
Based on -- the above evaluation this - condition is evaluated as
- reportable ' under :10CPR50.55(e) since, if' left uncorrected, it would result in a. safety significant condition. This condition-is-evaluated as not reportable under 10CFR Part 21-since a defect has not been found to. exist'in a basic component.-
III.
Corrective' Action
- A.
Nonconformance Report SM-5316 has been. dispositioned. to repair the condition by reinstalling the gear using Locktite as specified. and required by the suppliers design.
This action will.be completed prior to entry into Mode 5 for Unit-r 1.
B.
Investigation Request (IR-50) is being initiated to perform an inspection of all applicable Henry Pratt Company valves for the existence of Locktite compound at the valve driven gear.
This inspection will be completed prior to entry into Mode 5 for Unit 1 and prior to operating license in Units -2 and 3.
C.
The change to pneumatic operators
- s being implemented by.
Design Change Package 10J-CP-023, 2SJ-CP023 and 3CJ-CP-023 and is scheduled to be completed prior to Mode 4 in each unit.
D.
Any. nonconferming conditions ~found shall cross reference this DER for reportability disposition.
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