ML20101B119
| ML20101B119 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palo Verde  |
| Issue date: | 12/08/1984 |
| From: | Van Brunt E ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE CO. (FORMERLY ARIZONA NUCLEAR |
| To: | Kirsch D NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| References | |
| REF-PT21-84-553-000 ANPP-31387-TDS, DER-84-93, PT21-84-553, PT21-84-553-000, NUDOCS 8412200111 | |
| Download: ML20101B119 (4) | |
Text
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l Arizona Nuclear Power Project P.O. BOX 52034 e PHOENIX, AntZONA 85072-2034 December 8,1984 ANPP-31387-TDS/TRB U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region V 1450 Maria Lane - Suite 210 Walnut Creek, California 94596-5368 Attention: Mr. D. F. Kirsch, Acting Director Division of Reactor Safety and Projects
Subject:
Final Report - DER 84-93 A 50.55(e) Reportable Condition Relating To Support Rails In Panel B05.
File: 84-019-026; D.4.33.2
Reference:
A) Telephone Conversation between D. Hollenbach and T. Bradish on November 9, 1984
Dear Sir:
Attached is our final written report of the Reportable Deficiency under 10CFR50.55(e) referenced above.
Very Truly Yours, CLR_.A.,_
O@
E.E. Van Brunt, Jr.
APS Vice President Nuclear Production ANPP Project Director EEVB/TRB/nj Attachment C"*
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m Mr. D. F. Kirsch DER 84-93 Page Two cc Richard DeYoung, Director Office of. Inspection and Enforcement-U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C.
20555-T. G. Woods, Jr.
D. B. Karner W. E. Ide D. B. Fasnacht A. C. Rogers L. A. Souza D. E. Fowler T. D. Shriver C. N. Russo B. S. Kaplan J. R. Bynum J. M. Allen A. C. Gehr W. J. Stubblefield W. G. Bingham R. L. Patterson R. W. Welcher H. D. Foster D. R. Hawkinson R. P. Zimmerman L. Clyde M. Matt T. J. Bloom D. N. Stover J. D. Houchen J. E. Kirby D. Canady Records Center Institute of Nuclear Power Operations 1100 circle 75 Parkway, Suite 1500 Atlanta, GA 30339 2
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.a FINAL ~ REPORT - DER 84-93 DEFICIENCY EVALUATION 50.55(e)~
ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY (APS)
- s.. -
PVNGS UNIT 1, 2, 3-I.
~ Description of Deficiency-
- Class 1E devices - Core Protection. Calcula' tor / Control ' Element Assembly
' Calculator (CPC/CEAC) operator modules -(Tag #J-SAA-UIC-33, -
J-SAB-UIC-34, J-SAC-UIC-35 and J-SAD-UIC-36) mounted on~ main control-panel B05 were seismically qualified based on having support rails
-installed as shown in Reference 4.
A field walkdown by the vendor resident engineer verified that=no support rails exist for the CPC/CEAC oprator modules on the main control panel B05 in Units 1, 2,~and 3.
Evaluation 4
The operator modules interact with the CPC and CEAC which are vital parts of the Reactor Regulating System (ERS).
These modules permit the operator to do the following:
j Display selected parameters in the Reactor System.
Change selected constants used by the CPC and CEAC to control the reactor.
L Inhibit trip function at 10-4% of full power.
Verify CPC and CEAC status.
Verify if a deviation exists with a Control Element Assembly.
(CEA) group or subgroup.
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If, in the event of a DBE, the operator modules become dislodged from 5
the main control panel, the capability for automatic and manual safe-shutdown of the plant could be impaired.
i The root cause of the deficiency is attributed to an isolated-condition wherein the panel vendor (Consip-Customline) failed to l
incorporate the required support rails in the panel for the design transmitted to them (Reference 3). The subsequent review of the design by Bechtel Engineering did not identify this omission. JIo verify that this is an isolated condition, Bechtel Engineering conducted an intensive review on all devices mounted on the main a
l control panels B01 through B04 with similar mounting conditions.
No mounting discrepancies were found. Additional' review of approximately 15 devices with similar mounting conditions followed on the remaining 3 main control panels B05 through B07. Again no mounting discrepancies were found. Based on the above review of over 50% of the panel devices, it can be concluded that the identified condition is'an isolated case.
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- Final Report DER 84-93 Page Two II.
Analysis of Safety Implications Based upon the above, the condition is evaluated as reportable u' der n
10CFR50.55(e); since, if left' uncorrected, it could represent a significant safety hazard.
The condition is evaluated as reportable under 10CFR Part '21 since it constitutes a defect in a basic component.
It also presents.a 1
substantial safety hazard on a component that has been delivered.-
III.
Corrective Action The required bracing has been installed in Unit 1 (Reference DCP 10J-RM-8700).- DCP 2SJ, 3CJ-RM-800 have been issued to install the required bracing in Units 2 and 3.
This action will be accomplished prior to operating license for the respective units.
A copy of this report will be sent-to Combustion Engineering, Inc.
and Consip-Custooline to advise them of the reportability of this i
condition.
IV.
References 1.
VP N001-13-03-326.3225051-01 (Instruction Manual) 2.
3.
LTR B/CC-E-4450 (MOC 28278) 4.
VP N001 - 13.04-2 e
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