ML20100R440
| ML20100R440 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 05200001 |
| Issue date: | 04/03/1992 |
| From: | Marriott P GENERAL ELECTRIC CO. |
| To: | Pierson R NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM), Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20100R445 | List: |
| References | |
| EEN-9247, MFN-NO-079-02, MFN-NO-79-2, NUDOCS 9204130074 | |
| Download: ML20100R440 (85) | |
Text
_ _ _ _ _ _
GE Nuclear Triergy m a t a ce ;n m,
u.,
<nw Aptil 3,1992 MFN No.079 92 4
Docket No. 5TN 52-001 EEN 9247 Document Control Desk U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Wa' ',gton, D.C. 20555 Attention:
Robert C. Pierson, D! rector Standardization and Non Power Reactor Project Directorate
Subject:
GE Responses to the Resolution ofissues Related to Chapter 8 of' AllWR DSER SECY 91355
Reference:
GE Responses to the Resolution of Issues Related to Chapter 8 of ABW:>. DSER SECY-91355 (Proprietary Information), MFN. No.
lidos dated April 3,1992 u.nclosed are thirty four (34) copies of the GE responses to the subject issues.
Responses to the issue pertaining to Section 19E.2.1.2.2 (Attachment 4) contains information that -
is designated as General Electri: Company proprietary information. This response is being.
submitted under separate cover (Reference).
In addition so the attached responses, the following comments are provided:
1.
The battery sizing calculations, Tables 8.3 5 to' 8.310 were deleted because GE considers it inappropriate to include detailed calculation such as these in the SSAR:
The calculations were provided in a previous submittal for use by the NRC staff. A requirement to review the final battery sizing calculations will be included in the DC power system ITAAC.
2.
After further consideration, GE has concluded that the Electrical protection assemblies (EPAs) requested by the NRC staff for the scram solenoid power are not appropriate for the ABWR design..GE plans to discuss this iss se at the May 6th management meeting in Rockville.-
g-i t&
-j W Y4?
q al#
9204130C74 920403-PDR ADOCK'052000011
~
A-pog n k
E l
Document Control Desk Docket No.52 001 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission MFN No. 079 92 April 3,1992 Page 2 It is intended that GE will amend the SSAR, where appropriate, with these responses la the future amendment.
Sincerely, k
P.W. Marriot, Manager Regulatory and Analysis Services M/C 444, (408) 925-6948 cc: F.A. Ross (DOE)
N.D. Fletcher (DOE)
J.L. Knox (NRC)
C, Poslusny, Jr.
(NRC)
R. C. llerglund (GE)
J. F. Quirk (GE) i l
l l
l l'
L
i ABWR Chapter 8 DSER Open Items Response l
t The following is submitted in response to NRC Staff concerns expressed in Chapter 8 of the ABWR DSER and concerns expressed in past SSAR Chapter 8 meetings with the NRC staff.
Clean Revised Chaoter 8 of the SSAR The revisions to the chapter were so extensivo that a marked copy of the text was very difficult to read.
This cican text was prepared for readability.
It is not the final typed version for the SSAR so its format is not the same as for the future SSAR submittal.
The wording of thin version and the version to be included-in the appropriate SSAR amendment should be the same.
Changes from earlier.
j revisions are not marked in this text.
See attachment 2 for the complete record of text changer.
Marhed Chapter 8 of the SSAR The record of every change that was made in the text is shown on this marked version.
Each. change is coded.as to origin and the complete change is marked.
The rules for marking it were as follows:
a.
All changes are underlined.
b.
Changes were made by addition or' deletion only.
c.
The start and end of a text addition was marked with "l"
An example of an addition;is:
. lThig_is an addition.
I d.
The beginning of a deletion was marked with ">".
The ending of a' deletion was marked with "<".
An example of'a deletion is
?
>This is a~ deletion. ' <
e.-
Super deletions were used and were marked with a_">#"-
at the beginning and a
"<#" at the.end.
An example of a super deletion is:
>#This is a -C lsuperl
-C >suocer< deletion.<#
.l L
l L.
l f.
Each change was coded with a tilde (~) followed by an alpha character as followst
-A Revised prior to the January 21 and 22 meeting in Rockville.
-B Revised as a result of the discussions in the January 21 and 22 meetings in Rockville.
-C GE corrections discovered. Juring the process of incorporating the "b" revisions.
g.
Where applicable, each change was indexed back to the status summary issuo number as follows:
~B1.000 Where the "1." followed by three zeroes
'l indicates the change applies to Issue #1 in general.
~B1.03 Where the "1.03" indicates that the change was_made in response to sub-issue three of Insuo #1.
h.
Tilde alpha chararcter codes without a juxtapositioned j
index nunbur
("-B " for example) indicate a general 1
change such as rewriting Section 8.1. and 8.2.
Marked Copy of Section 9.5.3.
Lichtina and Servicina Power Sucolv Svgigm A conventionally marked copy and inserts for Section 9.5.3, Lighting and Servicing Power Supp'.y System, in response to Section 8.3.5 of the DSER.
Marked Copy of Section 19E.2.1.2.2. Station Blackout Performance Section 19E.2.1.2.2, Station Blackout Performance, marked in response to the concerns raised in Section 8.3.9 cov er ) prie+ %c3 s w So r m o h i o n, p r ovsele.d W er
( Pr o of the DSER.
sepoenAc Stat 19n Blackout Status _ Summary Summary of the status and basis for closing the open issues for station blackout.
Marked Coov of Chapter 8 of the DSER The revised SSAR section containing information which should be the basis for closing each open issue of the DSER is_ marked in the left margin of the enclosed copy of the DSER.
1
t Clean Revised Chaoter 8-of the UAE 1
8.1 INisoDUCTIC3 tecosforcers, connected to s@pty power to three approximately equal toed groups cf equigment.
8.1.1 Utility Crld Cescription The " Normal Preferred" powur feed is from the mit auxiliary transformers so that there the description of the utility grid systee is normally are no but transf ers reqJired when the out of the ABWR Standard Plant scope, however unit is tripped off the line, there are interface requirements contained in Section B.2.3.1 which pust be cornplied with by one, three winding 37.5 MvA unit reserve the Utility.
auxiliary transformer la supplied to provide p wer via one windleg for the emergency buses as 8.1.2 Electric Power Distribution systen er alternate to the " Normal Preferred" power.
T5e other secondary winding st4 plies reserve 8.1.2.1 Description of Offsite flectrical Power power to the non safety related buses in the system turbine toilding. This is truly a reserve transformer because mit startup is accorplished the scope of the offsite electrical power frca the normal preferred pc+er, which is system includes ths entire systeer f rom the backfed from the offsite power grid over the termination of the transmission lines coming into sein power circuit to the mit auxillary the switchyard to the termination of the bus duct transtornsrre. The two low voltage windings of at the terminals of the main genera *or and at the the reserve transformer are rated 18.75 MVA input terminals of the circuit brenbers for the each.
1he other wirding provides the second 7.2KV switchgear, the applicant has design
)ffsite power source frr the non safety-related respcmibility for portions of the of fsite power buses in the turbine building.
system. The scope split is as defined in the 8.1.2.2 Description of onsite AC Power detailed description of the offsite power system Distribution System in section 8.2.1.1.
Three turbine building non safety related buses the 1500MVA main power transfccmer is a bank of per load group and one rear, tor building safety three single phase transformers. One single related bus per division receive power from the phase installed spare transformer is provided.
single unit auxiliary transformer assigned to em:h load group. Load groups A, g and C line up A generator breaker capable of interrupting with divisions I, !! and !!!, respectively. One the maximan avaltable f ault current is provided.
winding of the reserve auxiliary tiensformer may This allows the generator to be taken off line be utilized to supply reserve power to each of and the main grid to be utilized as a power the non safst/ related buses eith s directly or source for the mit auxillery transformers and indirectly through bus tie breakers. The three their loads, both Class it and non Class 1E.
safety related buses may be supplied power from This is also the start up power source for the the other winding of the reserve auxillery unit.
transformer.
There are three unit auxiliary l
J
l A contustion turbire gmerator splits starriy pcwer to permanent non safety related loads in The Division I, ll, ces:f lit staviby AC power the turbine tullding. There loads are grouped on selles consist of an indeperu$ent is9Kv Class one of the 6.9(v buses per load group. A powar 1E diesel generator, one for each civtalon. Each swty bus is also provided f rom the ccetxistion turbine to the three Class 1E pedium voltage buses in the reactor building sia breakers that are normatty racked out for Divisions I and ill sno remote eenvally closed under ackninistrative control for Division 11.
In generat, motors larger than 300 KW are s e lled from the 6.9Kv bus, Motors 300KW or smaller but larger than 100KW are surptied power f rom 480V power center switchgear. Motors 100KW or se. aller are supplied power from 480V motor control centers. The 6.9KV and 480V switchgear singte line diagrams are shown in Figure 8.3 1.
During normal plant operation all of the re-Class it buses arti two of the Class 1E tanes are s e tted with power from the turbine generator-through the unit auxiliary transformers. The third Class 1E bus is supplied f rca the reserve transformer. This third division is imediately avaltable, without a bus transfer, if the normal preferred power is lost to the other two divisions.
Three diesel generator standby AC power supplies provide a separate onsite source of power for each class 1E toad group when normat or alternate preferred power supplies are not available. The transfer from the normal preferred or alternate preferred power supplies to the diesel generator is automatic. The transfer back to the normal preferred or the alternate preferred power source is a sanual transfer.
DG may be comected to its respective 6.9Kv Citts it switchesar bus through a main circuit breaker located in the switchgear.
8.1.2.3 Safety Loads the standby AC rower system (a capable of The safety loads utiltre various Ctest 1E AC providing the required power to safeiy thutdown ard/or DC sources for Instrwentation and 1ctive the reactor af ter loss of preferred power (LOPP) and/or loss of coolant accident (LOCA) or to maintain the saf e shutdown cordition and coerste the Class it sualttaries necessary for plant safety during and after shutdown ulth any one of the three power load gro @s.
The plant 460 VAC auxiliary power system distributes sufficient power for normat ausiliary ard Class it 460 volt plant loads.
All class 1E etenents of the auxiliary power distribution system are s e lled via the 6.9t" Class it switchgear ard, therefore, are capable of being fed by the normal preferred, alternate preferred, standoy or contiustion turbine generator power supplies.
The 120 VsC non Class it instrunentation power system, figure 8.3 4, provides power for non+ Class it control and instrunentation toads.
the Class it 120 VAC instrwent power system, figure 8.3 4, provides power for Class it plant controls and instrwentation. The system is separated into Divisions I, II, and til with distribution panels fed from their respective divisional sources.
The 125V DC power distribution systes pro-vides foua independent and redundant onsite sources of power for operation of Class 1E DC toads. The 125V DC non Class it power is supplied frra three 125V DL batteries located in the turbine building.-Separate non Class it 250V 1
batteries are provided to sumty uninterrwtible power to the plant conputers and non Class it DC mtors.
l l
The safety system and logic control ($$LC) f a i
RPS and M$lV derives its power from four uninterruptible a20 VAC buses. The $$tt for the ECCS derives its power from the four divis es of 125v DC buses. The four Luses provide the redtrdancy for various instrunentation, Logic and l
trip circuits and solenoid valves. The $$LC power supr.ly is further described in $4section 8.1.3.1.1.2.
l
~_
or control power or both for att system 6 required (c) Risikal W3tt Revnovel (RNR) system decay for safety. Certinations of gewer sources may be heat removat involved in performing a single safety function, f or eaanple, Lou voltage DC power in the control
($) Essentist Monitoring Systens logic may provide an actLation signal to control a 6.9kV circuit bresket to drive a large (a) heutron Mmitoring System AC powered ptrp petor. The systens required for safety ire Listed belows (b) Process Radiatim Monitoring System (1) $afety Systes Logic and Control Power (c) Containment Atmos $ere Monitoring System Supplies including the Reactor Protection System (d) Sumression Pool Tegerature Monitoring System (2) Core and Contairenent Cooling Systems (a) Restial Heat Removat System (RNR)
For detailed Ll6 tings of Division I,11 and (b) Nigh Pressure Core Flooder (PPCF) system lit toads, see tables 8.3 1 and 8.3 2.
(c) Automatic Depressuritation Systsm (ADS) 8.1.3 Design Bases (d) Leak Detection and Isolation System 8.1.3.1 safety Design Bases onsite Power (Lol)
(e) neactor Core Isolation Cooling system 8.1.3.1.1 General Functional Requirements (RCIC) 8.1.3.1.1.1 onsite Power tystems General (3) ESF Support systems 7he unit's total safety ret 6ted load is (a) blesel generator Sets and Class it AC/DC divided into three divisions cf toad groups, power distribution systems.
Each load group is fed by an independent 6.9Kv Class 1E txts, and each load group has access to (b) NVAC Emergency Cooling Water System two off6tte and one onsite power source. An (MECW) ackfitional onsite power source is provided by the contustion turbine gereretor (ctg).
(c) Reactor Building Cooling Water (RCW)
System Each of the two normally energized power feeders are provided for the Division 1, 2 and 3 (d) Spent Fuel Poot Cooling System Class 1E systems. Normally two load groups are fed from the normal preferred power source and (e) Stendby Gas Treatment System ($GTS) the third loau group is fed l rom the alternate preferred power sc.irce. Both feeders are used (f) Reactor Building faergency WAC System during nornet plant operation to prevent simultaneous deenergitation of all divisional (g) Control Building WAC System buses on the loss of only one of the offsite power s g lies, The transfer to the alternate (h) High Pressure Nitrogen Gas Supply Syste.n preferred feeder is manual. During the interim, power is sutcnaticatty supptled by the diesel-(4) kafe Shutdown Systems generators.
(a) Standby Liquid Control System (SLCS)
The redundant Class 1E electrical load groups (Divisions I, II, and lit) are provided with (b) Nuclear Boiler System
. separate onsite standby AC gnwer stopties, electric buses, distribution cables, controls, j
(1) Safety / Relief Valves ($RVs) relays and other electrical devices. Redundant (14) Steam Supply shutof f Portion parts of the system are physically separated and independent to the entent that in
-g p
yr
-p-.-
w g
.... ~
_ -.. ~ _ _..
_ ~. -... -. -...~
cnt design basis event with any resultin0 loss of equigrent, the plant can silti be shut down with either of the remaining two divisions, Irakpendent receway systems are provided to meet load gro@ cable separation regairements for Divisions I, 11, and Ill.
Olvisions I, II, and 111 stancby AC power supplies have suf ficient capacity to provide power to ell their respective tom s.
Loss of the i
normal preferred power surply, as detteted by 6.9Kv Class it tus mder voltage rilsys, will cause the stew power 64pties te start and connect evtraaticatty, in suf fl*
l l
l I
L
}
cient time to maintain the reactor in a safe (1) GDC 2
- Disign 8;sse for Protection (gelnet condition, safety shut down the reactor or li: cit Natural Phermena; the consequences of a design basis accident (DBA) to acceptable limita. The stancby power sgpties
- 4) GDC 4 Envitcasental and Mlssile Design are capable of teing started and stcteed manualty Bases; and are not to te stomed automatically during emergency operation mless reqJired to preserve (3) CDC $
- Sharing of Structurew, Systems ard integrity. Automatic start will also occur on Cwporents; receipt of a levet 1 t/? elenal (HPCf initiate).
l The A8 Wit is a single unit plant desten.
The Class it 6.9Cv Divisions I,11, and lit therefore, this CDC is not appilcoble.
Switchgear tunes, and associated 6.9Ev diesel generators, 46D VAC distribution systees,120 VAC (4) GDC 17 Electric Power Systems; and 125 VDC power and control systems conform to
$elsmic Category I requironents and ere housed in
($) CDC 18 Inspection and Testing of Elec-Seismic Category I structures. Selsmic trical Power Systems; gualification is in accordance with Ittf Standeret 344 (6) GDC $0 Contattrent Design Bases.
8.1.3.1.1.2 55LC ($afety System togic and 8.1.3.1.2.2 WRC Regt.netory Guldes Control) Power surply System Design Bases (1) RG i.6 Independence Between Redundant in order to provide redundant, reliable power Standby (Onsite) Powe' Sources of acceptable quality and availability to support and Between their Distribution the safety logic and control functions during Systems; normat, upset and accident conditions, the following design bases a mlys (2) RC 1.9 selection, Deslen and Quellfles-tion of Diesel generator (Jnits (1) s$tt power has four separate and indcoendent Used as Standby (Onsite) Liec-l Class it inverter constant voltage ecostant tric Power systems at kuclear l
f requency (CVCF) power supp'.tes each backed Power Plants; by separate Class it batteri6a.
i (3) kG 1.32 Criteria for safety Ret 6teo (2) erovision is made for automatic switching to Electric Power Systems for the alternate bypass supply frra its divi-Wuclear Power Plants; I
slon in case of a f alluce et the inverter power supply. The inverter power supply is (c) RG 1.47 lypassed and inoperable Status j
synchrontred in both f requercy ard phase Irdication for Nuclear e ower with the alternate bypass supply, so that Plant safety Systerns; macceptable voltage spikes will be avoidact in case of an eutanatic transf er frca normel (5) RG 1,63 Electric Penetration Assensa *as to alternate supply, the $3(C uninterrup-In Contairvnent Structures for tible power eupply conplies with if t! std.
tight Water Ccoled Wucletr Power 944.
Plants; 8.1.3.1.2 Regulatory eequirenents (6) RG 1.75 Physical lrdeperdence of Elec-tric Systems; the following tist of criteria is aMressed in accordance with table 8.1 1 which is based on teolation between Ctess it power supp'ics Table 61 of the Standard Review Flan. In and non Class It loads is discussed in generat, the ABWR is designed in accordance with subsection 8.3.1.1.1.
l att criteria. Any exceptions or clarifications are so noted.
8.1.3.1.2.1 General Design criterla l
_~
(P) RC 1.81 Chored Energency ard $hutdown tiectric Systems for Multi Unit Nuclear Power Plants; the ABWR le designed as a single unit plant.
Therafere, this Reguistory (,ulde is not amsicable.
(4) BIP 10$8 18 (PSB)
- Afplication of the
$1ngle f alture Criterion to Manually-(8) RC 1.106 thereal overload Protection for Controtted Liectrically Coerated Velvss; tiectric 40 tors on Motor-Operated valves; (5) IfP IC$8 21
- Guidance for Application of Regulatory Guide 1.47; (9) RG 1.108 -
Perledic Testing of Diesel Generator Units Used as Onsite (6) BIP P$81
- Adequacy of btstion Electric Electric Power Systems et OlstritAJt on Systee Voltages; i
huclear Power Plants; (See subsectite 8.3.1.1.7 (8))
(10) RG 1.118 - Periedle testing of tiectric Power and Protection Systems; (11) RG 1.153 -
Criteria for Power, Instewer:tation, and Controt t (7) rio e 2 Criteria for Alarms and Portlons of $afety Systems; tions Associated with Diesel
- tor Unit Bypassed and inoperable (12) RC 1.155 -
Station Blackout status; 8.1.3.1.2.3 Branch Technical Positions 8.1.3.1.2.4 Other $RP Criteria (1) BfP IC$B 4 (PSB)
- Requirwents on Motor-(1) NuwtG/CR 0660 Enhancement of onsite Operated valves in the (CC$ Accunutator Dieset Generator Rettability; Lines; Operating procedures and the tralning of this WIP is written for Pressurized Water personnel are outs {de the scope of the ABWR Reactor (PWR) plants only and is therefore Standard Plant. NUREC/CR 0660 is there-not applicable to the ABWR.
fore leposed as an interf ace requirteent for the applicant. See Subsection 8.1.4.2 (2) B1P IC$B 8 (PSB) Use of Diesel generator for Interface regairement.
Sets for Peaking; The diesel generator sets are not used for (2) IMI Action item II.E.3.1.
- tmergert./ Power peating in the ABWR design, therefore, this Supply for Pressurlier Hester; criteria la satisfled.
This criteria is applicable only to PWes ond does not amty to the AllWR.
i l
t
{
l I
(3) IMI Action itee II.G.1*fmergwy Power f or Pressuriser (Virrent; this criteria is applicable only to PWes ord does not smly to the AsilR.
8.1.4 Interfaces 8.1.4.1 stability of Of f site Power lystems l1P ICSB 11 (PSB) pertelt,6 3 to the stability of of fsite power systems shall te addressed (See
$uteection 8.1.3.1.2.3(3).
8.1.6.2 Diesel Generator teliability kUREC/CR 0660 pertaining to the enhancement of onsite dissel generator reliability throsgh operating procedures ard treintrig of pe.sonnel will te addressed by the emlicant (see Subsection 8.1.3.1.2.6(1)).
I J
m
hg (
t SYS1 EMS 8.2.1.2 leccription cf Offsite Power System C" /
on the uffsite electrical power system within the scope of the ASWR standard design consists of the isoleted phane bus &ct Lp to the low voltage terminals of the main power transformer, e provides a description of the isolated phase bus &ct to the mit auxiliary sy* tem design and the performarce Npirements transformers, a low voltage generator breaker, for the of fsite power systen:. The offsite power three unit auxiliM y transformers, a reserve systera consists of the electrical circuits and auxiliary transformer, and 6.9Kv connections associated piptent for interconnection to the from the unit auxiliary and reserve transforsers offsite t M o lssion syt.em, the plat.t main to the irput terminals of the medlun voltage generator, ard the onsite power distributic (7.2Kv, 500MvA) switchgear, as indicated on the systems. Included are the plant switchyards, the single line diagram, Figure 8.3-1.
The main main step up transformers, the unit auxiliary power transformer, the high voltage Leeds to the transformers, the reserve transformer, the high switchyards, the switchyards ard the auxillery voltage tie lines from the switchyards to the equipment for these portions of.cie system are trgnsforme,s, the isolated phase tuses with their in the scope of the applicant. See Section auxiliary systems including relays and lucal 8.2.3.1 for the interface requirements for the instrunentation and controls, and the equipment in the scope of the applicant.
non segregated phase bus ducts from the unit auxiliary and reserve tra.sformers to the medium Air cooled isolated phase bus duct rated 36Ka voltage switchgear.
is provided for a power feed to the main power transformer.
The offsite power system begins at the terminals on the transmission system side of the A generator breaker is provideJ in the circuit breakers which connect the switching isolated phase bus duct ; en intermediate stations to the of fs.se transmission system and location between the main generator arad the ealn ends at the terminals of the plant main generator power transformer. The generator breaker and at the circuit breaker input terminals of the provided is capable of interrupti N a maximum mediu, voltage (6.9Kv) switchgear.
f ault current of 275KA synmetrical and 340KA asymetrical at 5 cycles af ter initiation of the portions of the offsite power system fall fault. This correspards to the maximun un t r ue or ign responsibility of the applicant allewable interface fault current specified in or..t, e. and are not included in the design Section B.2.3.
The low voltage generator of th: dont stenard plant. It is the breaker allows the generator to be taken oft responsibility of oU concerned parties to insure line and the main grid to be utilfred as a power that the total c.1pteted design of equipment and source by backfeeding to the unit auxiliary systems falling within the scope of this $$AR transformers and their loads, both Class 1E and section be in line with the description and non Class 1E. This is also the start-up power requirements stated in this $$AR, however. See power source for the unit.
Section 8.2.3.1.for a detailed listing and description of the power interface requirements.
Unit sychronisation will normstly be through the low voltage generator breaker. A coincidental three out of three logic schene and synchrocheck relays are used to prevent f aulty synchronlaations. Dual trip coils are provided on the breaker and control power is s e lled from redrident load grow of the non safety-related onsite 125v DC power.
It is an interf ace requirenent that synchronization be possible through tne switching station's circuit breakers (See Section 8.2.3).
There e e three unit auxiliary transformers.
The transforcers have three windings and each transforner feeds one Class it bus directly, two Non-Class if buses directly, and one Non Class 1E bus indirectly through a Non 1E to Won 1E tus tie. The mediun voltage buses are in a three load group arrangement with three non safety related buses and one safety-related i.
bus per load group. Each unit
- +
yY
)
W,
$Q - 3 i
d
auxillery transformer has an oll/ air reting at 65 requirement th:t th) 50 foot ciininsa sIper: tion degrees centigrade of 37.5Mvs for the primary be meintained by the incoming tie lines, also, winding eM 18.75Mu for each secondary winding.
The transformere are provided.ith oft The forced alr/forceo oil rating is 62.5 and collection pits aM drains to a safe disposet 31.25/31.25Mvs respectively. The normal loading area.
of the six transformers is balanced with the heaviest loaded winding carrying a load of geference is made to Figures 8.3-1 for the 17.7Mva The heaviest transformer loading occurs single line diagrams showing the method of when one of the three uni, auxiliary transformers feeding tt:e loads. Separation of the normal is out of service with the plant operating at preferred eM alternate preferred poer feeds is full power. Under these conditions the heaviest accomplished by floors and walls over their loaded wirding experiences a load of 21.4*va, routes through the turbine, control ord reactor which is about two thirds of its forced buildings except within the switchgear rooms air / forced oil rating. See Table 8.2-jem1 for a where they aust be routed to the same switchgear more detailed stsomary of the loads, line@s. The normet preferred feeds are routed aromd the outside of the turbine building in an Disconnect links are provided in the isolated electrical tunnet from the unit auxiliary phase bus duct feeding the unit auxiliairy transformers to the turbine building switchgear transformers so that any single falted rooms as shown on Figure 8.2 1. (An u1derground transformer may be taken out of service and duct bank is an acceptable alternate.) From operation continued on the other two unit there the feeds to the reactor building eult the auxiliary transformers. One of the buses turbine building and continue across the roof on normally fed by the failed transformer would have the divisions 1 and 3 side of the control to be picked up on the reserve auxiliary building (Figure 8.3 1).
They drop down the transformer in order to keep all reactor internal side of the control buildire in the space pumps operating so as to attain full power. The between the control and reactor buildings where reserve auxiliary transformer is sited for this they enter the reactor building and continue on type of service.
through the divisions 1 and 3 side of the reactor building to the res Metive One, ti.ree winding 37.5MVA unit reserve safety related switchgear rooms in the reactor transformer is supplied to provide power as an
- building, alternate to the Normal Preferred" power. One of the equally rated secondary windingr, supplies The alternate preferred feeds from the reserve p%er to the nir.e (three through reserve auxiliary transformer are routed inside cross ties) non-safety-related buses and the the turbine building. The turbine building other winding supplies reserve power to the three switchgear feed from the reserve auxiliary safety related buses, The conbined load of the transformer is routed directly to the turbine-three safety related buses is equas.o the building switchgest rooms. The feed to the
'l/ air rating of transformer winding nerving centrol building is routed in corridors outside them. This is equal to 60% of 9 a forced of the turbine builcing switchgear rooms. It air / forced oil rating of the transformer winding.
exits the turbire building and crosses the The transformer is truly a reserve transformer control building roof on the opposite side of because unit startup is accornplished from the the control building from the route for the normal preferred power, which is backfed over the normal preferred power feeds. The steam tunnel main power circuit to the tut auxiliary -
is located between the normal preferred feeds transformers. The reserve auxi'.iary transformer ard the alternate preferred feeds across the serves no startup function, stepped roof of the control building. The alternate preferred power feed turns down 8.2.1.3 Separation between the control and reactor building a vj enters the reactor building on the division 2 The location of the main trans;Lrmer, unit side of the auxillery transformers, and reserve auxiliary transformer are shown on Figure 8.2 1.
The reserve auxiliary transformer is separated from the unit auxiliary transformers by a mininsn
)
distence of 50 feet. It is a
~
. ~ ~ - ~ _ - - -. -.
~ - - ~-
~.
~.
rsectar building. From th3r# it continues on to
-8.2.2 Analysis the respective switchgear rooms in the reactor building.
In accordance with the NRC Standard Review -
Plan (WUREG 0800), Table 81 and Section 8.2, Instrument and control cables for the mit the power distribution system between the main auxiliary transformer are to be routed in solid transformer and the Class 1E distritution system metal raceways and separate from the normal interfaces is designed consistent with the-preferred power cable rat.eways by a separation following criteria, so far as it' applies to the that is equivalent to that provided for the power. ncn Class 1E ewfpnent. Any exceptions or feeds. The reserve auxiliary cables may ret clarifications are so noted, share receways with any other cables, however.
The instrumentation and controls for the mit 8.2.2.1 General Design Criteria-sa lliary transfcrmers and generator breaker may be routed in the raceways corresponding to the (1)
GDC $ and RG 1,81 Sharing of load group of their power source.
Structures, Systems and Conponents; A conbustion turbine supplies stardy power to The ASWR-is a single unit plant design.
the non safety related turbine building buses Therefore, these criteria are not which supply the permanent non-safety-related applicable.
toads, it is a 9W rated self-containad unit which is capable of operation without external (2) GDC 17 Electric Power Systems; auxiliary systems. Although it is located on site, it is treated as an additional offsite As shown in figure 8.31, each of the Class.
t source in that it supplies power to multiple load 1E divisional 6.9 KV M/C buses'can receive-groups of electrical buses, power from multiple sources. There are separate utility feeds from the station grid =
Manually controlled breakers provide the (via the main transformer), and the offsite-capability -f connecting the conbustion turbine line (via the reserve auxiliary trans-
. generator to any one of the emergency bases if former). The unit auxiliary transformer-all other power sources are Lost, output power feeds and the reserve auxiliary transformer output power feeds are routed by The location of the ccebustion turbine
' two conpletely separate paths through.the generator (CTG) is shown on Figure 8.2 1.
The turbine building, control building ard CTG standby power feed for the turbine building.
reactor building to their destinations in i
is routed directly to the switchgear rooms in the
- the emergency electric rooms. :Although-turbine building. The branch to the reactor
-these load groups are non Class.1E such.
building is routed adjacent to the alternate ~
separ ation assures the physical preferred feeds across the control and reactor-
- irdependence requirrments of GDC 17 are j
buildings.
'- preserved.
1-As indicated in Section 8.1, the utility grid--
iThe transformers are provided with oil and the main power transformer are not within the collection pits and dre ns'to a safe AB.1t Starderd Plant s6 ope. The interface dispocal area. This 'separatior'M the requirements at the main power transformer are.
requirements of BTP CMES 9.5
- w h given in Subsection 8.2.3.
All other. equipment "therefore deemed adequate.
~
~ downstream of the main power transformer 's included in the ABWR Standard Plant se pt,,This includes the auxiliary transformers, switchyard conponents,. the main generator, etc., unich are -
assigned by Sk/ Section 8.2 as being part of the wpreferred power system", also called the l
"offsite power' system." ' $1nce GE considers these l
cunponents to be "onsite", their description is l
provided in Subsection 8.1.2.1.
l.
L i
{
l..
<.n.
- u..
a,
(3) GDC 18 Inspection crd Tssting of Electrical Power systems; The low voltage gereretor breaker aust open on a turbine trip to maintain the normal preferred power st4 ply to the safety buses. Th's breaker cannot be tested dJring normat operation of the plent. Generator i
i l
l l
l
{
1
besckers are extremely retitble. Thsre are
. (1)-in cass of fatture of..the normal prefstred published test results showing a reliability power supply circuit, etternate preferred power ruter of 0.9967 for 50 close operations per should normally cor.. sin avaltable to the reserve i
vear. This ce g ares favorably with the auxiliary transformer.
probability of falture from other causes of the normal preferred power supply.
(2) Voltage variations shall be no more then-plus or mirmes 10 per6ent of their nominal value All other equipment can either be tested charig normal steady state operation. Their during normal plant operation or.it is should be a voltage dip of no more than 20 continually tested by virtue of its operation percent charing motor starting. It is expected cbring normal plant operation and it remaining in that the sizing of the mit auxiliary and -
the same state to su mty normal preferred powar.
- reserve auxillery transformers, ($*e Section to the safety buses following a turbine trip.
8.2.1.2) will insure that this voltage dip regairement is met.
b) RG 's 1.32, 1.4 7, and StP ICSS 21; (3) Maintain the rwrmat steady state frequency These distribution load groups are non Class of the power system within plus or minus 2:
It and non safety related. Therefore, this-cycles per second of 60 cycles per secord during criteria is not applicable.
periods of system trotability.
(5) RG 1.153 Criteria For Power,
. (4) Analyze the site specifle configuratinn of-Instrumentation and Control Portions of the incoming power lines to assure _that the Safety Wystems expected availability.cf the offsite power is as
- good as the assumptions made in performity; the
- (6) RG 1.155 Station Blackout
- plant probability risk ~ analysis.- 'If, durinr' this analysis,'it is determined that the-(7) BTP ICSB 11 (PSB) Stability of Offsite.
availability of the power.from the alternate Power Systems; preferred power source is significantly less rettable than the normat preferred power, normal See Subsection 8.2.3 for interface operation of all plant buses from the normal requirement.
preferred power source is acceptable arvj -
recorsnended.
(9) Appendix A to SRP Section 8.2 (5) The main and reserve offsite power circuits it is a requirement that the design, testing shall be electriestly independent and physitetty and installation of the Low voltage separated. They shall be conrected to switching j
generator breaker meet the specific
- stations which are independent and separate.
guidelines of this appendix, therefore.
_ They shall be connected to different -
I compliance with the appendix is assured, transmission systems.
8.2.3 Interfaces (6) The switching station to which the main-
- offsite power circuit 14 connected shat l have at 8.2.3.1 of fsite Power System Deslan Requirements least two full capacity main buses arranged such l
that:-
The standard design of the ABWR is based on (a) Any incoming or outgoing transmission.
certain a n @tlons concerning the design line can be switched without effecting
- requirement
- which will be met by the applicant another linet in designing the portion of.the offsite power' l(b) Any single circuit breaker can be -
system in his scope, as cefined in Section-Isolated for maintenance without 8.2.1.1.
Those assurptions are listed here as
- Interrupting service to any circuit;-
' design interface requirements which the applicant (c) Faults of-a single main bus are isolated should meet, witnout interruoting service to any circuit.
i t-e
~
--wr n
--v e m y
,4
~ -..
wn-y w.r
I l
(7) The main power transformer shall be three independent ac busts, The capacity cf cach normally energited s{rgle-phase transformers with system shall be adequate to meet the ac power an additional installed spare. Provisions shall requirements for normal operation of the be made to permit connecting and energiting the switching station's eqJipment.
soare transformer in no more than 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> following a failure of one of the normally (15)
Each transformer. shall have primary and energized transformers, backup protective devices.' De power to the primary and backup devices shall be supplied (8) The main transformer shall be designed to from separate de sources.
meet the reoJirements of Assi starderd C57.12.00, General Requirements for Liquid-! mersed 8.2.3.2 Scope Split Interfaces Distribution, Power and Regulating Transformers.
The interface point be+ ween the Abut design (9) Physical separation betwen transformers and and the utility design for the main generator oil collection shall be provided as stated for output is at the corinection of the isolated I.
fire protection in Section 9A.4.6.
phase bus to the main power transformer low voltese terminals. The rated conditions for (10) Circuit breakers and disconnect switches this interface la 1500 MvA at a power factor of I
shall be sited and designed in accordance with 0.9 and a wottage of 26.325 KV plus or minus 10-the latest revision of ANSI Standard C37.06, per cent. -It is a requirement that the utility l
Preferred Ratings and Related Capabilities for AC provide suf ficient Ippedance in the main power -
High Voltege Circuit Breakers Rated on a transformer and thc high voltage circuit to Symetrical Current Basis.
limit the primary side maximum available fault.
current contribution from the system to no more (11) Although unit synchronization is normally than 275 KA symetrical and 340 KA asymetrical through the low voltage generator circuit at 5 cycles from inception of the fault. These
~
breaker, provisions shall be made to synchronite values should be acceptable to most utilities, the vn{t through the switching station's circuit.
When att' equipment and system parameters are breakers.
known, a refined calculation based on the known values with a fault located at the generator (12) All relay schemes used for protection of the side of the generator breaker may be made. This offsite power circuits and of the switching may allow a lower inpedance for the main power station's equipent shall be redmdant and transformer, if desired.
include backup protection features. All creakers shall be equipped with dual trip coils. Each The second power. Interf ace occurs at the hlch
[
redundant protection circuit which supplies a voltage terminals of the reserve auxiliary trip signal shall be connected to a separate trip transformer. The rated load is 37.5 MvA at a coil. Alt equipment and cabling associated with 0.9 power factor..The voltage and frequency-each redundant system shall be physically will be the utilities standard with the actual.
l l
separated.
values to be determined at= contract award.
l Tolerances are p'lus or minus 10 per cent of
~
nominet for voltage and plus or minus 2 per cent (13) The de power needed to operate redundant protection and control equipment of the of fsite of nominal for. frequency. - Frequency may vary power system shall be supplied from two separate, plus or minus 2 cycles per second during periods dedicated switchyard batteries, each with a of system instability.. The maxisun allowable l
battery charger fed from a separate ac bus..Each voltage dip during the starting of targe motors battery shall be capable of' supplying the de is 20 %.
power required for normal operation of the switching station's equi pent.
(14) Two redundant low voltage ac power supply -
systems shall be provided to supply ec power to the switching station's auxiliary loads. Each system shall be supplied from separate,
P?otective relaying Interfaces for the two
$ceir system Interf aces are to be def fW & rig the
- tall & sf9n phase fog (Owing contract awa-d.
l l
l i
l l
I l
l l
l l-(
l l
I
4->
M,h,3a--
p*p;+3.@
3, & as%4 4.+hw.a
,&_w gim,;w..A
.4Q 444i std. 4 J 4 4:6 dg/J.4J,...
.d.
u, 1.Lir A
4ha2
.A4 f,
4._.4..sga a
n z
. i 4
4 s
k transmith]).I PT ure- % E-l Po we WDhshlbubor; syhra &L,%)
Dikqm'mu 9
i'nra t
fidtt 9-e 7 cre =
yH r *w w
. e r
-7 P-f' m
w'M-y a----et e+
g gW-t 4-g==
-'g-wW-Of 93y
- -N t'
W Y
_. ~..
8.3 DNSITE POWER $YSicMS 1
8.3.1 AC Power Systems The onsite power system interfects with the of f aite power system at the 3rput terminals to the supply bres.kert. for the normal and alternate I
power f eeds to the nedlun <o ' age (7.2KV) switchgear. It is a thrts load group system with each load group consis' r.e of a non safety related and a sefety rtleted Fortion.
The three load groups of the Class 1E power systen are independent of esch other.
The prin-cipal elements of the euxiliary AC electric power systems are shewn on the single line diagrams (sLD) in Figure 8.3 1, 4, 5 and 7.
Each Class it division has a dedicated dieset generator, which automatically starts on high drywell pressure, tc.J reactor vessel level or loss of voltase on the divi ston's.6.9 kV bus.
Each 6.9 kV Class 1E bus feeds it's associated 480V unit substatian through a 6.9 kV/ 480/277'-
power center trans former,.
Flandby power ik provided to permanent non safety-related loads in att three load groups by e combustion gas tucbine located in the tarbine building.
AC power is supplied at 0.9KV for motor loads larger than 300KW and trar.sform-ed to 480 V for smetter loads. The 480V synem is further transformed into lower voltages-as re quired for instrunents, lignting, and controls, in general, motors targer than 300KW are suppiled from the
. 6.9KV buses. -Motors 300KW or smelter but targer than 100KW are st.pplied power form 480V switchgear. Motors 100KW or sma'.ter are supplied power from 480V mntor control centers.
See subsection 8.3.4.9 for interface reqlurements.
8.3.1.0 Ncn Safety Related AC Power.5ystem 8.3.1.0.1 Non-Safety Related Medlun Voltage Power Distribution system The non safety-related mediun voltage pvwer-distribution system consists of nine 6.9KV buses.
divided into-three load groups. The three load group configuration was chosen to match the '
mechanical systems which are mcstly three trains
. (Three feedwater puips,.three circulating water i
puips, three turbine building supply and exhaust -
fans).
l e -
t!Ithin e:ch load group th*m
's ono but which supplies power productior seas which do not provide water to the pressure vessel. Each one of these buses has access to power from one I
winding of its assigned unit auxiliary transformer. It also has access to the reserve auxiliary transformer as an alternate source if its unit auxiliary transformer falls or during maintenance outages for the normal feed. Bus transfer is manual dead bus transfer and not automatic.
Another bus within each load gro@ supplies power to peps which are capable of npplying water to the pressure vesset during normal power operation (i.e., the condensate and feedwater pw ps).
l These buses normally receive power fran the unit l
auxiliary transformer and supply power to the i
third bus (plant investment protection (PIP)) in the load group through a cross tie. The cross-tie automatically opens on loss of power but may be manually reclosed if it is desired to operate a condensate or feedwater pw p from the combustion turbine or the reserve auxiliary transformer which are connectable to the PIP buses. This cross-tie arrangement allows advan. age to be taken of the fact that the a
feedwater pw ps are motor driven through an adjustable speed drive so that they have low starting currents and can be started and run at i
tow power. The contustion turbine and reserve l
auxiliary transformer have sufficient capacity to start either or both the reactor feedwater'and j
condensate peps in a load group. This provides three load groups of non-safety grade equipment in addition to the divisional 1E load groups which may be used to supply water to the reactor l
vesse in emergencies.
A third bus supplies power to permanent non-safety lnads such as the turbine building HVAC, the tyd he building service water and the turbine building closed cooling water systems.
On loss of normal preferred power the cross-tie to the power production bus is automatically tripped oyn and the permenent non-safety related bus is autunatically transferred (two out of the three buses in the load groups transfe*) via a dead bus transfer to the combwtlon turbine which j.
automatically starts on loss of power. The l
permanent service systems for each load group outematically restat t to support their load groups.
The buses are comprised of 7.2Ky 500MvA metal clad switchgear with a bus full load rating l
of 2000A. waxinium calculated full load short time current is 1700A. Bus ratings of 3000 enperes are available for the switchgear as
.~
Insurtnce egairat future lo+3 growth, if necessary. The required interrupting capacity is 41,000 a@ eres.
The 6.9tv buses s @ ply power to adjustable speed drives for the feedwater and reactor internal ptsps. These adjustable speed drives are designed to the requirements of IEEE $td 519, Guide for harmonic Control and Reactive Conpensation of Static Power Converters. Voltage distortion limits are as stated in Table 4 of the IEEE Std. 8.3.1.0.2 Non $afety Related Low Voltage Power Distribution
$ystem Power for the 480V auxillaries is supplied from power centers consisting of 6.9KV/480 volt transformers and asso:iated metalclad switchgear, Figure 8.3 1.
There are six non safety related, two per load group, power centers. One power center per load group is stpplied power from the permanent non-safety bus for the load group.
8.3.1.0.3 Non Class 1E Vital AC Power $upply System The function of the Non Class 1E Vital AC Power supply System is to provide reliable 120V uninterruptible AC power fe-ieportant non safety related loads that are required for continuity of power plant operation. The system consists of three 120V AC uninterr @tible constant voltage, constant frequency (CVCF) power s @ plies, each including a static invertir, AC and DC static transfer switches, a regulating stepdown transformer (as an alternate AC power aupply),
and a distribution panel (Figure 8.3 5). The primary source of power comes from the non-Class 1E AC motor control centers. The secondary source is the non Class 1E 125 VDC central distribution panels.
There are three automatic switching modes for the CVCF power supplies, any of which may be initiated manually. First, the frequency of the output of the inverter is normally synchronized with the input AC power. If the trequnecy of the input power goes out of range, the power supply.
switches over to internal synchr eization to restore the frequercy of its output. $ witching back to caternal synchronization is automatic rd occurs if the frecuency of thew AC power has been restored and maintained for approximately 60-seconds.
l The second switching mode is from AC to DC for the power s wree. If the voltane of the input AC power is less than 88% of the rated voltage, the i
l
~,,
input is scitched to the DC power suppltt. 7be input is switched back to the AC powe? after a confirmat lon period of appro=1metely 60 sccc-ds.
The third switenir.g mode is between the inverter ard the.oltage regulating t ansformer. If any of the conditions 'isted below cemr, the power supply is switched to the W ltage a gulating transfcemer.
(a) Output voltage out of rating by more than plus or mi ms 1C per c et (b) Output fr W m y eat of rating by enre than ptw or wirus 3 par cent (c) High toperatwe insive of panci (d) Loss of enntrn tower supply (e) Com.Jtation feilt.re (f) Ov.tcurrent of smoothing condenser (g) Lon of control power for gate circuit (h) Incoming MCCB trip (1) rooting f?n trip Following correction of eny of the above events transfer back is by aanual initiation only.
8.3.1.0.
Cenputer Vital AC Power Supply System (Non-fafety Related) fwb constant voltage and constont frequency power supplies are provided to pcwer the process cceputers. Each of the power supplies consists of an AC to DC rectifier, and a DC to AC inver-ter, a bypass transformer and DC ard AC solid state transfer switches (Figure 8.3 5).
The normal feed for the power supplies is from non Class 1E power center supplied from the permanent non safety related buses which receive power from the combustion turbine if offsite power is lost. The backup for the normal feeds is f rom the 250VDC battery. Each power supply is pro"ided with a backup AC feed though isolation transformers and a static transfer switch. The backuo feed is provided for alternate use during maintenance periods. Switching of the power suppty is similar to that described for the hon vital AC power supply system, above. See Section 8.3.1.0.3.
The Intertocks for th3 bus grounding devices a*e as follows:
8.3.1.0 Safety Related AC Power D!stribution System (1) Undervoltege relays mest be actuated.
8.3.1.1.1 Meditsn voltage Safety-Related heer (2) Eus feeder breakers rmast be in the Olstribution System disconnect position.
Class if AC power loads are divided into three (3) Voltage for bus instrtsnentation available.
divisions (Divisions I,11, and 111), each fed fr m an independent 6.9 kV Class 1E bus. L,uring Conversely, the bus feeder brescers are normal operation (which includes all sedes of inetrlocked such that they cannot close unless plant operation; i.e., shutdown, refueling, their associated grounding breakers are in their startLp, and ruri.), two of the three divisions dia. connect positions.
are fed from an offsite nors.at preferred power supply. The remaining division shall be fed from Standby AC power for Class it buses is sup-the alterrate power source (See subsection plied by diesel generators at 6.9 kV and distri-8.3.4.9).
buted by the Class 1E power distribution system.
Division I, !! and !!! buses are automatically Each 6.9 kV bus has a safety grounding circuit transferred to the diesel generators when the breaker designed to protect persoruel during normal preferred power supply to these buses is maintenance operations (st's Figure 8.3 1).
Lost.
During periods when tne buses are energited, these breakers are racked out (i.e., in the The division I safety-related bus has ore disconnect position). A control room annunciator ren safety related load on it. The load is a sounds whenever ar.r of these breakers are racked power center which supplies power to the fine in for r.ervi e.
motion control rod drive (FHCED) motors.
Although these motors are not safety related, the drives may be inserted as's backup to scram and are of special IFportance because of thIs.
It is inportant that the first available stardoy power be available for the motors, therefore, a ditsel supplied bus was chosen as the first source of stan@y ac power and the ccrnbustion turbine as the second backup source. Division I was chosen because it was the most lightly-loaded diesol generator.
The load breaker in the division I switchgear I
la part of the isolation scheme between the safety related power and the non-safety related load. In addition to the normal overcurrent tripping of this isolation breaker, zone selective interlocking is provided between it and its L.pstream Class 1E bus feed breaker.
if fault current flows in the non-Class 1E load, it is sensed by the Class 1E current device for-the isolation breaker.and.a trip blocking signal is sent to the upstream Class 1E feed breaker.
This blocking lasts for about 75 milliseconds.
This allows the isolation breaker to trip in its normal instantaneous tripping time of 35 to 50 milliseconds, if the magnitude of the fault current is high enough. This assures that the l
l fault current has been terminated before the
' Class 1E upstream breaker is free to trip. For fault currents of lesser magnitude, the blocking delay will time out without either breaker tripping, but the isolation breaker will l
sventu;tly trio and stesys befcre t53 Lostream bre:ker. This order of tripping is cssured by the coordination between the two breakers provided by long time pickup, long time delay and instantaneous pickup trip device characteristics. Tripping of the Class 1E feed breaker is normal 1or faults which occur on the Class it bus it feeds. Coordination is provided between the bus main feed breakers and the load breakers.
The zone selective interlock is a feature of the trip unit for the breaker and is tested when the other feature 3 such as current setting and long time delay are tested.
A pair of interlocked breakers are provided at the input to the power center transformer to supply power to the tratuformer from either tt.e safety-relatee diesel generator backed bus or the non'saf ety-related contwstion turbine backed bus. Switchover is automatic on toss of power from the safety related sourc9. $ witching back to the safety reist.rJ power is by manual action caly. The breaker in the safety-related leg of the power supply is utvision 1 associated. The breaker in the non safety related leg is non-safety related on the basis of the electrical isolation of its controls, the fact that there are two breakers between it and the Class 1E 6.9CV bus and that the transfer breakers are interlocked so that only one can be in the closed condition.
The circuits on the output side of the power center transformer are non safety-related on the basis of the isolation provided by the two upstream breakers and the power center transformer. It is also a requirement that they cannot be classified anything other than non-safety-related so that they can never be routed as essociated with cables of any safety-related division, 8.3.1.1.2 Low Voltage Safety Related Power Distribution System 8.3.1.1.2.1 Power Centers Power for 480V auxilleries is supplied from power centers consisting of 6.9 kV/480V transfor mers and associated metal clad switchgear, Fig-ure 8.3 1.
centers supplying Class 1E loads are arranged es independent radial sys tems, with each 480V bus fed by its own power transformer. Each 480V Class 1E bus in a divi-sion is physically arvi electricatty irdependent of the other 480V buses
In oth3r divisions.
The 480V unit substation breakers supply mo-ter control centers and motor loads up to l
l
and including 300KW. Switchge:r fcr ths 480Y load centers is of Indoor, metat enclosed type with drawout circuit breakers. Control power is from the Class 1E 125 VDC power system of the owne division.
8.3.1.1.2.2 Motor Controt centers The 480 MCCs feed motors 90KV and smatter, control power translormers, process heaters, motor-operated valves and other smctl electri-
- ally operated auxiliaries, including 480 120V wd 480-240V transforw rs. Ctats 1E motor control centers are isoland in separate load groups corresponding to divisions established by the 480V unit substations.
Starters for the e xtrol of 460V motors smal-Ler than 90KW are MCC mounted, across the line magneticatty operated, air break type. Circuits tending from the electriest penetration assem-btles into the containment area have a fuse in series with the circuit breakers as a backup pro-tection for a f ault current in the penetration in the event of circuit breaker overcurrent or fault protection failure.
8.3.1.1.3 120/240V Distribution System Individual transformers e.d distribution panels are located in ths vicinity of the loads requiring 120/240V power. This power is used for lighting,120V receptectes ard other 120v toads.
8.3.1.1.4 Instrument Power Supply Systems l
l I
.-.. - - -.... ~.
- 8.3.1.1.4.1 120V AC Safety.Related Instrur.ent etso supply power to neutron monitoring system-Power System and parts.of the process radiation monitoring' system and MSIV. function in the leak detection Individual transformers supply 120V AC instru-system. Power distribution is arranged to ment power Figure 8.3 4 Each Class 1E division-
- prevent inadvertent operation of the reactor at transformer is supplied from a 480V MCC in the-scram initiation or.MSIV isolation upon loss of s ue division, there are three divisions, each
- any single power supply, beckod up by its divisional diesel generator as
- the source when the offsite source is lost. Po-Routine maintenance can be conducted on wer is distributed to the individual loads from equipment associated with the CYCF power supply.
distribution panels, and to logic level circuits Inverters and solid state switches can be through the control room logic panels.
Inspected, serviced and tested channet'by channel without tripping the RPS logic.
3.3.1.1.4.2 120V AC Safety Related Vital AC Pomer Supply System 8.3.1.1.4.2.1 Constant Voltege, constant 8.3.1.1.4.2.6~(Moved to 8.3.1.0.4)
Frequency (CVCF) Power Supply for the Safety -
System Logic and Control (SSLC)
Conponents -
The power supply for the $$iC is shown in-
- Each of the four Class'1E CVCF power supp(les
~
Figure 8.3 5, with each of the four buses includes the following conponc3ts -
su m!ying power for the independent trip systems of the SSLC system. Four constant voltage, (1) a power distribution cabinet,-including the-constant frequercy (C/CF) control power buses.
CVCF 120 VAC bus and circuit breakers for (Divisions I, ii 521, and IV) have been' the SSLC toads;
. established. They a e each normally supplied independently from inverters which, in turn,.are-
- (2)- a solid state inverter,. to convert:125 VDC -
rormally supplied power via a static switch from
' power to 120 VAC uninterruptible power =
~
e rectifier which receives 480V divisional power.
supply;,
4 125v DC battery provirtes an alternate source of power through the static switch.'
(3) a solid state transfer switch to sense in-j.
For Divisions I, !!, and Ill,-the AC supply is verter failure and automatically switch to-l from a 480 V MCC for each division. The backup _
alternate 120 VAC power;=
lL DC supply is via a static switch and a DC/AC inverter from the 125VDC central / distribution (4) a 480V/120V bypass transformer for the al-
. board for the division. A t.econd static switch
-ternate power: supply;.
clso is capable of transferring from the inverter.-
to a direct feed through a voltage regulating -
_(5) a solid-state transfer switch to sense AC-~
transformer from a 480V motor control center for.
~ input power fatture and automatically switch -
each of the three divisions, to alternate 125 VDC power.
Since there is no 480V_AC Division IV power, (6) a manual transfer switch for maintenance.
Division IV is fed from a Division 1 motor,
control center. Otherwise, the AC supply for tho 8.3.1.1.4.2.0 (Deleted) -
Division IV CVCF power supply is similar to the other three divisions. The DC suppl.y for Division IV is backed up by a separate Division
-IV battery.
The CVCF power supply buses are designed to provide logic and control power to'the fours division SSLC system that operates the RPS. (The SSLC for the ECCS derives its power.from the 125 VDC power system (Figure 8.3 7)). The AC buses 8.3.1.1.4'.2.3; operating Configuration-The four 120 VAC essential power su m lies opt erste independently, providing four divisions of
- CVCF power supplies for the SSLC. The normal 1
-w, e,4'
--e.-w-
, e e s
e,-wr n-
+ mta-p ee w -
rr e e-e te +
c um ee v v r
-ewy w
r,
- ,-gyrr-=
--tge-=,
- e<-
- -+, -
-v
--e r
-- w e, p=ay y-h e-n w v ueet.
- c. s w - -cy,e
line m for e:ch division is through on assential 480 VAC power supply, the AC/DC rectifier, the inverter ard the static transfer switch.
There are three automatic switching modes for the CVCF power supplies, any of which may be initiated manually. First, the frequency of the outpJt of the inverter is normally synchronized with the input AC power. If the frequnecy of the input Fower goes out of range, the power supply switches over to internal synchronization to restore the frequency of its output. Switching back to external svm bronization is automatic and occurs if the frequency of thew AC power has been restored and maintained for amroximately 60 seconds.
The second switching mode is frem AC to DC for the power source, if the voltage of the input AC power is less than 88% of the rated voltage, the input is switched to the DC power supply. The input is switched back to the AC power after a confirmation period of appreximately 60 seconds.
The third switching mode is between the inverter and the voltage regulating transformer. If any of the conditions listed below occur, the power supply is switched to the voltage regulating transformer.
(a) Output voltage out of rating by nore than plus or minus 10 per cent (b) Output frequency out of rating by more i
than plus or minus 3 per cent I
(c) High tenperature inside of panel (d) Loss of control power supply i
(e) Ccanutation f ailure (f) Overcurrent of smoothing cordenser (g) Loss of control power for gate circuit (h) Incoming MCCB trip (i) Cooling fan trip Following correction of any of the above events transfer back is by manual initiation only.
8.3.1.1.4.2.4 Class 1E RPS and MSly Soleniods Power Supply Three of the CVCF power supply buses provide power to the RPS scram and MSIV solenoid valves as a part of their load. The bus for the RPS A solenoids is supplied by the Division !! CVCF power su mly. The RPS B solenoids bus is supplied frem the Division !!! CVCF power supply.
The #3 solenfods for the MSivs are powerwd from the Division I CVCF; and the #2 soleniods, f rom the Division il CVCF power supply, 8.3.1.1.5 Clats 1E Electric Equipment Considerations The following guidelines are utilized for
Ctoss 1E equipment.
8.3.1.1.5.1 Physical separation and Independence Att electrical equipment is separated in accordance with IEEE Std 384, Regulatory Guide 1.75 and General Design Criterion 17, with the fotnowing clarifying interpretations of IEEE Std 384:
i (1) Enclosed solid metat raceways are regaired for separation between safety related or associated cables of different safety divisions or bettreen safety-related or associated cables ord non saf ety related cables if the vertical separation distance is less than five feet, the horizontal separation distance is less than three feet and the cables are in the same fire area; (2) Both groupings of cables requiring separation per item one must be enclosed in solid metal raceways.
To meet the provisions of Policy !su o SECD89-013, which relates to fire tolerance, three hour rated fire barriers are provided between areas of different safety divisions throu-5ost the plant except in the primary contalment and the control room complex. See Section 9.5.1.0 for a detailed description of how the provisions of the Policy Issue are met.
The overall design objective is to locate the divisional equipnent and its associated con-trol, instruraentation, electrical supporting systems and interconnecting cabling such that separation is maintained among att divisions.
Redundant divisions of electric equipnent and cabling are Located in separate rooms or fire areas wherever possible.
Electric equipnent and wiring for the Class 1E systems which are segregated into separate divi-sions are separated so that no design basis event is capable of disabling more than one division of any ESF total function, t
The tafsty rotated divisionst AC switchster, power centers, battery rooms and DC distributloc panels and MCCs are located to provide separa-tion and electrical isolation among the divi-sions. Separation is provided among divisional cables being routed between the equipment rooms, the main Control Room, conteirrent ord other processing areas. Equipment in these areas is divided into Divisions I,11, Ill and IV and se-parated by barriers formed by watts, ftoo a, and ceilings. The eauipment is located to f acill-tate divisional separation of cable tsays and to provide access to electrical penetration assee-blies. Exceptions to this separation objectise are identified and anatyted as to eqi:ivstenef and acceptability in the fire hazard anatyals. (See Appendix 9A.$)
The penetration assentiles are to.sted around the periphery of the Containment and at difle-rent elevations to facilitate reasonably direct routing to and f rcen the equipnent. No penetra-tion carries cables of more than one division.
Separation within tne.%ain control room is designed in acc(edsner with liEE 384, and is discussed in Subsection 8.3.1.4.1.
t i
(
I
8.3.1.6.2.2.3.
tro, pull in and triving terque needed for the par:Iculcr application, with due consid-eration for capabilities of the power sources. Plant design specifications for Wiring for all Class 1E eQJipment indicating electrical equipmePt TVquire such equipment lights is an integral part of the Class 1E cables be capable of continuous operation for used for control of the sane equipment and are voltage fluctuations of +/ 10%. In considered to be Class 1E circuits.
addition, Class M motcrs must be able to withstand voltage deops to 70% rated during Anociated cables, if any, are treated as starting transients.
Class 1E circuits sM routed in their corresponding divisional raceways. Separation (2) Power sources, distributien systems and requirements are the same as for Class 1E branch circuits are designed to maintain circuits. Associated cables are required to meet voltage and frequency within acceptable all of the requirements for Class 1E cables, limits.
The careful placing of equipnent la ingetant (3) The selectiv of motor insulation such as to the necessary segregation of circuits by divi-Class F, M or B is a design consideration ston. Deliberate routirra in separate fire areas based on service requirements and environ-on dif f erent floor levels, ard in erit >edded ducts cent. The Class 1E mctors are quellfled by is employed to achieve physical independence, tests in accordance with 12EE Std 334.
8.3.1.1.5.2 Class 1E Electric Equipment Design (4) Interrupting capacity of switchgear, power Bases and Criteria centers, motor control centers, and distri-bution panels is equal to or greater then (1) Notors are sized in accordance with WEMA the maximum available fault current to which standards. The manufacturers' ratings are it is exposed under all modes of operation, et least large enough to produce the start-a Interrupting capacity requirements of the-6.9kV Class 1E switchgeur is selected to acccanodate the available short circuit current at the switchgear terminals.
Circuit breaker eM applications are in accordence with ANSI Standards. (See Subsection 8.3.4.1 for interface requirements)
Unit substation transformers are sized and i
inpedances chosen to f acilitate the selection of low-voltage switchgear, MCCs and distributton panels, which are optimized within the manufac-ture*8s recorreended ratings for interrupting capacity and coordination of'overcurrent devices. Ispedance of connecting upstream cable is factored in for a specific physical layout.
8.3.1.1.5.3 Testing The design provides for periodically testing the chain of s) stem elements from sensing devi-cec through driven equipnent to assure that Class 1E equipment is functioning in accordance with design requirements. Such on line testing is greatly enhanced by the design, which utilizes three Independent divisions, any one of s
which can safely shut cown the plant.
The l
requirements of IEEE $2d 379 Regulatory Guide 1.118 and IEEE 338 are met.
8.3.1.1.6 Circuit Protection 8.3.1.1.6.1 Philosophy of Protection Sinplicity of load grouping f acilltetes the l
l l
.. ~.
un of conysntional, protective retcying precti-othsr pecttetive relays, such es loss of ess for isolation of faults. Epphists has been cacitation, antimetoring (retirse power) placed on preserving f metion and limiting loss overcurrent voltage restraint, low Jacket water of Class 1E equipment function in situations of pressure high Jacket water tenperature and low power loss or equipment falture.
Lube oft pressure, are used to protect the machine when operating in parattet with the lltreult protection of the Class 1E buses normal power system, during pericdic tests. The contained within the nuclear island is interfaced relays are automatically isolated frcn the with the design of the overall protection system tripping circuits Aring LOCA conditions.
outside the nuclear island.
However, all bypassed parameters are a.1nunciated in the main control rocni (see subsection 8.3.1.1.6.2 Grounding Methods 8.3.1.1.8.5).
The bypasses are testable and are manually reset as required by Position 7 of Aeg.
The medim voltage (6900V) system is low re-Guide 1.9 No trips are bypassed during LOPP or sistance grounded except that each dieset testing.
generetor is high res stance grounded to maximite 8
availabi-lity.
8.3.1.1.7 Load shedding end sequencing on Class 1E Buses 8.3.1.1.6.3 Rus Protection This subsection addresses Class 1E Divisions Bus protection is as follows:
I, !!, and Ill. Load shedding, bus transfer and sequencing on a 6.9kV Class 1E bus is initiated (1) 6.9kV bus incoming circuits have inverse on toss of bus voltage. Only LGPP signals tre time overload, ground fault, bus used to trip the loads, however, the presence differential and undervoltage protection, of a LOCA during LOPP re&ces the time delay for initiation of bus transfer from 3 seconds to 0.4 (2) 6.9kV feeders for power centers have seconds. The load sequencing for the diesels is instantaneous, inverse time overload and given on Table 8.3 4 ground fault protection.
Load shedding and ouses ready to lead signals (3) 6.9kV f eeders f or heat exchanger buildmg are generated by the control system for the substations have inverse time overload and electrical power distribution system.
ground fault protection.
Individual timers for each major load are reset and started by their electrical power (4) 6.9kV feeders used for motor starters have distribution systems signals.
instantaneous, inverse time overload, ground fault and motor protection, l
I (5) 480V bus incoming line and feeder circuits (1) Loss of Preferred ibuer (LCoP) : The 6.9kV have inverse time overload and ground fault Class 1E buses are normally energized from protection.
the normat or atternate preferred power suppt les. Should the bus voltage decay to 8.3.1.1.6.4 Protection Requirements below 70% of its nominal rated value for a predetermined time a bus trar.:.fer is When the dieselagenerators are called upon to initiated and the signal will trip the cperate during LOCA conditions, the only supply breaker, and start the dieset protective devices which shut down, the diesel generator. As the bus voltage decays, targe are the generator differential relays, and the pump motor breakers are trip-ped. The engine overspeed trip. These protection devices transfer proceeds to the diesel generator, are retained under accident conditions to protect If the standby diesel generator is ready to.
against possible, significant damage, accept load (i.e., voltage and frequency are within normal limits and no Lockout exists, and the normat and alter-nate preferred supply breakers are cp 9), thea the diesel-generator breale.- is signal-led to close, acconplishing autoratic trans fer of the Class 1E bus to the diesel generator.
Large motor loads will be sequence started as required and shown on Table 8.3 4
(2) Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA): When a LOCA occurs, with or without a LOPP, tha load sequence timers are started if the 6.9 KV emergency bus voltage is grester than 70%
and toads are applied to the but at the end of preset tises.
Each load has an indivicbat load sequence tirer which will start if a LOCA cccurs and the 6.9 KV emergency tus voltage is greater than 70%, regardless of tAether the bus voltage source is normat or otternate preferred power or the diesel generator.
The toad sequence timers are part of the low levet Ofrcuit logic for each LOCA load and do not provis'e a swans of comon mode failure that would render both onsite and offsite power unavaltable. If a timer f alted, the LOCA load could be applied manually provided the bus voltage is greater than 70%.
(I) LODP followina LOCA: If the bus voltage (normal or alternate pref,trred power) is lost daring post acciden* operation, transfer to diesel generator power occurs as described in (1) ae ve.
(4) LOCA followina LOPP: If a LOCA occurs fol-towing loss of the normat or alternate preferred power supplies, the LOCA signal starts ESF equip-ment as required. Ru riing loads are not tripped. Automatic (LOCA +
LOOP) time delayed load sequencirig assures that the diesel generator will not be overloaded.
(5) LOCA when dieset cenerator is oarattel with -
pn ferred power source durinq le,11 If a -
LOCA occurs when the diesel generator is paralled with either the normal preferred power or the alternate preferred power source, the D/G wi: automatically be disconnected from the 6.9 KV emergency bus regradless of whether the test is being conducted from the local control panet or the main control room.
i l
l 3
- ~. -
(6) LOPP & ring distel generator paretteting 8.3.1.1.8.1 Red mdant Stendby AC Power test: If the normal preferred power supply Supplies-is lost duing the dieVL generator parat-leting test,_the dieset generater circuit
_Each standby power system division, including breaker is automatically tripped. Transfer the diesel generator, its auxiliary systems and to the diesel generator then proceeds as the distribution of power to various Class 1E described in (1).
toads through the 6.9kV and 480V systems, is se-gregated and separated from the other divi-If the alternate preferred source is used siens. No avtamatic inter onnection is provided for load testing the dieset generator, and between the Class 1E div slons. : Each diesel ge-the alternate preferred source is lost (and nerator set is operaty(' independently of the no LOCA signet exists), the dieset generator - other sets and is core cted to the utility power breaker witt trip on overcurrent, and LOPP system by manual en.rol, only during testing or condition will exist. Load shedding and bus for but transfer, transfer will proceed as described in (1).
8.3.1.1.8.2 Ratings and Capability (7) Restoration of of fsite power: Upon restoration of offsite power, the Class _1E
.The site of each of the dieset generators-bust.es) can be transferred tsack to the serving Divisions I, 11 and Ill satisfies the offsite source by manual operation only, requirements of NRC Regulatory Guide i.9 and IEEE'Std 337 and conforms to the following.
(8) Protection apinst degraded voltage: For criteria -
protection of the Olvision I, II and Ill electrical equiprent against the ef fects of
~ (1) Each diesel generator is capable of start-a sultained degraded voltage, the 6.9 kV ESF:
ing, accelerating and stoplying its loads in bus voltages are monitored. When the bus the sequence shown in Table 8.3 4 voltage degrades to 90% or below of its rated value and after a time delay (to (2) Each dieset generator is capable of start-prevent triggering by transients),
ing, accelerating and supplying its loads in =
undervoltage will be annunciated in the their proper sequence without exceeding a control room. Simultaneously a 5 strute 25% voltage drop at Its terminals, timer is star.Jd. to allow the operatur.to take corrective action. After 5 minutes,.
(3) Each dieset generator is capable of start-the respective feeder breaker with the ing, acceleroting and running its largest undervottage is tripped. Should a (OCA.
motor at any time after'the automatic' load-occur & ring the 5 minute time delay, the
.ing sequence is conyleted/ assuning that the -
feeder breaker with the undecvoltage will be motor had failed to start initially.
tri ped instantly. Subsequent bus transfer.
will be as desribed.bove.
(4) The criterte is for.'each dieset generator to be capable of rasching full speed and!
-8.3.1.1.8 Stendby AC Fower System voltage within 20 seconds af ter receiving a signal to start, and cap.able of being The diesel generators cog rising the Divi-fully loaded within the next 65 deconds'as sions I, !! and !!! standby AC power supplies are
- shown in Table 8.3 4.
The limiting designed to quickly restore power to their re-condition is for,the RHR and HPCF injection spective Class 1E distribution system divisions valves to be open lo seconds after the-as required.to achieve safe shutdown of the plant' receipt of a high drywell'or low reactor and/or to mitigate the consequences of a LOCA in vessel levet signal. Since the motor.
'the event of a' coincident LOPP. Figure 8.3-1
_ operated valves are not tripped off the.
Shows the interconnections between the preferred -
. buses / they start.to.open, if requested to' power supplies and the Divisions I, !! and III do so by their controls, when power is dieset-generator standby power supplies.-
restored to the Ws at 20 seconds. -This=
gives them en alloweble travet time of.16 seconds, which is attainable for the vttves.
~
(5) Each dieset generator hae a continuous load rating of 6.25 MyA a 0.8 power factor (r.ee Figure 8.3 1).
Tha overicad rating is 110%
of the rated output for a teo-hour. period out of a 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> period.-
l
See Subnection 8.3.4.2 for intsrface requirements.
8.3.1.1.8.3 starting Circuits and systems Dieset generators I, 11 and lit start automa-tically on loss of bus voltage. Under-voltage relays are used to stert each diesel ercine in 4
i l
'7 F
'f8' W
f 1"
9 7
MN Canadard Plant nM100A0 m>a the event of a drop in bus voltage below preset values for a predetermined period of time.
Low. water level switches and dr>well high pres-l sure switches in each division are used to ini.
tiate diesel start under accident conditions.
Manual start capability (without need of D.C.
power) is also provided. The transfer of the Class IE buses to standby power supply is automatic should this become necessary os less of all preferred power. After the breakers connecting the buses to the preferred power supplies are open the diesel. generator breaker is closed when required generator voltage and frequency ar; established.
Diesel generators I,11 and III are designed to start and attain rated voltage and frequency l within 20 seconds. The generator, and voltage regulator are designed to permit the set to accept the load and to accelerate the motors in the sequence within the time requirements. The voltage drop caused by starting the large motors does not exceed the requirements set forth in-Regulatory Guide 1.9, and proper acceleration of these motors is ensured. Control and timing P
t l
l Amendawn: 10 -
834t 9
v
=F
-r
~
- e-
- w t-1 m
f n**
- e ~
-- =
l circu ts are provided, as (n.Torlate, to ensure that ecch load is amtied cutumatically at the correc* tine. toch diesel generator set is pro-vided with two Irdependent starting air systems.
6.3.1.1.8.4 Automatic thedding. Loading ord Isolation the diesel generator is conrweted to its Class it tus only when the incoming preferred source breakers have teen trigNd (subsection 8.3.1.1.
7). Under this condition, major loads are triged f rom the Class 11 bus, enrept f or the Class 11 480v unit substation feeders, before closing the diesel generator breaker.
The large motor loads are letsr reapptled w
seqJentistly and automatically to the trJe af ter closing of the Jieset* generator breaker.
8.3.1.1.8.5 Protection systems the diesel generator is shut down and the generator brweker triged under the following conhtfons during sit modes of operatici and testing operations (1) engine overspeed trip; and (2) generator differentist relay trip, these and other prc'ective functions (alarms and trips) of the enJ ne or the generator breaker i
and other of 4* normal conditions are annurstleted in the mein control room and/or locally as show in Teole 8.5 11. Locet starm/ annunciation points beve auxittery isolated switch outputs which provide inputs to alarm /ennunciator ref resh unita -
in the main control room which identifies the diesel generator and general anomaly concerned.
Those anomalies which cause the respective 0/G to become Inoperitive are so irdicated in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.47 and 51P PSB 2.
.l i
m.
.. _._ _. = _ _
m i
tion in th3 ditsfl generator cres by ope.ating key sultches at that station.
8.3.1.1.8.6 Local and Remote Controt 8.3.1.1.8.7 Engine Mechanical systems and Accessories fach diesel generator is capable of being started or steged manually f rom the esin control Descriptions of these syste% and accessor;es room. Start /stop control aM bus transf er con-are given in Section 9.$.
trol may be transferred to a local control sta-8.3.1.1.8.8 Interlocks and festability tech diesel generator, when operating other than in test node, is totally trdeperr'ent of the preferred power supply. A M itional interlocks to the LOCA and toPF oensing circulta terminate parallel operation test and cause the dieset ge-nerator to autonetically revert and reset to its starrby mode if either signal appears during a test. A lockout or maintenance node removes the diesel generator from service. The inoperable status is indicated in the control room.
8.3.1.1.8.9 teliability cualification festire the qualification tests are performed nn the diesel generator per IttE Std. 387 as podified by Regulatory Guide 1.9 requirements.
See subsectim 8,3.4.10 for interf ace requirements.
8.3.1.2 Analysis I
8.3.1.2.1 General AC Power Systens The general AC power systems are illustrated in Fige 8.3 1.
The analysis demonstrates conpliance of the Class 1E AC power system to NRC General Design Criteria (GDC), NRC Regulatory Guides and other criteria consistent with the 6tsndard Review Plan (5DP).
Ta$le 8.1 1 identifies the onsite power systr and the associated codes ard standards applaJ in accordance with Table d 1 of the $RP.
Criteria are (Isted in order of the listing on the table, eM the deg m of conformance is discussed fo each. Any enceptions or ctrifications are so noted.
(1) General Design Criteria (GDC):
r (a) Criteria: GDCs 2, 4,17,18 ard $0.
i y
.n-
,.,,,-. +
(b) Conformarce: The AC power system is in corvitance with these GDCs. The GDCs (j) RG 1.153 -
are generically addressed in Subsection Criteria for Power, Instrunentation, and Controt 3.1.2.
Portions of Safety Systems J
(2) Regulatory Guldes (RCs):
(k) 20 1.155 -
Station glackout (a) RG 1.6 Irdependence Between Redun-dant $tendby (Onsite) Power tegarding Position C 1 of Regulatory Guide sources and Between. heir 1.75, see section 8.3.1.1.1, the non-safety Distribution Systems related FMCR0 notcra ord brakes are sumtled power from the division 1 Class it
$s tection, Design, and Gusa safety related bu9 through a dedicated power
'b) RG 1.9 a
lification of Diesel Gene-center transformer. The Class 1E toad breaker retor Units Used as Starcby for the bus is trig;ed by fault current for (Onsite) Electric Power sys-faults in the non safety load. There is also a tems at Nuclear Power Plants tone selective interlock provided from the load breaker to the Class 1E bus supply breaker so Criteria for safety Related that the supply breaker is blocked frors tripping (c) PG 1.32 Electric Power systems for while f ault current la flowing in the non safety Wuclear Power Plants load feeder. This meets the Intent of the Regulatory Guide position in that the main Bypassed and inoperable $ta-sumty breaker is prevented from tripping on (d) RG 1.47 tus le'* ration for Nuclear faults in the non safety related loads. A Power Plant Safety Systems second isolation device is provided by the power center transformer, wnich is associated vid Electric Fenetration Assem-meets 1E requirements.
(e) RG 1.63 blies in Contalrsnent Struc-tures for Light Water Cooted there are three 6.9 KV electrical divisions Nuclear Power Plants which are independent load groups backed by individual diesel generator sets. The (ou Physical Independence of voltage AC systems consists of f our divisions (f) PG 1.75 Electric Systems which are backed by Irdependent DC battery, charger and inverter systems.
(g) RG 1.106 - Thermat Overload Protection for Electric Motors on Ho-
..The st edby power system redundancy is based tor Operated Valves
~) the capability of any one of.the divisims 1, 2 or 3 load groups to provide the mininun safety Safety functions w5fch are required to functions necessary to manually shut down the go to conpletion for saf ety have their unit f rom the control room in case of an therstel oveload protec*lon devices in accident and maintain it in the safe shutdown force during normal plant operation but condition.Two of the four divisions are required the overloads are bypassed under to be functional to accorrplish an automatir' safe accident conditions per Regulatory shutdown.
Postion 1.(b) of the guide, th) RG 1.108 - Periodle festing t,f Diesel Generator Units Used as On-site Electric Power Systems at Nuclear Power Plants (t) RG 1.118 - Perlvdic festing of Electric r ar and Protection Systems l
l i
l
_.-____.__.__m..__
There is no sharing of stancby power system corgonents between load gro@s, and there is no sharing of diesel-generator power sources be.
tween units, since the ABWR is a single plant design.
toch standby power su mly for each of the three %ad groups is corposed of a single ge-nerator driven by a diesel ergine having f ast.
start characteristics and slaed in accordance with Regulatory Culde 1.9.
Table 8.31 and 8.3 2 sho.# the rating of each of f > Division I,11 anri I!! diesel generators, respectively, and the maxinun coincidental toed for esch.
(3) Branch Technical Positions (BfM):
(a) BfP ICSB 8 (PSB) + Use of Diesel *Cene-j rdor Sets for Peaking (b) BIP ICSB 18 (PSB) Application of the
$1ngle f ailure Criterion to Mai. ally-Controlled Electrically operated valves.
(c) Of? ICSB 21 + Guidence for Application cf Regulatory Guide 1.47 (d) BfP P$B 1 Adequacy of Station Electric Distribution fystem Vcltages (e) BfP P$8 2
- Criteria for Alarms and in-dications Associated with Diesel-Gene-retor Unit Bypassed and inoperable Status The onsite AC power system is designed consistent with these positions.
1i
~
~
- ~ -
identification eethod shall be placed on color coding. Att markers within a division shall have the some color, f or associated cabl es (if any) treated as Ctess it (see hote 1), there shall be en A eme* des to the divisional desig nation (e.g., A1). The letter A stands for as sociated and kD f or nondivisional. Associated cables are unicpely identifi'f by a longitudinal stripe or other color coded et had and the data on the lebet. The color of Se cable marker for ossociated cables shalt be the same as the related Class it cabit. Olvisional separation requirements of indivicket pieces of bc +, ors 3re l
shown in the systes ele eentary diagren s.
Identification of recewers, cables, etc., shall te ccrpetible with the iden tification of the
{
l Cte n it equipment with which it interfaces.
Location of identification shall be such that points of thenge cf circuit classia fication (at 1101stion devices, etc.) are reedl ty identifiable.'
kote 1 Associated circuits added beyond the c9ttified design must be specifically l
identified and justified per $ h ection 8.3.4.13.
Associated circuits are defined in section 5.5.1 of IEtt 384 1981, with the clarification for items (3) and (4) that non Class 1E circuits being in en enclosed receway
- without the required physical separation or barriers between the enclosed recewey and the Class it or $ssociated cables makes the circuits (related to the non Class it cable in the enclosed racewey) associated circuits.
8.3.1.3.1.1 Equipment identification Equiprent (Penets, rocks, junction or putt boxes) of each division of the Ctess it electric f
system and various CVCF power supply divisions are identified es follows:
t
(
l (1) the background of the nameplate for the eqJignent.cf a division has the same color as the cable jacket markers and the receway markers associated with that division.
(i) Power system distribution equip'ent (e.g.,
motor control centers, switchgear, trans-
..n
~,.., -
v:ss3L dame pressure trip. The swply breaksts to the high inertia MG sets are also tripped to prevent cower being drawn from the flywheels by the other 16tge motors on the buses. The remaining sin RIPS continue to operate t0 (4) Other $RP Criteria:
optimite the rate of recleculation flow reduction mtil the MG sets have coasted down to (a) WstG/CR 0660 - Enhancenent o' ansite the A$D cut off point, at which time the Olesel Generator Rettability remaining RIPS are tripped.
As Indicated in W ection 8.1.3.1.2.4, the The only need to restart a RIP is in A. D of person-preparation for restart of the plant, at operating prct Wr es d U not are outste e9 *h 3ste
- V Te which tire normal power sust have been of supply, h UCt RM (p C at.
sa-restored to the non safety buses. The posed as an Inth.gyy-57 cq y taS operuor rioy then restart any of the arolicant.(See subsect w,'..t.4.h k!Ps, providing that the te@ erature difference between the vessel dome (as (b) WRC Policy issue on Al enate Power for
!ndicated by the dome pressure Non saf ety LoadC Indicator) ard thc 69tten head is within alto.4ble limits. A start lnhibit This policy issue states that "An interlock is provided to insure that the evolutionary ALVR design should include tem erature limits are satisfled before an alteenste power source to the a RIP is started.
non safety loads unless the design can demonstrate thbt the design margins in Any non safety toads which should be the evolutionary ALWR will result in restarted insnediately are on the plant transients for a loss of non safety investment protection (PIP) buses, p wer event that are no more severe than these buses are picked up automatically those associated with the by the conication turbine. For the turoine trip only event in current remaining non safety buses there is no existing plan designs. A subsequent requirement to lamediately restore power clarification steted that the transfer a W for sinplicity considerations should tr en automatic slow bus transfer automatic transfers are not provided, to picb. et least one of the non MG set 4
delven RIPS for an ABWR.
8.3.1.2.3 cuality Assurance RegJirements An automatic transfer has not been A planned cpality acsurance program la provided for two reasons:
provid ed in Chapter 17. This program includes a conprehensive system to ensure that the (1) The coast down provided by the MG purchased materiet, manufacture, fabrication, f
sets is equivalent to the coastdown testing and quality control of the equipment in p ovided by the recirculation pu p the energency electric power system conforms to (nertia on the current plants.
the evaluation of the emergency electric power sy6 tem equipnent vendor quality assurance (2) The morror in which the A8WR pr% rams and preparation of procurement functions on the loss of offsite power specifications incorporating qual ity assurance does not require a bus transfer. The rquirement s.
The s etnistrative responsibility four RIPS which are not suppl {ed f rom and controt provided are also des cribed in the high inertja MG sets receive a grip Chapter 17.
comand levnedlately on tripping of the unit. This trip consnand originates f rom lhese quality assurance requirements include turbine / toad rejection trip, low vessel an appropriate vervjor quality assurance program water tevet (Level 3) trip or high and organization, purchaser survelttance as re-quired, vendor preparation and maintenance of appropriate test and inspection records, certia ficates and other r;uality assurance doctanenta-tion, and vendor sutalttal of quality control records considered necessary for purchaser retention to verify quality of conpleted work, J
A necessary cordition for receipt, Inst:lle*
tion and placing of equipment in s rvice has teen the signing and auditing of CA/QC verification data and the placing of thle data in permanent onsite storage files.
S.3.1.2.4 trivirorvnental Considerations in addition to the effects of operation in normal service environment, all Class it equipment is designed to operate during and after any design basis event, in the accioent environment expected in the aree in which it is located. ALL Class it electric equipment in cpattfled to litt 323 (see section 3.11) 8.3.1.3 Physical Identification of safety Related Equipnent 8.3.1.3.1 Power, Instrunentation and Controt
$ystems tiectrical and control equipment, as-soebtles, devices, and cablea grouped into sepe-rate divisions shall be identia fled no that their electrical divisional assign ment is apparent and so that en observer can via sually differenilate between Class it equipment and wiring of different divisions, and between Class it and non-Class 1E equipnent and wires. The
.__.____]
1 h
m --
i l
1 -o-.
..c.nv-=
l t
i, l (! g - g
..4
-o.-.
. c - we-g o.-.. -
g, l
-.o.-.--..
-. o.-.
.u u u qr y
g
-.cs g
o._._
I l!,'; G d
k_
i 3
, ;. r.o _-o..=*.
o.
I
,[
o.-
.-. w co.-23.tt# E:.
I.
8 Iv.
g
-o-.GCE:'ik I
l g
g.- u m.-t I
-C*****
g 7
s
-~ ca.--::N n.t'--
l*e g h,I y1.
. E= =....
,is Ig
-- -i
---. m='
i
- = - - - - -
.ti I
ll *E*%o
' I. -n--. -.= a**
a
{,y{
t o.
a.=-,.
l.s.-.o.-. -
==,u
((-l l l 1,!,
ti o.-..-...--.
,.i, i
- e. m..a I-I
[i tw Il l,
l
-_o.--.o.-t.._..__._________.,
o.
I..o._-o -.
[
o.
i
,,,6 [
-. o.-..
g,, (*~E*-*..
,,.. o.-..
g
-o..-
1-..-e-.o.-ta.tras.
I abr
.. Th 1:
l l l [o.5.
o.-.o..
l
-o.-*==
--.o.-. m - -nem==
,<-. o.--:: N a.r 4
jli..g g;ij tI lI g
tt-E*-4
!li-o-r:L='
l a
_ g -a-. ~.-.-
g';
._'~
j s t-o.-. -.===*
1:
Ig 3-o.4 e
ry-k:03
- I :
il _
f" l
-*E " ".'...
~.o i
i i
li I
i
-.o.-..-.-
-o itg.
~o.
1 I1 1-o
'l3d [~~~~"Tr-o- & 4.'O'".
i
_~ o -t
~
s.o p.,
I-.o c -.
- o cp-.s au.u
.m ~e t,
o. -...>
4
- t. o._..
g!,,; g l
isl-
-g-
___ g,_. -.o._,,.g;. g:,
- o-i
-.o.- =nwu.>.8 5
- p. - o -.w.
~
~
g
, -. o.-
I<
gj -.o 7,8,'d*g
. e kms N
[:p 3 Wg O'",
. g !8 8
. -am-- wa.:'
i y'
~"*- rikW' tM Its.I}.
g-zg
-.ce-+ - --*
i~
, t-
!i ggl.,1-ot
!!@.!iI r
I
_I. - = c2 =....
8il I
,; ar::=:=:=
illilli:1 1=B:.:: ='O r ~
~
~" f" y X M.a' =.a "
1 ".Iii i
M EIDGDG>
'a j
1 1
j i
j L
j T..
j
=
=. -.
u-...
- - ~.. - - - - -. - - -
1-c***$=l
~*
.oane.as.o swu m-mo an.
1111!
llihil IIllllll!
I
~
,lil u
. li l!!!!ill l
!!!!jiliti l d!'!!!;illi ni!LI.!!!!jitiLi!!!!i!!!!!
l n!!!Ii!!!!!!
!Lill!!!!!!!!!!
Ilifilillifili Tillifillillill R Illillillill fillillii i
.w g=
qme3
~ = - -
j I
)
l i
ll ll"li!
1"li IIllii 15AEA!aai5'S
,,,ri!.!!iin
,,,,,81 ! n
,,,,,un 1&Aii 2aI$$$
$,55&iA5ii!!
.:".N 3
- [~ 5 dN.
~
~' L.
~ ~.
~'I I
.i.1 1
.i.3
.g 1
+4 1
I
- I
+
1
=
=
A md&&w..
e"e d-M 4
m A4*
mas-6,M.
A
--4
&m M 4 4-
~
i s om-ee 1-O*A 'S.ry
-u
,s,. nu, -,
i llI
[jj j [* *..
3
& A I
ssIOk!
I I I.I,',s,s,s,s.
r nii S
kf k
~
. =.
,=
i
~ 7_ -.
- T _,
1
)
m hh h
Iiss!I!
~
s s s E!!
1
- i11111)(18i11111111111 1 i i !! !
I
._g, 4
]
_m 3
2 1
i I!!
lililt
~
~
iii!!!
rirrial!!!!!!
IIII!_fk IIIII}kd*III [ l ~ ~ =. = = m 1 1 I i i a
i I.l.o 3 g .,ib r,; 4 16 P-E ..1 l j t r lii i. il. 11 lij j i gw r -1g i--.n-.g 'll g, hg
- *1 ti g-
-g]e -n g e I ,f ,ii m I ' I i i T .!![ 1( l Li e lg l = li l-u m, gl I -f s il!! '.l,l - i.: I j. ![ .l!. e iI I -u q11 qT' tl s -.u~B-F e 11 i u -.u g-n-3. ,il gi e s. -11.lIis II 'i - I- . g ;. ;. - ia e = = 9 i s e e .l.*l l f , f-g l e, { a e e +*-NeJWa2 34&+orwaem-"+1s -wr Waaw'ame +7 F ie-s y tN+M W -t & - &TrrTP'f'WPe Wt ay-t af=Fy' wg= ty W M 'e W' P v e wui t'v*7-' $'M'T q dyp og y wEr y gr e-pNe tymyusww yi. E %yF br"'pv-
- s
- 7 P
-'Myp,:- y y'-w~5W1'q
-,m, -s ..1m a -Ae-- h I I i f!b al, li + ll A li,;j!! U$ 3,A_ui t i O:!! _A. l!j [ L i, ph d$ l II !!l1 i dgg ~ d-Ei .d, i, s -F gy';j, Mh Il ~ li- ~ e ~ = ,=; j ,p E,- lilj e.g ,,.y.. "1^111 1 m, .a, l.I lI r"i l E' I 11 g!!! j l ~ M
- ALLg, i
,,Ati!. 'l. , jgil-fi j i ~ til: Js Pall,i L 3 i r?- k_g, ~ i .J I 1l1 I i ~id$ u su a u i !, 4
- iils iiy
-ti ill. ~s Ailli gi i fildi 'I Pi ii;j, lIll g ..b E 1 i i i i 1., i 1 I w m v
m J A _A.- I n ,I I ' !. h, i !il 9 .!l 00 ~ l 6ff 9 m e e sum -9 0 emm I ISOS h i ll N'N iil twnw = 1 f 11 I a111 s r - - x l f l-, m {! iI Iy y1,
- Li
!1 t1 i !i j i yr-ll n I I y e l r i ~ ls I vii ! W 72!! el,j l't! I L. i g.1 1 eum 9 3 I l i l l .j or I I j j
l l l l l 1 t i I l I Marked Chanter 8 of the SSAR i l t l i +
8.1 INTR 00LtCTICJ trCnsformers, -B leonnected to aunotv nower to 3pfee amoroximately nauat load aroups of 8.1.1 Utility Grid Description eauinment. pB nyo to feed the non Class it buses and two to feed the Class 1E buses..,gthe ~B jfhe descriottori of the utility arid system
- Normel Preferred" power feed la fr(en the unit is out of the ABWe Standard Plant stone, however auxiliary transformers so that there normally i
there are interf ace reautrements contained in are no bus transfers required when the unit is tection 8.2.3.1 whlettaust be comot ted with by tripped of f the line. the Utility. l-B f.r3st of ASWit Stendard Plant Scope.< One,threewinding~Bj}J.M-B>].Q,,,tMVAunit reserve -C lausittery ltransformer is s@ptled 8.1.2 -8 >0nsite < Electric Power -B to provide power -B lvla one windlna ifor the IDistribution ISystern emergency buses as an alternate to the "Normat Preferreda power. -8 Ifhe other 3,g.ggndery 8.1.2.1 Description of -8 loffsite ltlectrical windina suoettes rese n e oower to thg Power System non-safety *retated buses in the turbine buildino. I1his is truly a reserve transformer the scope of the of f site electricot power because unit startup is accenptlshed from the system includes the entire system ~B ffrom the normet preferred power, which is beckfed -C termination of the transmission lines comina into Ifrom the offsite power arid lover the main the switchverd to the termination of the but duct power circuit to the unit euxillary at the terminets of the main eenerator and at the. transformers. The two low voltage windings of i ircut terminals of the circuit breakers for the the reserve transformer are rated -B liOJ$FB. 7.2rv switchneer. TFe sooticent has desian >15 <MVA each. -B
- sone windins orovides the t.gjoonsibility for portions of the offsite power second of fsite power source for Divisions 1<-B s ys t em.
The scope fetit is as defined in the
- 1. f ! and li f l.-B *end !! < The other winding detailed description of the offsite power system provides the second of fsite power source for ~B in Section 8.2.1.1.
l-B >on the olent side of itbe non sofety related buses in the turbine the low voltene terminals of the main power' buildina. l-B y.Mylpinn 111 and non sMety_bytg.2 transformer and the connection at the hiah which sucoties investment erotection loads.<# vettene bushines of the reserve transformer es -B 18.1.2.2 Dese<1otion of Onsite AC Power indiested on the sinate line dJgeram. Floure Distribution System (J ># There is also a 8.3 1. The main power transformer it,,not in contiustion turbine which suooties stan*v nower scoce. The certiustion turbine menerator (ctg) is to -A lone Iturbine buildina buses
- A lwhich within scope, feeds the lotant investment protection toads-A' l.1-A *ste arouped on the two turbine _buildina The electricot interface reovirements are buses.* Manuelty controlled breakers omyldg
.showq on the sinate line dienram.4 the ceDability of connectine the contiustion - turbine cenerator to any coa of the enernency -B lLh* 1500MvA mM n power transformer is a bank buses if alt,othee power cources are lost.<# pfgee sinate obese transformers. One sinate phsse instat ted sper; transformer is orovided. 1, ~B Ifbree turbine buildino non safetv reli tt0 byges cer load nrom and one reactor buildfra A generator breder cepable of interrupting safety related bus per division receive power the maxinun available f ault current '. provided, from
- be sinate unit auxiliary transformer This allows the generator to be taken off line 9.2.P nned to each load aro s.
Load arggg M i and the main grid to be utilfred as e power and C line up with divisions 1.11 and 111. i source for the unit auxiliary trentformers And resoeetively. One windina of the reserve their loads, both Class 1E ond non Class 1E. auxittery transformer may be utitireo to supolv This is etso the start-up power -C lsource reserve oowca to each of the non-safetv related 1-C>trein<fortheunit. buses either direeth or indireetty throuch _ bus M e breakers. The three safety related buses There are -B lthree hB >four< unit auxillery may be supolled power from the other windino of the reserve auxiliary transformer. ,.y + w v e-w-. 9 e ,w,.e ,-e,~ y-- - -.,,-,wy<- g ..W"t V
- W"ft-"""N
""M' T T F "td'T""*r'*" F'-P' T w-r v"-"1"
A cortestion. turbine centrator sureties stanty ser to permanent non sofety rettted loads in the Division 1, ll, ard lit starsby AC power the turbine tuildino. These toads are arouped on supplies consist of an Indeperdent 6.9Kv Ctess one of the 6.9KV buses eer toed orNo. A Mwee it diesel generator, one for each division. Each ggply bus le also orovided f ree the ccetution turbine to the three Ctess 1E medhe vottent buses in the reactor tvildino v!e breakers that grg poemat tv rocked out for Divisions I end 111 erd remote manuet tv closed mder e+fnistrative contret for Division 11. ( -8 > The resetor buildino is suretted with ,1,btee divisions of etest if AC Mwer (Floyrt 8.3 1). Each of the Division 1. II. and Ill Ctess 1E 6.9 kv twes have two feeders -8 leer division If rom the olf,gite sour-ces norniti f oreferred and etternate oreferred power. The U, gig 1E AC Dower system is divided into three J.r)d,ependent divisions to orovide AC power to the three divisions of Ctess 1E loads.s -B1 _[ In general, motore larger than 300 KW are sumlied from the 6.9(v bus. Motors 300KW or smelter but targer than 100KW ore sumtled power f revn 480V -C loower center tswitchgear. -A gy<-Aj{-A gotors 100KV or smaller are supplied powse from 480V motor control centers. The 6.9KV and 480V switchgear single line diagrams are shown -c lin Floure 8.3 1. I-C >y) U ggts B.3 1. 8.3 2 end 8.3 3.< During normal plant operation att of the non-Clar.s 1E buses and two of the Class it buses are supplied with power from the turbine generator through the unit auxiliary transformers. The third Class 1E bus is supplied from the reserve ( transformer, this third division is le ediotely l ovailable, without a bus transfer, if the normal preferred power is lost to the other two divisions. -8 *Either of the normat ereferred or l the alternate oreferred AC power sources et.g l p,ppable of providino power to att Division f. II. and !!! Clost if leeds in addition to some I selected non Cless 1E toad y -B lthree dieset eenerator l-B >The thee,g < standby AC pcwer supplies provide a separate onsite source od power for each class 1E toad groupwhennormat-Clgr1-C>and< alternate preferred power supplies are not evallable. The transfer from the normal preferred or alternate preferred power supplies to the diesel generator is autevnetic. The transfer back to the normal preferred or the alternate preferred power source is a manual transfer.
-C M.jmay be connected to its ecspective 6.9Nv -B sf-A 18.1.2.1.1 Separation Class it switchgear bus through a main circuit breaker located in the sw: chgear. The locations for the main transformer, unit pumillary transformers and reserve suultiery The standby AC power system is capable of transformer see shy n on Floure 1.1 25. Thg providing the required power to safety shutdown Ingeve ouillierv transformer will be separatd the reactor efter loss of preferred power (LOPP) from the unit suntilary transformers by 50 feet and/or loss of coolant accident (LOCA) or to er shp A fire wett. maintain the safe shutdown condition and operate the Ctess it outillaries necessory for plant Reference is made to Floure 8.31 for the safety during ord af ter shutdown-8.I with any ont sinate line dientems showino the method of ofthethreepower(2fLA124t11 feedino the toeds. teoaration of the normat preferred and siternate preferred Dower feeds is The plant 480 VAC suxillery power system accerotished tu floors and walls over QgjI distributes suf ficient power for normal routes throvoh the turbine, control and reactor aunillary and Class it 480 volt plant loads. bgildinns creeot within the swltehnear roms Att class it elements of the auxillery power where they rust be routed to the some switchoese distribution systec are supplied vie the 6.9(v t i neues. The normat preferred feeds are routed Ctess it switchgear end, therefore, are capable Rhin the turbine buildina f rom the unit of being f ed by the reormal preferred, alternate ouilliery transformers to the turbine buildina preferred, standby or corrbustion turbine jwitchoest ord to the control buildina. From generator power supplies. there. the normet creferred feeds continue ecret the divisions 1 and 3 sides of the the 120 VAC non Class it instrumentation power control and reactor buildinos to the resocetive system, Figure 8.3 4, provides power for safety-related switthoter rooms in the reactor non Ctass it centrot and Instrumentation Ioeds. bgj.Lp,1,m the Class it 120 VAC instrunent power system, The etteenste oref erred feeds f rom the Figure 8.3 4, provides power for Ctess 1E plant reserve cupitiery transformer are routed contruts and instrunentation. The system is el0noside the turbine bultoina. the feed f reen separated into Olvisions I, 31, and 111 with ge non safety related switehneer Deets off and distribution panets fed from their respective gnters the load neote A switehneer room et neede divisionet sources. to of ck up the switehnear et that elevation. and then rises on uo to the toad aroup B switchage The 125V DC power distribution system pro-room above. The otter etternste preferred feed. vides four independent and redundant onsite which is for the s.afety reteted buses, con @ygg sources of power for operation of Class it DC 20.2yjoide of the turbine buildina untit it - toads. The 125V DC non-Class it power is -B enters the eteen niing corridor Uioute-i.2 24) isuoetied f rom three 125V DC betteries toested in Just below acede between the turbine and controt I the turbine buildina. I-B *taken from the Class buildinos. It crosses the turbine buildina in if betteries. C;ess if isoletion is provided by 1ht tno of the eteen eccess tunnet and then DC to DC congrters. < Separate non Class 1E 250V enters the divisions 2 and 4 side of the control batteries are provided to supply u m terruptible buildina. From there. it crosses the divisions power to the plant coryuters and non Class 1E DC 2 end 4 sides of the controt and resetor motors. buildino to access the switehneer rooms within the resetor buildina. The normal oreferred The safety system and to0 c control (SSLC) for power feeds are not sitowed to be in or throuch l RP5 and MSIV derives its power f*om four the eteen secess corridor, uninterruptible 120 VAC buses. The $$LC for the ECCS derives its power freen the four divisions of ,,,,,,,the t oestion of tba. corrbust ion turbine 125V DC buses. The four buses provide the ggnerator (CTC) is shown on Floure 1.2-26. The redarsiancy for various instrunentation, logic ord standby onwer feed f rom the Cf G is routed trip circuits and solenold valves. The SSLC directly to the switehneer roms in the turine power supply is further described in Subsection ballding. 8.1.3.1.1.2.
The branch to the reactor buttd(no is routed f edlocent to the alternate preferred feeds across the control and resetor buildinns.lej -A j}ddM.A >$.1.F.1.1<tafety Leeds The safety loads utillat verlous C!sts it AC ard/or DC sources for instrmentation ard active i i i I P i l l l l .. ~,
or retros power or both for att systems requireo (b) Wuclear Bolter syst>n I for safety. 'Contelnations of power sources may be involved in perfortar.g a 4tngle safety fmction. (1) Safety / Relief Valves ($tVs) for eaanote, low voltage DC p.ner in the control (II) steam Sumty shutoff Portion logic may provide an actuation alsnal to control e 6.9kV circuit breaker to drive a large (c) Residual Heat temoval (tHR) system decoy AC $ owe,'ed pop motor. The systems required for heat removal safety are listed be'.ows ($) Essentfet Monitoring Systems (1) lafety $ystem Logic ard Control Fower Surplies incitding the Re6ctor Protection (a) neutron konttoring System System (b) Process Radiation Monitoring System (2) Core and Conteirvent Cooling $ystems (c) Contaltnent Atnesphere Monitoring System (a) tesidust Heat teemat System (the) (d) Sumeession Poot fenperature Monitoring (b) High Pressure Core f tpuder (HPCF) system System (c) Automatic Depressurlastion System (ADS) -A $8,1.2.3.2 Division of $sfety Leeds < (d) Leak Detection and Isolation System for detailed (1 stings of Divlefon 1, il and (LDS) Ill loads, see Tables 8.31 and 8.3 2. (e) Reactor Cere lacletion Cooling System (RCIC) 8.i.3 Design Bases (3) ($F Support Systems 8.1.3.1 lafety Design Seses Onsite Power (e) Dieset generator Sets and Class it AC/DC 8.1.3.1.1 Generet Functional pequirements l power distribution systems. 8.1.3.1.1.1 Onsite Power Systems General (b) HVAC Emergency Cooling Water System (HECW) The unft8s total safety related toed is divided (Ma three divisions of load grot 4m. (c) Reactor Building Cooling Water (RCW) ich load aroup le fed by an treeperdent 6.9(v System sss it bus, cru vach load groe;, t es access to M off-ite and one onstte power source. An (d) Spent f uel Poot tooling System additio al onsite power source la provided by the contusGwn turbine generator (ctg). (e) Standby Gas Treatment $ystem ($G15) Each of the two rermally energlied power (f) Reactor Building Emergency HVAC $ystem feeder $ are provided f or the Divf d 41, 2 and 3 l Class 1E systems. -C lWormity two load aroups l (g) Control Building HVAC System 3,re fed from the normat preferred power sourC3 gd the third load crow is f ed f ecm the (h) High Pressure Nitrogen Gas Supply System gliernate preferred power source. I-A M igeders are used durino no % l olent ooerotion (4) $afe Shutdown Systems j u revent simulteneous deenernfration of att divisional buses on the toit of only one d thg i (a) Standby Liquid Control System ($LCS) of8 site powy swolies. l-A >The normat oref er* i t l l l l l
-. - ~ _. _... -. . - - -... = _.. -.. -,. _ _ . -. ~. ~ _.. - - -.--.. -.... -.---..-._. - i red f eeder is used dir19e the elent coerotion, with the alterrwte oreferred feeder used een the f.ormer is losy the transfer to the alternate preferred feeder is wynt. During the interim, power is automatically st4ptied by the diesel generators. The redundant Ctess it electrical load grop (Divisions I, 11, and til) are providcJ with separate onsite standby AC cover supplies, electric buses, distribution cables, controle, relays and other electrical devices. Re asdent parts of the system are physically separated -A Mrderendent lto the extent *A lthet in l+A h a sinate credible event.< l t
-A3.100 ler.v & un beste event with any 33uttino toss of eout:sient 1-R3.100 >-0.100 lend sinnte f elturelt, -83.100 lthe plant con still te shut cf2gn with either of the remaininn two divisions. l~83.100 *-ALiOO leuf f trient i remainine safety systems >tti be evellable to ef fect a saf e olent shutom for ett allewohte tw>$es of olent oreration. f -A3.100 tjIrludin2.4 sinole electrical f atture. carmt cause loss of gewee to eedundant ioldoursa indtpendent receway systems are provided to meet load group cable seperation require *ents f or Divisions 1, ll, and Ill. Divisions 1,11, and lit stardby A* power supplies have suf ficient cepecity to provide power to ett their respective loads. Loss of the normal preferred power supply, as detected by 6.9tv Ctess it bus i.nder-voltage reters, will cause the standby power supplies to start and connect automaticetty, in suf fi-r, - 3 ..,.I
~-.=- -- ~ - - Cicnt time to meintain the reactor in a safe (1) GDC 2 Dreign 81 sis for Protection against cordition, ssfety shut down the recctor or Lisit N1tural Pherm ena; the consequences of a design basis accident (DBA) to acceptable limits. The stardby power selles (2) GDC 4
- Envirorvental ord Missile Design are capable of being started and stomed manualty Bases; and are not to be stopped automatically Wring emergency operation unless required to preserve (3) GDC 5 $ haring of $tructures, Systems and integrity. Automitic start will also occur on Conponents; receipt of a levet i 1/2 signal (NPCF initiate).
The ABWR is a single mit plant design. The Class 4 o.9Kv Divisions I, 11, and 111 Therefore, this GDC in net applicable. switchgear buses, and associated 6.9(v diesel gene *uors, 480 vac distribution systems,120 VAC (4) GDC 17 Electric Power Systems; and 125 VDC power and control systems conform to Seismic Category I requirements and are housed in (5) GDC 18 Inspection and Testing of Elec. Seismic Category I structures. Seismic trical Power Systems; gualification is in accordance with IEEE standard 344 (6) GDt 50 Contairvient Design Bases. 8.1.3.1.1.2 $$LC (Safety System Logic and 8.1.3.1.2.2 NRC Regulatory Guides Control) Power Supply system Design Bases (1) RG 1.6 - Independence Between ReduMant in rder to provide redundant, ret table power Stardbv (Onsitet Power Sources of acceptable quality and availability to s @ port and Between Their Distribution the safety logic and control functions during Systems; normat, upset and accident conditions, the following design bases apply (2) RG 1.9 Selection, Design and Qualifica. tion of Diesel generator Units (1) $$LC power has four separate and trdeperdent Used as Standoy (Onsite) Elec-Class it inverter constant voltage constant tric eower Systems at Nuclear frequency (CVCF) power sumlies each backed Power Plants; by separate Class 1E batteries. (3) RG 1.32 - Criteria for Safety Related (2) Provision is made f or automatic switching to Electric Power Systems for the alternate bypass supply from its divi. Nuclser Power Plants; sion in case of a fatture of the inverter power supply. The inverter power sumty is (4) RG 1,47 Bypassed e% Inoperable $tatus i synchronized in both frequency and phase Indicotton for Nuclear Power with the alternate bypass supply, so that Plant Safety bystems; unacceptable voltage spikes will be avoidad in case of an automatic transfer f rom normal (5) RG 1.63 Electric Pene: ration Assenblies to alternate supply. The $$tC uninterrup-in Contelrvaent $tructures for tible power supply conplies with IEEE Std. Light Water cooled Nuclear Power 944 Plants; 8.1.3.1.2 Regulatory Requirements (6) RG 1.75 Physical Indeperdence of Etee-tric Systems; The following list of criteria is addressed in i accorrlante with fable 8.1 1 which is based on Isolation between Class 1E power supplies-Table 81 of the Standard Review plan, in and non Class it loads is discussed in general, the ABWR is designed in accordance with $ubsection -B 18,3.1.1.1. {-B all -A Secciticable< criteria. Any exceptions or >8.1.1.1.P.1. < clarifications are so noted. 8.1.3.1.2.1 General Design Criteria ~-
~, (7) BG 1,81 Sh red toergency cnd $hutdown -A H3) B1P ICSB 11 (PSB) Stability of offsite (tectric Systems for Kulti Unit Power Systemst Nuclear Power Plants; see subsection 8.1.4.1 for interfaC3 The ABWR is designed as a single-unit plant. reoJirem mt.< Therefore, this Regulatory Guide is not applicable. (8) RG 1.106 - Thermat Overload Protection for (tectric Motors on Motor-Operated Valves; (4) BTP IC$$ 18 (PSB)
- Aplication of the
$1ngle falture Criterion to Manually-(9) RG 1.108 - Periodic festing of Oleset Controtted Electrically operated valves; Generator Units Used as Onsite Electric Power systems at (5) BTP ICSB P1 Guidance for Application of Nuclear Power Plants; Regulatory Guide 1.47; f10) RG 1.118 - Periodic festing of Electric (6) BfP P$8 1 Adequacy of Station Electric Power and Protectlee Systems; Distribution System Voltages; ($ee subsection 8.3.1.1.7 (8)) -A >(11) RG 1.12B Installation De}jetanti instattation of terne lead Storace Batte*les for Nuclege Power Pign,Q; 1))),,JG 1.129 - Maintfnance. Testino, eM Reptocecent of larce lead storece Batter 8es for htnlese (7) 01P PSB 2
- Criteria for Alarms ard Fower Plants:<
indications Associated with Dieset* Generator Unit Bypassed arv:f Inoperable -B1.000 l(11) PG 1.153 status;
- . Criteria for Power. Instrtrentation, and (patroll Portions of Saf ety SystemM 8.1.3.1.2.4 Other $RP Criteria (12) RG 1.155 -
station Blackout (t) WURIG/CR 0660 Enhancement of Onsite Diesel Generator Reliability; 18.1.3.1.2.3 Branch Technical Positions Operating procedures and the tralning of (1) BTP IC$D 4 (PSB) Requirements on Motor-personnet are p;tside the scope of the ABWR Operated valves in the [CCS Acetriutato-Standard Plant. NUREG/CR 0660 is there-Lines; fore i mosed as an interface requirement for the applicant. See subsection 8.1.4.? This StP is written for Pressurlied Water for interface requirement. Reactor (PWR) plants only and is therefore not applicable to the ABWR. (2) IMI Action item II.E.3.is Emergency Power l $@ ply for Pressurlier Nester; (2) 81P IC$8 8 (PSB) Use of Diesel generator i Sets for Peakirg; this criteria is applicable only to PWRs The diesel generator sets a ' not used for and does not apply to the ABVR. peaking in the ABWt desig% therefore, this l criteria la satisfied. l t l l
~.. _. _. - _. (3) ini Action item fl.c.1 tmergerty Power for Pressuriser Equipment; e l This criterla is applicable v.ly to PWRs ard does not apply to the AB't. 8.1.4 Interfaces i 8.1.4.1 Stability of Of f site Power Systems I1P ICSB 11 (P$B) pertaining to the stability of effsite power systems shall be a&1ressed (See Subsection 8.1.3.1.2.3(3). 8.1.4.2 Dieset Generater Reliability WUetG/CR 0660 pertaining to the enhancocent cef onsite diesel genotator reliability through ce rating proevdures art! training sf personnel will be ad1ressed by the applicant (see Subsection 8.1.3.1.2.4(1)). +9 pffbet,e reoutrements are covered in f g,M yg 8 ? aid confirmed by on it A AC.) A 18.1.4.3 6 irperated Power Feeds foe 6.9 yV $witchneer instetrentall2und controts assoelsted with W (,tittigd avJ eiternote 6.9 RV busea feggj,Dg the non Class if lotds shet t be powered tw itet!,gte non Class ia $*dources, with cower eg jnstrtigt cables rajn senarete trays. lid lleceruted rt.n;G1gss if DC power sources are pvalleMe from any two of the four DC to DC converters shown on Hou*e 8.3 7.lu# l l l I s
8.2 0FF$ lit POWER $f tfECS
- 89.02l8.2.1.2 Descriotton of offsite Powe? tyj,1 3 8.2.1.
Description ~81.01*01.021 The of f site electricot power sysm ghija 8.2.1.1 teooe the scoce of the ABWR standard desion coq 31113 of the isolated chose tus duc t to to the low This section provides a descriotion of the voltene terminals of the, yin onwer transfor% systee desion and the Derfpemenee reJutreme,pfg ((gleted chose tus dxt to the mit ausi(jery for the of f site rower systea. The of f sNe tower , transformers. e low voltant centrator breeler. (itreconsistsoftheelectriestcircuitseg three mit euxillery transforcers. a reserve associated costrvnent for interconnection to the sukillery transformer, ard 6.9(v connections offsite transmission system. the M eillt1D from the unit munillervyyf reserve transforeets nenerator, and the onsite tower distribution ljLibe input terfinaf t of the meditas voltene gyltem9. InclWed are the Dient switchverds, thq $2Ev. $0CWVA) switehneer, es irdicated on the gt,ILtiggge transformers, the mi t euxiliary sinnie line dienrem. Finure 8.3 1. The main l transformers. the resfeve transfoirer the high cower transformer the hiah voltene leads to the yritene t{e lines from the switchverdS to the switchyseds. the switchroeds end the tuulliely transformers, the isoleted teele bytti ytth thele gguipment for these portions of the erstem ere sunitlary systems i jgjudinn relays erv3 local in the scoDe of_ the eroticent. See lection f instrtrentation enri controls, end the L 2.3.1 for t h,leterfece reoviremants for the non secrecated tAsse tUs dJets f f te the Unij ggyirinent in the sf org of the erCQQ agnitierv and reserve transferarfs to the redim vettene switetg % Air cooled isolated phase bus duet rated 36re is Drovided for a tower feed to the main oower the of f site c9wfr syste'n t*nint et the if,gnsformer. terminets on the transmission system side of the circuit bree6ers which conreet tFe switchinJ Aceneratorbreterisbrevidedinthg h gletionc to the offsite (rensmission system and isoleted these los dxt et en intermediate erds et the terminets of the cignt main eenerator location between the main manerator end tha mein end et the circuit bregjter inout termimts of the m er transformer. The cenerator breaker redite voltecej6.9(v) switt.g% ntgvided !s caogble of interruotino a menin n h f ault current of 275rA swetrieel end 140KA Portions of the of fsite rowet system fell esyPpetricet et $ fyc(g(ef ter initletion of the trder the d*sion restensibilitY of the e[plicant fault. This corr,,g}Donch to the meulPyj er his eoent end ere not inctWed ir the desian allowebte interf ace f ault current sreci.f f ed in of the ABuR stenderd plant, it is the Section 2.2.3. The low voltene cenerator, resonsibility of all concerned per*les to insure breaker ellows th,g eenerator to te tengp 4( that the totet emoleted desion of couloment and line and the main celd to be utitired as e Dower ystems f at tina within the secoe of this,. MAR source by t>eckfeedina to the unit euxillery - section be in line with the de,igIfotion and transforners and their loadE oth Ctess it and b reoutrements stated in this SSAR. however. See non Cleos 1E. This 13 also the start up rower Section 8.2.3.1.for e detelled listinog rewer source for thejd ggseriotionoftherewerinterfaceriggjreMntd i I i \\
m_. ___m Unit evchronf retion will normatty be thremh iht low voltene menerator breakte. A coincidentet three out ef three legij sch ms and synchrocheck relevs are ustd to brevent feutty s W hronitettong. Duel trio colts are t,revidnf on the breeket end control towthagotted frorf redident toed crours of the non safety related 20illt 12W DC reveh It is en interf ace rewirement tkg m hronitetton be bossible throoth the swltchina Listionie circuit bree6ers esce tection 8.2.31. There are three unit suilltierv transforreet. The transf ormers have three wlqcgLg,,njLgEh jffnsformer feeds one Cless it tus directly. two Non ttess it tuses directiv. ervi one Won Ctess it EM2.1111rectly throuch a von if to Non it bus _t i e. The w<fim vettooe tuses are in a three topd group arrennecent with thg 02n;fdtv related tmes and one saf etvareteted tus ter load aroup. fech unit I y, n..,.,, w
.. _ ~ - _. E sitimev transformer hws an oll/str retina et 65 distance of 50 feet. It is a remitement thal decrees centierede of 3tSu a foe the crimary the 50 foot minimtse_seneration be maintained by v i ylr,gjlr,g and 18.75 pit l.9L.t.t.fh secordery wirdina. Iha Inemino tie lines ejio. The tro7sformers ne forced alr/ forced oil rattru le 62.5 and are provided with ett collection bits and drains 31.25/31.25pve respectively. The norm t toe N to e sefe disteset erf L of the sin transformers is betenced with the beaviest toaded windina carryinn a toed,pf Reference is made to Flagres 4.31 for the it 7pys the heeviest transformer toedire oceves afnnte line dienrams showins the method of wAen one of the three mf + suu t tlery treng,ffr,.e,,gg feedina the toads. Seoerettee of the normal is out of service with the otant ooerotino at preferred snu atternate preferred power feeds is lutt cover. Under these corditions the kesviest aggyjished by flo2n end watts over their 12pAf windina eroef f ences e tono of 21.6tve. routes throuah the turbine, control and reselgI which it stout two thirds of its forced byitdinos eseect witMn the switchneer toons air / forced ett retina. *B1.09Z *$ee__f ahlt where they must be r >uted to the..stme sdigggg R,11eetfor a pere detailed stmery of the lineuos. The normal pref erred feeds are routHi ign:fs.*_ greed the outsidgJf the turblne buildino in en electrical timet f rom the unit tamillacy ,,,,,,)lgeonnect link,,,, pre provided in the JtQttfy it.gnsformers to the tyrbine buildina switehagg t M os t tvs duc t f tid 109.1h.e uni t eur i t i a r y - ro<vm os shown on Floure B.21. (An trdernromd tr_ansforcers so that any sinate failed gxt bank is en ocecotebte siternete.1 f om transforeer mov be teken out of service end there the feeds to the resetor buildina exit the 22eration continued on the other tw<., unit turbine buildino end continue across the roof on eusiliary transformers. One of the buses the divisions i and 3,,11de of the eontrot norme'.tv f ed by the fat ted transformer would beve tuildina (Floure 8.31). They drop down the to be ole 6ed up on the,J.eserve auxilian side of the control buildino in the sogg 1,r,,gnsformee_in order to been att reector internet h, tween the control sod repetor tvildf rg,Qg,g otros operatina so es to attain fut t power. The they enter the reactor bulloina ord continue on fuerve musilierv transformar le strad fer this through the divisjons 1 and 3_1 de of the ,1 tyre of service. geactor tnitdino to the respectilt gef etv related switehaear rooms in the resetor one three windino 3L$wvA unit reserve buildino. Ironsf ormar is sunctied to provide oower a) en alternate to the %erret Preferred" cover. One The alternste preferred feeds from the of the couelty rated secordery windinos surolles reserveevallierytransformerererouted,jnphit reserve newer to the nine (three through the turbine buildino. The turbine tuildino cross ties) non safety reteted buses and th.g switehneer feed from the reserve euxille.n other windino sunolles reserve power to the three transformer is routed direetty to the turbing safety related buses. Ibe corbined load of the buildino swig,h, geer rooms. The feed to the ,th ee safely related tvies le emot to the untrol buildina is rout _esLin corridors outside f cit /eir retina of transformer wirdino serwing of the turbine buildino switchster rooms. It them. This is covet to 60% of the forced exits the turbine buildino and crosses the mir/ forced oil retino of the transforme4 winding, control bu'tdino roof on the conesite side of the transformer is truly a reserve transformer the control buitifina from the route for the hgsme unit startuo is georetished f rom the normat preferred onwer feeds. The steem tunnel normat oreferred power. whigh is bee 6 fed over the is toested between the normat preferred feads j main power circuit to the unit punittery and the alternate preferred feeds seross the transformers. The reserve eunillery transformer 3,1g y ed roof of the control buildino. The serves no startuo function.l alternate prt erred power feed turns down f between the control pnd resetor buildina grd "B1.04a *B1.04b *B1.04c *B1.05 *st.06 je.2.1.3 enters the resetor tuildina on the division 2 leoeretion side of the The txation of the main transf ormer mit eunitierv transf,gemers, end reserve auxillerv trans4reer ere shown on Floure 8.2+1 The g userve auxiliary transformer is seostated f run the unit auxillery transformers by a miniriin . _ =,
= resetor tvildino. Frca there it continues on to 8.2.2 Analysis the resrective switthceer roms in the resetor buildino. In accordance with the WRC stardard Review } Plan (wafG 0600), lebte 81 and lection 8.2,
- 01.06 1 Instetsnent ord emtrol esbtes f or the the power distritsution system tetween the main unit munitiery transf ornenere to be routed in transformer and the Ctess it distribution system 3s,Ug metet reeewers and separate fecn the normat interfaces is designed consistent with the preferred tower cable raceways by a separation following criteria, so for as it applies to the that is emtveient to that provided for the rower non Class it ecpirment. Any exceptions or feeds. The reserve easiliary cables may not clarifications are so noted, share reeeways with any other cables, however, the instetrentation ord controls for the unit 8.2.2,1 General Design Criteria auritiary transforwere ned nenerator breaker way be routed in the rett ns correspondino to We (1)
CDC $ and RG 1.81 sharing of w
- tood aroup of their cover source. l Structures, Systems and Conponents
- B1.04c I A egetustion turbine strenties stendby the *C [AM,fC >ALWe <ls a single mit powertothenonnefetyrelatedturbinebuttdng plant design. Therefore, these criterie are buses which sucoty the termanent not app llcable.
ron safety reisted loads. It is e 9W rated self centeined unit which is capable ef ooerstl2D (2) CDC 17 Electric Power Systems; without enternal auxiliury systems. Althovah Q is toested on site, it is treated es en As shown in Figure 8.31, each of the Ctess g;tdttional of fsite source in that it stootles it divisional 6.9 KV M/C buses can reed ve power to Puttiele teed aro u of electrice,[ power f rom multiple sources. There are biti,, separate utility feeds from the station grid (via the mein transformer), and the offsIte Menvet ty controt ted breakers provide the line (via the reserve auxiliary trans-cooability of connectino the certustien turbina former). The '81.000 >two emercersy < unit generator to any one of the ecernency tuses if auxillery transformer output power feeds att other rowee sources are lost. '91.00 lend the reserve eunitiary transforcer outcut tower feeds lere routed the location of the contestion turbine by two conpletely separate paths through the cenerator (CTC) is shown on Floure 8.2 1. tht turbine building, control buildinr3 and CTC stenrfby power f eed for thLturbine buildino reactor building to their destinatic.3s in is routtd.,detytty to the syitehnee* rooms in the the energency ettetric rooms. *B1.000 Lurbine tvildino. The branch to the reactor >$eparation is provided tv routino each tuitdino is re stes!.Jlecent to the alternate n, pin on a dif ferent fleor in each preferred i + J the a:ontrol end reactor httdino. <Although these N 11 ped aroues t buildines.
- C >treins< are non Class 1E, such seper-ation assures the physical independence
- B1.01 no As indicated in section 8.1. the requirements of CDC 17 are preserved, utititv orid and3he main power trensforner are "B1.0001 not within the ABWe Standard Plant seoce. The the transformers are orovided with ott intterface 1eovirements et the main oowe.
collection olts and d.ains to e safe [ transformer are cla n in Subsection 8.2,3. Att ditooset sees. This seoerotion meets the othee euuirnent downstreem of the main power recuirements of StP CME 8 9.5 1 and is l transferrer is included in the ABWR Stardard therefore deemed edeovate.1 brt scooe. This includes the eunitigry transformers. switchvord components. the main generator, etc. which ere assioned tv $sP Lection 5.2 es beino part of the "oreferred powee system, atsg celled the "of f site rower sys tem." a since CE considers theseJorronents to te "onsite" their description is Drovided in lubsection 8.1.2.1 (3) CDC 18 Inspection and Testing of Electrical Power Systems;
~B1.08 831.07 i The low vettene newrotor breaker must open on a turb'j' trio to maintain the normal Dreferred power g olv to the 57fety bases. This breaker connot be tested duriN normat overettm of the Otant. Generette i i l l f
preekers are extremely ret tobte. There are
- 81.031 published test results showina e reliability Of fsite Poo r A tem Desian ReOJirements noter of 0.9967 for 50 close coerotions Mr year. This copperes f avorabtv with the The ste @, 'sinn of tte ABWR is based on probability of felture fe m other reuses of the certain ossu M ons concernina the destro normet ereferred power sucety.
reasirements which will be mat by the soolictint in deslinina the nortion of the of fsite power At t other co>ionent een either be tested system in his scooc. es defined in section durinc normet olent operation or it is 8.2.1.1. Those assuietions are listad here es continually tested by virtue of its oceration desion interface reovirements which tae durina normal olent oceretion and it remainina in g oticant should meet. the some stata to strolv normat eref erred power to the safety buseL ollowino e turbire trio. (1) In cese of fatture of the normat preferred f 1 power sutelv llrevit. etternate preferrM power
- B1.08 3 should normally tggggin avellebte to the reserve Att couipment een be inspected and tested in guitiery transformer, accordance with this GCC.
Q Voltece variations IL all be no more t...n h g(4) RG's 1.32,1.47, and BTP ICse 21; otus or minus 10 cercent of their rominst vetve durina normat steady state operation. Their These distribution 'C iload troups!'C _sh_ould be a volteoe die of no more then 20 ytrains are non-Class 1E and non-safety oercent durino mter startina. It is expected wteted. Therefore, this criteria is not that the sitino of the unit auxillery and applica4te. reserve auxillery transformers. (See Section 8.2.1.2) will insure that this voltece die (5)B1.0001 reautrement is met. RC 1.153 Criterie For power. Instruwntatinn end Coritral Portions of Saf ety Systems (3) Maintain the normat steady s,Dte frxivency pf the cower system within otus or minus 2 (6) RG 1.155 Station Bit;kout Cycles Der second of 60 cycles cor second durina periods of system instability. (. T B1.000.[h5 3 BTP ICS8 11 (PSB) - Stability of Offsite Power (4) Anatyre the site toecific confiouestion of Systems; the ineamino power lines to assure that the - expected avellebility of the of fsite onwer ig pl SeeSubsection*B1.000l8.2.3 cood as the assuretions made in performina the 1~B1.000>8.1.4.1<forinterfacerequirement. olent orotwbflity risk analysis. If, durina t515 enalysis. it is determined that the [ l- , 8 l(9) Appendix A to $RP Section 8.2 aveltab M tv of the power from the alternate i oreferred power source is sionificantly less l It is a recuirement that the desion. testina rellebte than the normal preferred power, normal l and instattation of the low voltece speration of att olent buses f rom the normat cenerator breeker meet the specific oreferred oower source is ecetotable and-( ouldetines of this aonendin. therefore recomended. cometlence with the evnerdix is assuredd (5) The main and reserve of f site onwer ef revits t l 8.2.3 Interfaces ghett bt electricetty indeoandent and physicatty 1pearoted. they shall be connected to switchino 8.2.3.1 'B1.03 > Power Fnterfaces stations which are independent and seoerste. They shall be Connected to dif ferent 3 transmission systems. l 16j The switchinn_s,ytlon to whhh the ma n i oHsite power circuit is connected shall have at least two fut t capacity main tx>ses arranced such that: (a) Any incomino or outgoing transmu sion line can be switched without effee,1.12q another tine: (b) Any sinate circuit breaker can be
teotated for maintenance without interrtetino service to any cir.ggj_tl (c) Faults of a sinate main bus t re f ootsted with m inteertetino servic+,to any cirCVit. l I g y
(F) The main power transformer shall be them independent ac buses. Thq.geonelty of each normaltv enerafted sinate chase transformers wijh. system shatI be adeavate to meet the ac power en additionet Instatled snare. Provisions shall reautrements for normat ooerettun of the 4 be made to cermit connectina and eneratrino the-switchina station 8s aaulement.. 3 pare transformer in no more than 12 hours feitowine a f ailure of one of the normat ty (15) 'fach transformer shalt have crimary and enernfred transformers. backup orotective devices. De power to the primary and backuo devlees shalt be sunotied (8) The main transf ormer shall be d.-stoned to - from seoarate de sources.1 meet the reaut rements of ANst standard C57.12.00. General Reautrements for Liould Irp_eIged
- B 18.2.3.2 Scope totit Interfneet Distributton Pover and Renutetire Transformers.
1 The interface point between the AtuR design (9) Phystest separation between transformers and and the utility design for the main generator oft collection shall be orovided as stat d igt output is at the connection of the isolated fire orotection in Section 9A.4.6. phase bus to the main power trar.aformer low voltage terminals. The rateo conditions for (10) Circuit breakers and disconnect switches this interface is 1500 MVA ~B1.000 S t a power shall be sired and desianed in accordance with factor of 0.9 and a voltace of l*B1.r.i0 ?_arsl the latest revision of AN51 Standard C37.06. <26.325 KV B1.07 I otus or minus 10 per centi. Preferred Ratings and Ret ^ed Capabilities for AC lt is a. requirement that the utility provide Nich Voltage Circuit Breakers Rated on a suf ficeent inpedance in the main power Symetrical Current Bast: transformer and the high voltage circuit to limit the primary side maxinua available f ault : (11) Althouch unit synchronization is normatty current contribution frm the system to no more throuch the low voltaae cenerator efreult than 275 KA synenetrical and 340 KA asymmetrical breaker, orovisions shall be made to synchrontre at 5 cycles frem inception of the fault. These the unit throua5 the switchina station's circuit values should be acceptable to most utilities. brenhers. When att equipment and system parameters are known, a refined calculation based on the known (12) At t relav schemes used for protection of the values with a fault located at the generator offsite power circuits and of the switchina - side of the generator breaker m?y be made. This 11stion's cavitnent shall be redundant end may allow a lower impedance for the main power inetude backup crotection features. At t breakers -. transformer, if desired, ghptt be eautooed with dust trio colts. Each redundant orotection circuit which suootles a The second power interface occurs at the high trio sianal shalt be connected to a seoarate trio voltage terminals of the reserve auxillary coil. At t cautoment and cablina associated with transformer. TheratedLoadis"B1.0001241 each redundant system shall be physically - 1"B1.000>30<MVAata0.9powerfactor. The separated, voltage and frequency will be the utilities standard with the actual values to be determined (13) The de power needed to operate redundant at contract award. *B1.09 I Tolerances are clus protection and control couite nt of the offsite or minus 10 per cent of nominal for voltane and - oower system shall be mootied f rom two separate. otus or minus 2 oar cent of noeninal for - dedicated switchverd'batterle$. each with a freauency. Frece*ney may very otus or minus j battery charcer fed f rom a seoarate oc bus. Ep,ch evetes per second durino periods of system-batterv shall be caoable of sucotvino the de instability. The maximun allowable voltace dio oower reautred for normat operation of the durina the startino of tarne motors is 20 %. switchino station's eaulanent. (14) Two redundant low voltane se power'suooty - gystemn shalt be provided to suooty ac oower to R switchino station's auxiliary toads. Eerh typtem shatI be supotled from separg h .~. ~,.
1 Protective relaying interfaces for the two gwer system interf aces are to be rkfined during the detail design phase following contract award.
l 10 be Su //6 C }Q Q qhr Tran smi & k l). mquce v. a-1 Po we e Dhs h-iMiuY?on spYzm Sufin D iqqmm.
m___ ~_ 8.3 CSITE POWER SYSTEMS + - 8.3.1 AC Power Systems- -t>8.3;1.1 Descriotion 5 -81.000 lihe onstte onwer system interf aces with the_of.fsite power system at the input terminals to the sucotv breakers for the normat and - alternate power feeds to the redi m voltane (7.2KY) switchoese. -It is e three load aroyo + fvstem with each load aroup consistina of a non safetv-related aryi a safety related [ portion.l-B1.000
- The auxiliary electric power system inetudes three independent Class 1E AC electrie power sys* tems for nuclear safety related loads.<-81.000 Ithe three lead groyps of the Class if power system are '
independent of each other.(- The pric-cipal:- elements of the auxiliary AC electric power systems are shown on the single line diagrams ($LD) in figure 8.3-1, -C 14. 5 and 7.1 -C 3.L, L 4 and 5. < r ~ Each Class 1E division has a dedicated diesel, generator,whichautomaticallystarts-Cjon.hinh ' drywetI oressurei tow reactor-vesset' level l-C >fn case of a tevet tr8e and/<or loss of voltage i on the divi
- ston's 6.9 kV bus. Each 6.9 kV Class 1E bus feeds it's associated 480V unit substation through a 6.9 kV/ 480/27N power center trans* former.
-81.0001 Andhv power is L ovided to oermanent non-safety-related loads in att three teat grey m 1 by a conbustion cas turbine located in the j;,y!bine butIdina. I l At power is suootied 1-C *and utilized 3-B1.000 let 6.9rv for motor toads taraer than-3 300 W and transform-ed to 480 V for smalter loads. The 480V system is further transformed l-JIsto lower voltanes as re auired,fg instrunents. tiahtina, and controls. = In eeneret. motors torner than 300W are stentled from the 6.9tv buses. Motors 300 W or smetter but tercer x then 100W are supotied oower form 4F')V switchaear. Motors 100W or smat,ler are sumotied oower from 480V motor control centers. s j see $ 4section 8.3.4.9 for inte'rface. ~ ~ regiurements. -B1.000l5,31.0 Non-$afety-Related AC Power System - 8.3.1.0.1 - Non-Safety Related Medlun Voltage Power - a c,-.-_ ~~ ,._..w,, , _,_. ;., x., c.., a__.._..,2_.....
gi,g ribution System The non tafety-related rediun voltene power distribution system consists cf nine 6.9KV buses' divided into three load aroups. The three toaj nroto confiouration was chosen to match the mechenfest systems which are mostly three trains (Three feedwater ours, three circulatino watte rsros. three turbine buildino supply and exhaust fans). VithinJach toad proup there is one tus which sucolies power production @, ads which do not provide water to the pressyre vesset. Each one of these buses has access to power f rom one windina of its assioned unit auxilleev 3,Lensfccmer. It also het access to the reserve ouvitiary transformer es en alternate source if its unit eunitiary transformer faits or durino maintenance outenes for the vrmal feed. Bus transfer is manuel dead bus transfer end not gu,tomatie. Another bus within ea:h load neoun suceties oower to oumns which ere capable of suontvino water tg the cressure vesset durino rormal power operation (i.e. the condensate and f eedwater coos). These buses normattv receive power from th Q,{ i ,curit iary transformer and sucolv rower to th,3 third bus (plant investment protection (PIP)) in l the load croup te2 3h a cross-tie. The cross-tie automt..cally coens on toss of oower but may be manually rectosed if-it is desired to operate a condensate or feedwater omo f rom the cortet ton turbine or the reserve auxiliary transformer which are connettable to the PIP buses. This cross tie arrenaement allows. advantece to be taken of the fact that the feedwater oumos are meter detven throuch an adjustable speed drive so that they have low startino currents uM con be started eM run et low onwer. The cowb d ion turbine and reserve auxiliary transforcer have sufficient caoacity to .g,tyrt either or both the reactor feedwater and condensate c m ps in a toad aroup. This orovides gree load croups of non-safety crede eautoment in edditien to the divisional 1E teed aroups which may be used to sucols water to the reactor vessal in emercencies. A third bus sureties Dower to permanent ,n,,nn safety leads such as the turbine tx;f tdina WAC. the turbine buildino servlee water and the - turbine buildina closed coolina water systems. On toss of normat oreferred cowar the cross tie to the power production bus is automaticatty trioc M ocen and the oermanant non safety retaled. Jus is eutematicallY transferred (two out of the three buses in the lead groucs transfer) via e dead bus transf er to the cort)ustion turbine which
l l autometteatly eterQs on toss of oower. ' The unent service systess for each load aroup automaticaltv restart to succort their load aroups. The buses are coreised of 7.2tV 500MvA metet eted switchaear with a bus full lead ratino of 7000A. Maximun cateuteted fut t toad short line current le 1700A. - aus ratinas of 3000 ggar,es are avaltable for the y ttchaear as insurance aneinst future load crowth. H necessery The reautred interruptino cannetty is 41.000 anoeres. The 6.9tV buses simotv Dower to adjustable speed arives for the f ee& ster and reactor internal pues. These adjustabte speed drives pre desinned to the reautrements of IEEE std 519. Guide for Harmonie Control and Reactive Concensatico of Static Power Converters. Voltane distortion limits are es a.tated in Table 4 of the IEEE Std. 8.3.1.0.2 Non-Safety Related low Voltane Power Distribution System Power for the 480V auxitfories is sumotied from power centers consistino of 6.9rV/480 volt transformers and associated metaleted switehaear. Figure 8.3 1. There are six non sofety related. 4 two per lead arouo. oower centers. One cower- -l center oer load aroup is s m iled power from the oermanent non-safety bus for the toad aroup.l -B1.000'l8.3.1.0.3 Non-Ctess 1E Vitat AC Power-Szety System The function of the Non-Class 1E Vital AC Power Supolv system is to orovide reliable 120V uninterruptible AC oower for importent non-safetv-related toads that are recuired for continuity of power plant operation. The evstem consists of three 120V AC uninterruptible constant vattene. cor:stant -f recuency (CVCF) oower suDolles. eeth j includina 's statie inverter. AC and DC statie ' transfer switches. a reautatino step mf _ transformer (es an alterna*e AC nower s motv). ) and a distribution panel (Floure 8.3 5). The primary source of power comes from the non-Ctesg' 1E AC motor controt centers. The seconda,ry source is the non-Ctess 1E 125 VDC centra;' -distribution canets. There are three automatic switchina modes for ' the CVCF oower supot f es, any of which may be initiated manuattv. First, the frecuency of the output of the inverter is normet ty synchronited with the inout AC cower. If the f reGJneCy of the irput power noes out of rence, the oower sucotv.
A switches o"er to intemet synchrontration to restore the frecuency of its output. Switchino 'back to enternal syncheonitation is automatic and occurs if the f reauency of thew AC power has been Igitored and maintained for amorontmatelv E Second5. I 3 The s N ond switchino mode is from At to DC for the o.wer source. If the voltane of the inout AC power is less than 88% of the rated voltene/ the inout is switched to the DC cower sumpty. The inout is switchec tasek to the AC oower ef ter a confirmation period of sooronisately 60 seconds. 4 The third switchina mode is between the inverter and the voltane reautatino transformer. If any of the conditions listed below occur. the power t.ucotv is switched to the voltene reautatina transformer. (e) Outout voltaae out of ratino by filore than otus or minus 10 per cent (b) Outout frecuency out of retina by nvare than etus or minus 3 oer cent (c) Mich tenceratu'e Insida of osmet (d) Loss of control power sunoty (e) Commutetton feiture (f) Overcurrent of smoothian condenser (a) Less of control power for note circuit th) Incomino wCCB trio (i) Cootino fan trio Followina correction of any of the above even,11 transfer back is by manuet initiation ontL 1-B1.000 l8,3,1,0 A Cornouter vitet At Po.er Sucety System (Non-Safety Related) Two constont vettaae and constont f recuenev Lower sucolies are provided to power the process c oncuters. Each of the power sumoties consists pf an At to 00 rectifier; and a DC to AC inver-ter. a bvoass transformer and DC and AC solid gigte transfer switches (Floure 8.3 5), the no, mal feed for the power suootles is from non Ctess 1E power center sucol led from the 4 permanent non setetv-related buses which receive power from the contustion turbine if of f:ite ~ power is lost. The backup for the normet fetds is from the 250v0C bettery. Each oower sumoty is provided with a backuo AC feed thovah isolation ' ' transformers and a static transfer switch. = Tbj bacuuo feed is o*cvided for alternate use dueino l1 . maintenance periods.. Switchina of the power I-sucotv is simiter to that described for the-Non-vitet AC power Sumoty system. above. See section 8.3.1.0.3. J: L 1 . u.
The inteetocks for the bus aroundino devices are es follows: Sefety Reteted et Power Distribution System (1) Undervottooe relevs must be actuated. 8.3.1.1.1 Medium Vettene safetydeleted Power g) A Sj eeder beeskers must h in the Distribution System disconnect DesitIon. 1 -81.000 > At power is s uoct ied and ut i t i red et (3) Voltene for but instiswentation sveitable. [29 kV for motor toads tercer then 300 rv and ILrnef orm-ed to 480 y f or smet ter toeds. The Converselv. the bus feeder breake*s are 480V system is further transformed into tower inetriocked such that they cannot close untest voltenes es re* outred for instruments tiahtina, their essociated aroundino breakers are in their and controls. The 6.0 kV system includes normel disconnect oositions.1 and alternate oreferred power supolv feeders. -B12.01 1 Standw At power for Ctess it buses I Class 1E AC power loads are divided into is suo-olied by diesel cenerators et 6.9 iv and three divisions (Divisions I,11, and Ill), each distri-bulgd by the Class 1F oower distribution fed from en independent 6.9 kV Class if bus, gyjtem. Division I. 11 end !!! buses are During normat operation -A > 1-Z1.11 -A1.08 outomaticatty transferred to the dies 11 -A1.11 Mich inetudes et t modes of plant nenerators when the r.ormat oreferred powgr poerotion; i.e. shutdown. refuelina, startue. sucoty to these buses is lost. end run.). two of the three divisions l-A1.08 1 -A1.11 > Division 1. DI Iston !! and Di vision -98.03c IThe division I safety related bOs has Ill loads <ere fed from en offsite normat one non safety related teed on it. The toed is-preferred power supply. *A1.02-A1.1111h2 e oower center whleh sucot tes power to the fine remainino division shall be fed f rom the motion control rod drive (FMCRD) motors. etternate onwer source (See Subsection 8.3.4.9).1 Althovah these motors are not safety-rrteted, the drives mov be inserted as a backup to serem "A12.01 leach 6.0 kV bus hes e safety and are of speelet importance because of this. cecJndino circuit breaker desianed to prote(i It is important that the first evellebte stan 'by cgesonnet durina maintenance coeretions (see power be eveltable for the motors. therefore e f,,,imure 8.3 1). Durino oeriods when the buses are dieset sucotied but was chosen es the first gueraired these breakers are reeked out (i.e source of standby se power and the ccabusti,pn. u jn the disconnect position). A control room turbine es the second backvo source. Division I unnunciator sounds whenever any of these breakers was chosen because it was the most tinhtte are rocked in fo service. toeded dieset cenerator. The toed breaker in the division I switchaear 11 cart of the isoletion scheme between the safety related power and the non-safety-related toed. In addition to the normat oveccuerent triocina of this isolation breaker. rone selective interlockino is provided between it and its upstream Ctess it bus feed breaker. If f ault current flows in the non Class 1E toed. it is sensed by the Ciess 1E ruerent device for the isolation breaker end a trio blocking sinnat is sent to the upstream Class 1E feed breaker. This blockina tests for' about 75 mi t t iseconds. This attows the isolation breaker to trio in its normal instantaneous tripolna time of 35 to 50 mit t iseconds, if the mannitude of the f euti current is hiah enough. Th's assures that the f_eult current has been terminated before the Ctess 1E upstream breaker is f ree to trio. For f ault currents of lesser maonitude, the blockina detev wilt time out without either breaker triooina. but the isolation breaker witt
, ytuot ty 2rio and etWevs before the uDstreM breaker. This order of tricoino is essured by the coordination between the two breakers providad by lono time cickue. lono time detev and instantaneous Dickup trio device chorecteristics, triopina of the class 1E feed breaker is norpal for feutts which occur on the Ctess 1E bus it feeds. Coordination is orovided between the bus main feed breakers and the tog breakers. The zone selective interloc'. is a feature of the trio unit for the breaker and is tested when the other features such as es rent setting _gnd long-time de. lev are tested. A pair of intertocked breakers ire orovided at the inout to the power center transformer to supoly Dower to the transformer from either the safety related dieset cenerator backed txis or the non safety related cortustion turbine backed bus. Switchover is automatie on loss of power from the safety-related source. Switchina back to the safety-related power is by manual action only. The beesker in the safety related lec of the oower sucotv is division I associated. The breaker in the non safety related leo is non-safety-retered on thf basis of the electrical isolation of its controls, the feet that there are two breakers between it and the Class 1E 6.9KV buuna that the transfer breakers are interlocked so that only one can be in the closed condition. The circuits on the outout side of the oower center transformer are non-safety-related on the basis of the Isoletion orovided by the tw2 upstrerm breakers and the power center transformer. It is s!so a reavirement that they cannot be etessified anythino other than rve-sofety-related so that they con never be routed as assoelated with cables of any safety related division.l 8.3.1.1.2 Lew Voltage -B isefety-Reteted l Power Distribution System 8.3.1.1.2.1 Power Centers Power for 480V auxiliaries is setied f rom -C leower l-C Sload < centers censisting of 6.9 kv/480V transfor-mers ard associated metal clad switchgear, Fig-ure 8.3--C M -C >J,5 -816.01 ># There are three 480 VAC non-cia _s.,g 1E power centers which are resoectively and individually fed from Division I. II and til s.9KV Class 1E buses. Isolation breakers are provided between the Ctess 1E and non-Ctess 1E l 1
. _ = - ~- buses. -In addition to' normal overcurrent tricolna of the isolation breaker, none selective intertockins is provided between end footation breaker and its upstream Class 1E feed breaker.' ff feutt current lisws in the non class 1E bus, it is sensed by the Class 1E - currept device for the isolation breaker and a trio blockina sianal is sent to the metream - Closs M e h sker. This blockins lasts for-about 7$ si t t(see'g%.' This atters the isolet w' Trocker to trio in its normat instantaneous trimoina time of 35 to 50 mittiseconds.-if the maanftude of the fault. current is hiah enouch. This assures that the fault current has been terminated before the Cips 1E unstream breaker is free to trio. For fault currents of tesser meanitude, the blockina detav will time out without either breaker trimoina, but the isolation breaker will - eventually trio and alWays before the @ stream . breaker. This order *)f trimoina'is assured by the coordination between the two breakers. providaf by tone-time ofckup. lona time detavi and instantaneous ofcktm trio device characteristics. This coordination is carriqp - throuah to the non-class if load breakers so that for a load fault the load breaker would -normatty trio without the bus isolation breeker-trimoina. Trimoina of the Class it feed breaker is-normat for faults which occur on the Class il g_. '.+ '. - _., ,1.-- ,r,-, w,, .-r-2y. r -, e
.f 1 6 i h a __._______.__.__m _E-_____.
.fs'C y\\/ C l _) ~ 8.3.5 References in ackfition to those codes and standards regJired by the $RP the following codes an standards will be used and have been referenced in the text of this chapter of the $$A4. I IEEE Std 323 Qualifying Class 1E Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations IEEE sto 334 Standard for Type Test of Continuous Duty Class 1E Motors for Nuclear Power. Generating Stations IEEE Std 379 standard Application of the Single Failure Criter;on to Nuclear-Power Generating $tations IEEE Std 382 Standard for Qualification of Safety Related Valve Actuators IEEE Std 383 Standard for Type Test of Class 1E. Electric Cables, Field Splices, and Connections'for Nucleer Power Generating Station IEEE Std 387 Standard Criteria for Dieset Generator Units Applied as Stan4y Power Supplies l 7 for Nuclear Power Generating Stations IEEE Std 450 Recommended Practice for Large Lead Storage Batteries for Generating Stations and $ 46tations-J IEEE std 485 Reccamended Practice for slaing Large-Lead storage Batteries for Generating: Stations and 5 4 stations IPCEA S 66-402 Thermoplastic Insulated Wire & Cable i l i for the Transmission and Distribution - of Electrical Energy .1PCEA 54 440/ Aspacities Cables'in open top Cable NEMA WC-51 Trays IPCEA s 66-524/ Cross Linked Thermosetting Polyethylene NEMA WC 7 Insulated Wire and Cable for the Transmission and Distrittation of - Electrical Energy '- t.. l
.. - -_ - ~ A partial listing of other consion industry starderds which any be used as applicable is given below. There are many more standarch referenced in the starderds which are Listed here. Motor Control Centers NEMA IC$ 2 standards for Industrial control-Devices, Controllers and Asserettes underwriter's Ledoratories starderd No. 845 Low voltage Circuit Breekers ANSI C37.13 Low Voltage Power Circuit Breakers ANSI C37.16 Preferred Ratings and Related RegJirements for Lod Voltage AC Power Circuit Breakers and AC Power Service Protectors ANSI C37. 17 Trip Devices for AC and Ceneral-Purpose DC Low Voltage Power Circuit Breakers - ANSI C37.50 Test Proce&res for Low voltage AC Power Circuit Breakers Used in Enclosures Molded Case Circuit Breekers UL 489 Branch Circuit and serv;ce Circuit Breakers NEMA AB 1 Molded Case Circuit Breakers 7.2rv Metalcted $witchgear-ANSI C37.01 Application Guide for >vwer Circuit Breakers ANSI C37.04 AC Power Circuit Breaker Rating Structure ANSI C37.06 Preferred Ratings of Power Circuit Breakers ANSI C37.09 - Test' Procedure for' Power Circuit _ Breakers.. AN$1 C37.11 Power Circuit Breeker Centrol Requiremmts ' ANSI C37.20 Switchgear Assentlies and i Metat Enclosed Bus ANSI C37.100 Definitions for Power Switchger ,,..-,.s.,.- ~ .c. .. =. . ~..
fransformers Ahlt C$7.12 General Requirements for Distribution, Power, and Regulating fransformers l ANs! C57.12.11 Guide for Instattation of olt imersed Transformers (10MVA and targer, 69-287 kV reting) J ANs! C57.12.80 Terminology for Power and Distribution Transformers AN$1 C57.12.90 test code for Disteltution, Power, and Regulating Transformers t l l l l l
-A16.01 Dor its Class 1E toads <-A96.01-d19.000 lit feeds. Caordination is provida between the bus mala feed breakers..end the lead breekers.<# Class 1E 480V -C l rower l-C >tood < centers supplying Class 1E loads are arranged as independent radial sys tems, with each 480V bus fe by its own power transfo m e. Each 480V Class 1E tus in a divi sion is physicalf y and electrically independent of the other 480V buses in other divisions. The 480V unit substation breakers supply mo-tor control centers and -A >460V<nctor loads up to I 1 I s i l l i l l + .y
ced fretuding 300KW. Switchge:r for the 480V toad centers is of indoor, metat enc'Med type with drawout circuit breakers. Control power is f rom the class it 125 VDC power system of the same division. 8.3.1.1.2.2 Motor Control Centers The 480 MCCs feed motors 90KW cnd smaller, control power trarsformers, process heaters, motor operated valves and other smalt electri-cally operated auxiliaries, inctu:fing 480 120V and 480 240V transformers. Class 1E motor control centers are isolated in separate load groups corresponding to divisions established by the 480V unit substations. Starters for the control of 460V motors snel-ter than 90KW are MCC-mounted, across the tfne magnetically operated, air break type. Circuits leading from the electrical penetration assem-biles into the containment area have a fuse in series with the circuit breakers as a backup pro-tection for c f ault curren' .n the penetration in the event of circuit breakei overcurrent or fault protection failure. 8.3.1.1.3 120/240v Distribution System. Individual transformers and distribution penets are located in the vicinity of the loads requiring 120/240V power. This power is used for lighting, 120V receptacles and other 120V toads. 8.3.1.1.4 Instrment Power Supply Systems
8.3.1.1.4.1 120V AC Safety Rstatd Instement Power System Individual transformers supply 120V AC instru-ment power Figure 8.3-4 Each Class it division-at transformer is s e lted from a 480V hCC in the same division. There are thres divisions, each backed up by its divisional diesel generator as the source d en the offsite soJrce is lost. Po. wer is distributed to the individual loads from distr'bution panels, and to logic level circuits through the control room togic penets. 8.3.1.1.4.2 120V AC Safety Related -C IVital AC Power 1upolv Syste9 l-C >Uninterruotible Power Suroties (UPS)< 8.3.1.1 4.2.1 Constant Voltage, Constant freqt sey (CVCF) Power S q ly for the Safety System Logic and Control (SSLC)-C > for the R ector Protection System (RPS)< i The power supply for the -C >RPS <SSLC is shown in Figure 8.3--C M -C >y1 with each of the four buses supplying power for the independent trip systems of the SSLC system. Four constant vcitage, constant frequency (CVCF) control power buses (Divisions I, 11, Ill, and IV) have been established. They are each normally supplied independently from inverters which, in turn, are -C Inormally sucotled onwer via a static switch from a rectifier which t.e d ves 480V divisional powe g A 125V Oc e battery orovides an alternate source of oower grough the static switch. l-C >#surot ied f rom four independent and redundant -A26.000 >AC and<DC supoties -A 3.<-A26.000 l h t
f.and three 8ndcoendent and redundant AC clso supply power to neutron monitoring sys?em sucotien.l<W and parts of the pr-ess radiation monitoring system and MSIV. function in the leak detection for Divisions I, II, and 111, the AC supply is system. Power distribution is arranged to from a 480 V MCC for each division. The backup prevent innovertent operation of the reactor DC supply is via -C la stati: switch and la DC/AC scram initiation or MSIV isolation @ on loss of inverter from the 125VDC centrat/ distribution any single power supply. board for the division. A -C lsecorid latatic switch also is capable of transferring from the Routine maintenance can be conducted on inverter to a direct feed through a voltage equipment associated with the CYCF power supply. regulating transformer from a 480V motor control Inverters and solid state switches can be center for each of the three divisions. Inspected, serviced and tested channet by channel without trigping the RPS logic. Since there is no 480V AC Division IV power, Division IV is fed fr m a Division I motor -B1.000 >l(Moved to 8.3.1.1.4.2.4)l8.3.1.1.4.2.2 control center. Otherwise, the AC supply for the Class 1E RPS and MSIV Solenfods Powee Supph Division IV CVCF power sunply is similar to the other three divisions. The DC supply for Three of the CVCF cower supply buses are . Division IV is backed tp by a separate Division desianed to orovide power to the APS serem and IV battery. ,MSIV solenoid vatves. The bus for the RPS A se?enoids is supotted by the Division 11 CVCF The CVCF power supply buses are designed to power sucoty. The RPS B solenoids bus is provide logic and control power to the four-puootied from the Division 111 CYC8 power division SSLC syst o that operates the RPS. (The sucolv. The #3 solenfods for the MStVs are $$t,C for the ECCS derives its power from the 125 powered from the Division I CYCF and the #2 VDC power system (Figure 8.3 7)]. The AC buses soleniods, from the Division 11 CVCF coygI suDoly.4 -B1.000 >*8.3.1.1.4.2.3 -81.000 l(Moved to 8.3.1.0.3)l-01.000 Process Corouter Constant Voltane Constant Frecuency (CVCF) Power Suopty - two constant voltace end constant frecuency power sucoltes are provided to power the ococess Emout ers. Each of the power sucoties consists of an AC to DC rectifier. and a DC to AC inver-ter, e bvoass transformer and DC and AC solid - state transfer switches (Fiaure 8.3 5). Th3 h normet feed for the power suootles is fece a non-Class 1E power center sucolied from the Division 1 diesel cenerator for one power supolv l and from a non-Cless 1E coder canter sucolied f rom the Division !! diesel nenerator for the other power sucolv. The backuo for the normat feeds is frcm the 250VDC bettery. Each power sucoty is provided with a backup AC feed though isolation transformers and a statie transfer switch. The backup feed is oroviced for atternate use durino maintenance ceriods. 8.3.1.1.4.2.4 --B1.000 f(Moved to 8.3.1.0.4)l-B1.000 >Non Class 1E Vitat AC Power System < -81.000 >is The function cf the Non Class 1E Vital AC Power Supply System is to orovide ) reliable 120V<# )
-B1.000 >hinterruptible AC oower f or important 8.3.1.1.4.2.-B 1}}-B >f,3_ Operating _ ~ ~ non-safety related inads that are reautred for ~ Configuration continuity of power cient operation. The system consists of two 120V AC uninterruptible CvCF The four 120 VAC essentist power supplies op-power sunottes. each inetudins a statir inverter, erste independently, providing four divisions of-AC and DC static transfer switches. a reauietina CVCF power supplies for the TSLC. The normat steodown transformer tas an atternate AC power _ tineup for each division is through an essentist-gg! gly). and a distribution panet (Floure 8.3 6). 480 VAC power supplyj the AC/DC rectifier, the The crimary source of power enmes from the inverter and the static transfer switth. -C non Class 1E AC oewer centers. The seconda.r_y > Transfer from the inverter directly to the es-source is the non-Class 1E 125 VDC centrat~ sentist AC source is done automaticatty in case dist ributim,penh_ _ of inverter f atture, or to the DC source in case .p h,tifier or AC cower failure. Anrunc 8 at ang iftheinverterfaits.theACstaticswitch in the control room-is provided for any of the - ttansfers to the remtatina transformer without atte nate operatina modes. Three of the four i interruption (not more than 4 meee). If the Ar,. divisions simotv indeoendent cower to the RPS source or rectifier faits. the DC thyristee ntam solenoids and the MSIV solenoids for switch transfers to tNe DC source wittsy" - h olition. < interuption.<# dI 'There are three automatic switchina modes 8.3-1.1.4.2.-d 121 -B i Cornponnts -tor the CvCF'oower suootles. any of which may be initiated manually. First, the freauency of the Each of the four Class if CYC8 gwee e.grLies output of the inverter is normatty synchronized includes the following coeponents: with the incut AC power. if the freauneev of the f rqut power r.oes out of rance, the newer (1) a power distribution cobinete itchsMng the supolv switches over to internal synchronization CYCF 120 VAC tus ecs circW t breakers for to restore the freauency of its output. the $$LC toas; $witchina back to external _synchrontration 3 automatic and occurs if the freauenCv of~ thew AC (2) a solid state ' serts...to ec net 125 VDC power has been restored and maintain-d for power to 120 VAc umnterrupdbte power aooconimately 60 seconds. supply; The second switchinn mode is from At to DC for (3) a solid-state transfer switch to sense in-the power source. If the voltece of the inout - verter failure and automatically switch to _ AC snwer is less than 88% of the rated voltane. slternate 120 VAC power; the inout is switched to the DC power simotv. The inout is switched back to the AC power after-(4) a 480V/120V bypass transformer for the al-a confirmation oeriod of sooroximatelv 60 ternate power supply; 3, peon #s. j. (5) a solid state transfer switch to sense -C The third switchina_. mode is between the inverter l > rectifier or <AC -C H nputJ power failure and the voltane reautatinn trinsformer. 'If any_, and automatically switch to alternate 125 - ~ of the conditions listed below occur.~ the oower VDC power. Sucoty is switched to the voltaae reautatina - l transformer. (6) a manual transfer switch for maintenance. ,_,Ja) Output vottane out of ratina by more ~ than otus or minus 10 oer cent ' l '8.3.1.1.4.2.6 (Deleted) (b) Outout frecuency out of ratina by more; i - than otuo or minus 3 per cent l (c) Hinh temperature inside of canet (d) Loss of control power sucoty (e) Consutatton f alture ' 1(f) Overcurrent of emoothina condenser (c) Lois of control oower for cate cireyh ~ b) Incomina MCC8' trio' ( (1)Coojjn.2 fen trio-Followino correction of any of the atmve events transfer back is by manual-init.ation only. 1-C18.3.1.1.4.2.4 Ctest 1E RPS and MSf4-
}otenfods Power Surely Three of the CVCF power supply Nses provilt power to the RPS scram arri NSIV solenoid valvet as a part of their toad.l-C > Three of the [VCF power sgely buses are desioned to provide power to the RPS scram and MS1V solenoid valves.<-C l The Ns for the PPS A solenoids is suretied by the Division 11 CYCF power supoly. The #PS 9 solenoids bus is supott,gy frem the Division 111 CvCF oower sucety. The #3 soleniods for the MSivs are coered f rom the Division I CVCF; and the 82. <teniods. from the Division 11 CVCF cower sucotyd 8.3.1.1.5 Class 1E Electric Equipnent Considerations The following guidelines are utilized for class 1E equignont. 8.3.1.1.5.1 Physical Separation and Independence -B4.000 -B6.000 -810.01b i Alt etectrirM eauirrnent is senaasted in accordance with lj ff. Std 384. peoutatory Guide 1.75 and Generat Desian C*iterion 17. with the followino. glarifyina interpretations of IEEE Std 3 h Lt3 Enclosed solid metal receways are reovired for separation between safety-retated or associated cables of different safety divisions or between safety related or associated cables end non safety-related gg)tes if the vertical senaration distance is less than five feet, the horizontal separation distance is less than three feej and the cables are in the same fire areal (?) Both urevoinas of cables recuirina separation per item one must be enclosed in solid metal raceways. To meet the provisions of Poliev Issy SECY-89-013. which relates to fire tolerance, three hour rated fire barriers are provided between areas of different safety divisions-throuchout the olent except in tne crimary contalment and the controi room conotex. See 3ection 9.5.1.0 for a detailed descriotion of how the provisions of the Policy Issue are met. 1 -84.000 -86.000' > Eculement of one division is secrecated froen eovirment of other divisions and nondivisional eautoment, in accordance with IEEE Std 39/.. We-gulatory Guide 1.75 and l General Desian Criterion 17.< The overall 1 design objective is to locate the divit,ional . equipnent and its associated con-trol, l
.. -....~. instrunentation, electrical steporting systens and interconnecting cabling such that sepa_ ration is maintained among att divisions. -84.00 -36.000 > Divisional seoaration is achieved ~ throush the use of -A6.000 lthree hour fire Isted Ibarriers <-A n. sostial-seoaration.<-84.000 -86.000 -810.01a >gsl totally enclosed racewevt. -A4.05 IClass 1E to non Class 1E seoaration 's desinned in-accordav e with the reautrements of IEEE 384. I (See subsection 9.5.1.0)l g Redundant divisions of electric equipment and cal'ing are located in separate rooms or fire areas wherever possible. -84.000 >In.some -A3.000 Isoecificlinstances son - tial seoarati20 is previded such that no sincie event may disable more than one of thelech.rdant divisions - or orevent safe shutdown of the olent with either of the remainino two power divisions. ~ -A lThere are analized and lustified in Anoend!M 9A.S.51<- i Electric equipment' and wiring for the Class. 1E systems'which are segregated into separate divisions are separated -84.000 -B6.000 >-A6.000 ~ land barrieredl< so that no design basis event-is capable of disabling more than one division of any ESF total function, i' I l I l. l r ~, -., w. ,., - i -,,..~ ;,. L, ;, -. n,v. .dn.,., - , -. J.
The safety-related divisf orut AC switchgetr, -Cl power l-C> toad < centers,batteryroomsand DC distribution penets and MCCs are located tc provide separa-tion ard electrical isolation among the divi sions. Separation is provided among divisional cables being routed between the equipnent rooms, the Main Control Room, containment and other processing areas. Equipwnt in these areas is divided into Divisions I, II, 111 and IV anc parated by 4 barriers formed by watts, floors. rd ceilings. the equipment is located to faciti tate divisional separation of cable trays and to provide access to electrical penetration assem-blies. Exceptions to this separation objective are identified and analyzed as to equivalency and acceptability in the fire hazard analysis. -A Itsee Aroendin 9A.5)! The penetration assemblies are located around the periphery of the containment sad at diffe-rent elevations to facilitate reasonably direct routing to and f rom the equipnent. . penetra-tion carries cables of more than one division. -A7.01 Iseparation within the main control reem is desianed in accordance with IEEE 38/.. and is dj evssed in Subsection 8.3.1.4.1. l l l l 6
. _. _ -. ~ - - - - -... ~.--.. -..... . - =. - 8.3.1.4.2.2.3.l ing. putt in and driving tcrque frieded for f the particular application, with due consid- ~A7.01' > Divisional cables to and f rom the. eretien for capabilities of the power: contaireent and to and from the dedicated sources. -A13.06 (Plant aesfun divis?onal eautoment in the reactor tulldino =are speelfications 3 r electrical eautoment routed in seoarated cable raceways for each reavire such eautoment be canable of divisioni toutinn is maintained up to the continuous oceration for volcane terminal cabinets in the main control room.< flygtuations of +/ 10%. In addition. Cla11t 1E motors must be able to withstand voltane Wiring for att Class 1E equipment indicating droos to 70% rated durine startina tights is an integral part of the Class 1E cmbles fransientsj.- used for control.of the same equipment and are considered to be class 1E circuits. (2) Power sources, distribution systems and branch circuits are designed to maintain Associated cabies -AS.000 I. If any.1 are . voltage and frequency within acceptable treated as Class 1E circuits and routed in their Limits. corresponding divisional raceways. Separation requirements are the same as for Class 1E (3) the selection of setor insulation such as circuits.-88.000 lAssociated cables are reautred Class F, H or B is a design consideration to meet att of the reavirements for Class 1E based on service requirements and environ-cables;l ment. The' Class'?E motors a* qualified by'
- tests in accordarse with IEEE Std 334.
the careful placing of equipment is inportant to the necessary segregation of circuits by divi-(4) Interrupting capacity of switchgear,'-C, sion. Dettberate routing in separate fire areas l power l-C> toed < centers,motorcontrot on different floor levels, and in embedded ducts centers, and distri bution pinets is is employed to achieve physical independence. 4A21.01 feaual'to or arcater than the merim e avaltable fault current to which it - 8.3.1.1.5.2 Class 1E Electric Equipnent Design is exoosed under att modes of. Bases and Criteria operation. l-A6.000 >concatible with the chort eircuit current available at the (1) Motors are sized in accordance with NEMA Class 1E buses.< standards. the manufacturers' ratings are-at least large enough to produce the start-Interrupting capacity requirements of the /t '6.9kV Class 1E-switchgear-is selected tc,' acconnodate the available short circuit current at the switchgear terminals. Circuit breaker and appt(cations are.in - (accordance with ANSI Standards. (See subsectton 8.3.4.1 for interface-requirements). Unit substation transformers are sized and inpedances chosen to faellitate the selection of' low-voltage switchgear MCCs and distribution - penets, which are optimized within the manufac-turer's recontrended Tatings for interrupting capacity and coordination of overcurrent - devices. Impedance of connecting -A21.01-luostream Icebte is factored in for a specific physicat Layout. 8.3.1.t.5.3-testing-l- the design provides.for periodically testing. . the chain of system elements from sensing devi-ces through driven equipment'to assure that . Class 1E equipment;is functisning in accordance. - with design requirements. -A31.01'isuch on-line. -testino is neeatty enhanced bY the desIQn. whICh u._ a -a. m . w..~
A utittres three tr& w, &<,t divisions, any one of whleh een safety shut down the plant. l The ? I i s . ~ n. .., - ~ --n e e,,. e- +
requirements of IEEE Std 379 -A31.01 IPeautatory Guide 1.118 and 1EEE 338 lore met. 8.3.1.1.6 Circuit Protection 8.3.1.1.6.1 Philosophy of Protection Simlicity of load grosping' f acilitates the i l i W g-w wy,,,,-y-9g-g y-9 ,.p
= - - _ = - use of conv*ntionst, prettettve rotsytro prectt-Other pret:ctive r6teys, such cs lors cf ces for isolation of faults. taphs.ls has been cultrtig,, antlectoring (reverse power) i pieced on preserving function and limiting loss overcurrent voltage restraint, A17.01 hts of Class it equipmnt function in situations of f eelet water oressurel high Jacket water pnwer loss or equiptent laiture. temereture and low lite o(t pressure, are used to protect the sc hine when operating in Circuit protection of the Class it tunes parattet with the rormal power system, during vontained within the ructeer letand is interf aced periodic tests. The reters are wtomatically with the design of the overett protect' m system isolated frca the tripping circuits during LOCA omir6e the ruclear Island, cordhlons. -Ai?.03 howeve y tt broasted gp,f,mgters are arruneisted i the metn control 8.3.1.1.6.2 Groundfrt Methods row (see subsection 8.3.1.1.8.5). The broessti are testeblg_pfd are mametty eeset as reautred the pedita voltage (6900v) system is low re* by Poaltlen 7 of een, cuide 1 91 ho trips are sistance grounded except that each diesel bypassed during LOPP of twating. generator is high resistance pro d ed to maximite eveiisbl tIty. 6.3.1.1.7 Lead shedding eM f xpeneing on Class it Sunes 8.3.1.1.6.3 Bus Protection This subsection aMresses Class it Olvisions gus protection is as follows: 1, 11, and Ill. Load shedding, but transfer and sequencing on a 6.9kV Close it bus is initiated (1) 6.9kV bus incoming circuits have inverse on loss of bus voltage. Only LOPP signets are line overiced, ground f ault, bass used to trip the loads. m sever, the presence dif ferential and undervoltage protet, tion. of a LOCa during LOPP reduces she tiee delay for initiation of bus transfer f rom 3 secoMs to 0.4 (2) 6.9kV f eeders f or -C 12Mt.P 1-C ?.12.PJ seconds, the load sequencing for the diesets is geenters have instantaneous, invU se time given on Table 8.3 4 overload and ground fault prot Mtion. Load shNd.ng and Duses ready to load signals (3) 6.9kV feeders for heat exchanger building are generated by the enntrol system for the substations have inverse tipe overload and electrical power distribution cystom. gesund fault protection. Individual timers for each major ined are raset and started by their electrical power (4) 6.9kV feeders used for ector starter: have distribution systems signals, instantaneous, inverse time overload, ground fault and mator protection. ($) 480V bus inc Aing line and feeder circuits (1) Loss of Preferred Power (LOPP) : The 6.9kV have inverse time overload eM ground f 6utt Class it buses are normally energized from protection. the normat -A1.08 lor alternete lpreferred .powersuppt-A*Ig-A1131}. Should the bus B.3.1.1.6.4 Protectico Requirements voltage decay to below 70% of its nominal rated value for a predetermined time a bus When the dieset generators are called upon to transfer is initiated and the signal wlll operate during LOCA coMitions, the only trip the supply breaker, and start the protective devices -A17.01 j.@ich shut ('own the diesel generator. As the bus voltage diesel l-A17.01thr,thediesetneneretnr<arethe decays, large psp motor bresAers are trip- ~ generator -A *and bus <dif ferentist retrys, -A ped. The transfer proceeJs to the diesel 1pai jthe engine overspee(' trip -A17.04 generator. If the standby diesel generator l.l-A17.04 Ow_Jigeet coctina water pressure is ready to accept load (i.e., voltage and [two out of two sensors) and low differentist fregency are within normal limits and no t efsure of secondary coolina water (two out of Lockout exists, and the normal and alter-two sensorsi a These protection devices are nate preferred surply breakers are open), retained under scar.t conditions to orotect - then the dieset generator breaker is signal-against possible, signif-A df.gicant damage. led to close, accoglishing automatic trans-fer of the Class if but to the diesel gen. erstor. Lerge actor ios.ls wiil be sequence started as required and shown on Table i 8.3 4. -
+ -
(2) LtiL21 footent Accident flotA): Wh:n a LOCA occurs, alth or without a LOPP, the load seq;ence tiaers are started if the 6.9 sv energency tus voitage is greater than 70% ard loads are asp l led to the but at the erd of prestt times. u Each load has an trdividual load segaence tiner which will start if a LOCA occurs ord the 6.9 KV energency tus voltage is greater then 70s, regardless of whether the tus voltage source is *C jnormat or el g p ig jpreferredpowerorthedieselgetestor. The load secpence tiee<re are part of the low level circuit topic for each LOCA load and do not provide a mean* vf ccreon mode f ailure that would render both onsite ord offsite power unavaltable. If a tiser f ailed, the LOCA load could be applid tenually provided the hus voltage is greater than 70%.
- 3) torp followino LO(At If the bus voltage A
(nornet*A1.08jprsiternatelpreferred power) is lost daring post accident operation, transf er to diesel g>nerator power occurs as descrited in (1) above. (4) LOCA followino torPt if '.0C4 occurs fol* towinglossofthenormat*A1.0812r, alternett.] preferred power supplies, the LOCA signal starts ESF equip eent as required. *p16.13 leunnino loads are ng1 trirved.l Autonetic (LOCA + LOPP) time delayed load sequencing assures thht the diesel
- generator will not be oYerloaded.
(5) LOCA een dieset oenerator is carollet with preferred rewer source darino teLu if a LOCA occurs when the diesel generator is paralicd wiu either the norman prvverred power or the alternate prtferred power source, the D/0 will automaticatty be disconnected f rm the 6.9 KV emergency bus regradless of whether the test is t4ing corducted f rom the local control panet or the sein control coora. A
(c) LOPP durirc dits3! ger.3retor percitelig 8.3.1.1.8.1 tedmdent e,,dby AC Power tests if the normet preferred power surply suppiles is lost during the diesel generator perot. tellr., test, the dieset generator circuit tech stardby power system division, inctu:llng breaker is suttnetically tripred. T r or.s f er the diesel generator, its eusiliary systees and to the diesel generatc? then proceeds as tiu distritution of power to various Class il descrited in (1). Loads thrcuigh tae o.9hv and 480V systeam, is sc-grepeted and separated feca the other divl= If the etternate pra erred source is used slins. ho autorwtic Intercomection is provided for load testing the diesel generator, and between the Ctess it divisions toch diesel pea the alternate pref erred sour (c is lost (and nerator set is operated IndepeMently of the no LOCA signet entsts), the diesel generator other sets and is conrected to the utility power breaker will trip on overcurrent, ynd LOPP system by eenuet fontrol, only during testing or condition will ektet. Load shedding e d tus for tus trarisfer. transf er will proce*4 as descrited in (1). c.3.1.1.8.2 Ratings and Capabt tity (7) Resto*etion of offsite power Upon restoration of offsite lever, the Class it the slan of each of the dieselageneretors bus (es) con be transferred back to the serving Divisions I, 11 and lit settsfies the offsite source by menuet operation only, requiremthts of htC Regulatory Guide 1.9 and IEEE $td 387 erd conf orme to the f ollowing (8) Protection egelnst degrsded voltage For criteriet protection of the Division i,11 and lit electrical equigment egelnst the ef fects of (1) Coch diesti geaeretor is capable of start
- a sustelred deprodd voltag*, the 6.9 kV Elf ing, accelerating ord supplying its loads in but voltages are monitored. When the bus the sequence shown in Table 8.3 4 voltage degrades to 90% or below of its rated value and ef ter a tirne delay (to (2) Each diesel generator iti capable of start-prevent triggering by transients),
Ing, accelerating and SWplying its loads in undervet tage will be annunciated in the their proper sequence withoui exceeding a control room. Sinultaneovnty o 5 minute 25% voltage drop at its terminets, tiner is started, to allow the operator to take corrective action. After 5 minutes, (3) Each diesel generator is capable of start
- the respective feeder breaker with the leg, accelerating and running its largest uncserv< :oge in trl ped. Should a LOCA actor et any time af ter the auton.atic toed-F occur during the 5 minute time deley, the Ing sequence is ccupleted, esstaning that the feedor breaker with the undervoltage will be motor had failed to start inittstly, tripped instantly. Subsequent bus trentfer will be as desrtbed above.
(4) -836.01 IThe criterte is for b g & -g igbchdieselgenerator-836.01119,_t3 8.3.1.1.8 standby AC Power system bs36.01y,ji<cepobteofreachingfuttspetJ erd voltage within -A31.10 MD A31.101LQ The diesel generators conprising the Olvi-1secords af ter receiving a signet to start, sions 1,11 and lit standby AC power supplies are ord cap oble of being futty tooded within designed to quickly restore power to thelf re-the neat -A31 1 d,qi A31.10 J M _lseconds spective Ctess it distribution system divisions - -A31.10131_an e in table 8.3-41.-836.011 es required to achieve safe shutdown of the plant The tieltina ecMillon is f or the PHR and and/or to mitigste the consequences of & LOCA in HeCF inlection volves to tv open 36 seconds the event of a coincident LOPP, Figure 8.3 1 gjtee the recelot of a hiah devwell or low shows the interconnections between the preferred reactor vesset levet sinnet. 3.lfte the power supplies and the Olvisions 1,11 and lit Peter'onerated yet es are not tricoed off dieset. generator standby power supplies, the buses. they start to open. If reauested to do sn by their controls when power is restored to the bus et 20 segords. This nives thM en ettowebte teevel time of 16 seconds. which is etteinebte for the MX11 -A36.04 -1t$1 toch dieset Mnerator has a continuous load retino of 6.25 NVA & 0.8 newer
factor (see Finute 8.3 11. The overtend ratino is 110% of the rated outout for a two hour periodl-t36.03 j put of a 24hourberl.2ds} See Subsection 8.3.4.2 -9 2rd.8.3.4. 8 < f cr interface rNN rements. i 8.3.1.1.8.3 starting circuits and systeve Diesel generators 1,11 and lit start autone* tically on loss of bus voltage. Under voltage relays are used to.t iet each diesel engine in b
MM seandard Plant uAs100A0 arv s the event of a drop in bus voltage below preset values for a predetermined period of time. l.ow. water level switches and drywell high pres. l sure switches in each division are used to ini. tiate diesel start under accitset conditions. Manual start capability (wite 9 need of D.C. power) is also provided. The transfer of the Class 1E buses to standby power supply is automatic should this become necessary on loss of all preferred power. After the breakers connecting the buses to the preferred power supplies are open the diesel. generator breaker is closed when required generator voltage and frequency are established. Diesel generators I,11 and III are designed to start and attain rated voltage and frequency l within 20 seconds. The generator, and voltsge regulator are designed to permit the set to accept the load and to accelerate the motors in the sequence within the time requirements. The voltage drop caused by starting the large motors does not exceed the requirements set forth in a Regulatory Guide 1.9, and proper acceleration of these motors is ensured. Control and timing i I Amendment 10 SMI .i _m_._
circuits era prolded, es appropriate, to ensure (3) cenerator loss of ereitetton; that etch load is tpplied automat cally at the correct time, fech diesel generator set is pro-(4) reverse jower; vided with two independent starting etr systems. ($) Low turbo ott pressure 8.3.1.1.8.4 Automatic shedding, Loading and Isolation (6) hich vibration The diesel generator is connected to its Ctess (7) hich tube ot t temnergggi it bus cely when 16e incoming preferred source breakere have been tripped (sthsection 8.3.1.1 (8) tow tube oft oressuref 7). Urder this condition, mejor loads e+e tripped from the Ctess it bus, except for the (9) hich etenkeese cressu9: ed Class it 480V unit substetton feeders, before closing the diesel generator breaker. (10) tow hebet water oressure.* the large entor loads are teter res@l led
- A17.000 >The f ollowim<-A17.000 IThese eN sequentietty and outceaticetty to the bus after other jprotective functions -A listerms and closing of the dieset generator breaker.
trips)l -A >(trips)<of the engine or the generator breaker and other off normal condi-8.3.1.1.8.5 Protection systems tions are annunciated in the main control room and/or tocetty -A17.000 le; shown in f ebts the diesel generater la shut down eru the 8.311l. -A17.000 mitems merked with esterisk generator breaker tripped under the following (*) are annunciated directiv in the main control Otherwise <-A >M A jdocal conditions during ell modes of operation and room. testing operationt storm /ennunciation points have auxillery isolated switch outputs which provide inputs to (1) engine overspeed trip; and -A17.000 *e sinate<elerm/ennuncletor ref resh unit-A M ir' the main control room which (2) generator differential relay trip. Identifies the diesel generator -A17.00011 Led geyret enomaly leoncerned. Tho.e anomalies -A17.000 > The cenerator breaker is triroed which cause the respective D/G to become h under the followino conditions durino normat inoperitive are so indicated in accordance with operations and testinct Begulatory Guide 1.47 and BTP PSB 2. [1] oenerator o*em d overeu ztat -A17.05 >Lil low levet leeket waterr (2) cenerator voltene restreihed overeurrent: (2) tow oressure locket wateer (3) bus underfreauency! (3) tow tow oressure leeket water; (4) cenerator reverse cower! and (4) tow te m ereture leeket water in; ($) centrator lost pf fit ld. ($) hiah temerature locket water out! In addition durino dieset-neerster normal goerations or testino. the diest; cenerator is (6) hich blo5 te m ereture leeket weter out! shut down due tot (7) tow levet tube oft merkt (1). hg Jerket water tecoerature (8) tew tecoe*ature tube oit ini (2) cenerator hich bearino teeteratury (9) hiah tecoerature tube eit out; (10) hich hich temerature tube olt; s (ii) hich differentist oressure-tube oft ff(ter;<
-A *(121 low pressure turM et t richt/tef t beak; (13) to tow oressure turbo oft 1 (14) tow pressure tube cllt (15) tow tow pressure Itke oltre i D
-A ofi6) hiah tewrature D/G bearinnsi tion in the ditsel gerorator crga by opersting key swltches at that station. (17) high eressure"crankeesef 8.3.1.1.8.7 Engine Mechanicet Systems and (18) egestive D/G beerino vibration; Accessortes (19) enoine overspeed Descriptions of these systems ord accessortes are given in Section 9.5. (20) contort circuit fuse f atturc* 8.3.1.1.8.8 Interlocks and testability (21) D/G overvoltate _" Each diesel generator, when operating other {22) tow r>ressure"steetina af ri than in test code, is totally independent of the preferred power supply. Additional interlocks G3) in metatenance sede; to the LOCA and LOPP senalng circuits tersinate parattet operation test and cause the diesel go. (24) unit felts to statii nerator to automatically revert and raset to its standby mode if either signal appears during a (25) D/G vaderf ressenevi test. A lockcut or maintenance modo removes the dieset generator from service. The inoperable (26) D/G rease r>vercurreat-stats
- is indicated la the control room.
12f)ou+.ofst1Yinti 8.3.1.1.8.9 Reliability cualification Testing (2BLrtiesel emine shutdown: The cpatiffration tests are performed on the diesel generator per IEEE Std. 387 as codified (29) tock cut tetav operated; by Regulatory Guide 1.9 requirements. (30) e w rmeney stre,11 see sv. < tion 8.3.4.10 for Interfsee requirements. 131) D/G v2D ate restraint overeurtent-8.3.1.2 Analysta Q 21, tow +1oh te<et " fuel day tank: 8.3.1.2.1 General AC Power Syttems (33) tow pressure fuel oil; The generai AC power systems are illustrated Q4,) high q,!ittrential oressure" fuel filtert in -0 jMaure 8.3 il-C >Fhures 8.31 throuah lijI. The analysis demonstrates ce g tlance of Q}) cenerator reverse power-the Class 1E At power system to -A3.000 >acolicable<hRC General Design Criteria (GDC), (36) in local control only: NRC Regulatory Guldas and other criteria consistent with the Standard Review Plan ($RP). (37) cenerater differentist trle;< ' table 8.1-1 identifies the onsite power system and the associated codes and standards 8.3.1.1.8.6 Local and Remote Control applied in accordance with Table 81 of the SRP. -A3.000 >foolicable c<-A M riteria are listed Each dieset generator is capable of being in order of the ilsting on the table, and the started or stopped manually f rom the main control ckgree of conformance is discussed for each, room. Start /stop control and bus transfer con-Any exceptions or clarlfications are so noted. trol may be transf erred to a tocal control sta-(1* General Design critecla (GDC): (a) Criteriet GDCs 2, 4, 17, 18 and $0. r i
(b) Conformance: The AC power system is in -B1.0001 coppliance with these GDCs -A M-A3.000 (1) DG 1.153 - >. In part, or as a whole. en Criterie f or Power. Instemen,1.gt ton and Control eroticable.< The GDCs are generically Portions of Safety systems addressed in subsectita 3.1.2, sk) RG 1,155 - (2) Regulatory Gulces (RGs): Stetton Stoclout 1 Indeperdence Between Rede Regarding Position C 1 of Regulatory Culde (a) RG 1.6 dont Stanctir (onsite) Power 1.75, see Section -816.000 18.3.1.1.1. the Sources ord Between their ron sefety related FMCRD motors and brakes are Offtribucion Systems tactied oower from the division i Clost.,,1[, ipfetvaretsted bus through a dedicated ocwer (b) RG 1.9 Selection, Design, and ous-center transformer. The class iE load breeher lification of Diesel-Gene- 's the but is tricoed tnr f ault current for retor Units Used as Standby feutts in the non sofety toed. There is ell 2_I (Onsite) Electric Power Sys. rene selective interlock erovided f rom the toad tems at Nuclear Power Plants breeker to the Class 1E bus supoly breaker so that the supolv breaker le blocked f rom tricolna (c) RG 1.32 Criteria for Safety telated white fault euerent is flowina in the non safety Electric Power Systems for load f eeder. This meets the intent of the tu ! ear Power Plants Resulattiry Guide position in that the main suootv breaker is crevented f rom triccino on (d) RG 1,47 Bypassed and inoperable Sta-laults in the non sofety reteted loads. A tus Indication for Nuclear second isolation device is orovided by the tower Power Plant Safety Systems center transformer which is asspeisted and neets 1E reautrements. (e) RG 1.63 - tiectric Penetration Assem-blies in Contelrvnent $truc-1-916.000>88.3.1.1.2.1. Althovah the At tures for Light Water Cooled isolation is f euttacurrent actuated. the intent buclear Power Plante of Reculntory Guide 1.75 is met throunh the tone 1,e_teet tve interlockina teebntoue. Therefore. (f) RG t.75 Physicet Independence of the onsite At oower system is desianed in accor. Electric Systems dance wi h.recomendations of this nuide, and t ytth the other listed Regulatory Guides. (g) RG 1.106 - Thermal overload Protection 18 ~There are three 6.9 KV electrical divisions for Electric Motors on Mo-which are independent load groups backed by tor Operated Valves individual diesel generator sets. The low -B18.0001 voltage AC systems consists of four divisions - Safety functions which are reovired tg which are backed by irdependent DC battery, no to coretetton for safety beve their charger and inverter systems, thermat oveloed erotection devices in force durina normst olent operation but The standoy power system reduMoney is based the overloads are bvoessed under on the capability of eny one of the -A415.024 accident conditions per Reculetary ldivisions 1. 2 or 3 tcad aroues I-A435.024 Postion 1.tb) of the naide l. Ifour divi sions (one of three load aroups) <to g provide the minim m safety functions necessary (h) RG 1.108 - Periodic festing of Diesel to -A435.024 Imenvativ lshut down the unit -A Generator Units Used as On-oform<-A If*om lthe control room in case of an site Electric Power Systems accident and maletain it in the safe shutdown at Nucteer Fower Plants cortti t io...- A435.024 Jtwo of the f me_ divisions are reovired to be functional to acconotish an (1) RG 1.118 - Periodic festing of Electric outteatic safe shutdd power and Protection Systems {_ .........._, ~...... _.. _. j
-. - =.. _ _ There is no sharing of stsexiby power system cceponents between load groups, and there is no sharing of dieset* generator power sources be-tween units, since the ABWR is a single plant design. toch standty power supply for each of the three load groups la cceposed of a single ge-nerator driven ty a diesel engine having f ast-start characteristics ard slaed in accordance with regulatory Guide 1.9 Table 8.31 and 8.3 2 show the rating of each of the Division 1,11 and lit diesel generators, respectively, and the snaminum coincidental load for each. (3) Branch Technical Positions (B1Ps)! (a) BfP ICSB 8 (P88) Use of Diesel Gene-retor sets for Pesking (ti) Bf P IC$R 18 (PSB)
- App llcation of the
$1rigle Failure Criterien to Manually-Controlled Electrically Operatec Valves. (c) BfP 1C$8 21 a Guldence for Application of Regulatory Guide 1.47 (d) BTP PSB 1 Adequacy of Station Electric Distribution sy* item voltages (e) B1P P$E 2 Criterla for Alarms and in-dications Associated with Diesel-Gene-retor Unit Bypassed and Inoperable Status The onsite AC power system is designed consistent with these positions. i l
vessel d q y ysure trio. the supoly breebers to the hic $ +egette MG sets are etso tricoed to Drevent Dower twinn drawn f rom the flywheets by the other lerne motors on the buses, the remainino sin elPs continue to operate to (6) Other $EP Criteries optimite the rete of reefreutetton flow re<betinn until the MW13 Seve coasted down to (e) NUREG/CR 0660 Enhancement of Onsite the ASD cut off ceint. et whfeh time the Diesel Generator tellebitisy teamininn RIPS are tricC As indicated in Sut>section 6.1.3.1.2.4, the The only need to restert s RIP la in operating procedures and training of person-crensretio@estert of the olent. et net are outside of the Nuclear laterd scope wh1ch tIpe normat power nust have been of supply. NURfC/CR 0660 is therefore im-restored to the non sofety buses. The posed as en interf ace requirement for the operator mov then restert any of the applicant.(See Subsection 8.1.6.2) p f Ps. Drovidino that the temereture difference between the vessel dome (es -82.100 1 (b) indiceted bv the dome Dressurg. OC Poliev 1ssse On Alternate Power fn irdiceter) and the bottes, head is within Non-s0fety Loo g ettewable limits. A start inhibit ht,t,tjock is Drovided to insure that the This poliev issue states that "An te merature limits are settsfied before evolutionary ALVR desten should include a ele is started._ en etternate ecwer source te the non safety loads unless the desion een Anv non-sefety toeds which should be deconstrate thet the desion meroins in resterted levnediately are on the Dient n e evolutionarv.fLVR will result i,r} investment n'otection (PIP) busm g entients for a toss of non sefety These buse, are eleked uo automettently Dower event that are no Fore severe theD by the ece 4 tion turbine. For the lh2se associated with the remainino non safety buses there is no turbine tri_rronly event in cuerent reautrement to insnediately restore power existina plant cesinns." A subse7pnt and for sinctietty considerations eterification stated that the transfer automstle trentfers are not provided. Shoutd be en outtvretie atow bus trens{E to Dickun et least one of the non MC set MB1.000>45.3.1.2.2 Ctess if Constant Voltene. driven RIPS for en AD & Constaqt h eavency (CVCF) Powee Suco,1y An automatic transfer hes not betD the CVCF Dower supoly onetime die 0 rem is provided f or two eessent s ittustrated in Floure 5.3-6. The followina enelvsts indleates conetience of the ClagLji (1) the coast down provided by the y CVCF wwer sygply to -A secoticable<WRt Generet sets is eaufvetent to the e00stdown Desian Criteria (CDC). het Peculatory Guides and provided by the recirculation prg other criterie cenststent with the Standard hqrtie on the current plants. Review Plan (SRP). l t?' The menner in 6Alch the ABWR table 8.1*1 (dentifies the Ctess it CYCF functions on the loss of offsite cower power sueoly and the essociated codes and does not reautre e bus transfer. The gtendeeds soplied in secordence with table 8 1' fgue RIPS which are not stootied f rom of the SRP. -A >Aceticebte e<-A ICiriterig m the hich inertie MG sets receive e trip listed in order of the listino on the tebte. and eeverwnd invnedletely on trinnina of the the decree of conformance le discutted for each. ynit. This trip etweend erf einstes f rom Any exceptions or eteelfleetions ere so noted, turbine /tood edeetion trio. tow vessel - water level (level 3) trio Q {sh
fi) Cenerat Desian criteria (GDelt (b) to 9.32 reiteria for safety Related [1gitric Power Systems f or (a) triteriet GDCs 2. 4.17. and 18. Nuclear Power Plants (b) conformaneet the Cty s it tvCF oower (e) RG 1.47 tvoasted and Inocerable $ t sunolv is in cons >llance with these GDCs tu indleation for Nuclear -A3.01 min eenetience with these CDC's M Plant safety Systems in oart, or as a whole, as atu>t teablb the CDCs are meneriestly addressed in (d) RG 1.75 Physleat Indeoendence of }psection 3.1.2 Electric tvstem (2) Renutatory Guldts (#Csit ,Q},,RG1.118* Periodie testina of Electric Power and erotection tvstoms (a) 90 1.6 fr h -s 6ce Betwetc. Want Stan@v (Onsite) Renardina Position C 1 of Reaulatory muide Epwer tources and betweeD 1.75, see teetion 8.1.3.1.2.2 (6). Otherwise. Their Distribution tystems the class it Cy,gf cower avstem is deslaned in accordance with reconenendations of this aufde. and with the other listed teaulatoav Guides. There are four indeoendent electrical dtvia sions.. each with its own individual nower sunolv as fttustrattd on Fleure 8.3 5. The normat un-Interruptible power (UPS) to each of the four CYCF divisions is orovided by its divisional rectifter and invarter nowered by its divisional AC bus. The AC/DC rectifier nowered by g,6,RQ-VAC but provides the normal DC cov,ar with the 125 VDC division as a backup. The class it CVCF~ cover succties are not shared amona puttiple reactor units since the ABWR is a sinate mit etont desian. The etass 1E cvCF nower suontv redundancy is t,esed on the coonbility of pnv one of the_ M divisions to orovide the mininun safety .hanctions necessary to shut down the unit f rom - the control room in case of an aceldent and maintain it in the safe shut:fown Londition. The Ctess it CVCF nower sunoty avstem is deslaned to permit inanection arvi testina of at t Moortant ersuinment and featuren and ett automatic and manual switchina funettons. Q) Granch technical Positions (BfPsit (gLBTP lesa 21 Guidance for Anolleation - of Renut atory Guide i.47 - (b) BTP PtB 1 Adeaunev of Station Electgj,g ' Distribution System Voltanes- --__a-_w-.~--.,_.------- a
With renrod to B7P Ptti, protection ensinst . (1) certify 60 veer life by thermal eninni CorededvetteneisdiseyisedinSubsection
- 8. 3.1.1. 7( 8 ). 1he CytF cower surely is design,e,d (2) prove the redletion reelstance by espo-consistent with these $1Ps.
sure of ened spectrens to intecrated do. j 19111 f <e5.3.1.2.3 Quality Assurance Recpirenents (3) orove Rechanical/electriest tests of A planned quality assurance program is provid-embit for envircreentet ecg1LdQ".1 ed in Chapter 17. This program includes a cca-speelffed prehensive system to ensure that the purchased meteriet, manuf acture, f abrication, testing and (4) prove flaae resistener by the vertiest quellty control of the equipment in the emergercy .ttty2000 stu/hr flene test for 8 electric power system conforms to the evaluation minutes (mini e ); eM of the emergency electric power system equipnent vendor quality assurance programs and preparation ($1 show seceptabte levels of_ nos evolution of procurement specifications incorporating qual-by en acid oss neneration test. Ity assurance requirements. the a *Inistrative responsibility and control provided are also det. The directives whleh also n2vern the ouellfl. cribed in Chapter 17. cetfon.gigt these quality assurance requirements include litt $td 317 - Electric Peretration Ascenbtles en appropriate vendor quality assurance program and organitetton, purcheter survelltence as re-IffE ttd 323 - ttata 1E Eauf trent Quotifica-quired, vendor preparation and meintenance of Lim appropriate test and inspection records, certi. ficates and other quality assurance doewente-litt std 33. - continuaus Duty Jtess if Motors tion, and vendor sutaittel of quality control records considered necessary for puechaser Ittt $td 381 - tiess it Electrie Velve retention to verif y quality et conpleted work. Doeratore A necessary condition for receipt, installe-litt std 383 - class if tables. Solices and tion and placing of equipment in service has been Connectors the signing and auditing of QA/QC verification dets and the plecing of this date in permanent Kit $td 3M - Diesel Cencretor Eterdby Power onsite storage files. $uopties 8.3.1.2.4 invirorrental Considerations __...$tej ubsection 8.3.4.3 for interface re m l h in addition to the ef f eets of operation in h8.3.1.3 Physical _ Identification of normat service enviroment, att Clmst if $afety Related Equipment equipnent -A13.01 3 wMeh is c}sentist to limitina the consecuences of a LDes.<le designed 8.3.1.3.1 Power-89.01 1. Instementot ton and to operate -A13.01 Idrino end af ter env deston controtJ_ systems bf,.f 3, vin d in the -A13.01 >co tt.<eccident enu ronment expected in the pres in which it is ~B9.01 * -89.01d>Melore<-89.01dlillectrical located. -A13.01 _lstt eines it el-A g<tectric' and control equipmerit, as senblies, devices, equiprent is qualified to litt -A 3344<-A }}H and cables grouped into sepe rate divisions 1(seeSection3.11) -A4.000 >per table 8.3 1<shelt be identl. fled so that thelt electrical divisional assign ment -B13.04 se Att cables toecified for Ctess it is apparent and so that an observer can via gystems -A 3.<erf -A13.01 nossociated< circuits.-A sually dif ferentiate between Class 1E.-A >ig >.<ere moisture end radiation resistent. are i! essociated>< equipment and wiring of bichly f tsme resistant and evidence little different divisions, and between Class 1E and corrosive effect when sublected to best or fle% non Class 1E -A ytor between 1E essociated and or both, certified croof tests are performed on non-tt ecs 1E)<eoutpmer t and wires. The table samtes tot J
{ identification method shall be plcced on color coding. Att Pierkers within a division shall have the same color. For associated cables -A M gnyLjtreatedasCtess1E-Al(seehete1) l, there shall be en A agerded to the divisional desig nation (e.g., A1). The letter A stands for as sociated and WD for nordivisional. Associated cables are unicraly identified by a longitustnet strice -A9.02 f or other colee e2;hd gethodland=A*/orethedateonthelabel, the color of the cc5te marker f ar estociated cohtet shall be the same as the related Ctese it esble. Divisional separation requirements of Irdividual piecen of hardware are shown in the system ele-mentary disgrams. Identification of receways, cables, etc., shall be ccepettble with the iden-tification of the Ctess it ecylpvent with which it interfaces. Location of toentification shall te such that points of change of circuit classi-fication (at isolation oevices, etc.) are readt-ly identifiable.' -A l ht e i. Associated circuits added tevond the tertified desion must be speelfically 1,5fentified and lustified Der subsectiorj 8.3.4.13. Associated circuits et,3 defined in,,$ection 5.5.1 ei liff }fj;1 H 1. with the clariffration for JJems (3) and (4) that non Clas1,,1( circuits beina in ei enciesed recewer without the reauired ohysite,l_itaggli,e pr barriers between the enetoSed rnerway end o e Ctess it or associated esbles mobes the circuits (related to the non rtest it cablin the enclosgd re.cewev) estoslA ed circuits.l -g7.000 18.3.1.3.1.1 t oulvent Identificetion tovirrent (Panets, rocks lunction or cult MAgglofeachdivisionoftheClass1Eelectric system and various CVCf power supply divisions are identified as fctiows: (1) The background of th.
- +u 9 ate for the equiptent of a divisk ses the sane color es the cable jacket markers and the raceway markers associated with that division.
(2) Power system distribution equipment (e.g., vnotor controt centers, switchgear, trans-
.--.~- - - -. .__ _ ~- ~. .ormers, distritaation panels, betterito, Att A9.01 IClass it le:ble -89.01b freceways chcrgirs) is tegged tsith en equipment ruter 1-89.01b *ttsys <tre marked A9.01 Iwlth tht the same as indicated on the single line division color, and.lwith their proper raceway diagrams. identification at 15 ft intervals on straight sections, at turning points and at points of (3) The nameplates are laminated black a M white entry and emit from enclosed areas. Cable trays plastic, arranged to show bisck engraving on are serked prior to installation of their a white background for non Class il equip-
- cables, eent. For Class if equipment, the name-plates have color coded backgromd with To help distinguish the reutron monitoring black engraving, and scram solenoid cables f rce other type cables, the following unique voltage class
-87.000 18.3.1.3.1.2 tot,te Identification designctions -0.01c land merkinos fare used-B9.01c > in the eabte routina neearom ? j All cables for Class 1E systems and -A Type of Unique >pssociated<-86.000 lenocf>1tsLjcircuits (except special Cables Voltage Class those routed in conduits) are tagged every % f t prior to (or during) installation. All cables Neutron mnitoring VN are tagged at their terminations with a unique ) identif ying rve ber (cable ruter), in addition Scram solenoid cables v$ to the marking characteristics shown below, heutrnn ecnitoring cables are run in thei: -A7.01 -A9a iCables shall be marked in a manner own divisional conduits and cable trays, of suf ficient durabiitty to be ligjple throuchout serarately from all other power, instrutaentation the life of the otant and to feettita" initial and contret cables. Scram solenoid cables are ygrification that the instattation is in run in a se parate conduit for each rod scram conform nee with the teneration criteria, group. Such markinos skat t be cetored to miovelv -9.01 > f n addition, the enbles of the rod jgetify the division (or non division) of the contret aM information system in the hydraulic [ghte._ Generally, individual conductors esposed control unit QqQ) are also etaced in separate tv strippino the lecket are also color rodet.Jf, conduits and cable tr6vs. color teamed (at intervatt not to esceed i foot) such t.at their division is still discernable. The redundant Class it, equiprent and cir-freertions are oermitted for individust cults, assigned to redundant Class it divisions conductors within cabinets or benets wher e at t and non class 1E system equipment and cirs;uits wirina is untoue to a sinate divisiont-B7.02 L are readily distinguishable from each other Any non divis8ennt cable within such cabinets without the necessity for consulting referencu shall be sopropriately merked to distinaulsh it naterlats. This is accomplIshed by color coding from the divisienal cables. l-87.02 >-a l(or is of equipment, nameplates, cables and racew.,ys, non divisionet).l< as described above. -87.000 18.3.1.) 3 Racew n Identifcation -89.01,> & 3.1.3.2 Instementation and controt $vstems 1 All conduit is similerty tagged with a unique conduit rut >er, in addition to the marking cha-ff.3.1.3.2-g9 01 $.it identifica1M a recteristics shown below, at 15 ft intervals, at discontinuities, at putt boxes, at points of (1) Penets and rocks entrance and emit of rooms and at origin and destination of equirenent. Conduits containing cables operating at above 600V ti.e., 6.9kV) a+e etso tagged to indicate the operatirq voltage, these markings are applied prior to the installation of the cables.
color of enatsvian fill. The mader plates gh,elt inctWe identifiention of the proner Redurusent sensory logic / control and actua-slIvi: Ion ef the ecrsirnent ine t Wed. tion equipment ior safety reieted systems shall be identified by suffla letters.-89.01 (2) Junction or rot t..tves hensinn It,nes are discussed in Section 7.7.1.1.1 Junc t i on and/or rs>t i be"t8 thC I D' I hD W I f l &Q for the nucleeifef ety related system shell 8.3.1.4 Independence of Redundant Systems beve identification simi[3r to end torpett-8.3.1.4.1 Power Systeem (dr with the canets and rec 6s. The Ctess 1E onsite electric power systems (3) Cebtes ord mejor components of the separate power divi 6f ons is sho.m on figure 8.31. - A 7. 03 - A 9.,,,0 3 lCebtes shott be merked in a penner d sufficient durability Irdependence of the electric equignent and to be teolble throuahout the recewey systems between the dif f erent divisions life of the olent. and to la mainteined primarily by firewall type separ-feeftitate inittet verificotton etion -A6.000 he decribed in subsection het the instettetton is in 8.3.1.4.P. Any esceotions _are lustified in conformance with the seperation Appendiu 9A. Subsection 9A.5.5.5. l-A6.000 >where criterie. feasible end by spattai separation in secordence with criterie alven in Subsection such markings shet t le colored to twet y 8.3.1.4.2. where firewalls are not feasib h identif y the division f or non division) e4 Where sostiet separation cannot be meinteined in the cable. Generetty. (npividual conductors herordous E fes (e.o. potentist missile oreen). eroosed by steireinn the locket ere egg ohysteet isolation between electrical coulong.nl color coded or color teoced (et interzgj,g of different divisions it schieved by use of a not to enreed 1 foot) such that thei-6 inch mininun thickness reinforced concrete division is stitt discermble. Deeet t ons barrier.< pre ocemitted for individuet conductors within efij_na,t3,g,,panet s where et t wirino the physical independence of elertric power ,fi g iove to a sinale division for is systems cocpties with the requirements of IEEE nondivisionet)J Standards -B3.02 g79. <308, 379, 384, General Design Criteria 17,18 eM 21 and htC Regulatory -A7.03 Stebtes enternet to cehirets and/or Guides 1.6 and 1.75. Danets for the safetvarelate#,, systems shell be marked, es O giggled in Subst d 2n 8.3.1.t 1.1 Class 1E Electric Equipment l U 1.3.t. to distinouish them from other Arrangement esbles and identify their seoarete division es eroticable. This identification (1) Class 1E electric equipment and wiring is reuulrement does not eroty to individual segregated into separate divisions so that s.stnduc t or s. < no single credible ever ' is capable of dis-abling enough equipment to hinder reactor (4) Recewevs shutdown-83.104 L removel of decay heet f rom the core. or e-B3.104 l end removpipj those trays or condaits which carry nuclear decay heat by either of two unaf fected safety related system wirina shett be iden- ' divisional load croups or prevent lisolation tified as (rdicated in Subsection 8.3.1.3.1. of the conteirmsnt in the event of an et room entrence points throuch which they accident. Separation require ments are cess (and e dt points unless the room is applied to control power e d motive power smeti enouah to fseiiitate eonvenient for all systems involved, followino of cable) with a permanent merker identifvj.nc their assioned division. (2) Equipment arrangement ard/or protective bar-riers are provided such that no locatty ge-D.hs-87.0008.3.1.1.1.4 Sensory equipment nerated force or missile con destroy any re-grouping and designation letters dundant RPS, h$$$. ECCS, or ESF functions.
l I in addition, errengernent and/or separation i barriers are provided to ensure that such l disturbances do not ef fect both HPCF and RCIC systems. (3) Routing of wiring / cabling is arranged such as to eliminate, insofar as practical, all potentist for fire damese to cables s.nd to sepe*ete the redundant divisions 50 that fire In one division wil' not propagate to i another division. -A10..J Ifless it and non Class it cables are senareted in i gggdence with Itti 384 e d R.C.1.75 (su Flourts 9A.4 1 through 9A.4 16). ] (4) An f rdependent raceway system is provided for each division of the Class it electric system. The receways are arranged, physi-r.stly, top to bottorn, es foltows (based on the function and the voltage class of the cables)i (e) V4
- Mediun voltage power, 6.9kV (8kv insulation class),
l 1 l 7
(b) v3 a Low voltege power ir:ctudira 480 (4) Cable fire protection c.nd detection"For VAC, 120 VAC, 125 VDC power and att details of cable fire protection ard instrtmentation ord control power detection, refer to Stbsections 8.3.3 ord stgply feeders (600v insulation 9.5.1. ctess). (5) Cable and racesey markings" Att cables (c) Y2 s High level signal and control, (except lighting and nonvital y incitding 125 V9C ard 120 VAC ccommt cations) are tagged at their b controls which carry less than 20A terminations with a unique identifying current and 250 VDC or AC for relay ruter. Colors used for identification of contactor control. cables and race ways are covered in $ 4section 8.3.1.3. (d) v1
- Low levet signet and control, in-cluding -A >gn<-A10.01a (6) Specing of wiring ord conponents in control lfiter coljf cables and metettle boards, panels and relay rocks" Separation cables with_lanalog sigrets up to is acconplished by motriting the redundant 55 VDC erd digital signal up to 12 devices or other cocoonents on physically VDC.
separated control boards if, from a plant -B10.021, operational point of view, this is feasi-Power cebles (v3) are couted in flealbte ble. When operational design dictetes that stattle condsit (cder the reised floor of redundant equipment be in close proximity, Ire control room.l separation is achieved by a barrier or 8.3.1.4.1.2 Electric Cable Instattation enclosure to retard internet. fire or try a maintained air space in accordance with (1) Cable Derating a*d cable tray fill" Base criterie given in Subsection 8.3.1.4.2. anpacity rating of cablas is established as descrited in subsection 8.3.3.1. Electric in this case, redundant circuits which serve cables of a discrete Class if electric sys-the same safety related function enter the tem divisio are instatted in a cable tray control penet through separated apertures system pros.ded for the same divisten. and terminate on separate ord separated ter-Cables are instelled in trays in accordance minal blocks. Where redundant circuits un-with their voltage ratings and as descrlbed avoidably terminate on the sane device, bar-in subsection 8.3.1.4.1. tray filt is as riers are provided between the device termi-established.n subsection 8.3.3.2. nations to ensure circuit separation approv. ed isolators (geneistly optical) are used. (2) Cable routing in potentistly hostH e areas Circuits of different safety divi-(7) Electric penet ation ersent>ty" Electric sions are not routed through the same poten-perietration assattles of dif f erent Class 1E tially hostile area, wi h the exception of divisicos are separated by -A5.01 jl.lts h main steam line instrteentation and control hour fire rated barrien.1-A5.01 >distanee<, circuits and main steam line (setetton -A5.01.ll.e.. (sepa rate rooms -A5.01 > g valves circuits which are exposed to possi-barr!erstard/or tocations on separate floor ble steam line break and turbine missites, levels-Alij.-A5.01ISeoacetionby respectively. -A13.04 lCable routino in the distonee (without barriers) is attowed only drYvelt is discussed $n afsociation with the within the inerted containment. tsg cau8cment it serves in th* "Soeefat Ceses" sect!on 20.3. RA18. Retoonse 435.31) Jection 94.5.l-A13.04 > The drywett is not Seoaration between division and considered a hostile etee because of Qt r e divisional penetrations shett be in splication of pipe wblo and othst g,cydance with IEEE 3*A.1 Grouping of res'reints.< circuits in penetration assent >lles follows the same raceway voltage groupings as (3) Shering of cable trays" All divisions of described in Subsection 8.3.1.4.1. Class 1E AC and DC systems are provided with Independent raceway systems.
-A10.01 pedrdent overcurrent interrutstina devices are orovided for all electriest g,1gy.1,ts (includine all instrumentation eM control devices, es.,well es rp gr circuits) noino throvah conteirvwnt teMtretions. if the mitrun evellable f ault tg j Liff;jtxfine f ailure of ur4tream devhd gfever then the continuous current retinJ t f the tenetration. I-A5.01 > Power circuits j gt ne throuah etertric tene+ tretion i i gittflies are protected ensinst overturrent by redfdjtot overcu r, tat inter-rtr'ing e devites toe-A M ovoid-A M penetration damage in the event of failure J of any single over. current device to clear a f ault within the penetration or teyond it. (See Subser'lon 8.3.4.4 for interface 1 tequirem j \\ 8.3.1 4.1.3 Control of Comlinnee with teparation Criteria During Design ard Inst 6tletion Cogliance with the criteria which insures inoeperdence of redordant systems is a surervl* sory responsibility during teth the design and installation phetes. The responsibility is i I L l =.,
.-_~.- - - - _.- _ - - i i 4 discharged by aoutraent. The sautoment is then oestanated f
- assoelatede oer teaulatory Guide 1.75. tabitt 4
(1) Identifying applicable criterla; used to connect such eautoment are safety arade and coat tfled and routed as " associated cir- { (2) issuing working procedure to inplement thess cuits" and marked as descrited in Sut4ection criterla; 8.3.1.3. (3) modifying procedures to keep them current g 8.3.1.4.2 Independence of Redurusant and workable; Saf ety Related instrunentation and Control Systems (4) checking the marufacturer's drawings and specifications to ensure conpliance with This subsection defines Irdependence criteria proceoutes; and apptled to safety related electricot systems and instrunentation and control equipnent. Safety-(5) controlling installation and procurement to related systems to which the criteria apply are tssure conplience with approved and issued those necessary to mitigate the effects of antl* s' awings and specifications. cipated and abnormal operational transients or design tsasis accidents.- this includes att those the equeent nomenclature used on the ABWR systems and functions erunerated in subsections standard desta is one of the primary 'rechanism 7.1,1.3, 7.1.1.4, 7.1.1.5, ard 7.1.1.6. the for ensuring proper separation. Each equipnent term " systems" includes the overall conplex of and/or asseebly of equipment carries a single actuated equipnent, actuation devices (actua* rwber, (e.g., the Itee tubers for motor drivers tors), logic, instrunent channeta, controls, and l are the same as the machinery drivens). Based on interconnecting cables which are required to these identification rubers, each itou can be perform system safety functions. The criteria identified as essential or nonessentist, and each outlines the separation requirements necessary essentiel item can further be identified to its to achieve Independence of safety related safety separation division. This la carrled functions conpatible with the redundant and/or I through and dictates a propriate treatment at the diverse equipnent provided and postulated design levet during preparation of the events. manufacturer's drewings. 8.3.1.4.2.1 General hon Class it equipment is separated where de-sired to enhance power generation tellability, Separation of the equipment for the systems although such separation is not a safety referred to in subsection 7.1.1.3, 7.1.1.4,- consleeration. 7.1.1.5, and 7.1.1.6 is acconplished so that they are in conpliance with -83.02 >#-A3.000 l Once the safety related equipment has been >the substance and intent of<lEEE 279. <#10CFR$0 identified with a Class 1E safety divillon. the Appendia A General Design Criterla 3, 17,
- divisional assigment dictates a characteristic and 22, and NRC Regulatory Guides 1.75 (IEEE l
color (subsection 8.3.1.3) for positive visuat 384) and 1.53 (IEEE 379). Identification. Likewise, the divisional id e-tification of att ancillary equipment, cebte eruf Independence of autually redundant and/or dt. -A > associated 4 raceways match the divisional verse Class 1E equipment, devices, and caotes is assigv ment of the system it supports. achieved by -A tohysleal teoarA115 m -A 'lthree hour fire rated barriers land -A - -88.03b >s -A >Thee are certain<-A 'libe z/syfetect tricat isolation. -A > Physical standby and emernenev tinhtina fixtures seoaration and/or electrical isolation <-Alihig l_ aceleneeotions to the above where non ttass it: orotection lis provided to talntain the equipment is connected to class if oower sourett . independence of nuclear safety related circuits l-for funettonal deslan rea sons -A >(vir. the. and equipment so' that the protective function l-standby AC tinhtincH. ' This is invnediately. required during and following a design basis-gooarent by the absence of essentist' ~ event including a single fire anywhere in.the i classification identiflegtion of the connected. i plant or a's. Ingle failure.in any circuit orj equipment can be acconplished.- --A lib 3 - excentional cases where it is not oossible to: irglgli such barriers have been analyzed and - Jus _tified in Anoendix 9a.5.1 l l: .... - ~ ___._.,_,m m
8.3.1.4.2.2 Srparettors Techniques (h Redundant switchaear or motor contret coulo-gent associated with redurdent safety re* The methods used to protect redurdant safety lated systems is not located in a notentist systems from results of single failures or events mechanicet damane toneauch as discussed in are utilitetton of safety class structures, -A asoa-tiet stearetion Srrf/or<-A lthree hour fire reted lprotective barriers, and isolation (3) In any coroactont containina en oreratina devices. etene (such as the reolon stove the reactor pressure vesset). there mus1,be a mininun 8.3.1.4.2.2.1 Safety Class Stretture hortrontet Seoaration of 20 fyet or a 6 inch thick reinforced concrete well between trays The basic design cornideration of plant layout containino cables from dif ferent divisions. is such that redmdant circuits and equipnent are located in separate safety class areas -A l(f.e.. (4) Sostiet separation in ceneret olent ares seperate fire renes) linsofar as possible. The ept t eauet or enceed the minimum et to ed by separution of Class 1E circuits and equipment is 1EEE 384.(See subsection 8.3.4.5 fo_c such that the required indepen dence will not be interfece recuirements)< conpromised by the f ailure of mechanical systems nerved by the Class it elec trical system. For -A10.03 >(5) sostiet s<-A JMeparation in -A esanple, Class it circuits are routed or lett safety couloment or cable protected so that f at ture of retet ed mechanicet ortes.l-A >cebte spreadina equipmrnt of one system cannot disable Class 1E E1.pa,<shali equal or exceed the -A s circuits or equipment essential to the operatico }reovirements of l-A Sminim m of a redundant system. This separation of Clan ettowed by<lEEE 384.-B !.dt! 1E circuits and equipments make effective use of Subsection 8.3.4.5 for interface features inherent in the plant oesign such as reavirements)< using dif ferent rocms or -A ifloorsd A 2.1,h3 proosite side of rooms or areas (distances).* 8.3.1.4.2.2.3 Main Control Room and Aelay Room Panets 8.3.1.4.2.2.2 -A >$oatiet sepitration and/or< -A libreg j our Fire eated l Protective Barriers the protection system and ESF control, logic, and instrument penets/ racks shall be tocated in -A >$oatial (distence) separation end/or<-A a safety class structure in C ich there are no Ithree hour fire rated f orotec tive barriers potential sources of missiles or pipe breaks shall be such that no locally ge* nerated -A that could Jeopardite redundant cabinets and ? force <-A lfire, lor missile resulting from a raceweys. design basis event (DBE) or f rom random feiture of Se's mic Category I equipment can disable a control, relay, and instrtsnent panels / racks safety re toted function. -A IThe exceotional will be dasigned in accordance with the follow-cases where it h not possible to instett such ing general criteria to preclude -A7.04 lfolture karriers have been snelred_p,31 lustified in of non safety circuits frea causino felture of Arvendin 9A.5. (-A >In the absen-e of confirmina any safety circuit and to preclude f at ture of analysis to sunoort less strinoent reavirements. one safety elreult from causina fatture of any the followina rules arvtvr other redundent safety circuit. l-AT.04> the possibility of fire prooecetina between (1) In rooms or cecoartments havino heavy ro-redundant circuits and oreventinc safe shutdown totino machinery (such as the tuebine-oe-of the olent.< $1ngle panels or instrument racks nerator or the resetor feedwater system - will not contain circuits or devices of the ptrn) er in rooms containina hich oressuee redundant protection system or ESF systems f eedwater oloina or high Dressvec steem except lines such as those between the reactor and .thi lgebine. mini u__pecaration of 20 feet (1) Certain operator interface control penets pe,,,p 6 inch thick reinforced eenerete wett may have operational considerations which is reg /jred between trays containino e6bles dictate that redurdant protection system or of different divisions. An exceotion it ESF system circuits or devices be located in m de in the steam tunnet where all-four a single panel. These circuits and devices divisions of conduit see separated by about are separated horizontatty and verticatty by three or four feet for the steem line a minfrun distance of 6 inches or by steel teekene detection instrtrentation. barriers or enetosures. i l I .7 y g-
, ~..- = I i (2) Class 9E circuits and devices will also be separated frees the non Cisse 1E circuits and from ea m other horizontally and vertically by a mininsn distance of 6 inches or by steel barriers or enclosures. (3; where electrical interfaces between Class 1E and non Class it circuits or between Ctess it circuits of different divisions cannot be Wiring frun Class 1E -A8.000 *lgt evolded, Class it isolation devices are used it associated)< equipment or circuits which (Subsection 8.3.1. 6. 2. 2. 4 ). interf ace with non Class it ewiprent circuits (f.e., annunciators or data loggers) is treated (4) If two penets containing circuits of differ-as Class it -A8.000 >(or 1E as sociated><and ent separation divisions are less than 3 retain its divisional identifica tion up to and feet apart, there shall be a steel barrier including its isolation device. The output between the two penets. Penet ends closed circuits from this isolotion device are by steet end plates are considered to be classif fred as nondivisional and shall be acceptable barriers provided that terminal physically separated from the divisional -A8.000 boards and wireways are spaced a minimum of >(or if-associated >< wiring. 1 inch from the end plate. 8.3.1.4.2.3 System separation Requirements (5) e netration of separation barriers within a e sthdivided panel fa permitted. provided Specific divialonal assierrnent of safety re-ihet such penetrations are sealed or other-Lated systems and equipment is given in Table wise treated to that fire generated by an 8.3 1. Other separation regulrements M rtaining electri:al fault ceutd not reasonably propa-to the RPS and other ESF systems are given in gate from one section to the other and tne following subsections. disable a protective function, 8.3.1.4.2.3.1 Reactor Protection (frip) system -C >(6) local instrtrent rocks en which flow (Rrs) trans taitters for main steam or recirculation wa ter, e located are the following separation requirements apply peraltted to have redun dant to the RPS wiring: Instruments on ediscent boys of a sin-nte rack in order to avoid superfluova (1) 8o$ sensors, sensor input circuit wirir1, in strteent oloina f rom flow etg.11 trip channels and trip togic equipment will yjlhin_,jhe derwell. In these cases a be arranged in four functionally indeperdent spatistly di verse set of redundant an:f divisionally seperate groups designated transmitters shstt be proviced on a Divisions I, ll, !! and IV. The trip seoarate locat instrurnent rack, channel wiring associated with the sensor input signals for each of the four divisions <8.3.1.4.2.2.4 Isolation Devices provides inputs to divisional logic cabinets w'tich are in the same divisional group as Where electrical interfaces between Class 1E the sensors and trip channels and which are -AS.000 See (1E associated)<and non Class 1E functionally independent and physically circu ts or between Ctesh 1E -A8.000 39; seperated from the logic cabinets of the i (1E associated >< circuits of different divisions redsdant divisions. cannot be avoided, Class 1E isolation devices will be used.-t33.000 > DC isoletion is (2) Where trip channel date originatinti from l provided by DC-to-DC converters.< AC isolation sensors of one division are required for l -833.000 f(the FMcRD delves on Division i is the coincident trip logic circuits in other 2nly case.Llis provided by interlocked circuit divisions, Class 1E isolation devices will breaker coordi nation ~B33.000 land an isetation be used as interface elements for signats transf ormer las described in subsection -833.000 sent f rom one division to another such as to 18.3.1.1.1.1 -833.000 >5.3.1.1.2.1.< ~~i---, m-w e w
mainteln electrical isstation between -B4.01 -B4.02 lif f f 384 and eenut etory culde divisions. ,1&d-B >-A lthe normet division to division seoaration reouiremente of the olent. See (3) sensor wiring for severet trip variables subsection 8.3.1.1.5.1)l< i essociated with the trip channels of one -A4.000 >The stram nemo condyittylli heye division may be rm together in the same yn,jg,g identification 1 will be treated corduits or in the same recewers of that essentietty es if they are senatete eneten d i same and only division. sensor wiring reeewnys. The conduits containina the scram j essociated with one divirion will not be solenoid croue etreult wirina will be routed with, or in close proximity to, any chysically senereted ov a minie scoeretton wiring or cabling associated with a distance of one Inch from either retd redundant division. enetesod race g,yp or non enclosed race.,ays whfeh contain either divtstonet or (4) The scram solenoid circuits, from the ron divisionet" (non sef ety related) actuation devices to the solenolds of the circuits.< scram pilot valves of the CRD hydraulic control units, will be run in gromded steel (7) Any scram group conduit may be routed conduits, with no other wiring contained alongside of any cable or racewey containing within the ccedults, so that each serem either safety-related circuits (of any group la protected against a hot short to division), or any cable or receway any other wiring by a grounded enclosure. contelning non safety related circuits, as $hort sections (less than one meter) of long as the conduit Itself is not within the flealbte metallic conduit will be permitted boundary of any raceway which contains for making connections within panels and the either the divisional or the connections to the solenoids. non safety related circuits and is physicatty separated from said cables and (5) Separate pro m ded steel conduits will be raceway boundaries -A Ins stated in ( M provided for the scram solerald wiring for abovel-A >bv s mini e senaretin, distance each of four screm groups. Separate of one inche. Any one scrern grow conduit grounded steel conduits will otso be mov also be routed along with scram group provided for both the A solenoid wiring condults of the same scram group or with circuits and for the 8 solenoid wiring conduits of any of the three other scrm circuits et the same scram group. groups as long as the miniran separation distance of one inch (2.5 cm) is maintained. (6) -A4.01 -A4.02 L ierom crovo condults will have uniove identification end witt be (8) The stardby (lquid control system redundant i 2coarately routed as Division !! and til Ctess'1E controts will be run as Division I conduits for the s s'd 8 solenoids of th,,3 and Division !! so that no f atture of teram pilot volves. resneettvely. This stardby liquid control (SLC) function will l arresponds to the divisional assiement of result from a single electrical fatture in a their power soun es. The conduits RPS circuit. containino the scram,igicapid geoup wirina of any one scram croup will etso be (9) The.tartup range conitoring ($kNN) ohysicat ty seDarsted by a miniMP separation subsystem cabling of the WMS -9.01 Send the distence of 1 inch f rom the conduit of en,y rod controi and information system (RC11$) other serem aroup. and f em metet enclosed < cabling under the vessel is treated as receweys which conteln either divisionet ei divisional. The SRNM cables will be non sefety retsted (non divisional) assigned to Division 1, !!,111 and IV-C 3 circuits. The serem aroup conduits may not ord the 9011$ cables to Division 1 and 11<. be routed within the confines of any other Under the vesset, cables wilt *A6.000 h tray or receway system. The RDS conduits enclosed and seoereted as def fred in containina the scram aroup wirino for the A Accendix 9A.5.5.5.l-A >not be otaced in any and B solenoids of the serem ettot vatves emelosure whteh will undalv restrie_t_ f essociated with Divisions !! ery' 111. caoability of removina orobe connectors for i respectively). She R,be seperated from maintenance euroeses.< non enetosed receways associeted with any 91 the four electrical divisioni_gt 8.3.1.4.2.7.2 Other safety Related Systems non+t4 visional cables in accordance with i l
~. _ =.... _. = - (1) Seperation of redundant systems or portions cf a system shall be such that no single failure can prevent initiation and i corvletion of an en0 neered safeguard f me t t on. (2) The inboard ard cuttoard isolation valves are redundant to each other so they are mase indeperdent of and protected f ree each other to the extent that no altyle f ailure can prevent the operation of st least one of an inboard /outtmard pair. 84.00 >The Mt1 feitassfe solenoid circuite follow the cable itEF e* tion leavirements described in fu&Lection 8.3.1.4.2.3.1 for PPS rod scram E29PMS (3) Isolation valve circuits require special attention because of their function in '.imiting ths consequences of a pipe break outside the primary contairrent. Isolation valve control and power circults are requir. k s n--- n.,,, - ,+ ~w ,e r w
.m ed to be protected from th0 pipe tirt3s that for APS or EtF toested in the simression they are responsible for isolating. noot level swell tone will be deslaned to setts f actority revetete their function Essentist isolation valve wiring in the vi-before< cinity of the outboard valve (or oownstream of the valve) shall be installed in con-cbits and routed to take advantage of the mechanical protection afforded by the vetve i operator or other avattebte structural bar-riers not susceptible to disabling damage from the pipe line breek. Additionst sechanical protection (berriers) shall be interp> sed as necessary between wiring and potentist sour ces of disabling mechanical damage consequential to a break covnstream of the outboerd valve. (4) The severet systems corprising the ECCS have their various sensprs, logics, actuating de-vices and power supplies assigned to divi-sions in accordante with table 8.3 1 so that no single failure can disable a redundant-ECCS function. This is seconcilsned by limiting cunsequences of a single feiture to equipment listed in any one division of-Table 8.3 1. The wiring to the ADS solenoid valves within the drywell shall run in one or more rigid conduits. ADS conduits for volenoid A shall be divisionally separated f rom solenoid B conduits. Short pieces (tess then 2 feet) of flexible conduit may be used in tne vicinity of the valve solenoids. (5) Electrical equipwnt ard receways for sys-tems listed in Table 8.3 1 shall not be to-cated in close proximity to primary steam piping (steem teskage zone), or be designed for short term exposure to the high tenpera-ture ard htsnidity associated with a steam leak. (6) -A14.01 fClost it electricet couloment located in the suceression Doot level swett tone is limited to sunooression ooot temerature mnitors which havuhd terminations seated such that operati.on l' would not be imaired by stkywesion due to m t swtti or LOCA. N sistent with their Class if status. these devices are al g - t .rustified to the reovirements of IEEE 323 for the environment in which they are tocetedl-A14.01 > Any electrical eautenent l-and/or receways<
-A14.000 Dbeina reMered Irv.ocrable due to migre to the envirement created by the All chargers are stred to sunpty the continuous levet swell obermena. This tone includes load demand to their bus white restoring that sosee above the stn;ression pool normat batterlestoafullychargedstate.l tevel which sees the succe ef water that could result f rom a hia5 -82.01 >8.3.2.1.1 ceneret Systems ,drywell to conteivent differentist pressure < <-B2.01 18.3.2.1.1.1 Class 1E 125 VDC System 1 (7) Containnent penetrations will be so erranged -82.01 >f Four irdependent Ctess 11 125 VDC that no design basis event ran disable systems are provided to sucoty normat og cabling in more than one division. Penetra-ggr,.genev DC powee-92.01 1. Ficur e 8.3 71. tions wit ( not contain cables of more then the DC power systems orovide edeo;ste power one divisional assigrment. igf_3jetion emercenev euillieries and for con-trol and switchino durina et t modes of (8) Annunciator and computer inputs from Class operation. 1E equipren* or circuits are treated as Class 1E and retain their divlstonal identl* !!-B2.01 >(Relocate O n this seqtion) The fication up to Class it isolation device. peeratina voltece renne of Ctess if DC toads ig The output circuit from this isolation de-100 to 140V. vice is classified as nnrdivisional. The meninun eosetiring cherce voltece for Annunciator and computer inputs from non-fless it betteries 's 140 VDC. Ctess 1E equipment or circuits do not require isolation devices. The DC system minimm discheroe voltene et the end of the discharoe period is i.75 VDC per 8.3.2 DC Power Systems Ldit i The 10 VDC system-B us provide-B 111 e 8.3.2.1 Description reliable control and switching power source for the Class 1E systems. -82.01 18.3.2.1.1 General systems 1 -82.01 >(Relocated to 8.3.2.1.11 AtI bati,tf.ita A -92.01 >1]) 2 0C power system -B2.01 L are stred so that reovired toeds will not exceed Finute 8.3 7. <is pro vided for switchgear 80% of neeplete ratina. or warranted caoecity control, controt power, in-strumentation, et end of inststled life with 100% desian critical motors and emergency lighting in control demand. < tach 125 VDC battery is provided with i rooms, switchgeer roces and fuel handling a charger, and a standby cher ger shared by two areas.-B2.01 lFour independent Ctess 1E 125VDC . divisions, each of which is capable of divisions. three inderendent non sefety related recharging its battery from a dis charged state 125VDC leed aroues and one non safety related to a fully charged state while handling the 250VDC ccmnuter end motor power suroty ytt normal, steady state DC toad. providedi See Finares 8.3 7 for the sinate
- lines, Batteries are stred for the DC toad in accordance with IEEE Standard 485 l
[fch bettery is senere uty housed in a ventiteted room eoset f rom its charnee ord distribution -C 58-B2.01 18.3.2.1.1.1 Non Class 1E 250V DC Donets, f ech. battery feeds a DC distribution Power Supolv j switchneer penet which in turn feeds loc d h! distribution canets and DC mtor controt centers. .-82.01 >(Retocated to 8.3.2.1.4) A non-class l An emeroency eve wesh is supot te<f in each batterv 1E 250VDC power sucotv. Finure 8.3 8. is L2iEl-B >(see sesection 8.3.4.7 for interfan orovided for the cecouters and the turbine l reavirements d3 turnine neer mtor. - The power supply consists of one 250VDC bettery and two char
- ners...T23 At t batteries are sired se that required loads normal charmer is fed by 480VAC f rom e' %er the will not esceed 80% of nameplete rating, or Division 1 or Division 11! toad cen ters.
l warranted capacity at end of insteited life with letection of the desired AC supoly is by a 100% design demand. e-y. .1-. v w
_ __.~ nechanicativ interlocked transfer switch. The starvAv charner is fed f rom a control buildinn motor control center. Sele: tion of the normat or the standby charner is controlled by 6E interleeled breaners. A 250VDC central distri-pution board is crevided for conne tion of the leeds. att of whith see _non etats it. tee Subsection 8.3.4 J for interface re-DJI r e"entM 1 8.3.2.1.2 Class it DC Loads The 125 WC Class it power is required f or emergency lighting, diesel generator field flashing, control end switching functions such as the control of 6.9 kV and 480V switchgear, control relays, meters ord irdicators, -C Imultiplesers. vilat ne cower strctiest, as well as DC cceponents used in the reactor core isolation cooling system. The four divisions that are essential to the safe shutdown of the reactor are supplied from four independent 125 VDC buses. 8.3.2.1.3 station Batteries and esttery Chargers, General Considerations The four E17 toad groups are s g lied from the four Class it 125 VDC systems.($ee Figure 8.3 7) i l \\ t-
Etch of ths 82.01 lClass 1E 1125 VDC systems -82.01 ]Each Class if 125 VDC bettery is has a 125 VDC battery, a battery charger ord a pfrpylded with e eherner. and a stendbv char-cer distribution penet. One sterrty bettery charger shared by two divisions each of which is -A 1cen be connee: td to either.pf j A #f t shared capable of recheroino its battery f rom e dis-hitwo divisions and another stardby battery chacned state to e fully th,gged state while charger A jean be ec&ected to either of l-A m,b hardline the normet, steady-state DC toed 2 thered by<two other divisions. -82.01 lettk new interttes brevent erop connection between j 82.012MW.t Battery Coonelty divisions. Ifhe main DC distribution buses Corit ide_e_e t ions Inctide distritastion penets, drawout type i breakers and nolded case circuit y'eekers. 82.01 l De manleum contirina cheroe voltene for Ctess it batteries is 140 VDC. The DC -82.01 *(aeloc at ed t o 8.3.2.1.1) Locat erstea minirm discheroe vettene et the end of distribution denets and ptor control centers are the dischaene period is 1.75 VDC rer cell (10$ fed.from the DC distributt a st,3ch neer,4 sotts for the betterv). The operatina vettene i renne of Ctest 1E DC toeds is 100 to 14Qy4 g The -82.01 lCl9sL1,L1125 VDC systems supply DC power to Divi tions I,11, Ill and IV, 1 4 34.000 JAs a ceneral reouirement. tl-A respectively, and are desigrtd p Class 1E 215 ese batteries have sufficient stored energy h equipvent in accordance with IEEE Std 308, they to operate connected essentist loads are designed so that no sin gle failure in any continuously for et least two hours without 125 VDC system will result in conditions that rechargiro. -A34.000 Ithe divielen 1 batterv. preventsafeshutdownoftheplant-B2.011with which controls the PCIC system. is suffielent either of th _1wo remaininn power divitionsl. for eloht hours of cooina durina station t The piant design ard circuit layout from these DC pleek out. Durino this event scenar b..he load systems provide physical separation of the reductions on Division 11.111. and IV at g t equipment, cabling and instementet ton essential estendthetipwsthesebatteriesareeva,lMph to plant safety. ($ce Aooendin Subsectlen 19E.2.1.2.2).1 Each distribution circuit is capable of transmitting -82.01 *(eelocated to 8.3.2.1.1) Each 125 VDC sufficlea energy to start and operate all battery is separately bovsed in a ventiteted rom required loads in that circuit. epart from its cheroce and distribution nanet.
- Each division of the system is to cated in an
-A34.000 l A leed enoaeltv enstvsts has teen eres separated physically f rcn other divisions, gerformed based on IEEE 4B51978. for estimated All the ccwiponents of Class it 125 VDC systems j-82.01lClass1El-A34.000IDCbatterv_toadsas are he:Used in Seismic Categc.ry I structures. of Septeater. 1989 The results for both two -82.01 21(eetocated to 8.3.2.1.1) An emeroency h we and eloht bours are providad es fables eve aeth is sucot ted in each room. Att charners 8.3 4 throuch 8.3 10.1 are stred to surely the continuous tend demvvd to their -AL000 *essociated< bus white restorino An initial conposite test of onsite AC ind DC batteries to a fully cherced state.(See power systems is catted for es a prerequ' site to sutweetion 8.3.4.7 f or f r..erf ace reouf rements) initial fuel toeding. This test will verify that each battary capacity is sufficient to so-s!8.3.2.1.3.1 125 VDC Systems Conffputation tisfy a safety load demand profile under the conditions of a LOCA and loss of preferred figure 8.3 7 shows the overalt 125 VDC system power. provided for Class it Olvisions I, II, Ill. and IV. Che divisional battery charger is used to Thereaf ter, periodic capacity tests niey be son-supply each divisional DC distribution panel bus ducted in accordance with IEEE std 450. These ard its associated battery. the divisional bet
- tests will ensure that the battery has the ca-tery charger is normally fed frce its divisional pacity to continue to meet safety load demands.
480V MCC bus. See Subsection 8.3.4.6 for interface requirements.
~B2.01-82.02-B3.03-833.00028.3.2.1.3 overcu? rent trios coordinated with the betterv kon-Class SE 925V PC Power Supolv IbLilut breaker. Vricoino current for the toed breakers is suoetled by the battery. A non class it 125vDC cower suroty. Floure-1 8.3 7. it provicted for non safety-retetff -B2.01 18.3.2.1.4 en-Ctess it 250V t$e Power s_wi t c hoese, volves. ronvs eters transducers. $mply ref'Jg instrunentation. The system hap Rg s y r suos with e. t>at t ery. charner g A non-etess IE 250VDC cower sucoty. F i nurr, hw tor.1 nroup. Ther* ere bus tie breakers 8.3 7. is provided f or the conruters and $g kstweer, buses. Normet ooeration is with bLtjig turbine turninc_cear meter. The powJr,,,,,Eggjy p,rfgers ocen. Eoch toad arouo's battery end .:onni.i. of one 250 Var " eiterv ad two char-cherter mov be removed from service as e unit fo:
- rs.
Th3 norme! et is fed tw 480VAC f rom ma'ntenance ci testina. A bettery con be either the I-B2.01 A g arouo A or toad aroue : reche oed by its chercee orter to beina otaced turbinebu8tding,j-82.01>DivisionierDivision back into service. Cload cen* ters. Selection of the desired AC surpty is by a mechanically interlocked One beckup chercer is orovided end.is connectable transfer switch. The standby 6arger it fed to any of the three buses, one bus at a time. . f rom e -82.01 head arouc A ter rol bu.tding under e vtrcl of Kirk key interlocks to: motor control center. Selection of the normal e) Perform extende1 maintenance on the normal or t'W standby charger is controtted by key charcer for the toed aroupa interlocked breakers. A 250VDC centrat distri-b) to make a live transfer of a bus to supolv bution board is provided for connection of the power from the tus of anothey toed aroup without loads, att of which ars non-class 1E. paralletino Og_two betterien -82.01 > See Subsection 8.3.4.6 for interfass The charners are toad limitino bettery re-out reer?nty itpjecement twe rhorcers eacable of operation without a battery eennected to the bus. The 8.3.2.1.3.3 ventitation backie che ger may be supotted from the AC supply of any one ef the three u d arouos. It may be Battery rooms are ventilated to remove the used to chary any one batterv at a niven t(me, minor amounts of gas produced during the for exanete the ined croup B bettery may be charging of batteries. charced from to=d oron A or B or C AC power via the backup charne". 8.3.2.1.3.4 Sta-AltjlonBlackout fach bus is conneetable to either of the other Station blackout performance is discussed in two buses via Kirk key intertoeked tie bree b rs. Subsection 19E.2.1.2.2. The Kirk key interlock system at tows paret telina of charcers. $1nce the charoers are are sejf -B2.01 ># (Combined into sections above.) toad tientina, carat tet operation is eeeeotebte. -A33.000 18.3.2.1.4 Non-Class if Loads The Kirk key intertvek system orevents perdjfj, operation of batteries. This is to nrevent tne The U$vDC non-Class iE power is used for possibility of carattelino betteeles which have sgration cf non-sefety couicanent such as 6.9 KV dif f erent terminal voltales and experiencina o idtehoear (see Subsection 8,3.4.3). valven lerne circulatina cuarent as e result, converters. transducers. controt ters. etc. It also secolics oower to non-Class 1E distribution The battery cutout b*eaker has an overcurrent eenets and toest rocks housina non-cadety , trio and I,n,tgeruots fault current flow from the instrunentation. bettery to a bus fault. A contination disconneet switch and fusg is en acceotebte alternate for The 125 WC non-Class 1E cower distributien the bettery outout breakea._Jhe charner output is shown on rioure 8.3-l-B2.01 IJEM31-82.01 >-4 breaker and the bus in rt breaker do not have 171<-A l. There cre I-92.01 >-A Ifour l<-92.01 ovefeurrent tries. They are used as discone d 1threeI-Alaroupsoffv>n-Class 1Edistributj,oD switches ontv. Bus load breckers have penetswhichrecievetieiroowerl-92.01lir_e,m i l I
w the three reJntesa 1E betteries. l*W-82.01 MJ29 !throuch DC to DC converters f rom the fy r J ess if et @ ;1 Jivisions. t
- e DC to0C converters (or "rewe&cks") ett t elettritet isoleters sveh that any anomalies in the non Cless it. m tea will not effect t h_e
[1 Ell.1f._liUtle. Also, o*oWs on thudd. side (non Ctess it) of the DC to 0 Leonerican do DQt erleer on the inrx;t side (Class 12). 46 ?h t M e iI
These tower Decks fully copoly with et t the reasirements of Petstatory Guide 1.75 and Section 7.2.2 of IEEL}$4. and. ore theref ore aceeetable helation devices. The non-Ctess it ioad W their relationshingthe tower packs and Clpss ,lL}pver sucoty IN.lSes ere the some confiGVept1o0 es those liluetrated in the #2 lend circl d Finure 1 of IEEE 3842 .yl : N(( fte Ctess it 125 VDC systems are edeauatelv [ ti n11 to hendte the non Cless it toeds. $hould a , J' . Loss of et t AC rnwer occur, the non Class if [;': hads can be shed. es needed. to assure extendd ' s bettery itfe for safe shutd m functions of the >p plant. Her bettery cad 8CItv ConSIdcratIonS. See t T," IV. bee t lon 8.3.2.1.3.2.)l< a 1.3.2.2 Analysis 8.3.2.2.1 General DC Power Systems The 480 VAC power supplies for the divisional battery ch;.rgers are from the individual class 1E MCC to which the particuter 125 VDC system belongs (Figure 8.3 7). In this way, separation between the irdeprdent systems is maintained and the AC power provided to the chargers can be from eitber preferred or standby AC power sour-ces. The DC system is so arranged that the pro-bability of an internal system failure resulting in loss of that DC power system is extremely low. Inportant system ceciponents are either self-atarming on f ailure or capable of clearing faults or being tested during service to detect faults. Each battery set is located in its own ventilated battery room. All abnormal cordi-tions of iirportant system parameters such as charger failure or low bus voltage ere annun-cicted in the main control room and/or locally. AC and DC switengear power circuit breakers in each division receive control power frein the 3 I
r- - batteries in the respective toed groups ensuring the following: (1) The unlikely loss of one 125 VDC eystem does not jeopardite the -A IClass it f eedsupply
- A mof pr ef err ed at s t oncby AC Dower t to the Class 1E tasses
?) e ^
of the other load groups. tures for Light W ter-Cooled (2) the differentist relays in one division and att the interheks associated with these re-(e) RG 1.75 Physical IndependeN e of lays are from one 125 VDC system only, Electric Systems thereby eliminating any cross connections between the redundant DC systems. -B8.03 J The DC safety related standby lightina system circuits up to the 8.3.2.2.2 Regulatory e quirements 11ohtino fistores are Class 1E and are e routed in seismic Catecory I raceways. The following analyses demonstrate compliance Nowever the tiohtino fixtures of the Class 1E Divisions I, 11, til and !V DC themselves are not seismicetty power systems to -A3 %)
- n oticable<NRC General cualified, but are seismiestly Design Criteria, hRt..egulatory Guides and other suroorted. The cables and circuits from cel teria consistent with the standard review the power source to the tinhtinn plan. The analyses establish the ability of the fixtures are Class it. The bulbs ennnot system to sustain credible single falture and be seismicatty oustified. This is an retain their capacity to function, exception to the reovirement that att Ctess 1E ecuhment be seismiently The fol Lowing list of criteria is addressed in cualified. The bulbe een only fail open accordance with Table 8,1 1 which is based on and therefore do not represent a hazard Table 8 1 of the Standard Review Plan (SRP).
In to the Class 1E power sources. general, the ABWR la designed in accordance with j att -A3.000 >anoticabte< criteria. Any exceptions -88.03b I Associated circuits edded or clarifications are so noted. beyond the certified desian must be specificetty identified ind Justified (1) General Design criteria (GGC): ggr Subsection B.3.4.13. Assoeleted ,qitsuits are defined in Section 5.5.1 of (a) Criteria: GDCs 2, 4, 17, and 18. IEEE 384 19)J. with the eterification for items (3) and (4) that non Class 1E (b) Conformance The DC power system is in circuits beino in an enclosed raceway compliance with these GDCs -A3,000 >. in w11hout the reautred ohysiret seoaration part. or as a whole, as etut icebic<. or betters between the enclosed raceway The GDCs are generically addressed in and the Class 1E or gssociated cables subsection 3.1.2. nakes the circuits (retated to the non Class 1E cable in the enclosed (2) Regulatory Guides (RGs): raceway) associated circuits.l (a) RG 1.6 Independence Between Redun- -B1.000 1 (f) dant Standby (Onsite) Power RG 1.106 - Thermat overload Protection Sources and Between Their for Electric Motors en Distribution Systems Motor-Ocerated valves (b) RG 1.32 - Criteria for Safety-Related Safelv functions which are reavired to - Electric Power Systems for no to concletion for safety have their Nuclear Pwer Plants lhermet ovetoad protection devices in gree durina normat olent ooeration but (c) RG 1.47 - Bypassed and Innperante Sta-the overload" are bvoassed undg,t tus Indication for Nuclear accident conditions Der Reculatory Power Plant Safety Systems Postion 1.(b) of tr e avide. (d) RG 1.63 - Electric Penetration Assem-1 btles in Contairvnent Struc-
-B1.000>(f)<-81.C00113).1 (I) RC 1.155 sta tion Blackout RG 1.118 - Periodic Tosting of Electric Power and P s'ection Systems Credit is not taken for the CTG as an alternate ac source ( AAC) so Section -81.000 g <-81.000 lih)) 3.3.5 of RG 1.155 is not reovired te h RG 1.128 - Installation Designs and in-me1 (The CTG does meet tha stattation of Large Lead Storage reouirerents of section 3.3.5. however.) Batteries for Nuclear Power See Sectim 19E.2.1.2.2 for a diveussion Plants of coreliance with RG 1.155. -B1.000 g<-B1.000 j.iDJ (3) Branch Technical Positions (BTPs): RG 1.129 - Maintenance, Testing, and Re-placement of large Lead Sto-(a) BIP ICSB 21
- Guidance for Application rage Batteries for Nuclear Power of Regulatory Guide 1.47.
Plants -Bl.000 i (1) R$ 1.153 The DC power system is designed consistent 4 Criteria for Power. Instrteentatf or. and with this criteria. Conteil Portions of Safety Systems (k) RG 1.155 station Blackout 1 The class 1E DC power system is designed in accordance with the listed Regulatory Guides. It is designed with sufficient capacity, inde-pendence and redundancy to assure that the re-quired power support for core cooling, contain-nent integrity and other vitet functions is maintained in the event of a postulated accident, assuming a single fatture. The batteries consist of industrial type storage tells, designed for the type of service in which they are used. Amte capaelty is sollable to serve the loads connected to the system for the duration of the tith that alternating current is not evaltable to the battery charger. Each division of Class 1E equipment is provided with a separate and independent 125 VDC system. The DC power system is designed to permit inspection and testing of all inportant areas and features, especially tiiose which have a standby function and whose operation is not normally demonstrated. -81.0001 (i) RG 1.153 Criteria For Power, Instrtrentation. ned Control Portions of Safety Systems I L
(4) Other SRP Criteries span. The cable installttion -A15.000 lti.e.. -redundant divisions separated by fire barriers) According to Table 8-1 of the SRP, there are jissuchthatdirectinpingementoffire- ~ no other criteria applicable to DC power suppressant will not prevent safe reactor systems. shutdown-815.000 1. even if f a1 Jure of the ul;d g g.,rs. Cables are speelfled tc.,e.sucmersible. u 8.3.3 Fire Protect'on of Cable Systems howeveel -A15.0001(See the f ourth re:nst rernent/conellence in Subsection 9.5.1.0.)1 The basic concept of fire protection for the cable system in the ASWR design is that it is in-8.3..,.2 Localleation of Fires corporated into the design and instattation re-ther than added onto the systems. By use of fire In the event of a fire, the instattation de-resistant and nonpropagating cables, conservative sign will localit6 the physical effects of the application in regard to anpacity ratings and fire by preventing its spread to adjacent areas raceway fill, and by separation, fire protection or to adjacent raceways of different divisions. is built into the system. Fire suppression sys-Localization of the effect of fires on the elec-tems (e.g.; automatic sprinkler systems) are pro-tric system is acco9plished by separation of 4 vided -c las listed in Table 9.5.1 1. l-C. >.fE reuundant cable systems and equipment as de-cable teays in areas of hich cortustible leads or scribed in Subsection 8.3.1 4. -Floors and watts possible transit fire toedina s are effectively used to provide vertical and horltontal fire resistive separations between 8.3.3.1 Resistance of Cables to Contustion re& ndant cable divisions. The electrical cable insulation is ciesigned to ' -810.04 lin any niven fire area en attenot is resist the onset of cortustle by limiting cable made to insure that there is'eauloment from only ampacity to tevels which prevent overheating and one safety-related disiston.' This desian insulation failures (aM resultant possibility of oblective 14 not always met due to other fire) and by choice of insulation and Jacket' over-ridina desian reauirements. IEEE Std 384 materials which have flame resistive and ' and Reautstory Guide 1.75 are etwaYS CoRolled s self extinguishing characteristics. Polyvinyt with, however. In addition an analysis is made; q chloride or neoprene cable insulation is not used and docmented in Section 9A.S.5 to ascertain in the ABWR. All cable trays are febricated from that the reaut rement of beir's able to saf ety noncombustible materlat. Base ampacity rating of shut the nient down with conotete burnout of thg. the cables was established as published in fire swee without recovery of the eauimment-is IPCEA 46-426/IEEE S 135 and IPCEA 54 440/ NEMA . met. the fire detectioni fire s m oression and WC 51 Each coaxial cable, each single conductor-fire contalrvnent systema provided should assure cable and each conductor in multi conductor-that a fire of this meanitude does not occur, cable is specified to pass _ the vertical flame .however, test in accordance with UL 44. 1-610,04># in noecial cases. sostial s In addition, each power, control and instrue _ senaration.jp ad as a method of oreventine,,thg mentation cable is speelfled to pass the verti-spread of fire between adlocent cable trays of - cat tray flame test in accordaice with IEEE 383. ' different di-visions (e.a. inside crimary c ont ainment ). In specist cases where minimm Power and control cables are specified to con-separation cannot be maintained between tinue to operate at a conductor tenperature not
- divisional cables in canets or at eautoment.
exceedirg 90 C and to withstand an emergency-barriers are provided t*etween the cable systems .i overload tenperature of up to 130 C in accora or -A >lustification is orovided between the dance with IPCEA S 66 524/ NEMA WC 7 Appenc"x D. cable systems of<luctification is orovided'(-A. Each power cable has stranded conductor and, IAccendix 9A.51-A > Subsection 9.5.1<>. The flame resistive and radiation-resistant covering, oblective is always to secerate cable trays of Conductors are specified to continue to crerste different di visions wj_th structural fire at 100% relative humidity with a service life .. barriers such as floors.' celtinas and watts. expectancy of 60 years. Also, Class 1E Cables Where this it not possible divisional trays are are designed -B15.03 land avalified lto survive separated 3 ft horizontatty and 5 ft verticattv. the LOCA ambient condition at the end of the which meets minimun seoarations at towed by 60-yr life __m_m___.Em____2._. ______.2.__..
[Ett 384 and associated Peautatory Guide 1.75. -A l'hese erupeelfleetly nnstred and lustified in Ag t M ia_ M.] Fire rated barriers e e used to nepeat@8sional cebte troys when they are seoereted by less then 3 ft horiz mtetty end 5 ft verticatty. Trav fit t is limited to 40*3 cross-sectionel area for att *ebtes. M Maxinsn separation ci egalprent is provided through location of ~B23.000 f redundant jequipmentinseparatefire~B23.000jerees 1-B23.000>ratedrooms<. The safety-related divisional AC unit aihstettons, motor control centers, and DC distribution penets are located to provide sepe ration ard electrical isolation between the di visions. Clear access to and from the main switchgear rooms is also provided. -B10.04 lCable choses are ventilated eM smoke is or vided. l-B23.000 removat capability o > Separation is envided between th* divisional ceblee, and betwe(n divisionet cables and condivisional ca-bles beina routed throughout the olent vie sepa rate fire rated corcertments or ectwbents. < local instrument penets and racks are -823.000 lseoarated by safety division and llocated to a
f acilitote ~C Ireautred l-C >edeauste escparation of cabling. 8.3.4.4 Electrical Penetration Assenbtles - 8.3.3.3 fire Detection and Protection systems $ssection 8.3.1.4.1.2. d)specifiesdesign requirements for electrical penetration Att areas -C lof the olent are covered by a essewblies. Trovide fault current-clearing time fire detection and storm system. Double manuel curves of the electrical penetrations' primary and secondary current interrupting deviceg )- hose reverece is orovided throunhout the plotted against the thernet capability (I t buttdinos. torinkler systems are o*ovided es ligi d.on Table 9.5.1 1. The dieset eenerator-curve of the penetration-(to maintain--mechanicalfl Provide rooms e d day tank rooms are orotected by foam integrity). -All.01 sorin 6ter s< stems. 1-c>eneeotthe dieset-nenerator toca are protected by product of RD RB31Vais showina DI9p.gI combustion detectors. The dieset-cenerator rooma 229Fdinntion-of these are orotected by erbon dioxide uooressten. curves. Also,. provide a which 1 _1-c ithe foam sorinkter systems are dry simplifned one-line diagram. 1 eloe systems with pre action vetves which are showing the location of.the lectuated by com pensated rate of heat rise and - protective devices in the uttraviotet eleme detector.-c 1 individuet' penetration circuit, and sprinkter heads are opened by their thermal indicate the maximum tinks.{ available fault curre.nt of -the circuit. -C > Automatie wet standoice. sortnkters, gsj reet s and manual cult bones f or the coerator's Provide specific initletion of fire sinnate are orovided in.<eas identification ~A11. 02,}Juld es described in s@section 9.5.1. which includes location-1of power supplies-areas where cabtes and cabt. trevs are routed; used to-provide external control power for tripping-3 3.4 interfaces primary and backup 8 electrical-penetration. 8.3.4.1 Interruoting capacity of tiectricat breakers (if utilized). Distribution Equipnent . l Provide an -A11.01 the interrupting capacity of the switchgear 3.nalysis demonstratina the. and circuit interrupting devices must be shown to thgIg&} capabilitV of all be co m atible with the magnitude of the avellable electrical-Conductors within fault current based on final selection of the Denetrations-is Dorserved. transformer impedence, etc. (see subsestion -and Drotected-by one of the 8.3.1.1.5.2(4)). followinc: l ~Dieset Generator Design Details -(1) Show that maximum ( 8.3.4.2 -availaple fault' subsection 8.3.1.1.8.2 (t.) requires the dieset Current--lincluding I generators be capobte of reaching full speed and failure of UDstream ~ voltage within -A36.1 12q1-A36.1 1111 seconds ~ devices)' is less=than i-efter the signet to start. Depunstrate the the maximum' continuous ~. reliability of the diesel generator start-up . Current'caDacitV' circuitry designed to accomplish this. ~.,{-B11.01,IiBassed on. no'damaae to the. B.3.4.3 Certified Proof Tests on fDonetration.) l~A11.01' l-Cable samples lof the ConductorL 'within'the. Subsection 8.3.1.2.4 requires certified proof. Denetration; or tests on cables to demonstrate 60-year Life,.and ] J resistance to radiation,. flame and the environment.. Demonstrate the testing methodology to assure such attributes are acceptable for the j 60 / ear life. j l-
- 12) Show that reMont circuit protection d wices are orovided, and are adeavately deslaned and set to interruot current. In gotte of sinole felture at a value below the meninum contiruous current cepeelty FB11.01 1(Based on no deineae to the penetration.) 1-411.01 lof the conductor within the Dem tration. Such devices nust by located in separate canets or be senareted by barriers and nust be indcoeMent such thet felture of one will not adversty affect the other. Furthermore, they Post not be dependent on the same power gupply,l 8.3.4.5
-B ltdeletedil-B >* Analysis testina f or $Detiet separation oer IEEE 384 - A > I t ems (4 ) and (5 ) in< subsection 8.3.1.4.2.2.2 state-A is (that -A lett safety eovioment or cable I-A >soatlet seoeration in general olent< areas -A lshalt I-A >and in cable ,ec.endina acess<eauet or exceed the -A treavirements of l-A > minimum attowed bv<ltEE 384. Identif y any soecific instances where this reauirement is met by testina and analvsjs (ej ooDosed to actual -A lsecaretion barrierst-A >di s t enc e < >. < e 8.3.4.6 DC voltage Analysis <rovide a DC voltage analysis showing battery terminal voltage and worst case DC load terminal voltage at each step of the Class 1E battery loading profile. (See subsection 8.3.2.1) Provide the manuf actuer's anpere hour rating of the batteries et the two hour rate and at the eight hour rate, and provide the c~ o'nute ampere rating of the batteries (see Subsection
- 8. 3. 2.1. 3. 2 ).
8.3.4.7 -B l(deletedi-B >#sei<mir cuetification of Eyewash Eauiment ,_jAscetion 8.3.2.1.'3 specifies that en emercenCv WY1gsh shall be toCeted in eeCh battery roce. Provide assurance that the eyewash and_ essociated cloina are selsMeatly cualified. and that the eyewesh is toested such that water cannot sotash on the battery.<8 8.3.4.8 -B f(deleted)l-B >80ieset Generator load Tabte Ch mti J Tebtes 8.3-1 and 8.3 3 are cenerie. However, chances may be needed for scectile<#
l 1 -8 >#otent anotications. Such charnes, if env and 9.5.3.2.3.1). a-A8.000 lin the 3 ghall t>e identified and addressed. (See imtementet ton desf ar orovidel-C 1,,1-A8.0001D Subsection 8.3.1.1 6 2 assurance that this is still e true statemert. d or 2) soecificetty identifty and justify any 8.3.4.9 of fsite Power Supply Arrangement other such circuits in the ABWR SSAR; and show they meet the reavirements of Reautatory Guide Operating procedures shall require one of the 1.75. cosition C.4 three divisional buses of figure 8.3 1 be fed by the etternate power source during normal 1-A12.0318.3.4.14 A *inistrative Controts for operation; in order to prevent simultaneous hg deenergitation cf att divisional buses on the Groundino Cittuit treakers loss of only one of 2be offsite power supplies. -81.000l<5eeSectionB.2.3.1(4).11 Fiaure 8.31 shows bus arouMina circuit 1 breakers, which are in*@ to provide safety 8.3.4.10 Diesel Generator Q a tification arounds durina maintenance ocaretions. Tests A@inistrative controls whet t be provided to keeo these circuit breekers rocked out (i.e. In The schedule for qualification testing of the the disconnect oosition) whenever corresoorvdina diesel generators, a d the subsequent results of buses are eneraised. Furtherware. annunciation those tests, must be provided. The tests shall shall be provided to eterm in the control roen be in accordance with IEEE 387 and F.egulatory wheMver the breakers are reeked in for service. Guide 1.9. (See Susbsection 8.3.1.1.8.9) 1-Al??18.3.4.15 Testino of Thernet overtoed 8.3.4.11 -B l(deleted)l-B >W0efectlyt Hypng RJ prbished Circuit Breakers Contacts for MOVs f NRC Bulliten ho ~ 8810 and NRC Information ts indicated in the res o nse to 435.60. Notice No. 88 46 identify problems with defective ptermat overtaod crottetion for Class 1E MOVs is refJrbished circuit breakers. To ensure that bvoasced at all times exeect when the MOV is If urbished circuit breakers shalt not be used in beina tested. A means for testina the bvoass f safety related or non-safety related circuitry of function shall be imlemented. in secordance the ABWR desion. it is en interface reautrement with tne reautrements of Reculatory Guide 1.10h that new breakers be specified in the Durchase 1-A3??1 specifications 38 8.3.4.16 Emercenev Oneratina Procedures f or Stati a U Q ;rg, 8.3.4.12 MinimumStartingV-AIgJ1-A312<tages for Aceticants 'referecina the ABWR Standard plant Class 1E Motors should orovide instructions in their olent Emercenev Operatina Procedures for operator Provide the minimum required startlag voltages actions durina a costuteted station blackout for Clasc 1E motors. Cormare these minimum event. Specificetty. If division 1 required voltages to the voltages that will be instrunentation is functionino crocerly, the supplied at the motor terminals during the redundant divisions If. Ill, and IV shou ld be start'ng transient when operating on offsite snut down in order to 1) reduce heat dissfoation power and when cperating on the -C *addieset in the control room while MVAC is lost, an( 7 generators, conserve battery encrav for additional SRV -AB.0001 ca2acity. or other soecific functions. as 1,.,3,4.13 Identification and Justification of needed. throughout the event. Associated Circuilg 1-A21.0118.3.4.17 Comon Industriot Standards Prior to the imolementation staae of the Referenced in Purchase Soecifications desian. the enty wassociated circuits" (as defined by IEEE 384) known to exist in the A8u4 in addition to the reautatory codes and Standard Plant desian see I-88.000 Ifor the FMCR0 standards reautred for-ticensino. nucchase drive ocwer feed tak;n frem the division 1 6.9Kv -. specifications shalt contein a list of comon safety-related bus (see Subsection 8.3.1.1.11 iMustrait standards, as amorooriete. for the a 1-88.000<inthesafetyrelatedtiohtina essurance of auetity manuf acturina of both gybsystems (see Subsection t.5.3.2.2.1 pafety and non-safety related equiernent. Such g,tandards would inqtude ANSI ASTM. IEEE. NEMA. R etc. - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ - _ _ _ _. _}}