ML20100M961
| ML20100M961 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Perry  |
| Issue date: | 12/04/1984 |
| From: | Edelman M CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ILLUMINATING CO. |
| To: | James Keppler NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| References | |
| (RDC-110(84)), NUDOCS 8412120518 | |
| Download: ML20100M961 (2) | |
Text
ph TH E C L EV E L Ai! D E L E CTRIC IL L U Mi U ATIN G C O M Pi!N Y P.O. box 5000 - CLEVELAND. OHIO 44101 - TELEPHONE (216) 622-9800 - lLLUMINATING BLOG. - 55 PUBLICSQUARE Serving The Best Location in the Nation December 4, 1984 VICE PREsloENT
""Mr"JamesG.Keppler Regional Administrator, Region III Office of Inspection and Enforcement U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 799 Roosevelt Road Glen Ellyn, Illinois 60137 RE: Perry 11tclear Power Plant Docket lios. 50-440; 50-441 Instrumentation 2:1 Fillet Welds (RDC 110(84)]
Dear Mr. Keppler:
This letter serves as the final report pursuant to 10CFR50.55(e) concerning concave 2:1 unequal leg fillet welds installed in Unit #1 Reactor Building by our Instrumentation and Controls contractor, Johnson Controls, Inc.
Mr. R.
Knop of four office was first notified on July 18, 1984, by Mr. E. Riley of The Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company (CEI) that this problem was being evaluated. Our interim report was filed August 17, 1984.
This report contains a description of the deficiency, corrective action taken and an analysis of safety implication.
Description of Deficiency Field inspection indicated that in some cases the 2:1 unequal leg fillet welds installed by Johnson Controls, Inc., (JCI) on 2", 3/4" and 1/2" instrument piping / tubing in Unit #1 Reactor Building (specifically inside Drywell and outside Drywell below the 620 ft. elevation) did not meet design requirements as specified on Gilbert / Commonwealth, Inc., (G/C Inc.) drawings. This work has not begun on Unit #2.
Analysis of Safety Implication Based on G/C Inc. design, it can be postulated that the deficient welds could result in an unacceptably high Stress Intensification Factor (SIF) at the transition from the toe of the veld to the pipe / tubing. The resulting overstress condition could potentially cause cracking at the toe of the fillet veld and eventual failure of the safety-related Instrumentation and Control System.
5.e A7 8412120518 841204 DEc 6 PDR ADOCK 05000440 S
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.n Mr. Jrmea G. K pplar Deccabar 4, 1984 e
Corrective Action Taken Indoctrination and training was given to all Johnson Control (JCI) welders and QA/QC personnel on the acceptance criteria fer 2:1 unequal leg fillet welds.
JCI QC reinspected all installed 2:1 fillet welds and reported the condition (leg sizes, actual profile) of each weld via Nonconformance Reports (NRs).
Engineering evaluated the inspection reports attached to the NRs and reanalyzed the pipe to determine which welds were acceptable as is and which required rework. All NRs issued as a result of this deficiency are now closed.
Johnson Controls procedure QAS 1001, " Visual Inspection", was revised to include detailed acceptance criteria for 2:1 fillet walds. Construction Quality Section is monitoring new installations. Those made after indoctrination and traiaing was given have been found acceptable.
Please call if there are any questions.
Sincereig, M v) urray R. Edelman Vice President Nuclear Group MRE:pab cc:
Mr. J. A. Grobe USNRC, Site Office Mr. D. E. Keating USNRC, Site Office Director j
Office of Inspection and Enforcement U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission i
Washington, D.C.
20555 l
l U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission l
c/o Document Management Branch Washington, D.C.
20555 l
Records Center, SEE-IN Institute of Nuclear Power Operations 1100 circle 75 Parkway, Suite 1500 Atlants, Georgia 30339 t
.