ML20100H279
| ML20100H279 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Susquehanna  |
| Issue date: | 08/31/1981 |
| From: | PENNSYLVANIA POWER & LIGHT CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20100H280 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8504090086 | |
| Download: ML20100H279 (32) | |
Text
,
m e
i ATTACHMENT 2 t
~
a SAFETY ANak.YSIS REPORT FOR TIIE OPERATION OF THE ON-SITE LOW-LEVEL RADI0 ACTIVE TASTE !!0LDING FACILITY (INTERD! STORACE) AT SUSQUE11 ANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION s
AUGUST 1981 4
f F
8504090006 810803 PDR ADOCK 05000387 X
cs.
i et I
SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT' FOR TIIE OPERATION OF TIIE ON-SITE LOT-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE !!OLDING FACILITY (INTERIM STORAGE)" AT SUSQUEIIANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION AUGUST 19.81 D
ew' 6
m g
as t
i l
t s.. e 0
9 l
l l
"**=a-=
== emo
.....- -.. es
-.. ~...
- m....... -..........-....
De
page 2 TABLE _O_F CONTENTS 1.0 INTP.0 DUCTION.............,........................ 4 2.0 FACILITY DESIGN.................................. 4 2.1 Container Deslan............................ 5 2.2 Waste Materla1s.............................. 6 2.3 Fire Detection / Protection.................... 7 2.4 Floor Drains................................. 8 2.5 Conmunications.............................. 9 2.6 Radiation Monitorina......................... 9 2.7 Securitv................................... 10
~
2.8 Lo a d i n g Ss st en s............................. 10 2.9 Ventilation Svsten..........................
10 2.10 Trash Restrainine Svsten....................
12
~
3.0 F A CIL ITY 0P ER ATION............................... 12 3.1 Loading and Uniondine.......................
12 3.2 Storage Patterns........................... 13 i
4.0. SAFETY ANALYSIS..................................
14 4.1 Handlina and Storage Aceldents..............
14 e
l 4.1.1 Container Drop from a Transport Vehicle.. 1G l-4.1.2 Dropping a Cell Cover into a Storage i
i Coll......................................
17 4.1.3 Dropping.a lleavy Component onto a l
i Shield Pane 1..............................
17 4.1.4 Collision of tho Overhead Crane or Transport Yehicle with a Storage Container..........
18 L
3 page 3 4.1.5 Dropping a LLRW Container into a Cell.....
19 4.1.6 Collision Between the Transport Vehicle and the Overhead Crane............ 20 4.2 Other Accidents........................... 20 4.2.1 F1res.....................................*.20 4.2.2 Freezes...................................
21 4.2.3 Tornadoes..................................
21 4.2.4 ' Floods & Seismic Events.................. 21 4.2.5 Sabotage................................. 22 s
4.3 Sunnarv................................... 22 l
5.0 REFERE.N*CES...............'........................
23 6.0 TABLES.....................'......................
24 7.0 FIGURES.......................................... 28 O
a
.D8 9
,A 3
l'..
pago 4
- 1.0 INTI:0DCCTION This is the safety analysis _ report to support the application
~
of the Pennsylvania Power and Light Company and the Allegheny Electric Cooperative, Inc.
to store waste in a Low-level Ra-
~
dioactive Waste Ifolding Facility (LLR'Kl!F)' at the Su'squehanna Steam Electric Station (SSES).
The LLRTIIF is designed to safely store about C0,000 cubic feet of low-level radioactive waste p$r year from both units for up to a four year period.
This facility is to be used for contingency storage in the event that offsite disposal facilities are not avallble.
The purpose of this report is to determine the effects of
, possible process disturbances or postulated component fa!-
lures and to ensure the facility's design adequacy to control or mitigate the consequence of these events and failures.
2.0 FACILITY DESIGN The LLRWIIF, shown in Figures 2.0-1
& 2.0-2, is designed to store all the dry activated (trash) and dewatered solidified (cement) low-level radioactive wastes generated by SSES for the equivalent of S reactor years.
These wastes would be stored in the facility for up to four years or until they can be shipped to permanent disposal facilitics offsite.
(See Ref. G.1) r
- h*
s
-,1
+
y
=_
pags 5 The overall facility dimensions will be 73 meters (240 feet) X 88 meters (283 feet) with a centerline elevation of 13 no-
'ters(42 fE~et).
In addition, a control and equipnent roon p
~
meters (20 feet) X 0 meters (30 feet) will be located adjacent to the facility's north wall approximately 5 noters (16 feet) from the northeast corner.
The LLRWIIF consists of concrete storage vaults and an open waste $toragearea within the confines of an uninsulated steel-framed, netal st'ded structure which provides weather protection.
The storage vaults are provided with concrete walls and. covered with pre ast, reinforced concrete shield panels.
Each panel contains a nunber of circular'renovable plugs or cell covers to permit theIloading and unloading of Individual storage cells without renoving the entire shield panel.
~
A curb Is provided around the perineter of the facility to contain any liquid such as rainwater or fire sprinkle'r water which may be introduced into the building. The curb can con-4 tain the volume of fire protection water released if all the i
sprinklers are actuated in the marinum credible fire event i
for a period of one half hour.
2.1 Container Deslen The storage containers to be stored in LLRTl!F are designed to I
preclude or reduce the occurrence of uncontrolled releases of
,)
l h
L
\\
~_ _ _ _ _.._.. _....
e h
r-pago 6 radioactive materials due to handling, transportation, or storage.
~
Container materials conform to the requirements established Im NUREG 75/087 (Section 11). The containers are designed to contain the solldtfled waste material without loss of con-tainer lategrity until final disposal.
The waste container
- materials' do not support combustion. The fo!!owing container types may be used in this faellity:
~
Manufacturce Designation Volume Diancter Heleht United Nuclear 50 CFL 50 cu.ft.
48" 53-7/8" liittman HN-100' 163 cu.ft.
72-3/8" 72-3/4" Hittman HN-200 75 ca.ft.
52-3/8".
61-3/8"
~
Illttman HN-600 83 cu.ft.
72-3/8" 40" Chem-Nuclear 14-105 2b0cu.ft.
76" 70" Chem-Nuclear 6-80 85 cu.ft.
58" 57-7/8" CPC *
'B-25
, 9G ca.ft.
50" x 46" x 72"
~
(Rectangular) 55 gal. drums 7.7 cu.ft.'
!.05' 2.D'
- Container Products Corporation 2.2 Waste Materials The LLRT!!F is designed to store low level dewatered solldt-fled radioactive wastes and the low lovel dry trasta radloac-tive wastes.
Should the need arlso, it nay also be used for v,
bb e
~
paga 7 the temporary storage of large pleces of contaninated or me-tivated plant equipnent. Temporary shleiding will be provid-ed for the contaninated equipment to ensure that radiation levels are within facility design limits.
It will not be used for storage of gaseous wastes or wastes containing free Itquids.
Solidirled waste is defined as wet dewatered waste (e.g.,
evaporat'or bottoms, resins, and sludge) which is solidified and contains less than O.57. free water by container solume or 1.0 gallon of liquid in the container, whichever is less.
Low level dry' trash is defiaed as contaninated naterial which contains sources of radioactive material that is d!'spersed in small concentrations throughout large volumes of inert mater-fal which'contain no free water.
Generally, this consists of dry material such as paper, trash, air filters, rags, cloth-Ing, small equipment, and other dry naterial.
A description of the solid radwasta systen, including types and amounts of waste expect to be generated, is contained in Section 11.4 of the Susquehanna Stean Electric Station FSAR.
2.3 Fire Detection / Protection The fire protection design is based on a conbustible loading of 1200 pounds per square foot.
The facility is provided with a fire detection systen "to provido an early warning
,)
alarm.
c-paga 8 The entire building is provided with a dry pipe sprinkler
~
system designed to deliver 0.25 gallons per square foot over the hydraulically nost remote 0000 square foot area.
The systen uses sprinkler heads rated at 2SS degrees Fahrenheit.
In the event of a fire in the facility the fire detection system automatically shuts down the ventilation system and annunciates an alarn in the main plant control room.
In ac-cordance with the plant procedures the operator sunnons the fire brigade. Should the ceiling temperature exceed 2SG de-grees Farhenhelt, the fire sprinkler systen,is automatically actuated in the area of the fire.
Any water or other fire fighting naterials Introduced into the facility are considered contaminated until proven other-wise.
If contaninate,d, they are disposed of accordingly.
2.4 Floor Drains The floor drainage system is designed to collect any liquids that spill on the floor of the facility.
The systen routes all drains to a collection sump located at the building peri-phery.
The sump is ergulpped with liquid. detection devices which provide annunciation in the naln plant and facility control roons whenever any lleguld enters the sunp.
The sump may be sampled and punped to portable tanks fron either inside or outside the building.
There is no pernanent
'pl
1 page 9 pumping equipment installed or any piping connections to the main plant.,,
The areas inside the storage vault are also provided with drains to route free liquids to the sump.
2.5 Communications The communication system allows two-way conversation and pag-Ing betseen the main plant and the facility.
It is connected to the existing main p!' ant conmunications sytem.
It has one l
station for paging and conversation in the loading area.
It
^
has sufficient speakers is..ide the storage area to insure that paging or an alarm can be heard whe'n the faellity is at full capacity.
It also han one station for paging and con-versation'in the facility control roon.
A telephone is pro-vided in the LLRTIIF control room to allow for both on and offsite connunications.
~
2.6 Radiation Monitorine Systen The radiation monitoring system is designed to monitor the r
general area radiation levels at various locations In' the trash storage area, the loading area, and the facility con-I trol room.
There is a readout for this systen in the faellty control room.
i
,1 i
l I
l.
~
page 10 2.7 Sceurity This systen is an extention of the existing plant security systen which monitors access to.the facility. Normal facill-ty access points are equipped with magnetic card readers.
Unauthorized access initiates an alarn in the plant security systen.
2.8 Loadina Svstens The loading systens for the facility consist of transport vehicles.(trucks and forklifts),
an overhead crane with main and aux 811ary hooks and a shield bell. These systems are ca-pable of unloading, transporting within t'he facility, plac-Ing, retrieving, and reloading of cemented waste and the con-pacted dry trash. They have the capacity to lift, transport, and replace movable shielding devices.
The systems may be either directly or remotely operated and incorporate features to mininize operator radiation exposure in accordance witla ALAP.A principles.
Dropped or damaged waste container can be retr,leved for re-packaging or other disposition.
2.0 Ventilation Systen The facility ventilation systen perfarns the following func-tions:
1) it renovos noxious or irritating exhaust fumes
Pag
- 11 whenever internal conbustion engine powered machinery is op-erating inside the facility, and 2)
It prevents excessive h'est build ~-up from'the roof in the summer.
,11e system is designed such that l' noves air generally in an upward direction away from the e<gulpnent operators.
Air inlets are provided such that when the fac!Ilty is closed, air entering t,he facility is evenly distributed and flows as described above.
They are located and designed such i
that snow accumulation'cannot significanly restrict the flow of air or be drawn int'o the facility.
The ventilation system doe not provide any heating.or cool-ing for the facility.
It also does not provide any humidity control.
~
The build!ng is provided with a smoke detection system.
If
~
smoke is detected, the ventilation system automatically shuts downandanannunci$toractuates la the main plant and facil-Ity control rooms.
The controls provide manual starting and stopping of the fans and manual override of the above de-e t
a scribed automatic shutdown function.
The automatic shutdown and alarm are the only automatic control features of the sys-tem.
- I N
psgs 12 2.10 Trash Restrainine System I
The facill_ty has a trash restraining system designed to pre-vent trash contalners from being blown out of the facility
-during a tornado having a win'd velocity up to 300 miles per hour.
The system is composed of nylon netting or other suitable na-terial enclosing the trash storage area and secured to an-chors in the foundation and floor slab.
All tornado wind loading is transyltted directly into the anchors.
The system is designed such that failure of the building structure will not tend to cause failure of the trash res. training system.
3.0 FACILITY OPERATION The purpose of operating the facility is to tenporarily store Iow-level radioactive waste' generated by the plant until It can be shipped off-site.'
It is normally not occupied by plant personnel except during loading and unloading opera-tions.
e l
l 3.1 Loadine and Unloading l
l Loading of the facility will generally proceed as follows for l
solidified waste.
A truck loaded with a container of the area.
The waste will enter the facility in the unloading
[
waste containers will be inside a shielding device called a and shield bell
,i shield bell.
The truck with the~ container e
F pngs 13 will stop in the overhead crane pickup area.
Before any oth-er unloading steps are taken, all personnel nust nove out of the storag~ area to's safe distance from the container or get behind shielding protection.
The overhead crape then lifts the shield bell and container from the truck and moves it ad-jacent to its designated storage cell where the auxiliary crane hook renoves the cell cover.
The container and shield bell are then moved over the opened cell.and the container is lowered into the cell. The shield bell is rer.oved and the cover is replaced, whercupon the operation is conplete.
Loading the facility with t. ash waste will take place in si,
~
mitar fashion. The truck ith the 55 gallon druns on pallets will back onto the loading ramp adjacent to the trash storage area.
It'is then unloaded with a forklift or other appropri-ate machine.
If required, depending on the dose rate from the containers, the forklift will be equipped with radiation shielding.
Unloading the LLRTIIF will generally occur in the reverse ord-er of the loading sequence.
3.2 Storace Patterns To maxinize the wastes' self shielding properties and ninin-Ize personnel exposure, the lower activity wastes are to be stored around the facility periphery and, if practical, on the top layer of each storage area.
l
--. a
pags 14 The shleided concrete vault and the open storage arcas are designed to hold the solidified waste and the trash cotain-respectively.'
~
~
- crs,
~
4.0 SAFETY ANALYSIS Due to the facility design, the possibility of an equipment failure or serious malfunction is remote. Because strict ad-mininstrative controls will be' exercised during waste trans-
~
fer operations the possibi!!ty of an accident caused by human error is also minimized.
Ifowever, an accident analysis has Leen performed to denonstrate the facility's capability to control or mitigate the consequences of postulated failures or accidents.
These accidents are divided into two catego-
+
ries:
- 1) hand _ ling and storage accidents and 2) other acci-
~ dents.
4.1 Handling and Storage Accidents
!!andling' and storage accidents include drops, collisions, and
~
system failures. ~
~~
The potential for drop accidents is minimal due to the oper-p.
~
l sting'and design features which are incorporated in the cranc
. design..
Lifting cables and lugs are designed with.a nininun safety factor of 2.
- In addition, container lifting devices are designed to rensin engaged until an operator initiates an electrical or mechancial force to release them.
The control 9
i
(?c.37.';;
~m e
,, ~,
pags 15 switches which activate and deactivate the lifting devices are totally segregated from those that position the trolley
~
and crane, thus reducing the possibility for operator error.,
The lifting devices are also designed t'a remain engaged until the downward force is completely renoved by resting the load on a floor surface.
In addition, lifting heights, travel times and distances will be mininized to further reduce the possibil'ity of a drop accident.
~
j Overhead crane and tran: sport vehicle collisions are not anti-cipated to occur duet $theirslow travel speed and the fa-In the LLPM F, the transport vehicle noves no cility design.
faster than 10 miles per hour and the overhead erane no fast-er than 50 feet per minute.
A transport vehicle collision
~
with a storage vault is possible, but due to vehicle speed l' pact on the storage containers' and vault design, has no a
structural integrity or the shielding capabilities of the vault wall.
System failures, though not anticipated, would not impair the
~
overall integrity of this facility.
Failure of normally op-j erating systems, such as lighting, ventilation, or electrical
?-
would not affect the facilities' safe storage function.
Should a shield pancI or cell cover become danaged for any l
spare panels and covers will be available onsite.
reason,
e 1_
paga 1G 4.1.1 Container Drop fron a Transport Vehicle The LLRT storage, containers are transferred from the plant to the storage facility on a truck. Solidified waste containers are shielded with a portablo shield bell while being trans-ferred fron"the solidification facility to the storage facil-Ity. Should a waste container fall to the ground and be dan-postulated transport vehicle collision or aged due to a upset, "the waste would not create an airborne radiation ha-zard because it is solidified.
However it is possible that the container shleIding would be danaged or inadequate t'a fully shield the direct radiation fron the container.
The design basis direct radiation dose from the solidified waste to the nearest offsite location is calculated to be 1.6 nren.
which is sell within the liisits of 10 CFR 100. The radiation sources and assumptions used for this calculation are given l
in Table 4.1-1.
( *
[
This analysis is based on a solidified waste container with a l
~
l design radiation dose of 60 ren/hr contact.
Infrequently, contaminated equipment and waste containers with dose rates higher than 60 ren/hr may be transferred to, and tenporarily stored in the LLRWF. Special procedures and administrative controls will be used in these cases.
The dose calculation results given in Table 4.1-1 show that wasto containers with l
radiation levels r.any times higher than 60 ren/hr would still be well within the limits of 10.CFE 100.
,6 i
page 17 4.1.2 Dropping a Cell Cover into a Storage Cell The cell, covers are designed with a shielding offset such that each Individual cell cover has a larger diancter than that of its cell opening, which prevent's the cover from drop-ping into the cell.
However, the cell covers and shield pa-nels are not designed to sustain a colI cover drop from the maximum lifting height. Therefore, a cell cover dropped from its eig$t' inch maxium lifting height could drop into a loaded
. cell, damaging the LLR5 containers inside.
1
. Since the waste is solidified this accident would not create
~
any radiation hazard to uns.:stricted areas. The damaged con-tainers would remain in the cel1 and be covered with a spare cover until the resguired decontamination, repair and/or re-packaging could be accomptished.
?
~.
4.1.3 Dropping a lleavy C'omponent onto a Shield Panel The shield panels covering the storage vaults are not de-
, signed to withstand the drop impact of a cell cover LLRW container or another shield panel. - llowever, the storage vaults are designed such that the supporting steel frame mem-I bers are not affected by damage to, or failure of, one or l
l more of the vaults shield panels. Therfore, although the pa-nel and stored waste containers could be damaged by a heavy i
component drop, the structural integrity of.the cel1 and the remaining faciIity would not be compronised. Since the waste l
l
~
pago 18 is solidified, this postulated accident would not create an airborne rs'diation hazard offsite.
!!owever, damage to the
~
~
shield panels could cause a skyshine radiation hazard off-site.
Assuming two fully loaded storage vaults and no ' shielding
^
provided by the damaged panels, the skyshine radiation dose rate offsite is 0.1 nren/hr.
.~
The sources and assumptions used in this evaluation are given In Table 4.1-2.
If this accident were to occur, the damaged containers would be covered by a spare shield panel and remain in the storage vault until the required decontamination, repair and/or re-packaging could be completed. The total dose for the accident duration.would be well within'10 CFR 100 limits.
4.1.4 Collision of the Overhead Crane or Transport Vehicle with a Storage Container A collision of the overhead crane or transport vehicle with a storage container is improbable due to their slow travel E
speeds discussed in 4.1.,
- Also, a transport vehicle (fork-lift) collision with a solidified waste container is not pos-sible because only the overhead crane is to be used in the storage vault area.
j-w
-r---
M
- ,--ww m--,
y o
e-,-mp-g-__.
9--,
n y
w-,
P3gs 19 A collision of 1) the crane hook with a solidified waste con-tainer, or 2) the crane hook or transport vehicle with the
~
trash containers, would cau.ie only ninor abrasive damage.
If the trash contairers were breached or their lids were dis-lodged, no waste would leave the facility's confines until the required decontam!' nation and/or repackaging was complet-
'ed Therefore, there would be no offsite radiological conse-quences due to this accident.
4.1.5 Droppiig a LLRW Cont'ainer into a Cell e
During storage cell loading operations, it is possible that a waste container could be da,opped into a partially loaded cell and damage the container and the storage cell contents.
Since all waste stored in'the cells is solidified, there
~
would be no airborne radiation hazard to unrestricted areas.
The damaged waste containers would remain shielded in the cell until the required decontamination, repair and/or re-packaging could be accomplished.
Therefore, no offsite ra -
dialogical consequences would result from this accident.
W e
Y 'e e
.e e
E:
- 6h9 me es e e +e
- ma e em e e e en 4
e =ree e ese emuus ed.& ee eee+=
.me w.
m e.e age eimme e e -,e e e es e me me e e e ese em eg
-ea
.e -eem me e
.e
,,.c.
e... -.,
page 20
- 4.1.6 Collision Between the Transport Vehicle and the Overhead Crane A collision between the transport vehicle and crane is un-
!!kely because both nachines are not in motion simultaneous-ly.
Also, the crane bridge support wheels are kept from the transport vehicle by a large vertical separation and a track wheel stop which prevents the crane from overriding its track andcol[idingwiththetransportvehicle.
4.2 Other Aceldents Other accidents include fires,
- freezes, tornadoes, floods.
earthquakes and sabotage.
4.2.1 Fires A fire ln the LLRil!F is extremely unlikely because all flan-mable material is stored inside metal containers.
Also, the facility is equipped with a fir detection / protection system
~
descrlhed in 2.3.
Therefore, a fire inside the facility re-
~
sulting in offsite dose consequences or appreciable damage to the LLRWIIF and its contents is not considered tp be probable.
However, to demonstrate that there are no adverse offsite ra-dialogical consequences, an accidental release due to an unspecified incendiary event has been conservatively evaluat-ed assuming 1007. of the facility's stored trash is affected by a fire. No credit was taken for the nitigating effects of
.9 e
e 6
m e
.e
'O,.,
e
F page 21 the fire protection system.
The resulting offsite dose is 0.2 nren.
The sources and assumptions used in this evalua-
~
tion are given in Table 4.2'1.
This dose is well within the limits of 10 CFR 100.
4.2.2 Freezes The breech of a container due to water crystallization expan-slon of its contents is'not possibic because all stored waste will be# solidified and contain less than 0.5 percent free-standing water by waste' container volume.
I 4.2.3 Tornadoes As described in 2.10, the incility's trash restraining systen is designed to prevent any trash containers from being blown out of the facility confines during a tornado with up to a.
300 mile per hour wind velocity.
Therefore, there would be no offsite radiological consequences due to tornado damage to this facility.
^
4.2.4 Floods and Selsnic Events r-The LLRWilF is designed for the maxinun plant design rainfall l
Intensity of G inches per hour.
The facility does not have 1
other special flood provisions because it is wcIl above the Susquehanna River flood stage for the probable maximum flood.
The LLRWi!F is a Non-Category I structure.
Failure of this structure during a scismic event would not result in the re-
,,l'
- 1..-.. _...
page 22 lease of significant radioactivity nor affect safe reactor shutdown.
4'.2.5 Sabotagc
~
is Damage to the LLRVl11F and its contents due to sabotage highly inprobable because of the inherently safe. design and security systen employed.
Also, the stored wastes are inert and low ~1n radioactivity making them an unlikely sabotage target. Since the facility is within the site's secured area and is equipped with x;agnetic card entry, no accider.ts' beyond those already considered are evaluated speelfically for sabo-tage.
4.3 Sunnary
~
The LLRWliF, and its associated storage containers, equipment
~
~
and operating procedures provide a satisfactory interin sto-rage facility which is capable of controlling and~nitigating '
the radiological e nsequences of potential accidents and un-planned events..
e r
~
e re W
G G
==.3 e
e 9
b a
e w
pago 23
5.0 REFERENCES
5.1
" Environmental Assessment of the Operation of On-site Low-level
~
Radioactive Waste Holding Facility (Interin Storage) at Suscluchanna Stean Electric Station, June 1081.
ee 5.2 "A Waste Inventory Report for Reactor and Fuel-Fabrication Facility Wastes" ONVI-20 NUS-3314, USDOE, March 1070.
e 5.3 "E5v'ironmental Survey of Transportation of Radioactive Materials To and Fron Nuclear Po"er Plants," WASH-1238, December 1972.
8 1
,s I*
D
'9 O
S.
em e
e e
.O gp e
- O f* *
.e
=
e e.g.
g!
6 "MD 888WMMe4 ese
-m e e ee.me es ee e,,,
a w e, e.g w a
$s a.n.=
pags 24 7
G.0 TABLES TABLE 4.1-1 DESIGN BASIS SOURCES AND hSSUMPTIONS USED Tg CALCULATE T1!E OFF-SITE RADIOLOGICAL CONSEOUENCES DUE TQ 3 CONTAINER DROP FR05f A TRANSPORT VE!!ICLE
'A.
Radiation Source
.J A design radiation level of 00 ren/hr contact is assumed for the solidifed waste container and is based on a solidified reactor water clean up spent resin activ'ity distrthution. The source for the reactor water clean-up spent resin is given in Section 12.2 of the Susquehanna SES FSAR.
B.
Geonetry of the Dropped. Container
~
The geonetry of the dropped container is based on a Chen-Nuclear Container 6-80.
s.
Diameter - 58" l
lleight 57-7/8" -
I Volume 85 cu.ft.
l l
[=
l, C.
Distance from the Sodrce to Receiver Point Distance from the drop point (innediately adjacent to the facility) i to the site boundary - 1208. ft.
l
.l i
paga 25
, a TABLE 4.1-1 (Cont'd)
D.
Duration of Accident
' Total tine the container is assumed to renaln unshielded - S hrs.
E.
Off-Site Radiological Consequences 0.2 neem /hr Off-site Dose Rate 1.6 nrem/hr Tota,1 Integrated Off-Site Dose h
a I
t 9
i*
mo 9
g e
_a N
e O
.I I
l l
r*
a
..m*
l
- sl s
t 1 - -. - - -........._._.._.
i l
r.
~
page 2G TABL5 4.1-2 DESIGN BASIS SOURCES AND ASSUMPTIONS USED TO CALCULATE TIIE OFF-SITE RADIOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES DCE TO DROPPING A IgVJ COMPONENT ONTO A S!!IELD PANEL A. Skyshine Radiation Source
^
~
Forty percent of the source is based on a solidified Reactor Water, Clean-up Spent Resin activity distribut.lon nornalized to a CD ren/hr contact container dose rate.
Sixty percent of the source is based on a solidified Condensat'e Demineralizer Spent Resin activity distribution normalized to a 3 ren/hr contact container dose rate.
't
~
Source terms for these spent resins are given in Section 12,.2 of the Susquehanna SES FSAR.
B. Skyshine Source Geometry
~
The total activity contained by two vaults assuming maximun capacity is used to determine an equivalent point source.
j No credit is taken for shleiding provided by the damaged panels. -
C. Distance from the Sour,ce to the Receiver Point Distance from the facility to the site boundary - 1303. ft.
t
?
l D. Off-Site Radiological Consequences Of.f-site dose rate - 0.1 mren/hr et e
e e
e e
PnC8 27
~~
TABLE 4.2-1 DESIGN BASIS SOURCES AND ASSUMPTIONS USED TQ CALCULATE TIIE OFF-SITE RADIOLOGICAL CONSEOUENCES DUE TQ A FIRE IN TIIE.
LLR7 COMPACTED TRASI!
A.
Isotope Inventory of Compacted Trash (Ref. 5.2)
ISOTOPE ACTIVITY (C1/drun)
Mn-54 1.1 -3 i
Co-58 l
1.0 -4 Co-60 2.2 -3 Cs-134 3.0 -4 Cs-137
'5.9 -4 B.
Nunber of Druns Affected by the Fire Nunber of drums assumed to catch fire - 14,100 (This is the 4 year compacted trash capacity of the LLRTIIF)'.
j C.
Meteorology 1
r X/Q - 1.3-3 sec/cu.n.
r-ID.
Airborne Radiation e.
Percent of Particulate Contanination Assumed to be Airborne (Ref 5.3) 1" E.
Of f-site Rsdiological Consc<guences
.,a Total Integrated Off-Site Doso (Thole Body Canna) - 0.21 nren l
-. - = -.
I h
y pag'e 23 i
I 7.0 FICURES t
(
FIGURE 2.0-1 OVERl!EAD VIEW OF TI!E SUSQUEllANNA STEM! ELECTn!C STATION, N
11 19 I
to 1
I 5
2 s
1 C
10 3
22 7
~
13 4
21 l
14' g,
ts i
is i
l, Kev 1-Rad Taste Du!Iding 12-North Ca+e llouse 2-Unit 1 Turbine Building 13-Combination Shop l
3-Control Structure 14-Warehouse c
4-Unit 2 Turbine Building 15-Change !!ouse 5-Diesel Generator Building 16-Project Orrice 6-Unit 1 Reactor Building 17-Telding Shop l
7-Unit 2 Reactor Building 18-South Cate !!ouse 8-Engineered Safeguards and 10-Security Control Center Service Water Pump !!ouse 20-Unit 1 Cooling Tower 9-Acid Storage Building 21-Unit 2 Cooling Tower l
10-Pump Ilouse 22-LLRTl!F 11-Service and Administration Building 1{
l!
I --
i prgo 29 v-2 I
i
'3.
(' \\ $
'3
!.. ~
[
~1*
\\'r 4.,
-mo
's
-A.
5
~. \\
\\.
g
's j
-'_._____...Th'
\\. \\ g'1-b h'DN%
I E,
i t-a <
t
,g
=w j
- \\. s / h%% %
" N ;), k
- w h,"
ts MWMM w
i n. \\ @e \\ n, gw-.
t g
se I
g gg
.y. n x
& ~ {b'y ;_,
)
~
bh
' \\ h?.-
g.,
. h h-
$ G m.
f' a
n
\\s#
=\\ ]y].,W Q 4
s w
e
- Q 3 Gy / j'
.w
,d. ' a i,,..
.1
=
tC.
g
's
t -.-
rp\\\\g.
-.w
/
.t 1 f /a.1
""1
,\\
--.,Q4 _
i
. =.= :t y'
h- &
^
-w
't.
c,. n
.i i is
.l
awan w-f Q
h hV A~
.y y 7590-01 bn> -327/EN UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION F
DOCKET NO. 30-19311 PENNSYLVANIA POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY AND
- t E
a ALLEGHENY ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC.
g h$
8 8
5 (SUSOUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION);
p g
o-RECEIPT AND AVAILABILITY OF APPLICATION FOR LICENSE T
W LOW-LEVEL RADI0 ACTIVE WASTE HOLDING FACILITY t
Pennsylvania Power and Light Company and Allegheny Electric Cooperative, Inc. (PP&L) currently hold USNRC Construction Permits, Nos. CPPR-101 and CPPR-102, for construction of two 1050 MWe General Electric boiling water nuclear power reactors for PP&L's Susquehanna Steam Electric Station (SSES) located in Luzerne County, Pennsylvania.
PP&L is currently seeking Operating Licenses for the two reactors.
On August 14,198T, the Commission received an application from PP&L for a by-product material license authorizing the storage of low-level racio-active wastes generated from operation of the SSES in an onsite Low-Level Radioactive Waste Holding Facility.
If granted, the license would authorize PP&L to store, on a contingency basis, dry active waste and dewatered, solidified (cement) waste for up to four years per reactor.
The application is available for public inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room,1717 H Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. and at the Local. Public Document Room maintained at the Osterhout Free Library in Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania. The application is filed in the Dockets for the Reactor Operating Licenses, Nos. 50-387 and 50-388.
V 7590-01 UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION DOCKET NO. 30-19311 -
PENNSYLVANIA POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY AND ALLEGHENY ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC.
~
(SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION);
RECEIPT AND AVAILABILITY OF APPLICATION FOR LICENSE LOW-LEVEL RADI0 ACTIVE WASTE HOLDING FACILITY Pennsylvania Power and Light Company and Allegheny Electric Cooperative, Inc. (PP&L) currently hold USNRC Construction Permits, Nos. CPPR-101 and CPPR-102, for construction of two 1050 MWe General Electric boiling water nuclear power reactors for PP&L's Susquehanna Steam Electric Station (SSES) located in Luzerne County, Pennsylvania.
PP&L is currently seeking Operating Licenses for the two reactors.
On August 14, 1981, the Commission received an application from PP&L for a by-product naterial license authorizing the storage of low-level radio-active wastes generated from operation of the SSES in an onsite Low-Level Radioactive Waste Holding Facility.
If granted, the license would authorize PP&L to store, on a contingency basis, dry active waste and dewatered, solidified (cement) waste for up to four years per reactor.
The application is available for public inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room,1717 H Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. and at the Local Public Document Room maintained at the Osterhout Free Library in Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania.
The application is filed in the Dockets for the Reactor Operating Licenses, Nos. 50-387 and 50-388.