ML20100G577

Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants,Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station,Units 1 & 2 (Phase 1)

ML20100G577
Person / Time
Site:	Comanche Peak
Issue date:	10/31/1984
From:	Stickley T, Yen T IDAHO NATIONAL ENGINEERING & ENVIRONMENTAL LABORATORY
To:	Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Shared Package
ML20100G541	List: ML20100G577
References
CON-FIN-A-6457, REF-GTECI-A-36, REF-GTECI-SF, RTR-NUREG-0612, RTR-NUREG-612, TASK-A-36, TASK-OR EGG-HS-6722, NUDOCS 8412070317
Download: ML20100G577 (30)

Text

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Inforrnal R:p3rt EGG-HS-6722 OCTOBER 1984 CONTROL OF HE VY LOADS AT NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS COMANCHE PEAK STEAM ELECTRIC STATION, UNITS 1 AND 2 (PHASE I) 9 T. C. Yen T. H. Stickley Idaho National Engineering Laboratory Operated by the U.S. Department of Energy

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05000445 PDR Prepared for the U'.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Under OE Contract No. DE-AC07-761001570 FIN No. A6457 fl ggg

EGG-HS-6722 4

CONTROL OF HEAVY LOADS AT NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS i

CDMANCHE PEAK STEAM ELECTRIC STATION, UNITS 1 AND 2 (PHASEI)

Occket Nos. 50-445, 50-446 Author T. C. Yen Principal Technical Investigator T. H. Stickley Published October 1984 EG&G Idaho, Inc.

Idaho Falls, Idaho 83415 Prepared for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commi'ssion Under DOE Contract No. DE-AC07-76100 1570 FIN No. A6457

ABSTRACT The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has requested that all nuclear plants, either operating or under construction, submit a response of compliancy with NUREG-0612, " Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants." EG&G Idaho, Inc., has contracted with the NRC to evaluate the responsi.s of those plants presently under construction. This report contains EG&G's evaluation and recommendations for Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station Units 1 and 2.

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EXECUTIVE

SUMMARY

Comanche Peak Units I and 2 are consistent with the intent of NUREG-0612, Article 5.1.1.

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CONTENTS ASSTRACT.............................................................

11 EXECUTIVE

SUMMARY

i ii 1.

INTRODUCTION.....................................................

I 1.1 Purpose of Review.........................................

1 1.2 Generic Background........................................

1 1.3 Plant-Specific Background.................................

3 2.

EVALUATION AND RECOMMENDATIONS.................................

4 2.1 Overview..................................................

4 2.2 Heavy Load Overhead Handling Systems......................

4 2.3 General Guidelines................................../.....

8 2.4 Interim Protection Measures...............................

19 3.

CONCLUDING

SUMMARY

23 3.1 Applicable Load-Handling Systems..........................

23 3.2 Guideli ne Recommendati on s................................ -

23 3.3 Interim protection........................................

27 3.4 Summary......................

27 4.

REFERENCES......................................................

28 TABLES 2.1 Nonexempt Heavy Load-Handling Systems...........................

6 3.1 NUREG-0612 Ccmpliance Matrix.....

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CONTROL OF HEAVY LOADS 'AT NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS COMANCHE PEAK STEAM ELECTRIC STATION UNITS 1 AND 2 (PHASE I)

P 1.

INTRODUCTION 1.1 Purpose of Rev'iew This technical evaluation report documents the EG&G Idaho, Inc.,

review of general load-handling policy and procedures at Comanche Peak Units 1 and 2.

This evaluation was performed with the objective of assessing.conformance to the general load-handling guidelines of NUREG-0612, " Control of. Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants" [1],

Section 5.1.1.

1.2 Generic Background Generic Technical Activity Task A-36 was established by the U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory Co^mmission (NRC) staff to systematically ex. amine staff licensing criteria and the adequ'acy of measures in effect at operating nuclear power plants to assure the safe handling of heavy loads and to recommend necessary changes to these measures.

This activity was initiated by a letter issued by the NRC staff on May 17,

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1978 [2], to all power reactor applicants, requesting information concerning the control of heavy loads near spent fuel.

The results of Task A-36 were reported in NUREG-0612. " Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants." The staff's conclusion from this evaluation was that existing reasures to control the handling of heavy loads at operat,ing plants..a.1_though.providing protection from certain potential problems, do not adequately c'over the major causes of load-handling accidents and should be upgraded.

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In order to upgrade measures for the control of heavy loads' the staff ceveloped a series of guidelines designed to achieve a two phase cojective using an accepted approach or protection philosophy.

The first portion of the objective, achieved through a set of general guidelines identified in NUREG-0612, Article 5.1.1, is to ensure that all load-handling systems at nuclear power plants are designed and opsrated such that their probabilit'y of failure is uniformly small and appropriate for the critical tasks in which they are employed.

The second portion of the staff's objective, achieved through guidelines identified in NUREG-0612, Articles 5.1.2 through 5.1.5, is to ensure that, for load-handling systems in areas where their failure might res' ult in significant consequences, either (a) features are provided, in additio,n to those required for all load-handling systems, to ensure that the potential for a load drop is extremely small (e.g., a single-failure proof crane) or (b) conservative evaluations of load-handling accidents indicate that the potential consequences of any load drop are acceptably small. Acceptability of accident consequences is quantified in NUREG-0612 into,four. accident analysis evaluation. criteria.

'Y The approach used to develop the staff' guidelines for minimizing the potential for a load drop was based on defense 1n depth and is I

summarized as follows:

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Provide sufficient operator training, handling system l

design, load-handling instructions, and equipment inspection to assure' reliable operation of the handling system o

Define safe. load travel paths through procedures and operator training so that, to the extent practical, heavy loads are not carried over'oV near irridiated fuel or safe shutdown equipment 2

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o Provide mechanical stops or electrical interlocks to prevent movement of heavy loads over irradiated fuel or in proximity to equipment associated with redundant shutdown paths.

Staff guidelines resulting from the foregoing are tabulated in Section 5 of NUREG-0612.

1.3. plant-Specific Background On December 22, 1980, the NRC issued a letter [3] to Te,xas Utilities Generating Company (TUGC), the applicant for Comanche Peak requesting that the. applicant review provisions for handling and control of heavy loads at Comanche Peak Units 1 and 2, evaluate these provisions with respect to the guidelines of NUREG-0612, and provide certain additional information to be used for an independent determination of conformance to these guidelines.

On August 7, 1981, TUGC provided the initial response [4] to this request. Additional information was provided on October 8,1981[5]. After EG&G's preliminary

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evaluation [12], TUGC s.ubmitted two revisions of the initial response

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on March 1,1982 and June 8, 1983 [10',~11].

Additional clarification

[13]wasprovidedonJuly 12, 1984.

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2.

EVALUATION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 2.1 Overview The following sections summarize Texas Utilities Generating Company's (TUGC) review of heavy load handling at Comanche Creek Units 1 and 2 accompanied by EG&G"s evaluation, conclusions, and recommendations to the applicant for bringing the facilities more completely into compliance with the intent of NUREG-0612.

TUGC's review of the fa'cilities does not differentiate between the two units so it is assumed that both units are of identical design.

The applica'nt has indicated the weight of a heavy load for this facility (as defined in NUREG-0612, Article 1.2) as 2150 lbs.

2.2 Heavy Load Overhead Handling Systems This section reviews the applicant's list of overhead handling systems which are subject to the criteria of NUREG-0613 and a review of the justification for. excluding overhead handling systems from the.above mentioned list.

l 2.2.1 Scope

" Report the results of your review of plant arrangements to identify all overhead handling systems from which a load drop may result in damage to any system required for plant shutdown or decay heat removal (taking no credit for any interlocks,

• . technical specifications, operating procedures, or detailed structural analysis) and justify the exclusion of any overhead handling system from your list by verifying that there is sufficient physical separation from any load-impact point and any safety-related component to permit a determination by inspection that no heavy load drop can result in damage.to any system or component required for plant shutdown or decay, heat removal."

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Summary of Applicant's Statements

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The applicant's review of overhead handling systems identified the cranes and hoists shown in Table 2.1 as those which handle heavy loads in the vicinity of irradiated fuel or safe shutdown equipment.

The applicant has also identified numerous other cranes that i

have been excluded from satisfying the criteria of the general guidelines of NUREG-0612.

B.,

EG&G Evaluation The applicant made thorough analysis of load handling systems which are not exempt from further consideration under the requirements of NUREG 0612. This information is presentedasTable1oftheJune1983 submittal (11],andis reproduced as Table 2.1 of this report.

EG&G concurs with the evalu~ation.

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C.

EG&G Conclusions and Recommendations Based on the information provided, EG&G concludes that the app 1'icant has included all applicable hoists and cranes in their list of handling systems which must comply with the requirements of the general guidelines of NUREG-0612.

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BenISEXIMP1 Hi AVV I nAD tlAp80t 380G SYSIlstS--t'tMUICHC FEAK UIllTS 1 A800 2 Capacity

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_Cr_anef,Ilo i s t B, D. _scienhe r fion51 Location

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s eer s inesilding overticad crane CPX-MESCFC-ot 130-17-5 ruel Building Alpove 860 ft 2.

Cowie. e sament auxi l ia ry upsw r C P I-ME SCCA-n

• 5 Containment Building 905 ft-6 in.

e e 23 s CF2-Mt.SCCA-01 3.

Osat inment posar cranes CP1-MESCPP-n1 175-20 containment Sullding 950 ft-F In.

CF2-MESCPP-01 4.

et teeatInes peX and 8etdown CP 3-Mt sect-If.

2 Sefoguerds Buiiding 831 ft-6 in.

rhe a ser etX hos st CF2-Mtpu ct-1(>

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.ew-nt coo s e ng wa ter peamp CPX-pet Mecs-n l 4

Auxillary Building 810 ft-6 in.

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.asety related ct'I t ter hoist CPI-MTMICl-04A 3

Auxilla ry Building 778 ft i S e ws t e-T a e l eare-Prnor)

Cr2-Mi PetCH-08s A l

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reset e i ruga t cha rg ing puns s Cr3-MIMHCH-n8 n2 4

AuxIIIery Butsding 810 rt-6 in.

hessa CF2-MLMICt-01 02 1

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Omt seeme-nt resel hannf a ir.as CP3-MESCCT-ot' 1

Containment Sullding Ahove 860 ft ter eet c crane CP2-M[SCCF-0t 9

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a... e s ea ry feedwahr paese CP1-Mfte ct-13 14 4

Saraguards Building

'F90 ft-6 In.

hoist (esectric meter driven CP2-Htre0CH-13 14 mew) g 10.

Aa.-. t ia ry reedus ter pump cps-MtpetCH-12 3

Safegesords building 790 ft-6 in, hus? t ( turbine driven peamp)

CF2-MEfteCH-12 l

11 Aassi e lary r3 Iter. Stoist CPX-MEsseWst-04

• S AesxIllary Building 852 ft-6 In.

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se atter coetent pumps helst CPI-MEpeeCH-42 45 Containment Buildig 905 ft-9 in.

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CP2-MEMMCH-42 13.

Deeses generater (piston)

CP1-MEMHCH-37. 38 1

Sefe9esords Basildini 810 ft-6 in, tw.a s t CF2-MileeCH-37, 3S 14.

Spent ruel pool MK helst CPX-feEpetCH-43, as e S

ruel Bulldlag*

838 ft-9 an.

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Service water travet ing CPX-MEMHCH-12 20 Outside of service 834 ft screen helst and Jib crane CPX-SWEMSG-01 3

water intake streseture 6

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_.._ r:e. arse /Wi s t Name Crane /stoi s t i D.

88umbe r iTons) t.oca t ion Elevation t (..

eces.es..a t heat removat stX CP1-MENICII-47. 59 10-Sareguards Sullding 831 rt-6 in.

r witainment Spray 4..

"yste,e hoist 17 Ma s es steen sarety valves CP 3-petusCH-48, 49, 50, 51 i

saraguards Sullding See rt-6 in.

tunest CP2-pettetCN-48, 49, 50, 31 18.

Service water intake CPX-MCSCSW-01 I

striartesre crane 71/2 Service water Intake Aapove 796 ft Structure 19.

Contaennent done access CP1-MESCItP-O t 1

Containeont Building 1000 ft j

r,t.ating platform Inoist CP2-MCSCAP-01 1

20.

Inace handling bridge crane T8X-THSCFB-01 2.

Fuel Building Atmove 860 ft (I tas t 3uiIding) l 23 R.-t e-a e ng machine TBX-THSCMC-01

, 2 Containment Sullding Alpove 860 ft l

IContainment Building)

TCX-THSCMC-01 1

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• crvece water intake stirp CPX-MEMICH-61 8

Service voter intake 789 ft-9 in.

apte immi st structure 73.

Ass.. e eary ri t ter hoist CPX-MEmA#t-04A 8

Auxi l ia ry Bui ld ing 352 rt-6 in.

I.sie=3 t e-Ta i l ure-Proo r) 24 Mesces saneous helst CPX-pe[mlCH-72 2

fuel Sesilding 333 ft-9 in, l

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sesidiaa I heat reeeveI pump CP1-MEMHCH-OS 3

Seroguerds SuIIdIseg 773 rt i

hoist CP2-MEMHCM-09 l

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2.3 General Guidelines This section addresses the extent to which the applicable handling systems comply with the general guidelines of NUREG-0612, Article 5.1.1..EG&G's conclusions and recommendations are provided in summaries for each guideline.

The NRC has established seven, general guidelines which must be met in order to provide the defense-in-depth approach for the handling of heavy loads.

These guide 11n'es consist of the following criteria from Section 5.1.1 of NUREG-0612:

Guideline 1--Safe Load Paths, o

o Guideline 2--Load-Handling procedures o

Guideline 3--Crane Operator Training o

Guideline 4--Special Lifting Devices o

Guideline 5--Lifting Devices (not specially designed) o Guideline 6--Cranes ( nspection, Testing, and Maintenance) o Guideline 7--Crane Design.

These seven guidelines should be satisfied for all overhead handling i

systens and programs in order to handle beavy loads in the vicinity of the reactor vessel, near spent fuel in the spent-fuel pool, or in other areas where a load drop may damage safe shutdown systems.

The succeeding paragraphs addr6ss the guideTines in'diVidually.

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i 2.3.1 Safe Load Paths [ Guideline 1. NUREG-0612, Article 5.1.1(1)]

" Safe load paths should be defined for the movement of heavy Ibads to minimize the potential for heavy loads, if dropped, to impact irradiated fuel in the reactor vessel and in the spent-fuel pool, or to impact safe shutdown equipment. The path should follow, to the extent practical, structural floor members, beams, e.tc., such that if the load is dropped, the structure is more likely to withstand the impact.

These load paths should be defined in procedures, shown on equipment layout drawings, and clearly marked on the floor in the area where the load is to be handled.

Deviations from defined load paths should require written alternative procedures approved by the plant safety review committee."

A.

Summary of Applicant's S'tatements

" ' Safe load areas' (areas serviced by a particular crane in which a lead drop will not result in damage to shutdown or decay heat removal. equipment or spent fuel) have been identified where applicable for the cranes listed in

[ Table 2.1,].

Equipment handled by these cranes will be transported whenever possib.le within the identified safe load areas."

" Safe load areas" for 9 of the 25 listed in Table 2.1 are marked on submitted drawings.

For the remaining hoists, the establishment of safe load areas is not applicable, since the hoists generally travel along a single monorail which allows the hoist to follow only one possible path.

"All ' safe load areas' and ' safe load paths' will be identified by drawing."

" ' Safe load paths' will also be identified and established for loads handled outside safe loaa areas prior to initial fuel lead to ensure the safe operation of the crane during maintenance and norcal opera: ten of the plant."

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" ' Safe l'ead paths' will be defined in the CPSES maintenance procedure as attachmen'ts to load handling procedures.

P'ocedures will be approved and handled in accordance with r

CPSES station procedures, as directed by the Station Operation Review Committee.

Deviation from this maintenance procedure or load path will be handled in accordance with procedures governing deviation or revisions of safety related procedures, as directed by the Station Operation Reviev Committee."

In the July 12,' 1984 submittal [13), TUGC states:

"Saf'e load areas are defined in CPSES plant procedures and operators training so that, to the extent practical, heavy loads are not carried over o,r,,near irradiated fuel or safe

, shutdown equipment." ' '

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" Safe load area sketches are provided in the appropriate plant procedures.".

" Electrical interlocks are utilized on the Fuel Building Overhead Crane ano are discussed in the appropriate plant procedures."

"The signalmen and crane operators at CPSES have been trained to use hand signals.

These signals are discussed'in the appropriate plant procedures."

B.

EG&G Evaluation CPSEShasdevelo'pedsafelaidareasfor$eavylead l

handling.

Safe load paths will be established for loads l

handled outside safe load areas prior to initial fuel leadinc.

The safe load paths are defined in CpSES 10

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f procedures.

Deviations from safe load paths must be approved in accordance with procedures established by the Station Operation Review Committee.

As the alternate to marking safe load paths on the floor, CPSES has elected to provide a signa 1 person to walk the load through the safe load path.

C.

EG&G Conclusions and Recommendations Based on the information provided, EG&G concludes that CPSES

. is consistent with the intent of Guideline 1.

2.3.2 Load-Handling procedures [ Guideline 2, NUREG-0612, Article 5.1.1(2)]

" Procedures should be developed to cover l'oad-handling operations for heavy loads that are or could be handled over or in proximity to_ irradiated fuel or safe shutdown ~ equipment. At a minimum,

~ proc'edures should. cover handling of those loads lis~ted in Table 3.1 of NUREG-0612.' These procedures should include:

identification of required equipment; inspections and acceptance criteria required before movement of load; the steps and proper sequence to be followed in handling the load; defining the safe path; and other special precautions."

A.

Summary of Applicant's Statements a

"For some heavy loads, it may be necessary to operate outside the safe l'oad area and transport the load over or near plant shutdown or decay heat removal equipment or spent fuel.

For these loads and all oversize loads, special precautions or procedures ~will'bs utilized with the purpose of minimizine the risk of a heavy load drop in these areas.

The procedure will consist of load drop prevention measures, such as a list of required eculpment, inspection, acceptance i

criteria fcr the mcvemer.t of the lead, sequence of steps, l

etc.

These prc:edures will be available for NRC review."

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B.

EG&G Evaluation The applicant's statements imply that the development of the load handling procedures is covered by the designation of the " safe load areas."

TUGC has committed to providing procedures in accordance with Guideline 2.

C.

EG&G Conclusions'and Recommendations Based upon the information supplied, EG&G considers that Comanche Peak units 1 and 2 are consistant with the intent of Guideline 2.

2.3.3 Crane Operator Training [ Guideline 3, NUREG-0612, Article 5.1.1(3)]

" Cran.e operators should be trained, qualif,ied, and conduct themselves in accordance with Chapter 2-3 of ANSI B30.2-1976,.

' Overhead and Gantry Cranes' [6]."

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A.

Summary of Acolicant's Statements

" Crane ope'rators will be trained, qualified, and will conduct themselves in accordance with Chapter 2-3 of ANSI B30.2-1976 " Overhead and Gantry Cranes."

Procedures governing crane operator training qualifications and conduct will be available for NRC review prior to fuel load."

B.

EG&G Evaluation l

ine applicant has ccmmitted te cc pliance with guideline 3.

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l C.

EG&G Conclusions and Recommendations

. Based upon'the information provided, EG&G considers Comanche Peak units I and 2 to be consistent with guideline 3.

2.3.4.Soecial L.'ftino Devices [ Guideline 4, NUREG-0612,

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Article 5.1.1(4)]

"Special lifting devices should satisfy the guidelines of ANSI N14.6-1978, ' Standard for Special Lifting Devices fpr Shipping Containers Weighing 10,000 Pounds (4500 kg) or More for Nuclear Materials' [7].

This standard should apply to all special itfting devices which carry heavy loads in areas as defined above.

For operating plants, certain inspections and load tests may be accepted in lieu of certain material requirements in the standard.

In addition, the stress design factor stated in Section 3.2.1.1 of ANSI N14.6 should be based on the combined maximum static and dynamic loads that could be imparted on the handling device based on characteristics of the crane which will be used.

This is in lieu of the guideline in Section 3.2.1.1 of ANSI N14.6 which bases the stress design factor on only the' weight (static load) or the load and of the intervening components of the'special handling device."

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A.

Summary of Acolicant's Statements "Although. a special lifting device for a spent fuel shipping container weighing 10,000 lbs or more has not yet been procured, ANSI N14.6-1978 and NUREG-0612 Guidelines for special lifting devices will be invoked when this device is obtained.

Although it is anticipated at this time that the standards for the lifting devices will be met, i-may later be determined that alternatives to the standard are required.

In.that even'tg-written not'ification will be made to the Nuclear Reguistory Ccmmission describing the alternatives and their equivalency in terms of load handling reliability."

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" Reactor vessel head and reactor internals lifting rigs meet the intent of ANSI N14.6-1978 and NUREG-0612 for design, fabrication, assembly and operation.

The analysis for these devices is provided in [the Westinghouse report WCAP-10156]"

"These rigs meet the intent of mentioned NUREG and ANSI standard for design, fabrication, assembly and operation, but do not meet all the specific load verification testing.

"These special lifting devices are used during plant refueling which is approximately once per year.

During plant operation these special lifting devices are inaccessible since they are permanently installed and/or remain in the containment.

They cannot be removed from the

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containment unless they are disassembled and no known purposes exist for disassembly.

Load testing to 150 percent of the total weight before each use would require special fixtures and is impractical to perform.

Crane capacity could also be limiting.

It is suggested that a check

- (visual) or critical welds and parts be conducted at initial

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lift prior to moving-to. full lift and movement for these devices.

Further note that with the use of the load cell for the head and internals lift rig, all lifting and lowering is monitored at all, times."

The ANSI requirements for periodic checking and functional load testing appear to be most difficult to demonstrate compliance.

It is almost impractical to perform the 150 percent load test prior to each use.

In accordance with the "Synop. sis of Issues Associated with NUREG 0612", TUGC proposes [13) that a nondestructive s,urface examination of critical weld's and pa'rts'be perfo'rmed every ten years as

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part of an inservice inspection outage.

"The #aed feel asse.r:1y lif ing toc' has teen deie ed t

Tacle a of [?.eper: WCAP.E*95] because cur review inc'catec

na: this teci is net required."

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4 In' Table A-4 [11],.the applicant indicates that special

' lifting devices will be used only on:

(1) Spent fuel cask (2) Reactor vessel head (3) Reactor internals In the July 12, 1984 submittal [13], TUGC states:

" Reactor vessel head and reactor internal lifting rigs meet the intent of ANSI 14.6-1978 and NUREG-0612 for design, fabrication, assembly and operation.

Refer to Section 6 of the enclosed WCAP-10156, Rev. 1.

A detailed analysis of an alternate. load verification, testing, and stress design factor is included in

- of WCAP-10156, Rev. 1."

B.

EG&G Evaluation A study of WCAP 10156, Rev. I shows that the special lifting devices at CPSES are consistent with the stress factors required by ANSI N14.6, including the dynamic loading requirements of Guideline 5 of NUREG 0612.

The acceptance load test of 125%, in lieu of the required 150% test, is acceptable.

EG&G concurs that strict' compliance with the ANSI N14.6

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requirements for verification of continuing compliance is impractical and non productive.

The proposed alternate for this type of testing, which was recommended in WCAP 10156, Rev. 1 (see 2.S.4A of this TER), is acceptable..

C?SES cc.m.mitted that the special lifting device that is to be used to handle the spent fuel cask will meet the intent of Guideline 4.

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C.

EG&G Conclusions and Recommendations

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Based on the information provided, EG&G concludes that CPSES is consistent with the intent of NUREG 0612, Guideline 4.

2.3.5 Lifting Devices (Not Specially Designed) [ Guideline 5 NUREG-0612, Article 5.1.1(5)]

" Lifting devices that are not specially designed should be installed and used in accordance with the guidelines of ANSI B30.9-1971, ' Slings' [8].

However, in selecting,the proper sling, the load used should be the sum of the static and maximum dynamic load. The rating identified on the sling should be in terms of the ' static load' which. produces the maximum static and dynamic' load. Where this restricts slings to use on only certain cranes, the slings should be clearly marked as to the cranes with which they may be used."

i A.

Summary of Applicant's Statements

" Lifting devices that are not specially designed for use with heavy loads, as defined by NUREG-0612, will comply with the guidelines of ANSI B30.9-1971."

" Sling ratings will be identified on the sling in terms of the static load, which produces the maximum static and dynamic load; (i.e., load x 0.005 x hoist speed + maximum static load). The hoist speed is expressed in feet per minute. Where this restricts slings to use on only certain cranes, the slings will be clearly marked as to the cranes with which they may be used."

B.

EG&G Evaluation

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CPSES has committed to comply with Guideline 5.

C.

E"43 Cc-clusions and Recn merdaticns Based on the information provided, EG&G concluces that CPSES is consistent with Guideline 5.'

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2.3.6 Cranes (Insoection, Testing, and Maintenance) [ Guideline 6, NUREG-0612, Article 5.1.1(6)]

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'IThe crane should be inspected, tested, and maintained in accordance with Chapter 2-2 of ANSI B30.2-1976, ' Overhead and Gantry Cranes,' with the exception that tests and inspections should be performed prior to use where it is not practical to meet the frequencies of ANSI B30.2 for periodic inspection and test, or where frequency of crane use is less than the specified inspection and test frequency (e.g., the polar crane inside a PWR containment may on'ly be used every 12 to 18 months during refueling operations, and is generally not accessible during power operation. ANSI B30.2, however, calls for certain inspections to be performed daily or monthly.

Fo'r such cranes having limited usage, the inspections, test, and maintenance sho.uld be performed prior to their use)."

A.

Summary of Applicant's Statements

" ANSI B30.2-1976, Chapter 2-2, will be invoked with respect to crane inspections, test and maintenance.

Aj-

~

With resp 6ct to Section 2-2.1.1.1 of ANSI B30 2, cranes located within containment'will be inspected every scheduled refueling outage in accordance with the requirements of ANSI B30.2.

This is necessary because periodic inspections during power operations are impractical due to high radiation levels in containment.

These measures will be implemented prior to fuel handling.

procedures and inspection records will be retained and available for NRC review."

B.

EG&G Evaluation ~

As stated, the applicant has committed to implement the measures consistent with the intent of this guideline prior to fuel handling, and':o retain the procedures and the inspection records for review.

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C.

EG&G Conclusions and Recommendations based on the information provided, EG&G considers that Comanche Peak units 1 and 2 are consistent with the intent of Guideline 6.

2.4. 7 Crane Design [ Guideline 7, AUREG-0612, Article 5.1.1(7)]

"The crane should be designed to meet the applicable criteria and guidelines of Chapter 2-1 of ANSI B30.2-1976, ' Overhead and Gantry Cranes,' and of CMAA-70, ' Specifications for Electric Overhead Traveling Cranes' [9]. An alternative to a specification in ANSI B30.2 or CHAA-70 may be accepted in lieu of specific. compliance if the intent of the specification is satisfied."

A.

Summary of Applicant's Statements

" Table A-3 lists the load handling systems. identified in Table A-1 and the applic.ble codes a,nd standards as

~

_specified in the CpSES Equipment Purchase Specifications.

In all cases, the crane' design compiies with the guidelfnes

~~

of CMAA Specification 70 and' Chapter 2-1 of ANSI B30.2-1967 and all hoists are designed in accordance with the requirements of ANSI B30.16-1973."

Table A-3 [11] is a revised version of Table 3 in the applicant's early response [10].

In Table 3, the applicant indicated that all nonexempt cranes were designed per ANSI B30.2-1976, Chapter 2-1 or to the criteria of both CMAA-70 and. ANSI B30.2, Chapter 2-1.

In response to EG&G's comments [12] on the specified weight o,f a heavy load and rated capacitids of ~some cranes, th'e' applicant states:

18

" Table 4 of Reference [10] has been corrected to eliminate the discrepancies concerning rated capacity of cranes [in question] and their maximum loads.

(See Attachment A, Table A-4 [11])."

B.

EG&G Evaluation As shown in Table A-3 [11], the applicant has apparently classified the overhead load handling systems into two categories:

cranes and hoists.

Even though a* hoist may run on a monorail, it is not considered as a crane. All the overhead load handling systems designated as hoists are specified to meet'the criteria of ANSI B30.16-1973:

" overhead hoist (underhung)", not the criteria of CMAA-70 and ANSI B30.2-1976 specified by this guideline.

Cranes are designed according to the criteria of ANSI B30.2-1967 instead of ANSI B30.2-1976.

Inas,much as there exist only o

some minor differences between the 1967 edition and the 1976 edition of ANSI B30.2, the use of the 1967 version in lieu of the 1976 edition for crane design is acceptable.

C.

EG&G Conclusions and Recommendations Based on the information provided, EG&G concludes that CPSES is consistent with the intent of Guideline 7.

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1 19

l 3.

CONCLUDING

SUMMARY

3.1 Aeolicable Load-Handling Systems The list of' cranes and hoists s9pplied by the applicant as being subject to the p,covisions of NUREG-0612 is complete.

3.2 Guideline Recommendations -

Compliance with the seven NRC guidelines for heavy load handling

.(Section 2.3) are satisfied at Comanche Peak Units 1 and 2.

This conclusion is represented in tabular form as Table 3.1.

Guideline Recommendation 1.

Section 2.3.1 Consistent with Guideline 1.

2.

Section 2.3.2 Consistent with Guideline 2.

3.

Section 2.3.3.

. Consistent with Guideline 3..

~

~4.

Section 2.3.4 Consistent with Guideliie 4.

5.

Section 2.3.5 Ccnsistent with Guideline 5.

6.

Section 2.3.6 Consistent with Guideline 6.

4 i

7.

Section 2.3.7 Consistent with Guideline 7.

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I I Afit t 1.1.

8 litIAtiltil l'f AK liftI151 Neil 21888tfG-0612 COMPLIANCE MATRIX Weight Goldeline I Guideline 2 Guideline 3 Guldeline 4 Guideline 5 Guideline 6 Guldeline 1.

nr trane SpecIal Crane-Test Capacity Safe liiad Operator lifting and i Tsipm nt th sipi.it iam ficavy Loails (tons) paths Procedures Training Device L Slings inspecticsi

_ Design _ _

a I.

lucI 1.n61 ling Iscw and spent fuel 130-11-5 C

C C

C C

C C

nverlic.i.I cr.ine casks, handling tonis and transfer canal gate. I to 110 tons 7.

Cim t ai narni Reactor vessel 5

C C

C C

C C+

aienillasy upper steals, stml re ane lens lamer,.slied baskets, control reul drive vent ducts 0.1 to 3.1 tons 1.

Constalnnent polar RV head, reactor 175 20 C

C C

C C

C C

crane Internals, reactor

+

conlant pesup and fuel storage area stop gate. Weights given.for 16 components:

1.5 to 168.1 tons t

4 hierallny III and Mnderating III and 2

C

.C.

C C

C C

Ictdmas rhiller III letdnise chiller llX

+-

campnnents.

0.2Lp1.1 tons

).

Cnagionent e smling CCW pesup compo.

4 C

C

'C C

C C

w.alcr pennie lent t nents, 24 In. valve and fan / roll motor.

0.1 in 3.3 tons

(>. Safe t y rel.ited All weights given 3

C C

C C

C C

chiller hnist less than " heavy weight."

/. Cent r i f ng.il e t... ging CCP crumponents.

4 C

C C

C C

pimp hoist Inhe all rooler and i-f an/ coll motor.

0.1 in 3.ft tons it.

r.ml ain,ii i n. l ruct anciably anel I

C C

C C

C C

ban.ll le.n I.r ici.p.

lifting lemt.

1.04 tems (less Ihan " heavy head"),

y 21

IAtti 1.1.

(e oril in s.-.11 Weight Gul:Icline 1 Guideline 2 Guideline 3 Guideline 4 Gesideline 5 Guideline 6 Guldeline 7

• or Crane Special Cranc-fest Capacity Safe inaal Operator Lifting anal f rgesi marig Desiipi.it inn

_Ileavy I.nads (tons)

Paths Procedures Training _

Devices Slings inspection Design

. l i

C C

C

'). Auxillai v liv lu.iler M pipap components.

4 C

C C

pisne hoist (n=einr 0.6 to 1.6 tons I

ilr iven) 10.

Aux illas y t er.lw.iler M pinap and turbine 3

C C

C C

C C

lumip hoist (lue hine components.

it iven) 0.6 to 2 tons a

11 Aust11ary filter Filter, spent f il-8 C

C C

C C

C Insist ter cask aewl con.

crete fJonr plug.

0.01 to 6.4 tons 17.

Reactor renil. int RC pimap and motor 45 C

C-C

'C C

C insup huisi ceauponents.

3.5 to 42.4 tons

11. Diesel epncralor Piping and struc-I C

C C

C C

C (pisteui) hoist

'ture components.

I lon l

- 14. Spent luel pani SFC pinnp antor, 8

C C

C C

C C

g llX -hsrist fit shell, ilX tubes and concrete finor plugs. '

.i 1.1 to 4.5 tons f

15.

Service w.iler Traveling screen, 20-3 C

C C

C C

C travellnel sorcen miscellaneous parts hoist arul lihe and stop gates.

rranc 2.3 to 10.5 toeis I fi.

Res telu.il heat RilR lit and C5511X 10 C

C C

C C

C e ewival lit arul run-components anel taineo nl spray sys-valves.

tcin ilt hoist 0.1 to 8.5 tons 11.

f t.iies sir.us s.e f. l y Main stease safety 1

C

• C C

C C

C valves footst valves.

0.3 ton (less than

" heavy load")

=

lit. service walee Service water' pump 7.5 C

C C

C C

C' int.d e sle us liss e motor and fire pimp trane cinuponen ts.

0.09 to 4.9 tons 22

~-

v I Atil[ 1.3.

(e ewit 6rna ell

- *.lleight Gulilcline I residellne 2 Guideline 3 Guideline 4 -Guideline 5 Guideline 6-Guidellee 1 nr Crane Special Crane. Test Capacity Safe toad Operator Lifting and Ilcavy loads (tons) paths procedures Training Devices Slings inspection

_licsp_.

I.ginip== nt II.. i p.it iews C

C C

19

(...l ai n n t.i. r Miscellaneous tants 1

C

'C C

as eess e a.t at in.t

- mid welding eclestp.

platin ni hnlst me nt. 0.7 ton (less than

' ~

" heavy welght")

C C

70 Focl h.m.llines fuel asseinhly plies 2

C C

C e

Iwl hje s e a.u- (risel lon1 and lighting hish 1 fIature.

0.15 to 1.04 tons

/1. Refuelinet in.selinne fuel assembly, rad 2

C

'C C

C C

(remitainan nt t.I.hj) control cle: Ster plus gripper and CR0 shaft plus handling fixture.

0.2 to 0.9 ton 77.

9 rvice water SW pisap compartament 8

C C

C C

C C

Intake sine ple stop(ates.

hoist 6.2 tons g

71. An JIlary filter Filter, spent fil-8 C

C'

'C C

C C.

hoist ter cask and can-crete' floor plug.

y*

.?t O.01 to 6.4 tons C

C C

24 Miscelimicnus Imist Spent. feel pool 2

C C

C

• cooling pessp inlet Isolatten valve.

l.3 tons j

75.

Rcslehaal heat film pump.

3 C

C C

C C

C resswal p m.p holst 3 tons C

= Applicant arlinn consistent with IslREG.0617 guideline.

NL = Applicant art isse rmt consistent with illlREG.0612 guideline.

-. = Galicline is sail applicable to this handilog system.

I = leisuf ficle nt Infeninatlun was providcol to determine consistency.

23

4.

REFERENCES 1.

NUREG-06i2,ControlofHeavyLoadsatNuclearPowerPlants,NRC.

2.

V. Stello, Jr. (NRC), Letter to all applicants.

Subject:

Request for Additional Information on Control of H'eavy Loads Near Spent Fuel, 17 May 1978.

3.

eSNRC, Letter to Texas Utilities' Generating Company.

Subject:

NRC Request for Additional Information on Control of Heavy Loads Near Spent Fuel, 22 December 1980.

4.

H. C. Schmidt Texas Utilities Services Inc. (TUSI), Letter to S. Burwell (NRC).

Subject:

Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station Control of Heavy Leads:

NUREG-0612, August 7, 1981.

5.

H. C. Schmidt (TUSI), Letter to S. Burwell (NRC).

Subject:

Comanche Peak Steam Electric Stat:en Control of Heavy Loads:

NUREG-0612, e

October 8,1981.

6.

ANSI B30.2-1976, Overhead and Gantry Cranes.

7.

ANSI N14.6-1978, Standard'for Lifting Devices for Shipping Containers t

Weighing 10,000 Pounds (4500 kg) or more for Nuclear Materials.

i.

^^

8.

ANSI B30.9-1971, Slings.

9.

CMAA '3, Specifications for Electric Overhead Traveling Cranes.

10.

H. C. Schmidt (TUSI), Letter to S.. Burwell (NRC).

Subject:

Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station Control of Heavy Loads:

NUREG-0612, March 1, 1982.

11.

H. C. Schmidt (TUSI), Letter to B. J. Youngblood (NRC).

Subject:

Cccanche Creek Steam Electric Station, Docket Nos. 50-445 and 50-446, Final Response to NUREG-0612, June 8,1983.

12.

B. W. Dixon (EG&G), Phase I Interim Report.

Subject:

Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Plants-Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station Units 1 and 2, Mar:h 1982.

13.

H. C. Schmidt (TUGC), Letter to B. J..Youngblood (NRC)..

Subject:

Comanche Peak Steam Electric Statio.n. Docket No. 50-445 and 50-446.

Respon'se to B. J. Youngblood Letter to M. D. Spence Dated May 17, 1954 23576 21

f,y'0".335 u.s. NuCLEAn cE ul4 Tory couuissiou

"'" C " T """" " ""'"" * 8# ##

e.

BIBLIOGRAPHIC DATA SHEET EGG-HS-6722

4. TaTLE AND SUBTITLE

2. (Leave staie/

Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2

3. RECIPIENT'S ACCESSION NO.

(Phace II

7. AUTHORtS1

5. DATE REPORT COMPLETED T. C. Yen, T. H. Stickley "oNT" lve^a October 1984

9. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND MAILING ADDRESS (tactuar le Coarl DATE REPORT ISSUED MONTM l YEAR December 1984 EG&G Idaho, Inc.

.. g,,,,,,,,,

Idaho Falls, ID 83415 S. (Leave blankl

12. SPONSORING ORGANIZ ATION NAME AND MA,tLING ADDRESS (lacivar to coorf p

Division of Systems Inteoration Office of woripar R actn, Rpenlatinn

11. FIN NO.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 A6457

13. TYPE OF REPORT PE RIOD COVE RE D (inclus,ve caers)

15. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

14. (Leave weset I

16. ABSTP ACT Q00 words or lessl The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has requested that all nuclear plants, either operating or under construction, submit a response of compliancy with NUREG-0612,

" Control of Jieavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants." EG&G Idaho, Inc. has contracted with the NRC to evaluate the responses of those plants presently under construction.

This report contains EG&G's evaluation and r&ommendations for Comanche Peak Steam i

Electric Station Units 1 and 2.

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