ML20100F879
| ML20100F879 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Perry  |
| Issue date: | 03/22/1985 |
| From: | Edelman M CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ILLUMINATING CO. |
| To: | James Keppler NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| References | |
| (RDC-130(85)), NUDOCS 8504050312 | |
| Download: ML20100F879 (2) | |
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[/O THE CLtVELAND ELECTR!C li LUMIN AilNG COMPA!!Y P.O. BOX 5000 - CLEVELAND, OHIO 44101 - TELEPHONE (216) 622-9800 - lLLUMINATING BLOG.
- $$ PUBLIC SQUARE Serving The Best Location in the Nation MUMMY R. EDE1 MAN VICE PRESIDEHi NUCUAR Mr. James G. Keppler Regional Administrator, Region III Office of Inspection and Enforcement U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 799 Roosevelt Road Glen Ellyn, Illinois 60137 RE:
Perry Nuclear Power Plant Docket Nos. 50-440; 50-441 Fire Protection Safe Shutdown Analysis [RDC 130(85)]
Dear Mr. Keppler:
This letter serves as an interim report pursuant to 10CFR50.55(e) concerning the fire protection safe shutdown analysis for the Perry Nuclear Power Plant (PNPP).
Mr. J. McCormick-Barger of your office was notified on February 22, 1985, by Mr. T. A. Boss of The Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company (CEI) that this problem was being evaluated per our Deviation Analysis Report 226.
As a result of our analysis, we have determined that this situation is reportable per the requirements of 10CFR50.55(e).
This report contains a description of the deficiency, analysis of safety implications, and our proposed corrective action.
Descriotion of Deficiency As a part of CEI's continuous process of verification of the design for PNPP, and in light of additional guidance provided by the NRC, a review of the fire protection safe shutdown analysis was undertaken.
Due to the revised criteria that were utilized, this review resulted in the identification of circuits and equipment that were not previously included in the analysis.
In particular, it was identified that the analysis of the existing arrangement for alternative shutdown outside the control room did not provide for protection of all of the circuits associated with support systems needed for shutdown systems to function.
As a result of the addition of these circuits to the scope of the analysis, some fire areas ncw require additional divisional separation analysis in order to ensure compliance with 10CFR50, Appendix R, Section IIIG.
I 0504050312 B50322 M' AR 2 5 BBS ADOCK 050 0
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s Mr.-Jcmes G. KGppler March 22, 1985 Analysis of Safety Imolications It can be postulated that a fire in particular areas could cause damage to the identified circuits associated with safe shutdown support systems.
In this event, the ability of the affected shutdown systems to perform their safety functions could ultimately be affected.
. Corrective Action l
We are currently analyzing the affected circuits / equipment to identify any additional isolation / protection which may be necessary.
We are working with the Office of' Nuclear Reactor Regulation to establish acceptable deviations and a schedule-for implementation of any necessary modifications.
We will notify you of our proposed schedule and status of corrective actions on
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or before May 17, 1985.
Please call if there are additional questions.
i Eincerely,&
3 Mu Edelman Vice President 4
Nuclear. Group MRE: gin cc:
Mr. J. A. Grobe USNRC, Site Office (SBB50)
}
Mr. D. E. Keating
-USNRC, Site Office (SBB50)
Director Office of Inspection and Enforcement j
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission i
c/o Document Management Branch Washington, D.C.
20555 i-Records Center, SEE-IN Institute of Nuclear Power Operations 1
1100 Circle 75 Parkway, Suite 1500 Atlanta, Georgia 30339 l
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