ML20099L462

Final Part 21 & Deficiency Rept Re Unqualified Foxboro Power Supplies.Initially Reported on 831027.Class Q1E Supplies Will Be Removed & Replaced W/Correct Power Supply as Required

ML20099L462
Person / Time
Site:	Palo Verde
Issue date:	11/15/1984
From:	Van Brunt E ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE CO. (FORMERLY ARIZONA NUCLEAR
To:	Kirsch D NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V)
References
REF-PT21-85-118-000 ANPP-31127-TDS, DER-83-73, PT21-85-118, PT21-85-118-000, NUDOCS 8412010137
Download: ML20099L462 (7)

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1lEfEIVE0 Arizona Nuclear Power Project PHOENIX, ARIZONA 85072-20N N If /7 fQ P.O. DOX $2034 e November 15,,,1984 ANPP-31127-TDS/TRE'-

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region V 1450 Maria Lane - Suite 210 -

Walnut Creek, California 94596-5368 Attention: Mr.- D. F. Kirsch

Subject:

Final Report - DER 83-73 A 50.55(e) Reportable Condition Relating To Unqualified Foxboro Power Supplies. -

File: 84-019-026; D.4.33.2

~ ) Telephone Conversation between P. Narbut and R. Tucker on A

Reference:

October 27, 1983 B) ANPP-28290, dated November 28, 1983 (Interim Report)

'C) ANPP-28538, dated January 3, 1984 (Time Extension)

D) ANPP-28934, dated February 24, 1984 (Time Extension)

E) ANPP-29352, dated April 24,-1984 (Time Extension)

F) ANPP-29582, dated May 23, 1984'(Time Extension)

G) ANPP-30448, dated September 6, 1984 (Time Extension)

H) ANPP-30636, dated September 24, 1984 (Time Extension)

I) ANPP-30948, dated October 25, 1984 (Time Extension)

Dear Sir:

Attached is our final written report of the Reportable Deficiency under 10CFR50.55(e), referenced above.

Very truly yours,

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CULL q LC E. E. Van Brunt, Jr.

APS Vice President Nuclear Production ANPP Project Director EEVB/TRB/nj Attachment cc: See Page Two

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Ohohg PDR E637

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- m Mr. i D.. F. Kirsch.

DER 83-73 Page Two ec:

Richard DeYoung, Director

<>ffice of Inspection and Enforcement

. U. S. Nuclear Regulatory-Commission

' Washington, D. C.

20555 T. G.- Woods, Jr.

- D. ' B. Karner W. E. Ide D. B. Fasnacht.

A. C. Rogers L." A. Souza D. E. Fowler T. D. Shriver C. N. Russo B. S. Kaplan J. R. Bynum J. M. Allen A. C. Gehr--

W. J..Stubblefield W. C.' Bingham R. L.-Patterson R. W. Welcher H. D. Foster D. R. Hawkinson R. P. Zimmerman L. Clyde' M. Woods T. J. Bloom D. N. Stover J. D. Houchen J. E. Kirby.

D. Canady Records Center Institute of Nuclear Power Operations 1100 circle 75 Parkway, Suite 1500 Atlanta,-GA 30339 l

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FINAL REPORT - DER:83-73

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DEFICIENCY EVALUATION 50.55(e)

ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY (APS)

PVNGSL UNITS 1; 2,',3

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Description of Deficiency r

While researching the ~ origin of 'a non-serialized Foxboro Spec. 200

' power supply; removed:from a safety-related instrument cabinet and sent to the Combuntion Engineering (C-E) site startup office for

~ warranty repair; it 'was found that codes stamped on the power supply r

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did not conform to'the standard format-that identifies the power supplies intended for Class'1E~ service. Further investigation '

disclosed 'that unqualified Foxboro Spec. 200 power supplies have~ heen installed.in the following QIE, C-E supplied; instrument cabinets..

2JSBBC02A-2JSBCC02A 2JSBDC02A=

, c Unqualified power supplies in these cabinets were identified by C-E letter V-CE-19077; dated September 30; 1983 Subsequent-investigation also revealed that power supplies intended for-Class IE service have been installed in non-Q instrument cabinets and power.

supplies. not intended for nuclear service; -QIE or_ otherwise, have been installed.in safety-related instrument cabinets. Non-nuclear service power supplies are used at Falo Verde in the Auxiliary Steam System (AS) and the Cooling Tower Makeup and Blowdown System (TB)/ Water Reclamation Facilities (WRF).

Evaluation This problem was evaluated by investigating (1) the identification systems used by Foxboro; (2) the actual conditions at the site; and (3) evaluation of material control procedures.and practices" including quality-related procurement activities.

(1) Foxboro has supplied Spec. 200 instrumentation to PVNGS under several purchase orders including C-E, Bechtel.JM-111,

. subsuppliers through Zurn Industries (Auxiliary Steam Supply) and t

WRF.

Wban initial deliveries were being made to PVNGS,~Foxboro had two categories of ' instruments, qualified.,(Quality Class Q) and:

nonqualified (non-Quality Class Q). They differentiated between the two by identifying the qualified units with serial numbers-s.

' for traceability and non serialization was applied to the -

nonqualified~ units. Unit:l'and WRF equipment fell =into these i

categories.

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. Final Report

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EDER 83-73 1Page Two c

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Later, Foxboro recognized a requirement for_ instrumentation which had to maintain structural: integrity; but need not function :to -

r Laitigate the circumstances of an' accident.- At this time-Foxboro-

' initiated another' program for identification = of qualified.

-equipments. Class I; Class II.and nonqualified instrumentation.

o The Class ;I instrumentation' is fully qualified environmentally,

= for operation,during _ and af ter a design basis _ seismic event.

'These units are identified with a serial number and a classification code number CS-N/SRC. The Class II instrumentation.is qualified to maintain only_ structural integrity during a design basis event. These units are identified with a serial number and a classification code number :

CS-N/SRD. Nonqualiffed. instrumentation have neither the CS-N/SRC

-nor the CS-N/SRD code' numbers and are not stamped with serial numbers. - Equipment deliveries from Foxboro for Units 2 and 3 fall into this category.

All Spec. 200 instrumentation classified by Foxboro as Class I and Class II are fabricated in accordance with the same QA procedures and the only difference is-the documentation supporting.the qualification of a given module. In fact; Class II modules can be upgraded to Class -I by Foxboro, such that a given serialized module can have the supporting qualification documentation backup to qualify it for Class lE service.

(2) As the second part of the' problem evaluation, the following-investigations were performed:

i Unit 1

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A walkdown of the Unit 1 cabinets and the one TB system cabinet,

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per Investigation Requests A-IR-017 and 1-IR-017 revealed the l

following:

No-unqualified power supplies in QIE cabinets, l

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A non-nuclear grade power supply in Class II (project-l classification R2E) cabinet IJSFNC03F (not safety-related).-

I Q class'C-E supplied power supplies in Q class Bechtel supplied' cabinets lJZJAC02A,.1JZJAC02B, and.lJZJBC02A.

ll C-E supplied Class II' power: supply in the Bechtel _ supplied

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non-nuc{ ear cabinet AJTBNC01..

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' DER 83-73

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Page'- Three -

--Unit.2

. Preliminary walkdown information indicates the following:

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Bechtel supplied non-nuclear ' grade l power-supplies in C-E:

- supplied Q class-cabinets 2JSBBC02A and>2JSBDCO2A._ These ara-also identified in Section I above. cNote:

-A non-nuclear

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grade power supply

• had bcen installed in C-E, supplied Q-class

. cabinet:2JSBCCO2A in'the past-but had been replaced by af Class I power supply. Documentation has been updated to.

reflect this. change.-

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Six C-E-supplied cabinets, 3 of which are Q class, contain :

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(13) power. supplies that were shipped in cabinets-for Unit 3 under C-E P.O. #9603109-14473. ' Six of the. power supplies' under that P.O. were intended for Class 1E ' service.. 'The remaining 7 power supplies under that.P.O. were intended for1 Class II service.- The fact that Unit 2 Q-class: cabinets-have power supplies f rom that Unit 3 P.O., makes the Unit - 2' Q class cabinets suspect. Their tag numbers are listed -below.

.2JSBAC02A

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2JSBACO2B 2JSBCC02A 4

Final walkdowne will determine whether or not the power -

supplies in theoe cabinets are qualified.

i (3) The third facet of the evaluation involved the following:

a.

Overall reviews of Startup, Maintenance, and Construction material control procedures and programs were ' conducted..

These reviews did not reveal any procedural inadequacies that

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could have caused or contributed to the improper use of.

i Foxboro Power Supplies.

b.

The Qualification Maintenance Program was, reviewed with l

regard to-the procurement of new equipment additions to the-plant, replacement equipment and. replacement parts-for qualified equipment. An administrative deficiency may have

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allowed Nuclear Operations to -purchaseiseme..e-quipment :

unqualified for installation in the plant.

Unit'3-Preliminary walkdown information. indicates no problems.

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- Final Report -

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DER'83

"Page_Four-

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Summary This evaluation ~ indicates that inadequate implementation of material control procedures have resulted in commingled power supplies.

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II; Analysis of Safety Implications This condition is evaluated.as:scfety significant. Commingled power supplies could result in failure of safety-related systems under-

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design basis conditions.

This condition is evaluated as ~ reportable 'under '10CFR50.55(e).since it' represents a significant breakdown in the Quality Assurance 4

Prog ram.

This condition-is ev;aluated as not reportable under-10 CFR-Part 21 since the affected cabinets had not been released for use in.

4 operations.

III.

. Corrective Action A.

Remedial Action 4

Investigation Requests A-IR-017; 1-IR-017, 2-IR-017,'and'3-IR-017 have been issued by Bechtel Engineering.to verify the~results of-preliminary walkdowns and to determine the full extent of-~the

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problem. The power supplies that were originally shipped for use?

in non-class-IE cabinets and are installed in QlE cabinetsswill be documented on NCRs and be replaced with power supplies i

intended for IE service. Additionally, the non-nuclear grade -

power supplies installed in nuclear service cabinets,. Class QlE or otherwise, will~be removed and replaced with a correct power-supply as required. This action will also be documented on NCRs.

B.

Action to Preclude Recurrence

-1 To address the root cause generically and to ensure that proper material control procedures and practices are j'

implemented, Startup,- Maintenance, and Construction have-issued and implemented procedural improvements to more.

directly control materials.

These organizations ~ are currently ro. viewing and monitoring these procedures to ensure adequate mat

• rial control

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requirements are implemented.' -Procedural changes and training is being conducted on t.n on-going basis to ensure proper! control and implementation.-

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- Final Report DER 83-73' Page Five 2

The folloving actions will be taken to verify acceptability of items procured prior to the administrative deficiency:

a.

Maintenance systems engineering will perform an evaluation to determine _which spare / replacement parts procured as a Level 1 (specification method); Level 4

.(catalogue specification method); or Level 5 (commercial grade method); purchases were for use in a safety-related~

(Quality Class 'Q') structure; system or component. (No spare / replacement parts have been procured as a Level 3, Verification Method; purchase.)

b; Maintenance Systems Engineering will identify to Nuclear Engineering, by Equipment Change Evaluation (ECE) requests, the safety-related spare / replacement parts procured as a Level 1 or 4. purchase so that ECEs can be performed to resolve the qualification status of the parts.

3.

As an additional measure; the subject of control of material has been summarized and presented in Bechtel and APS Quality Talk sessions.

4.

Bechtel Engineering has performed a review-of all purchase order specifications which ' procured both Class lE and non Class lE components frem the same supplier.. This review.

verifies that a sufficient component identification number is used to preclude recurrence of commingled' components.

5.

A copy of this report will be transmitted to C-E and Foxboro for their information.

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