ML20099L424
| ML20099L424 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palo Verde  |
| Issue date: | 11/14/1984 |
| From: | Van Brunt E ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE CO. (FORMERLY ARIZONA NUCLEAR |
| To: | Bishop T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| References | |
| REF-PT21-84, REF-PT21-85-069-000 ANPP-31125-TDS, DER-82-76, PT21-85-069-000, PT21-85-69, NUDOCS 8412010122 | |
| Download: ML20099L424 (9) | |
Text
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tECSVED 1
iMC Arizona Nuclear Power Projecg 777 ;g g ; ; q P.O. BOX 52034
- PHOENIX, ARIZONA 85072-2034 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission November 14, 1984 Region V ANPP-31125-TDS/.TRB Creekside Oaks Office Park 1450 Maria Lane - Suite 210 Walnut Creek, CA 94596-5368 Attention:
Mr. T. W. Bishop, Director Director of Resident Reactor Projects and Engiaeering Programs
Subject:
Final Report - DER 82-76 A 50.55(e) Reportable Condition Relating To Target Rock Valves Do Not Meet Specification / Test Requirements File: 84-019-026; D.4.33.2
Reference:
A) Telephone Conversation between P. Narbut and G. Duckworth on November 24, 1982 B) ANPP-22590, dated December 23, 1982 (Interim Report)
C) ANPP-23223, dated March 10,1933 (Time Extension)
D) ANPP-23641, dated May 3,1983 (Time Extension)
E) ANPP-27523, dated August 5, 1983 (Time Extension)
F) ANPP-28247, dated November 17,1983 (Time Extension)
G) ANPP-28608, dated January 12, 1984 (Time Extension)
H) ANPP-28884, dated February 15, 1984 (Time Extension)
I) ANPP-29288, dated April 12, 1984 (Time Extension)
J) ANPP-29612, dated May 29, 1984 (Interim Report, Rev. 1)
K) ANPP-29939, dated July 11,1984 (Final Report, Rev. 0)
L) Meeting with NRC (M. Licitra & H. Carg) to Discuss Comments on Equipment Qualification dated Oct. 9-10, 1984 M) ANPM-21123 TFQ/BJA dated October 16, 1984 Notes of REF. L)
Meeting
Dear Sir:
Attached is Rev. 1 of our final written report of the Reportable Deficiency under 10CFR50.55(e),
referenced above.
This supercedes the information provided in our letter of Ref. K) above, and is provided in response to specific NRC requests of the Ref. L) meeting.
Please advise if you have any additional questions or comments.
Very truly yours, (L Q SLR E. E. Van Brunt, Jr.
h,hN APS Vice President
$D, %o Nuclear Production ANPP Project Director h
EEVB/TRB/dlm Attachment I
ces See Page Two 8412010122 841114 PDR ADOCK 05000528 SE'01
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Mr. T. W.- Bishop DER 82-76 Page Two cc: -Richard DeYoung, Director Office of Inspection and Enforcement U. S. Nuclear. Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C.
20555 T. G. Woods, Jr.
D. B;'Karner W. E. Ide D. B. Fasnacht A. C. Rogers L. A. Souza D.EE. Fowler T. D. Shriver C. N. Russo J. R. Bynum J. M. Allen J. A. Brand A. C. Gehr W. J. Stubblefield W. G. Bingham R. L. Patterson R. W. Welcher H. D. Foster D. R. Hawkinson R. P. Zimmerman S. R. Frost D. Canady T. J. Bloom Records Center Institute of Nuclear Power Operations 1100 Circle 75 Parkway, Suite 1500 Atlanta, CA 30339
,3 FINAL REPORT - DER 82-76 DEFICIENCY EVALUATION 50.55(e)
ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY (APS)
PVNGS UNITS 1, 2, 3 I.
Description of Deficiency Combustion Engineering (C-E) ~ has reported deficiencies with thirty (30) Target - Rock solenoid valves supplied to : PVNGS.
Of these, twenty-four (24) one-inch valves Model 77L-001 were assigned to be installed as Safety Injection Tank Valves (eight per unit) and are identified by the following. unit tag numbers:
1JSIAHV605 2JSIAHV605 3JSIAHV605 IJSIAHV606 2JSIAHV606 3JSIAHV606 1JSIAHV607 2JSIAHV607 3JSIAHV607 1JSIAHV608 2JSIAHV608 3JSIAHV608 IJSIBHV613 2JSIBHV613 3JSIAHV613 IJSIBHV623 2JSIBHV623 3JSIBHV623 1JSIBHV633 2JSIBHV633 3JSIBHV633 1JSIBHV643 2JSIBHV643 3JSIBHV643 Additionally, six (6) two-inch Model - 77L-003 Target Rock solenoid.
valves were-assigned to be installed as Pressurizar Auxiliary Spray valves (two per unit) and are identified by the following unit tag numbers.
1JCHBHV203 2JCHBHV203 3JCHBHV203 1JCHAHV205 2JCHAHV205 3JCHARV205 To support the PVNGS equipment - qualification program, C-E deter-ained that four (4) valves would be returned to C-E for additional testing in accordance with NUREG-0588.
Units-1 & 2 were already installed at this time, so valves were selected from Unit. 3 stock and identified by model numbers,. serial numbers and size as follows:
Model No.
Serial No.
Size Unit Tag Numbers-77L-001 17 1"
3JSIAHV605-77L-001 18 1"
3JSIAHV606 77L-003 5
2" 3JCHBHV203-77L-003 6
2" 3JCHAHV205 1.
Prior to environmental testing
'a.
Incorrect Valve Assembly - -Examination found - an off-center
' insulating washer wedged in the _ land. between the pressure housing and the lower case of the - reed switch housing.
This prevented pressure from the assembly nut being J transmitted to the bottom of the solenoid housing and the lower 0-ring seal.
The misalignment.was corrected.
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4 Mr. T.' W. Bishop ANPP-31125-TDS/TRB -
Page Two b.
Significant Missing Parts - The delivered valves lacked 0-ring seals on both valves [5] and [6].. In addition, rubber grommets protecting the solenoid leads from chafing by the housing were missing on valves [17] = and [18].
'he missing 0-rings were replaced.
'2.
Attributed to environmental testing program a.
Limit switch valve position indicator failures, due to improper curing within the reed switch assembly, b.
Valve Failed to Open- - About 75% through the seismic test,,
valve [5] failed to open due to an electrical short in the.
solenoid.
On disassembly, the solenoid was observed to be f ree to move in all directions.
the lead wires to the other valve tested (18] were also damaged to the extent of exposing the conductors, but they had not'as yet come into contact either with each other or with the housing, where the grommet was missing, c.
Valve Failed to Close -- Although valve [18] was still operat-ing electrically at termination of the test, it was unable to seat properly in the closed position because the soft seat ring had started to come.out of its retention groove in the end of the plunger.
II.
Analysis of Safety Implications C-E has reviewed the impact of the reported condition and has determined the following:
"Failae of the Safety Injection Tank (SIT) Valves does not present ' a significant safety hazard because shutdown and depressurization can be accomplished withont'it.
Removal of SIT from service for repair is also permitted by the technical specification."
4
" Failure of the Pressurizer Auxiliary Spray Valves could present a sig-nificant sefety hazard because, in the Palo Verde design, these valves play a vital role in the principal path to cold shutdown for accident situations involving extended loss of off-site power".
l Based on the above, this condition is evaluated as reportable under the
. requirements of 10CFR50.55(e), since if the Pressurizer Auxiliary S ray t
valves defects were to remain uncorrected,. it would represent a signiti-cant safety condition.
C-E has subsequently reported this condition l
under the requirements of 10CFR Part 21.
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n' Mr. T. W. Bishop ANPP-31125-TDS/TRB Page Three III. Corrective Action 1.
Generic a.
Reed Switch Failures (Item I.2a)
It has been concluded that the Reed Switch problems were due, in part, to the high temperatures used to age pre-condition the valve components prior to DBE/DBA testing at C-E.
These switches had been shown to perform acceptably in testing by Target Rock as documented in their Report #2375.
To ' preclude potential future switch problems and to resolve any E.Q. ' con--
cerns, however, these Class,Q valves are being refurbished with new "high temperature" reed switches which have been demonstra-ted as qualified in TRC Report #3996.
The environmental condi-tions achieved in this testing greatly exceed those for PVNGS.
b.
Axial Coil Movement and Missing Parts (Items I.2b and I.la & b)
The root cause of the valve failure (2b) is attributable to the mechanism used to secure the solenoid to the upper works assembly, which is unique to the 77L series of solenoid valves at PVNGS.
These valves have a jam nut in combination with a lock washer which is used to secure the solenoid.
If, however, the upper works are rotated during handling or installation, the jam nut can become loose, allowing axial rotation of the coils.
This matter is addressed in TRC Service Bulletin #8302 dated April 6, 1983.
For TRC solenoid valves manuf actured prior to the 77L Series',
TRC utilized a jam nut with set screw to secure the solenoids.
The set screw precludes the loosening of the jam nut and conse-quential axial rotation of the coil.
The jam nut / set screw arrangement is applicable to all balance of plant (BOP) scope unpotted coil solenoid valves.
To assure that no concerns remain, however, all unpotted coil BOP Q class solenoid valves are being inspected per the TRC service bulletin referred to above.
s Regarding the MSSS valves on which the DER was written.
This problem was wholly resolved by the Mod III Upgrade to 77L-001 and 003 solenoid valves which included a complete factory refurbishment of these valves with potting of the coil into the solenoid housing.
The potting prevents differential movement
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- Mr. T. ;W. ' Bishop ANPP-31125-TDS/TRB Page Four-between ' the coil' and housing, precluding lead wire abrasion.
Additionally, TRC verified that all required parts (grommets, 0-rings, seals, washers) were properly-installed in the valves -
.during this rework activity.
This also closed the concerns. of Items la and b, above.
It -is not entirely clear that- 'the. original missing parts defects were a manufacturer responsibility.
These. valves had already been delivered to the.jobsite.for installation prior to their reshipment.back to C-E : labs for testing.
It is possible that unfamiliarity with the hardware in the field or in the
' labs may have resulted in parts being missing. We are aware of no other problems of this type with the TRC product.
Further a detailed inspection of a 10% -sample of the BOP scope solenoid valves, conducted in response to these concerns, revealed no parts deficiencies which could have compromised the valve s' qualification.
2.
Specific-C-E Scope Valves 77L-001 a.
C-E ' letter V-CE-19075 provides the corrective action for modi-fications of the existing solenoid operators. (Top Works) for the Model 77L-001 (Target Rock) one-inch Safety Injection Tank Vent valves for all 3 Units.
The modifications upgrade the valves to the qualified Mod III (potted coil) configuration.
The valves are identified by the following unit tag numbers:
1JSIAHV605 2SIAHV605 3SIAHV605 IJSIAHV606 2SIAHV606 3SIAHV606 IJSIAHV607 2SIAHV607 3SIAHV607 IJSIAHV608 2SIAHV608 3SIAHV608 IJSIBHV613 2SIBHV613 3SIBHV613 IJSIBHV623 2SIBHV623 3SIBHV623 IJSIBHV633 2SIBHV633 3SIBHV633 IJSIBHV643 2SIBHV643 3SIBHV643 C-E has submitted revised Target Rock Plan TP-ESE-024, Rev. 1 (Log N001-1.01-351-2) and Target Rock Modification Report No.
3862, as well as Qualification Program Document PE-5733A and Attachments (Log N001-1.01-421-1) which provide the results of testing on the Mod III Target Rock velves.
- This, in conjunction with a supplemental analysis which further defines the operability requirements for both the 1" (77L-001) and 2"
[
(77L-003) solenoid valves, demonstrates qualification to the PVNGS conditions in accordance with NUREG 0588 and 10CFR50.49.
4
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. Mr. T. ' W. Bishop ANF b 31125-TDS/TRB Page;Five As - previously stated, position switch qualification is docu-mented in TRC Report #3996.- That report, as well as TRC #2375, provides additional. assurance of the validity of our position that these valves are qualified.
'. Bechtel' will, laptement their' scope of 'the required modifi-cations to the T/R Solenoid operators by' the following Design Changes Package' prior to fuel load in each Unit:
ISM-SI-301 2SM-SI-301.
3CM-SI-301 C-E will submit revised drawings, manuals =and qualification documentation as required.
'3.
Valve Failed P.o Close (Item I.2c) s The root cause of the ~ seat extrusionL identified herein is attributed lreconditioning/ cycling _
i to a combination of overtesting during age and the effect of rapid decompression on the EPR softseat into which l
high pressure nitrogen gas had permeated.
Upon valve opening, the seat ~ saw a pressure decrease from.700 psig to O psig and the gae entrapped therein was released.
Repetitive pressurization-depres-surization. cycles. result 'in a physical breakdown of the seating i
material.and consequential valve leakage.
-c It is the project's position that these seats aro qualified. for at least one core refueling, however.
Further, we are following the operating experience of San ~ 0nof re Nuclear Generating Station, to determine the acceptability of the TRC "hard seat" alternate to tha existing soft seats which provide good gas sealing ' characteristics and and resistance to decompression related damage.
It is currently 3
thought that this fix will be pursued as a plant betterment _at first j
refeuling.
I' 4.. C-E Scope Valves 77L-003 a.
The corrective action required for the two-inch Pressurizer Spray Valves is as follows:
Replace existing Unit 1 Model 77L-003 Target Rock notenoid operators with Unit 2 refurbished (Mod III potted coll) solenoid operators of the same nodel (Tag-numbers IJCHAHV205 and.1 CHBHV203).
This will be the final solu-tion to support PVNGS Unit I schedule requirements.
As stated above, these valves are qualified for their applica-tion at PVNGS.
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_7, ?. --4 Mr..T. W. Bishop
- ANPP-31125-TDS/TRB Page Six Replace all Units. 2 & 3 Target Rock 'Model 77L-003 two-inch solenoid valves with Valcor two-inch solenoid valves Model V562-563-9, obtained in new condition from Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) and refurbished by the manufacturer prior to installation.
These valves are qualified for 40-year.
life and this replacement was. based on supporting construction schedule for Units 2 & 3.
.The Valcor valves will assume the following unit tag numbers.
2JCHAHV205 3JCHAHV205 2JCHBHV203 3JCHBHV203 Bechtel will implement the required valve modifications and valves change-out prior to fuel load in each Unit via the following Design Change Packages j
1SM-CH-307 2SM-CH-307 3SM-CJ-307 l
C-E will submit revised drawings, manuals, and qualification documentation, to support corrective action.
b.
C-E has issued Bulletin 82-11 dated November 9,1982 notifying all utility clients of this deficiency.
c.
Bechtel has identified twelve (12) additional Target Rock solenoid Model 77L (77L-002 and 77L-004) supplied by C-E to f
I Model 77L-002 IJSIBUV659 2JSIBUV659 3JSIBUV659 1JSIAUV660 2JSIAUV660 3JSIAUV660-These valves are not included in the PVNGS Harsh Environment Equipment Qualification Program, since they are mild environ-ment equipment (i.e., they have no post accident functional or accident mitigation requirements).
They are Q1E and qualifica-tion (seismic and mild environment operability) is still
- required, however.
This qualification is demonstrated as documented in Program PE-57338.
Additionally, these valves have potted coils as part of the original design so the concern of I.2b is not applicable.
Model 77L-004 IJCGBHV526 2JCHNHV526 3JCHNHV526 IJRCEHV403 2JRCEHV403 3JRCEHV403
_____7_____-
Mr. T. W. Bishop ANPP-31125-TDS/TRB Page Seven r
These valves are not Q1E, have no -safety function and are not part of the plant -qualification program; therefore, ;the' E.Q.
problems identified in this DER are not applicable.
However, Bechtel has issued Investigation Request (IR) No. 18 to inspect all of the above -12 valves for missing parts.
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