ML20099J166
| ML20099J166 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Beaver Valley |
| Issue date: | 11/13/1984 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20099J158 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8411280543 | |
| Download: ML20099J166 (8) | |
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SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 83 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-66 DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY OHI0 EDIS0N COMPANY
'7 PENNSYLVANIA POWER COMPANY BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION, UNIT N0. 1 DOCKET NO. 50-334
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INTRODUCTION By letter dated July 14, 1983, Duquesne Light Company (the licensee) submittea Change Request No. 86, to Operating License No. DPR-66 requesting that the. Technical Specifications set forth in Appendix A to the license be amended to clarify the conditions under which the safety action of channels of the protection system are manually bypassed or blocked by the protection system logic. The proposed changes are in response to the NRC Staff resolution of Multi-plant Action No. B-32, Blocked Safety injection Signal During Cooldown.
In addition the licensee has proposed changes to provide further clarification and consistency of the Technical $peci-fications in response to the staff review of this matter.
By letters dated September 22,,1983 and July 3, 1984 the licensee provided additional information.
DISCUSSION AND EVALUATION The limiting Conditions for Operation (LC0's) for the protection systems are specified in Table 3.3-1 for Reactor Trip System Instrumentation and Table 3.3-3 for Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System Instrumenta-
-tion of the plant Technical Specifications (TS).
In Table 3.3-3, the 8411280543 841113 PDR ADOCK 05000334 P
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Low Steamline Pressure channels used to initiate Steam.Line Isolation
.are required to be operable in Modes 1, 2 and 3#, where # is defined by the Table Notation to indicate that the trip function may be bypassed in Mode 3 when operating below the setpoint for the P-11 interlock.
The use of the notation avoids the potential for a conflict with the specified
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channel operability requirements when the safety action is manually _
bypassed. The capability to bypass the safety action of the channel is an intended feature of the design which is automatically removed by oper-ation above the P-11 interlock setpoint.
The same notation, (#) is used in Table 3.3-3 for the High Steam Pressure Rate channels used to initiate Steam Line Isolation, however this trip function-is by design only active when the aforementioned Low Steamline I
~ Pressure channels are manually bypassed. Therefore the licensee has pro-posed a new notation (##) to clarify the conditi6ns under which High Steam Pressure Rate channels may be manually bypassed.
This notation indicates that the trip function is bypassed above P-11, and is bypassed below P-11
< hen Safety Injection on low steam pressure is not manually bypassed.
Since this change appropriately reflects the conditions under which the High Steam Pressure Rate channels are bypassed we find it acceptable.
The Power, Intermediate, and Source Range chann'els of the Reactor Trip System Instrumentation noted in Table 3.3-1 of the TS include manual by-pass features using permissive interlocks P-6 and P-10.
The licensee has proposed changes to appropriately note the conditions.for the Applicable
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Modes under which these channels may be manually bypassed.
Since this change clarifies bypass capability for the design of these channels we find it acceptable.
J In addition to_the manual' bypass capability of protection system c,hannels,
' permissive interlocks are.used in the logic design such that the safety
. actions are automatically bypassed. The current Technical Specification U.
, /'l utilizes a notation under.the Functional Unit description of the' Loss of Flow of Flow channels for reactor trip in Table 3.3-1 to identify per-missive conditions under,which the channels are active and are not auto-4 matically tiypassed. For consistency the licensee has proposed changes to.
Tables 3.3-1 and 3.3-3 to indicat'e the interlock permissive associated 1-with each protection system channel where applicable.
Since this change
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is consistent with the design and provides further clarification of the
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automatic-bypassing of protective actions we find it acceptable.
The reactor trip and engineered safety feature interlock permissives are 1
summarized at the end of Tables 3.3-1 and 3.3 '3 respectively indicating f
the condition (parameter and coincidence of channel trips required 'to j
establish the permissive condition), the channel setpoint and the inter-I.
lock function. The licensee has proposed changes to Table 2.2-1, Reac-l
- tor Trip System Instrumentation Trip Setpoints and Table 3.3-4, Engineer-ed Safety Feature System Instrumentation Trip Setpoints to identify each interlock channel along with the trip 'setpoint and an allowable value (not presently defined) consistent with the specification of these values for channels which initiate safety actions. Also i.t was proposed 4
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to identify these channels in Tables 3.3-1 and 3.3-3 with specifications for the Minimum Channels Operable, Applicable Modes, and Action statements
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to establish limiting conditions for operation appropriate for the oper-ability of the permissive interlocks. Also it was proposed to identify these channels in Table 4.3-1, Reactor Trip System Instrumentation Sur-veillance Requirements and Table 4.3-2, Engineered Safety Feature Actua-tion System Instrumentation Surveillance Requirements with specifications '
for surveillance tests and modes in which surveillance is required.
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ally it was proposed to add a description of the permissive interlocks to the Bases for Reactor Trip System Setpoints in Section 2.2, Limiting Safe-ty System ietting's and to the Bases.for Instrumentation in Section B 3/4.3.'
Since these changes are consistent with the current guidance provided in
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NUREG-0452, Rev. 4, Standard Technical Specifications for Westinghouse Pressurized Water Reactors and provide further' clarification of the LCO's appropriate for permissive interlock channels we find thet they are
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acceptable.
Y In addition to manual bypass and automatic blocking of safety actions which have been addressed above, the logic for Safety Injection includes the capability to block (override) a safety trijection signal subsequent to the automatic initiation of a safety injection.
This feature has safety significance when used during the normal recovery of stable plant
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O conditions following an inadvertent safety injection. Under these condi-tionsthesafetyinjectionsignalisblockedbyactionoftheresetof A.
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safet'y injection and remains until the P-4 interlock permissive is clear-ed by closing the reactor trip breakers. ThepresentActionstatemen[
for inoperable (bypassed) safety injection logic requires that the unit be placed in hot standby within six hours and be in cold shutdown within i
the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />. Therefore in order to assure that Safety Injec-tion is restored to operable status during either a return to power or plant shutdown following an inadvertent initiation of Safety Injection, an Action-statement has been proposed _to stipulate that the block of safe-ty injection be removed by resetting the reactor trip breakers within one hour providing that all trip input signals have reset due to stable plant conditions. We find that this change is accepta'ble and appropriate for restoring the Safety Injection logic to an operable status following 're-covery from an inadvertent Safety Injection.
Attachment A to the licensee's letter dated July 3,1984 identified the j
proposed changes to the Technical Specifications.
Based on the review of these changes, the NRC staff and the licensee mutually agreed to thc following modifications to the proposed changes to be included in the Technical Specifications (letter, S. A. Varga (NRC) to J. J. Carey (DLC),
l September 24,1984).
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FunctionalUnitNo.20inTable2.b-1onreactortripsystem1.nstru-mentation trip setpoints is titled Reactor Trip System Interlocks s
(Base' on ascending power). Since the logic diagrams in the FSAR d
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specifically note that the interlock channels are tripped on~ ascend-ing power it was concluded that the parenthetical notation proposed is not necessary and therefore has been deleted. We find this is acceptable since it is consistent with the guidance in;the Standard Technical Specifications.
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2.
The Trip Setpoint and Allowable Value for Functional Unit item 20.D.
Power Range Keutron Flur., P-10 in Table 2.2-1 were indicated as
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greater than 9% and less than 12% Rated Thermal Power respectively.
It was concluded that the Trip Setpoint shoald be specified as 10%
Rated Thermal Power and that lower limit p'roposed for the trip set-point be included under the Allowable Value column. This change has been incorporated to avoid any ambiguity in interpretation of the specified values. Since this change is consistent with the guidance in the Standard Technical Specifications we find it acceptable.
3.
Some of the instrument channels identified in Table 4.3-1 on reac-tor trip system surveillance requirements included parenthetical notation under the functional unii descriptidn to identify permissive f
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interlocks associated with the aut6matic bypass of the safety. action.
Since this notation is included in Table 3.3-1 as cla.rification of the operability requirements of channels and does not add further
- s(I to the surveillance requirements of Table 4.3-1, it has been deleted.
We find this acceptable since it is consistent with the guidance in the Standard Technical Specifications.
4.
In Table 3.3-3 the engineered' safety feature actuation system oper-
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ability requirements were clarified by the addition of the paren-thetical notation (Loop Stop Valves Open) for Functional' Units 1.e.,
Low Steamline' Pressure and 7.a., Steam Generator Water Level-Low-Low.
This addition is consistent with the identification permissive inter-locks used in Tables 3.3-1 and 3.3-3 and is'therefore, acceptable.
5.
Action 36 in Table 3.3-3 was proposed to specify a time limit for un-blocking of a Safety Inject 16n signal following an inadv.ertent safety injection. The Action statement includes a sentence noting that man-ual block is permitted after safety injection and P-4 reset.
In that P-4 reset remover the block this statement is not technically correct, however its ourpose to permit the use of the override feature of the reset feature is implicit in the action statement itself. Therefore, this statement was deleted and is acceptable since it.was neither technically correct.nor necessary.
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d-o 8-In sumary, the licensee has proposed changes to the Technical Specification for-
-Beaver Valley Unit 1 which are purely administrative to achieve consistency.
Based,upon this review the Staff finds that they are acceptable on the basis
.j noted.therein.
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l ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION This amendment involves only changes in administrative procedure and requirements. '.Accordingly, this amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR Sec 51.22(c)(10). Pursuant to.
10CFR51.22(b)noenvironmentalimpactstatementorenvironmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of this amendment,,~
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CONCLUSION We have concluded, based on the considerations disc.ussed above, that:
(1) there is reasonable assurance that the health.and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation ~in the proposed manner, and (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Comission's regulations and the issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the comon defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.
Dated: November 13, 1984 PRINCIPAL CONTRIBUTOR:
T. Dunning e
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