ML20099C553

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Forwards Response to Power Sys Branch Questions.Mechanical Responses Accepted at 850211 & 28 Meetings.Fsar Changes Will Be Incorporated in Upcoming Amend.Response to Question 430.25 Re Load Acceptance Test Revised
ML20099C553
Person / Time
Site: Beaver Valley
Issue date: 03/05/1985
From: Woolever E
DUQUESNE LIGHT CO.
To: Knighton G
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
2NRC-5-038, 2NRC-5-38, NUDOCS 8503110353
Download: ML20099C553 (19)


Text

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ouquesneuet m ae Nuclear Construction Division Telecopy 29

$t$u' g"O'l'is"2Os " *""* ' March 5, 1985 United States Nuclear Regulatory Comission Washington, DC 20555 ATTENTION: Mr. George W. Knighton, Chief Licensing Branch 3 Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

SUBJECT:

Beaver Valley Power Station - Unit No. 2 Docket No. 50-412 PSB Mechanical Responses Gentlemen:

This letter forwards revised PSB Mechanical responses which were accepted at a meeting held or 7.5ruary 11,1985, and an informal meeting held on February 28, 1985. FSAR changes described in these revised responses will be incorporated in an upcoming amendment. The following responses are attached: 430.25, 430.55, 430.59, 430.107, 430.117, 430.122, 430.123, 430.125, 430.126, and GDC 5 for comunications systems.

Please note, the response to question 430.25 is being revised in response to question 430.54.

DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY By (

E. J. yooievef jf Vice-President //

GH0/wj s Attachment cc: Mr. B. K. Singh, Project Manager (w/a)

Mr. G. Walton, NRC Resident Inspector (w/a)

SUBSpRIBED AND SWORN J0 BEFORE ME THIS

-W DAY OF ')2&uf _ , 1985.

xll in) bk C l Notary Public l

ANITA ELAINE REITER, NOTARY PUBLIC ROBINSON TOWNSHIP, ALLEGHENY COUNTY '

\

I MY COMMISSION EXPIRES OCTOBER 20,1986 8503110353 850305 PDR ADOCK 05000412 A PDR

ITnited'Stctes Nuclear Reguletory Commission Mr. George W. Knighton, Chief PSB Mechanical Responses Page 2 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA )

) SS:

COUNTY OF ALLEGHENY )

The Manager, Regulatory Af fairs, Eugene F. Kurt z, Jr. , being first duly sworn, deposes, and says: that he is the Manager, Regulatory Af fairs, Nuclear Construction Division, of Duquesne Light Company; with legal author-ity to sign of ficial correspondence on behalf of the Vice President - Nuclear Construction Division, Earl J. Woolever, in relation to licensing for Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit 2 and therefore authorized to submit the foregoing on behalf of the applicant.

3~ YW ,,

/ v v Date Managecf Regulatory Af fairs Swogn and subscribed before me, this

,6dd day of %,u L , 1985.

L. itb /> YLL Notary Public ANITA ELAINE REITER, NOTARY PUBLIC ROBINSON TOWNSHIP, ALLEGHENY COUNTY MY COMMISSION EXPIRES OCTOBER 20,1986 3

a

. BVPS-2 FSAR NRC Letter: August 31, 1983 .

s Q estion 430.25 (SRP 8.3.1)

C ction 6.4.2 of IEEE Standard 387-1977 requires, in part, that the lead acceptance test consider the potential effects on load -

acceptance ;fter prolonged no load or light load operation of the diesel generator. Provide the results of load acceptance tests or analysis that demonstrate the capability of the diesel generator to accept the design accident load sequerce after prolonged no load operation. This capability should be demonstrated over the full range of ambient air temperatures that may exist at the diesel engine air intake. If this capability cannot be demonstrated for minimum ambient air temperature, conditions, describe design provision that will assure an acceptable engine air intake temperature during no load operation.

Response

In accordance with Section 8.3.1.1.15, the emergency diesel generator is capable of operating for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> at rated speed, no load, without any deterioration in its load acceptance or load carrying capability.

The emergency diesel generator manufacturer (Colt Industries) has performed an analysis which confirms that the only limitation to prolonged (greater than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />) operation, at ne load or light load

pressure alarm setpoint with regard to the capability to start the diesel once ,

a low pressure alarm condition exists. This concern was raised at a -

meeting between the NRC' (Power Systems Branch), DLC, and SWEC on 3; March 6, 1984. -

(

Amendment 7 Q430.107-1 -

July 1984

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BVPS-2 FSAR Refer to revised Tables 9.5-10 and 9.5-11 Amendment 7, for low pressure alarm setpoints, diesel starting times, and associated system pressures. . y de low pressure alarm setpoint is 375 psig. Based on the data t presented in Table 9.5-11, one receiver can start the diesel four l times (in less than 10' seconds) after it has reached its alarm setpoint. For two receivers in service, the starting capability would be enhanced such that more starts would be available. \ '

l Tha low pressure alarm seepoint is 375 psig for each air receiver; in the case of a compressor failure or a.avstem leak causing the_ low ,

pressure alarm point to be reached fod oc& air receiver, the pTl416.R air receiver for that diesel generator would still be at normal . _

pressure (395 - 425 psig) .- Based on the data presented in Table ,

9.5-11 one receiver can starc the diesel five times (in less than 10 seconds) from the low poinc in its normal operating range.

For two receivers in service,. the startig capsbility would be enhanced such that more starts would' be available.

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a Amendment 7 Q430.107-2 July 1984

y SU.95-2 FSAR

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NRC Letter: September 19, 1957 Question 430.117 (3ection 9.5.7)

You state in Secticn 9.5.7.1 of the FSAR under " specific design criteria" that "the temperature of the lub ricatir.g oil is automatically maintained above a minimum value by means of an independent recirculation loep including'its own pump and heater, to enhance first try s:arting reliability of the engine in the standby condition." The rocher arm lubrication system is an independent subsystem of the diesel lube oil system which is connected to the main system by a flos: valve in the rocker arm oil reservoir. From the inferma:lon available it appears that the lube o:1 :.n the rocker arm lubricatien system will never be preheated unless the cil level is low enough to open the fica: valve. If this is the case what means have you prosided for preheating the rocker arm lubricating oil er justify why preheating is unnecessary. (Refer to Question 430.128 for ccnditions when preheating may be necessary.) (SRP 9.5.7, Parts II and III).

Response

The rocker arm lubrication system is not preheated. The first-try starting reliability of the diesel engine without rocker arm lube oil preheating has been demonstrated by the test program described in Section S.3.1.1.15.

Because of the large total surface area of crankshaft and connecting rod jou nal bearings, when compared, to the small total surface area of rocker' arm bushings, it is evident that rocker arm resistance is an insignificant contributor to cranking resistance and that heating of crankcase oil alone is sufficient. SRP 9.5.7 recognizes the insignificance of rocker arm lube oil heating by stating that the design should contain "an independent circulation loop to ma:.ntain the temperature of the crankcase oil above a minimum value during the standbv mode." ine svn-z diesel generator buildings are heatec to -

provi$ a ia e ambient te conditions, which further assures prop oT1cm-,ho^graturereTI~able starting (nfer hh reyw

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Amendment 7 Q430.117-1 July 1984 m .e-- e m m ee

BVPS-2 FSAR PRC Letter: September 19, 1983 Question 430.122 (Section 9.5.8)

Provide the results of an analysis that demonstrates that the system design function of your diesel engine air intake and exhaustan extent which prevents developin will not be degraded to of any eng:.ne rated power or cause engine shutdown as a consequenceInclude in your discussior meteorological or accident condition. (gaseous) medium.

potent:.a1 and effect of fire extinguishing recirculation of diesel combustion products, or other gases including to a fire that may intentionally or products of comoustion due on site, on the performance of the diesel accidentally be released generator (SRP 9.5.8. Parts II and III).

Response

The effect of fire extinguishing (Co ) amedium, releasedresconses in the diesel to p g E/l T k building will be =Adressed in the generator 430.124 and 430.129 M he effects of products of comcustion [M 60.13~'4 on m - Question 430.126.

_ @ue to a fire will be addressed in the response to An. analysis has been perfomed to evaluate the effects of accidenta'i l

releases of gases stored. onsite- and the recirculation of diesel ,

exhaust gases orr the function of the emergency diesel generators.

The accidental:- reletae of ' gases. or liquids. capable of producing of their a.

gaseous cloud ort the BVPS-2. site was. evaluated. in.' terms potential to reduce the oxygen content of the diesel intake air below acceptable levels. The onsite stored chemicals and their quantities are shown 'in Table 2.2-9 and their- locations are indicated on Figure 6.4-5. Since the carbon diczide tanks are stored inside the auxiliary building (two 10-ton tanks) and the . turbine building within the (7.5-torr tank), any accidental releases will be confined buildings and released over a period of' time through the normal the effects of

  • ventilation system from rooftop vent. Therefore, carbon dioxide releases from these. sources on diesel generator performance is not significantT The"YemEining onsite chemicals' were analyzed by calculating the m ximum concentration expected to occur. -

at the diesel air intakes using the conservative methodology outlined .'

in NUREG-0570.

" Toxic Vapor concentrations. in the control Room Following a Postulated Accidental Release" (Section 2.2.3.1.2). '

accident- the entire contents of the largest single In a postulated or plume-storage cor.tainer are released, resulting in a vapor cloud

  • which is conservati'ely v assumed to be- transported byThe the wind most directly toward the- diesel generator" air intakes. '

conservative meteorological condition is assumed for the eelculation.

a wind speed of which consists of Pasquill Class G stability,It is further assumed 0.5 m/sec, and an ambient temperature of 40*C.

that the release point and diesel air intakes are both at ground .

i July 1984 Amendment .7 Q430.122-1

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o BVPS-2 FSAR level and that the puff or plume cent erline tirectly impacts the intake. Only the outside air concentration of each chemical is calculated with no further dilution In of thethe cast chemical inside the of nitrogen anddiesel generatorreleases, building being considered.the presence of the turbine building directly in hydrogen is accounted for by using the ne path of the puff (see Figure 6.4-5) expression for building wake effect from Regulatory Guide 1.145:

(430.122-1) x/Q = L Q (w67 jr A/2) is concentration (g/m ), Q is emission rate (g/sec), u is 3

wnere x, mean wind speed (m/sec). 6 and 6 2 are lateral and vertical and A is the building cross-sectional dispersion coefficients (m)7 ,

combined with area normal to the wind direction. This expression, included (X/Q =

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the dispersion equation without building wake effect., to the 1/uwd (1 + A/276ydz)-1 y dg) and yields the correction factor concentration calculated by the NUREG-0570 methodology whichwas does not used consider building wake effects. A building area of 1519 m:

Ln the calculation.

The result of the analysis is shown in Table 430.122-1. which indicates the maximum chemical concentrations at the diesel air intake in g/m3 and percent by volume, and the corresponding oxygen .

concentrations of the intake air assuming an ambient air oxygen content of 21 percent -by volume. Based on a lower limit of

's 17.5 percent oxygen by volume in the intake air for full engine rated l '

power to be achieved, accidental releases of gaues stored onsite will not degrade the intake air to an extent that diesel operation will be adversely affected.

Likewise, an analysis of the recirculation of diesel exhaust from the-roof in ths lee of the diesel generator building indicates The analysis no estimates impairment of the diesel generator operation.

diesel exhaust concentrations at the air intakes on the downwind side of the diesel generator building based on wind tunnel tests performed

  • by Wilson (1976). which producedroof" K isopleths for three different exhaust locations, where building shape.s and seveYaL L = length K = CUL/2/Q, and where C = concentration, a a wind speed, scale, and Q = tmission rate. The K isopleths represent the case of _

Even though the no plume rise, w1ich is the most conservative case.toward the roof, the exhaust diesel exhaust is directed downward temperature of 1,000*F will most likely result in some taoyancy- -

induced plume rise, which leads to added conservatism of the i analysis. The wind tunnel boundary layer is typical of. a suburban or  ! -

  • ;-ntly built-up urban area which is reasonably representative cf the f

1*:71-2 site area. .

Based on the X isopleths for t'he building shape and exhaust vent locations most representative of the diesel generatur butiding a K value of L exhaust and intake design (Figure 7 in Wilson, 1976$. k was conservatively chosen for the analysis. The concentration of l July 1984 Amendment 7 Q430.122-2

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BVPS-2 FSAR s then C = Q/UA, where A =L2 diesel exhaust (C) at the air intakes Bastd on a design exhaust flow (building area normalato the wind).

building area of 319 m2 (A), and an issumed of 42 m3/see (Q),

10 m/sec wind speed (U) for dcwnwash conditions, the diesel exhaust ,

concentration at the air intakes is 1.3 percent by volume. This 20.7 percent oxygen content of the ~

concentratton translates to a intake air. which is well above the minimum percentage of 17.5.

Reference for Question 430.122 Wilson. D.J. 1976. Contamination of Air Intakes frcm Roof Exhaust Vents, ASHRAE Transactions 82, Part 1, 1024.

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l TABLE 420.122-1 ESTIMATED CHEMICAL CONCENTRATIONS AT DIESEL GENERATOR I.1R INTAKES Diesel Intake Concentration Oxygen Content Chemical tg/m 3) (*5 by Volu.e)m T5 by volune)

Ammonium hydroxide 24.8 1.8 20.6 Mitrogen 171.9 15.8 17.7 Hydrogen 4.5 5.8 19.S Chlorine 201.7 7.3 19.5 Hydra::ine 0.1 0.01 21.0 Morpholine 0.1 1.5 x 10-3 21.0 Sulfuric acid 2.4 x 10-5 6.3 x 10-7 21.0

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. Amendment 7. ,

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  1. ' n1224106sts5ah BVPS-2 F3AR NRC I.etter: September 19. 1993 1.9 1.13 Question 430.123 (Section 9.5.8)

Discuss the provisions made in your design of the diesel engine. 1.14 combustion air intake and exhaust system to prevent possibis 1.15 clogging. during standby and in operation, dust from abnormal climatic storms, ice and snow 1.16 conditions (heavy rain, freezing rain, drtits. and snow) that could prevent operation of the diesel 1.17 generator on demand (SRP 9.5.8.. Parts II and I!!).

1.18

Response

1.19 Abnormal climatic conditions to be considered snow drifts, and snow.

at SVPS-2 would include Heavy .1.21 heavy rain, freezing rain, ice and rain, freezing rain, and snow cannot impair the functioning of diesel intakes and exhausts because of'the downward facing openings of the 1.22 labyrinths which are designed to protect the exhausts and intakes  ;

from tornado missiles. Drifting snow cannot restrict intakes due to 1.24 their elevation, which is greater than 25 f t. above the ground (refer to Figure 3.8-43). Blockage of diesel exhausts by drifting snow is 1.26 prevented. by the. location and' configuration of the concrete hoods (refer to Figur .8-4 .-

Since each; hood has two downward facing 1.2S openings, one o the- north side of the center supporting pedestal and one on the south side of the pedestal,~ blowing snow from the north or 1.29

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south will not. significantly- drif t. ~ at- ' least one opening on esca 1.30 diesel exhaust because of shielding by the . pedestals and/or the adjacent. diesel exhaust hood. Snow blown from the- east or west will 1.31.

not drif t.significantly because the north opening of the "8" diesel exhaust and the south opening. of the "A"~ diesel ~ exhaust permit 1.32.

f blowing snow to freely pasa under the overhanging a openings. Q 1.33 addition, the area of the openings (over 50 ' fe ) f ar exceeds the- area 1.34 ,

of the exhaust pipe (less than 8 f ta) and. would permit significant 1.35 screen blockage before diesel performance would be impacted. Snow depth can reach 51 inches average at the- dtesel exhausts and still maintain the- 8"fta total opening area, assuming the exhaust flow does 1.36 not blow or melt nearby snow (which it certainly would) .

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BVPS-2 FSAR NRC I.etter: September 19, 1983 Question 430.125 (Section 9.5.8)

Experience at some operating plants has shown that diesel engines other have failed to start due to accumulation of dust and ~

deleterious material on electrical equipment associated with starting control of the diesel generators (e.g.. auxiliary relay contacts, switches. etc.). Describe the provisions that have been made in your electrical starting system, and diesel generator building design.

combustion air and ventilation air intake design (s) to preclude this condition to assure availability of the diesel generator on demand.

will be Also describe under normal plant operation what procedure (s) used to minimir.e accumulation of. dust in the diesel generator room; specifically address concrete dust control (SRP 9.5.8, Parts II and III).

Response: .% ~

NEMA Type 12 enclosures are used the for all enclosed diesel generator equipmentelectrical against panels. and are designed to protect dirt and dust.

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_'the current in-place station administrative procedures require that a.

housekeeping program exist to ensure that tne quality of safety--

, related items is not degraded as, a result of housekeeping practices.

  • A senior supervisor, siong with other plant supervisory personnel.

' the station housekeeping committee, and employees are responsible to ensure housekeeping requirements. are properly implemented. This i program is in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.39.

To minimize the entry of airporna particulate meterial from the VT outside, the boter.ms of the ventil(Tation air intakes for the diesel

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generator rooms are located 27 feet above grade. elevation (paragraph III.4 of SRP 9.4.5 specifies a minimum of 20 feet for this distance). ,

_a, , _

M Concrete is proportioned, placed, and cured suc.t that the existence of Leose concrete -

M dist on formed and floor surfaces is prevented. Personnel foot traffic into the diesel C generator building is expected to introduce small amounts of mud, dirt and dust origin _

f ating from other areas, principally the yard area. This debris, in conjunction with normal foot traffic, will act as an abrasive, thus loosening a small quantity of add-itional dust from concrete floor surfaces. The total duat produced, however, will be

' adequately addressed by the housekeeping program and other measures described herein. e Finally, NIMA Type 12 enclosures are used for all diesel generator electrical panels and are designed to protect the enclosed equipment against dirt and dust. .

~~

July 1984 Amendment'7 Q430.125-1

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p- BVPS-2 F~AR NRC Letter: September 19 1983 Question 430.126 (Section 9.5.8)

Figure 1.2-2 of the FSAR sho.rs system station service transformer 2A located near the diesel generator building . A transformer fire with the right meteorological conditions could degrade engine operation by the products of combustion being drawn into the D/G ventilation system and D/G combusti m air intake system. The same conditions apply for the oil storage laydown area and oil separator no. 22.

located in the immediate area of the diesel generator building.

Discuss the provisions of your design (site characteristics, ventilation system and building design, etc) which preclude this event from occurring (SKP 9.5.8, Parts II and III).

Response

Provisions in SVPS-2 design which preclude degradation of diesel '

performance because of combustion product intake includes .

1. A heat detector-actuated. automatic water spray delug5 system and backup fire suppression capability provided by a yard fire hydrant for system station service transformer 2A
2. The oil storage laydown area is used only to hold the oil drained from station service transformer 2A during maintenance. This type of maintenance can only be done during a plant shutdown condition.
3. 011. separator No. 22 is buried and its vent is supplied with a flame arrestor. Ataj odesLPL4w) Feavvt Tits est IsI%e47>e-Seet 70 W 57ada) Seldwt -s jsTewt W NfutF IT WsNtc A#ri coth riTuTs A Ptd5 ftAydC, SiSTErrl ~
1. 'The/tationgervice/ransformers are used to bring of fsite power into the plant and 'would not be transmitting power during normal pucp._ ofcMrd manc conaitions. In the unlikely event of a fire in % M O ,

l jfervice fransformer 2A, plant auxiliary power could be supplied by either the main generator or of fsite power via the redundant sisTEM -

geneientervice/ransformer2B(locatedonthenorthwestside .

of the plant)? In addition, a heat detector-actuated, automatic water spray debge system and backup fire suparession capability -_

from a yard fire hydrant are provided fo tacion /ervice fransformer 2A.

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7tzMitfoames 7 A wouu) **T m"W " A Amendment 7 Q430.126-1 July 1984 l

f GDC 5 Question (Provided Infomally):

. The information submitted by the applicant in Amendment 4 to the FSAR indicates that the communication systems, in particular the page party system, the radio system, the microwave system, and telephone systems, are shared, interconnected in some manner, or can be connected to their counterpart systems in Beaver Valley Unit 1. From the information submit-ted, the staff cannot determine if the communication systems are designed to meet the requirements of GDC 5.

Response

As clearly stated in the standard review plan, there are no general design criteria which apply to communications systems. Therefore, GDC 5 was not considered as a design basis for BVPS communications systems. Regardless of the review criteria being applied here, experience in designing commu-nications systems has resulted in certain independence of communications systems between BVPS-1 and BVPS-2 where it makes engineering sense to do so. The following discussions attempt to answer the reviewer's concern.

The page party systems for BVPS-1 and BVPS-2 nomally operate as two independent systems. The handsets and speakers for each system are located

, only in areas of their respective unit so that messages pertaining to one unit will not be monitored on the other unit. The page party systems of the two units can be combined if desired. This is accomplished by use of

" merge-isolate" switches located at the communications panel in the main control room, at the auxiliary shutdown panel of BVPS-1, and at the alter-nate shutdown panel of BVPS-2. These switches are normally in the " iso-late" position, which allows for independent operation of each unit's system. The " merge-isolate" switches are provided for the purpose of making emergency announcements at both units simultaneously and are returned to the " isolate" mode following use. This will maximize the number of channels available at each unit and will not interfere with p1 ant shutdown.

The radio system consists of several separate elements. Base stations and hand-held units communicate through either of two selected radios (VHF high band and VHF low band) located in the Radio Building. In addition, the control room is provided with a third radio (VHF high band) and a roof mounted antenna should the others be inoperative. These multible radio systems assure that loss of all radio consnunications is unlikely.

. The private automatic exchange (PAX) telephone system is shared between the two units. The telephone lines from the switchboard to various parts of the two units are fed radially and are in separate conduits. This modular construction assures that the loss of a local line does not cause the loss of the entire system or affect other incoming or outgoing calls.

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n The microwave system is no longer used for voice communications at BVPS and was never intended to be used for onsite communications. A revised response to Question 430.58 will address deletion of this system.

Based upon the diversity of communications systems provided for BVPS and the design features of each system described above, it can be concluded that failure of a communications system at one plant cannot affect safety at the other.