ML20098E499

Final Deficiency Rept DER 84-18 Re Wiring Error on LPSI Pump B CS-3 Switch.Wiring Errors Corrected.Deficiency Determined Not Reportable Per 10CFR50.55(e)

ML20098E499
Person / Time
Site:	Palo Verde
Issue date:	09/10/1984
From:	Van Brunt E ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE CO. (FORMERLY ARIZONA NUCLEAR
To:	Bishop T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V)
References
ANPP-30471-TDS, DER-84-18, NUDOCS 8409280562
Download: ML20098E499 (5)

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Arizona Public Service Company September 10, 1984 ANPP-30471-TDS /TRB l

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region V Creekside Oaks Office Park 1450 Maria Lane - Suite 210 Walnut Creek, CA 94596-5368 Attention: Mr. T. W. Bishop, Director Division of Resident Reactor Projects and Engineering Programs

Subject:

Final Report - DER 84-18 A 50.55(e) Reportable Condition Relating To Wiring Error On LPSI

'B' PUMP CS-3 Switch.

File: 84-019-026; D.4. 33.2 Ref erence : A) Telephone Conversation between P. Narbut and T. Bradish on March 26,1984 B) ANPP-29315, dated April 18,1984 (Interim Report)

C) ANPP-29664, dated June 6,1984 (Time Extension)

D) ANPP-29974, dated July 16, 1984 (Time Extension)

E) ANPP-30278, dated August 20,1984 (Time Extension)

Dear Sir:

Attached is our final written report of the deficiency referenced above, which has been determined to be Not Reportable under the requirements of 10CFR50. 55( e).

Very truly yours, Cm JWw

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E. E. Van B runt, J.

APS Vice President Nuclear Production ANPP Project Director EEVB/TRB/nj g f, p ~,tg At tachment cc: See Page Two gg

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1Mr. T. W. : Bishop

'DI!R 84-18 Page Two cc:

Richard 'DeYoung, Director.

Office of Inspection and Enforcement U. S.. Nuclear Regulatory Connaission Washington, D. C. 20555 '

T. G. : Woods, Jr.

.D. B. Karner W. E..Ide~

D. B.~Fasnacht A. C. Rogers

.L. A.'Souza.

D. E. Fowler; T. D. Shriver -

C. N. Russo J. Vorees

- J. R. Bynum J. M. Allen.

J. A. Brand D..Canady A. C. Gehr-W. J. Stubblefield W. G. Bingham R. L. Patterson R. W. Welcher H. D. Foster D. R. Hawkinson L. E. Vorderbrueggen R. P. Zinumerman S. R. Frost L. Clyde M. Woods T. J. Bloom D. N. Stover Records Center Institute of Nuclear Power Operations 1100 Circle 75 Parkway, Suite 1500 Atlanta, GA 30339'

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5 FINAL REPORT - DER 84-18 DEFICIENCY EVALUATION 50.55(e)

ARI30NA FUBLIC SERVICE ( APS)

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4 Description _bf ~ D6f fielency,

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Design Change Pac'mige (DC?) ISE-RM-08Q required the

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installation of-cqqtrol swi:ch CS-3 in 4.16 kV switchgear 1E-PBB-SO4F and'vning revisions in accordanca with BR3 of g

vendor drawing E00911BS-9. This modification a2fected the addition of an isolation 'switcIi to the pump

• circuit breaker control circuit in which the wiring to the switch was incomplete. The' ECT was signed as completed on

[ Mach 10,1983.. During a sucsequent site Valkdown to verif y ve'ador-installed viring, a; discrepancy in complet1h of the DCP. was discovered and documented by 'NCR SE-3551, ' dated January 12, 1984;

,g5 To resolve ' concerns by 'both APS and B'eghtel Management, Becht11 Engineering. initiated an ' extensive walhlow and m

verification of vendor-installed wiring and' viritig j subsequently changed by Dechtel using DOPs,bich included at This walkdown included 130 safety-related wiring schemes least 10,000 ' individual terminations in-Unit 1.

As a result of the reinspection program, the following additional errors

, were identified:

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'A.; Low Pressurt Safety Injection Pump "B" - two wires which should have;been removed per NCR SE-3551 reierenced above were electri XU y disconnected but not physically removed.

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The error of not removing two " spared" wires bad no effect or all on the operation of the LPSI B pump control circuits.

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3 B. Valves UV-659 and 660, High ifessure S'afety Injaction Recirculation Valves - (DCP SD-001) Jumper not installed to complete connection to the negative side. Absence of jumpers in valve circuits for UV-659 and UV-660 involves only the green light and ERFDADS' input and have no effe~ce(on the valve controls), Loss of this indication woul1 not impact system voeraticn since ERFDADS is a non-safetyyelatedinidation' system.

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C. ?lalle UV-660 - Unused wires not removed af ter co'rpleting a modification. A5 described in "A"'above, the presence of

~ ar., unconnected spare end in these-valve circuits has no

'effect on operation.'

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~ Mr. T. W. Bishop DER 84 Page~Two

- D. Refueling Water Tank'(RWT). level indicator was incorrectly

' connected at the control board. The two-wire input was __

connected instead to' the Reactor Make-Up-Water Tank' level

-indicator., The RWT indicator wiring error 'affected only

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instrument CIB-LI-201.

Instruments CHA-LI-200, and CHA, B, C, D-LI-203 A, B, C, D 'still remained to inform the operator of tank condition. Therefore, at least five indicators were available to check the _ single potential incorrect indicator. This would insure proper. operation of the safety function of the RWT.

The root cause of'this condition has been evaluated as errors by craf ts and QC in the installation of the wiring and the implementation of the DCP.

II.

Analysis of Safety Implications The circuits were reviewed with respect to the specific wiring errors that were observed. : The originally discovered error-in implementation of DCP 1SE-RM-083 is the only condition f ound to be safety significant; however, it would have been identified and corrected as part of the prescribed-startup testing activity and/or performance of the Demonstration Test.

The other identified conditions described as A, B, C, and D above have no effect on the operation of safety-related systems.

Since additional investigation has revealed no further safety significant items, it is concluded that there is no breakdown of the Quality Assurance Program and that this condition does not represent a significant deviation f rom construction requirements as defined in 10CFR.50.55(e).

Based on the above discussion, this condition is evaluated as not reportable under the requirerants of 10CFR50.55(e) and Part 21.

III.

Corrective Action A. The wiring errors on Control Switch CS-3 in Switchgear IE-PBB-SO4F were corrected by NCR 'SE-3551, which received final disposition on January 12, 1984

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qy Mr. T. WT Bishop -

DER 84-18.-

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.Page Two B. The wiring errors found 'during the inspection program were verified as correct or corrected in the following manner:

1. Low Pres 9ure Safet.y Injection Pump "B": -SFR 1SI-715.has

! been issved to recheck sire bundles and verify ' that the

.two wires? 'which should' have been removed; have been.

d removed.

2. High Pressure Safety Inject! a R'ecirculation Valves UV-659 and-UV-660: Wiring corrections were performed by SWA #19591 and SWA #20008.

3. Refueling Water Tank Level Indicators: - Instrument l'oop-

-verification for RWT level CHB-L1-201B was made 'on April 4,1984 and verified as correct to Startup test 1

procedure 92GT-CZZO4

4. To preclude recurrence of these ' deficiencies, the' importance of attention to details and proper-implementation of DCPs have been included in training sessions for craft and QC personnel.

(Reference B/ANPP-N-113212, dated March 30, 1984.)

5. To verify that similar problems do not exist in other disciplines, ' Bechtel Engineering has implemented a series of walkdowns similar to that described in Section I of this report.

Identification of'.these walkdowns is contained in Internal Procedure IP-5.26.

Any potentially safety,significant-deficiencies found will be reported or,,if applicable,. cross-referenced to this DER.

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