ML20096F100
| ML20096F100 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 05200001 |
| Issue date: | 04/28/1992 |
| From: | Fox J GENERAL ELECTRIC CO. |
| To: | Poslusny C NRC |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9205200188 | |
| Download: ML20096F100 (19) | |
Text
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GEAkaturEmrgy ABWR l
Date 4/2s/92_
To 0
Fax No.
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(@ 8) 925-1193 or (48) 925-1687
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4 /2g/s d DRAFT PROPOSED ABWR TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS SECTION 3.3.1.1/2. RPS INSTRUMENTATION / LOGIC Attached are proposed technical specifications for the ABWR Reactor Protection System (RPS). These specifications were developed from the BWR/6 Improveo Technical Speciflestions (ITS) and adjusted for relevant design differences in the ABWR It was Intended to retain the look and feel of the BWM ITS to the maximum extent practical. When departures were necessary to reflect design or performance differences, the ITS products for the other vendor designs were utilized where appropriate. With regards te instrumentation systems, the ABWM uses input from many of the same va ables as with past BWR designs. Thus, to a great extent, the c
basic technical specifications have remained the same. However, the logic ano processing of input k s'ene with digital technology that is a departure from past SWR practice,' In that regard it le very similar to the technology used in other vendor designs. Thus, their ITS products were used as a basis for some of the modifications that were made to the ABWR specifications and are reflected in the example attached, included with the attached specifications are very abbreviated bases intended to provide general insight intoLthe proposed specifications, with particular emphasis on differences from recent p6st practice. These descriptions are in no way meant to be a substitute for the full blown bases which are to be provided in a future submittal. The intent of this submittal is to provide the NRC staff with an indication of.the direction GE is headed in the Instrumentation area of Tech Specs and to seek early feedback. Other ABWR instrumentation systems will resemble the RPS example and are currently in various stages of completion.
As they are finalized in draft form they will be forwarded to the staff for review.
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B 3.3.1.1/2 RPS
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Abbreviated Dimeumsfen s f AB'dR_3 a *
- n - RPE inatrumentatien The ABWR has a digitally multiplexed RPS that utilises two out of four trip initiatien logic.
Tour separate instrument divisions are used to menitor the required variables.
Four separate divisions of trip logic are then used to perform the required trip determination.
This occurs within the divisional Digital Trip Modules (DTMs).
Each divisional DTM receives input from the instrumentation in that same division for each variable monitored.
For analog variables the DTMs make the trip /no-trip decision by comparing a digitized analog value against a setpoint and initiating a trip condition for that variable if the setpoint is exceeded.
For seme variables trip determinations are made by the monitoring element itself (e.g. limit switch).
In such cases the DTM simply passes on the signal in the form of a trip /no-trip cutput.
The output of each divisional DTM (a trip /no-trip condition) for each variable is then routed to all four divisional Trip Logic Units (TLUs) such that each divisional TLU receives input from each of the four divisions of DTMs.
Each DTM has a divisien-of-sensors bypass such that all instruments in that division will be bypassed in the RPS trip logic at the TLUs.
Thus, each TLU will be making its trip decision on a two out of three logic basis for each variable.
It is possible for only one division-of-sensors bypass condition to be in effect at any time.
The two out of feux trip logic decision (or two out of three if a division-of-sensors bypass is in effect) is made by each TLU en a per variable basis such that setpoint exceedence in two instrument divisions for the same variable is required to initiate a trip output at the TLU.
Since each TLU sees the outputs from all four DTMs, alj four divisions of logic should sense and initiate a required trip simultaneously.
A two out of four trip in a TLU causes a trip in its corresponding output Logic Unit (OLU).
It is this trip that then initiates a reactor scram by tripping load drivers in the power circuits that energize the CRD scram pilot valve solenoids.
Each OLU sends output signals to a total of eight lead drivers, four each associated with the ' A' a nd 'B' scram pilot valve solonoids, respectively.
The total set of 32 load drivers are grouped in a series-parallel arrangement such that each load driver group energizes eitner the 'A' or the
'B' scram pilot valve solenoids for the control rods in one of four distinct groups of control rac.1.
The overall arrangement of OLU outputs and load driver groupings is such that a trip of any two of four TLUs (and associated OLUs) will cause the de-energization of both the 'A' and 'B' scram pilot valve colenoids for all four groups of control rods, af fecting a full reactor scram.
Each of the four TLUs has a bypass switch so that they can be bypassed, one at a time, such that the RPS output logic reverts to two out of three, i.e. the tripping of any two of the three remaining TLUs will still result in a full scram.
Each OLU has test and trip 4/28/92 rinal craft B 3.3.1.1/2-1 ASWR STS B 3.3.1.1/2 RPS switches such that the lead drivers can be tested both with and without causing a half scram condition (i.e. tripping of either the 'A' or 'B' scrom pilot valve solenoids),
Manual screa is accomplished either via two manual scram push cuttons or by placing the reactor mode switch in the shutdewn position.
Both manual scram functions directly interrupt power in the circuits that energize the scram pilot valve solenoids such that a full scram results.
This octurs upstream of the load driver groups and is completely separate from the associated automatic scram logic.
They are also hardwired and therefore not reliant on the plant multiplexing system.
The two manual scram pushbuttons each de-energize a separate path such that when individually actuated a half-scram condition results, and when actuated together a full scram results.
Placing the mode switch in shutdown immediately results in full scram by coincidentally interrupting power to the circuits affected by each manual scram pushbutton.
The RPS instrumentation for ABWR is very similar to that in recent BWR designs with many of the same variables providing trip input.
The biggest difference in the variables utilized is due to the elimination of the scram discharge volume (SDV).
Replacing the various SDV trips is a trip on low CRD charging water header pressure.
This trip is added because the scram discharge in ABWR is into the reactor, and thus against full reactor pressure and not normal atmospheric pressure.
Therefore, fully charged HCUs are essential for assuring reactor scram.
Additionally, a trip on high suppression pool temperature has been added to automate the ABWR response to a stuck open SRV event.
This signal will be supplied by the suppression pool temperature monitoring system (and will likely be in the form of a trip /no-trip signal based on an algorithm and/or setpoint comparison done within that system).
Other RPS variables that differ slightly are those generated within the Neutron Monitoring System (NMS).
The APRM supplied inouts remain the same with the addition of a trip on rapid core flow coastdown to terminate postulated multiple RIP trip events that may have unacceptable transient analyses results.
The St.artup Range Neutron Monitoring (SRNM) system replaces the IRMa of old.
There is still a high flux trip in this range, but because the range switches have been deleted, a direct trip on fast period has been added.
A significant difference from the past is that all APRM and SRNM trip decisions are made within the NMS.
This is done on a divisional basis and the results then sent directly to the RPS 7LUs (i.e. the DTM function is done within the NMS).
Thus, each NMS division sends only two inputs to the RPS divisional TLUs, one for APRM trip /no-trip and one for SRNM trip /no-trip.
A divisional APRM or SRNM may be tripped due to any of the monitored variables exceeding its trip setpoint.
The RPS two out of four trip d9eision is then 4 /2 8/ 92 rir.a1 oratt B 3.3.1.1/2-2 ABWR STS j
\\
B 3.3.1.1/2 RPS made, not on a per variable basis, but on an APRM tripped or SRNM tripped basis, by looking at the four divisions oi' APRM and four divisions of SRNM.
All bypasses of the SENMs and APRMs are performed within and by the NMS.
Another variable created arrictly on a divisional basis is the MSIV closure status.
Each divisional DTM monitors the s:atus of the inboard and outbcard MSIV in one (of four) steamline and establishes a trip condition if either valve is sensed as not full open.
Therefore, a scram on MSIV closure will occur if the valve position limit switches for one or both valves in a given steamline indicate an MSIV not full open in two or more steamlines.
The scram trips on turbine stop valve closure and turbine control valve fast closure are also handled in a unique way by the RPS in that the automatic bypass on turbine first stage pressure is handled on a divisional basis only.
As in the past these scram trips are byparsed when reactor power is below approximately 40 t PTP, as sensed by turbine first stage pressure.
The actual scram trips on valve closure are determined on a two out of four basis, by the DTMs and TLUs as described previously.
However, the four turbine first stage pressure instrument inputs remcin divisional, each providing input only to the logic in that division and affecting a bypass, if appropriate, onay in that division.
Like other RPS variables the instrumen; output goes to its respective divisional DTM where a trip /no-trip (i.e.
bypass /no-bypass) condition is generated.
Each divisional DTM output, however, is routed only to the TLU in that same division.
Therefore, three bypass channels are needed to prevent scram as the trip of any two unbypassed TLUs would still cause a reactor scram.
The LCO for RPS instrumentation has been separated into two separate LCOs, borrowing from how digital systems are treated in the CE and B&W ITS products.
LCO 3.3.1.1 deals with the actual instrumentation providing RPS input, including that which performs automatic bypass functions, as well as the associated setpof.nt trip determination done at either the DTM level.
This LCO then is essentially limited to issues concerning instrumentation and the verification that RPS trips (and bypasses) occur at the proper variable setpoints.
LCO 3.'
1.2 deals with the automatic output trip logic performed at the TLU/OLU level and also covers the manual scram function.
This LCO covers the output logic and trip devices that actually affect reactor scram, including load drivers and solenoids of the scram pilot valves.
LCO 3.3.1-1 RPS Instrumentation This LCO deals with the OPERABILITY of instruments and instrument trip channels, including setpoints.
The LCO uses the familiar instrument table, arranged by variable, where setpoint values, Applicability requirements and Required Surveillances are specified.
All RPS variables are monitored 4/28/92 rinal Draf t B 3.3.1.1/2-3 ASWR STS B 3.3.1.1/2 RPS by four instrument channels,'all of which are required to be OPERABLE.
However, with ene instrument trip channel out of service, that channel can be bypassed in all four divisions of logic, such that the icgic autematically reverts to two cut of 3.
This is done via the division-of-sensors bypass function at the DTM.
Alternately, the channel could be tripped, which would effectively result in a one out of three logic being in place for that variable in all four logic divisions.
Either is an acceptable long term condition at the instrument trip channel level as there would still be four channels of RPS trip output logic.
The intent of the Required. tion is to not force an unneeded shutdown to repair equipment that might not be readily accessible during operation.
Of course, most repairs are likely to be simple card or other electronic subassembly replacements that can be done on-line with the affected division of sensors in bypass.
In such cases, restoration should be done as soon as practicable.
With two channels out, one is bypassed and the other trippec, resulting effectively in an one out of two logic configuration.
This situation would only be acceptable for a shorter duration, railure to meet Required Actions would necessitate placing the plant in an operating mode, or conditions, where the particular variable involved is no longer required.
Such actions mimic very closely those specified in the ITS.
The Surveillance Requirements for RPS instrumentation are virtually identical to those in the BWR/6 ITS.
Minor modi ications were made to reflect design differences such as having SRNMs instead of IRMs.
However, the intent, with regards to the scope and depth of surveillance testing to be performed, is the same for ABWR as with current plants.
This testing will not include tripping of the final trip actuation devicas except for the combined testing that is done as part of the LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TESTS.
LOC 3.3.1.2 RPS Trip Logic This LCO covers the bulk of the RPS aside from the actual instrumentation and associated setpoint comparison and digital trip signal initiation.
Although the equipment differs from past BWR designs, other than being two out of four logic the system is effectively the same in how it functions and with regards to technical specifications.
If one automatic output logic channel is out of service it can be placed in bypass, such that the RPS is operating in two out of three logic, and must then be restored within the next seven days.
However, most repairs are expected to be simple replacements and p.:n restoration would be expected to be made in a much shorter came interval.
Should restoration not be made within the allowable time interval, continuation with the channel in bypass (i.e. the RPS in two out of three logic) is allowed only if the three remaining OPERABLE RPS logic channels are surveilled more frequently to assure their 4/28/92 Final Duf t B 3.3.1.1/2-4 ABWR STS
D 3.3.1.1/2 RPS continued operability.
Alternatively, the inoperable channel could be taken out of bypass and tripped, placing the RPS in a one out of three Aegic.
This would e:! actively increase the reliability of the scram function, if demanded, such that continued operation is then justified.
In either case, the inoperable RPS channel would have to be restored to CPERABLE status within the following 31 days.
With two automatic output logic channels, or one manual scram channel, inopetable redundancy is significantly reduced and restoration to OPERABLE status is required much more expeditiously.
'cual scram actuation devices, such as
~
load drivers and pilot valve solenoids, are an integral part of the RPS a.
to specifically covered by the required surveillance testing.
However, their operability was not singled cut within the proposed Conditions as they are fail-safe, de-energize to operate devices whose failure would cause a trip, or partial trip, in their respective channel (s).
railures of these devices would be treated by declaring the associated logic division inoperable and proceeding accordingly.
Required surveillance testing is equivalent to current BWMs for this portion of the RPS, consisting of CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL and LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TESTS.
Ot.411ne testing of the automatic and manual scram output logic, including testing of the final actuators, is required on a monthly basis.
The exception is the Reactor Mode Switch--Shutdown Position manual scram function which can only be tested during shutdown conditions.
LOGIC SYSTEM TUNCT10NAL testing of the-RPS will combined testing of both instrumentation input trip logic and scram output logic.
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4/28/92 Final craf t B 3.3.1.1/2-5 ASWR STS
RPS Instrumentatitn 3.3.1.1 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.1.1 poseene pretectic-e;; tem (RPs) ?nutrumentatica LCO 3.3.1.1 Four RPS instrumet.tation trip channels for the functions in Table 3.3.1.1-1 shall be OPERABLE.
APPLICASILITY:
A: cording to Table 3.3.1.1-1.
A0!!CNS
...____....._______.......___.....go;g......______.........____....___
Seperate Condition entry is allowed for each RPS trip function CCNDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One RPS 2.
1
NOTE-------
instrumentation trip LCO 3.0.4 is not channel inoperable.
applicable.
Place channel in I hour bypass or trip.
AC A.2 Restore Channel to Prior to CPERABLE status, entering MODE 2 following next MODE 5 entry.
B. Two RPS B.1 Place one channel I hour instrumentation trip in bypass and the channels inoperable.
other in trip.
AE B.2 Restore one Prior to channel to completion of OPERABLE status, the next CHANNEL TUNCTIONAL TEST l
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4/28/92 rinal Draf t 3.3.1.1-1 ABWR STS l
RPS 8nstrumentatica 3.3.1.1 C.
Required Actions and C.1 Enter the
- mmediately associated Completion conditien(s)
Times of Condition A referenced in or B not met.
T;ble 3.3.1.1-1 for the function.
D. As required by D.1 Redue:3 THERMAL 4 hourn Required Action C.1 POWER to < (8014-and referenced in RTP.
Table 3.3.1.1-1.
E. As required by E.1 Reduce THERMAL 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> Required Action C.1 POWER to < (40}n-and referenced in RTP.
Table 3.3.1.1-1.
- r. As required by F.1 Be in MODE 2.
6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> Required Action C.1 and referenced in Table 3.3.1.1-1.
G. As required by G.1 Be in MODE 3.
12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> Regaired Action C.1 and referenced in Table 3.3.1.1-1.
H. As required by H.1 Initiate action to Immediately Required Action C.1 insert all and referenced in insertable control Table 3.3.1.1-1.
rods in core cells containing one or more fuel assemblies.
4/28/92 rinal craf t 3.3.1.1-2 ABWR STS l
R9S Instrumentation 3.3.1.1 SURVEILLANCf. REQUIREMENT!
~
SURVEILLANCE lFREQUENCY
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............................... 3o g...................______.......
j Refer to Table 3.3.1.1-1 to det ermine which SRs apply for each RPS function.
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SR 3.3.1.1.1 Perform CHANNEL CHECK.
12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />
[, a hr? k?
NOTE---
4:,
Only required with THERWAL POWEP. 2 25%
2
- ~F RTP.
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- A Verify the absolute difference between 7 days o
the APRM channels and the calculated power 5 2% (plus any gain adjustment required by LCO3.2.4; RTP.
t SR ? 7.1.1.3 Adjust the channel to conform to a 7 days calibrated flow signal.
NOTE------------------
Not required to be performed when entering MODE 2 from MODE 1 until 12 nours after entering M0?S 2.
Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST.
7 usys SR 3.3.1.1.5 Perform CRANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST.
7 days SR 3.3.1.1.6
NOTE-----------------
Only required to be met during entry into MODE 2 from MODE 1.
Verify the SBNMs indicate within (21%
7 days RTP of actual reactor power at a reactor power level between (51% and (401% BTP.
4/28/92 rinal Draf:
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RPS Instrumentatien 3.3.1.1 SR 3.3.1.1.7 Calibrate the lei power range 1000 KKD/T monitors.
average core exposure SR 3.3.1.1.8 Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST.
- 31. days SR 3.3.1.1.9 Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST.
(92) days SR 3.3.1.1.10 -----------------NOTE-----------------
Neutron detectors may be excluded.
Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION.
194 days c
SR 3.3.1.1.11 Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST.
(18) months SR 3.3.1.1.12 -----------------NCTE-----------------
Neutror. detectors may be excludtd.
Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION.
(18] months SP. 3.3.1.1.13 Verify the APRM Flow Biased Simuleted (18] months Thermal Power--High time constant is 5 (7) seconds.
SR 3.3.1.1.14 Perform LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST.
(in) months SR 3.3.1.1.15 Verify Turbine Stop Valve (TSV)
(18) months Closure and Turbine Control Valve (TCV) Fast Closure functions are not bypassed when 2 (40) % RTP.
SR 3.3.1.1.16 -----------------NOTE-----------------
Neutron detectors may be excluded.
Verify the RPS RESPONSE TIME is within (18) months on limits.
a STAGGERED TEST BASIS 4/2S/92 rinal craf:
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RPS Instrumentation 3.3.1.1 Table 3.3.1.1-1 Reactor Protection System Instrumentation
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FUNCTI'vN RDPLICABLE CONDITION genyggLLaycg ALLoyAntg NCDES REFERENCED
(
9IREMENTS VAttE FRON REQUIRED RCTIONC.1
- 1. Startup Range Wautron konitors a.
Neutron Flux.. Sigh 3
8R 3.3.1.1.1 5 (48) % RTP 81 3.3.1.1.4 8R 3.3.1.1.5 8R 3.3.1.1.12 SR 3,3.1.1.14
!(*)
I SR 3.3.1.1.1 5 (48) B RTP SR 3.3.1.1.8 SR 3.3.1.1.13 3R 3.3,1.1.14
- a. Neutrea Flux.Short 2 03 0
88 3.3.1.1.1
$ [10.7) second Period SR 3.3.1.1,4 period SR 3.3.1.1.5 81 3.3.1.1.13 SR 3.3.1.1.14 S e) W I
3R 3 3.1.1.1 5 (10.7) second l
81 3.3.1.1.5 period SR 3.3.1.1.13 SR 3.3.1.1.14
- c. Inst 2
0 81 3.3.1.1.4 W/R l
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SR 3.3.1.1.14 8(a)
I SR 3.3.1.1.5 W/R 81-3.3.1.1.14 I
i 4/28/92 Final cras:
- - 7
.RPG 8nstrumentatien 1
3.3.1.1
- 3. Average power Range Monigers
- 4. Neutron Flus-etigh, 2
G SR 3.3.1.1.1 5 (13.6]t. RTP 8etdown IR 3.3.1.1.4 81 3,3.1.1.6 SR 3.3.1.1.10 SR 3.3.1.1.14 3 a) 3 81 3.3.1.1.1 5 113.4)t RTP 1
SR 3.3.1.1.5 81 3.3,1.1.10 3R 3.3.1.1.14
- 4. Flow 81ased 1
F AR 3.3.1.1.1 A [0.84W +
$3)t simulated Thermal SR 3,J.1.1.3 RTP.
and Povgr--Sigh 4R 3.3.1.1.8 5 (113.3)% RTP SR 3.3.1.1.10 SR 3.3.1.1.13 OR 3.3.1.1.14 SR 3.3.1.1.16
- c. Timed Neutron Flux--
1 T
SR 3.3.1.1.1 5 (%19]% RTP Sigh Sk 3.3.1.1.3 OR 3.3.1.1.1 81 3.3.1.1.8 SR 3.3.1.1.10 SR 3.3.1.1.14 SR 3.3.1.1.16
- d. Core flow Rapid 3 [B0) - 4 D
SR 3.3.1 1.1 Value of 1(d)
Decrease RTP 183 3R 3.3.1.1.3 5(1.81% Tlew SR 3.3.1.1.5 SR 3.3.1.1,10 SR 3.3.1.1.14
-SR 3.3.1.1.16
- e. Inop 1,3 G
SR 3.3.1.1.8 W/A 8R 3.3.1.1.14 I5 *I I
sk 3.3.1.1.5 N/A SR 3.3.1.1.14 I
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4/28/92 rinal Draft 3.3.1.1-6
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RPS Instrumentation 3.3.1.1
- 3. Centrol Red Drive 1.2 G
81 3.3.1.1.1 a (18701 peig Acesselster Charging 8A 3.3.1.1.I Water leader treksure--
8A 3.3.1.1.13 low 3R 3.3.1.1.14
$(*)
E SR 3.3.1.1.1 t (1970) psig 8R 3.3.1.1.5 SR 3.3.1.1.13 JR 3. 3.1.1.1,4
- 4. Aesctor vesset steam 1,3 0
-5 (1050) peig-Dome Pressure==I1gh SR 3.3.1.1.9 8A 3.3.1.1.13 81 3.3.1.1.14 SR 3.3.1.1.18
- 3. Beestor Yeasel Water 1,2 C
SR 3.3.1.1.1 2 (33) inches taval.. low, level 3 SR J.3.1.1.9 SR 3.3.1.1.12 SR 3.3.1.1.14 SE li. 3.1.1.16
- 6. Drywell Pressure..kigh 1.2 G
SR 3.3.1.1.1 5 (1.85) paig SR 3.3.1.1.9 SR 3.3.1.1.13 81 3.3.1.1.14
- 1. Main Steam Isolation 1
F SR 3.3.1.1.9 s (4]4 elesed valve--Closure SR 3.3.1.1.13 SR 3.3.1.1.14 81 3.3.1.1.14
- 8. Main Steaaline Radiaties Meaitor8
- a. Main Stotaline 1,3 0
SR 3.3.1.1.1 5 (3.6 X Radiaties..Righ SR 3.3.1.1.9 lackground]
SR 3.3.1.1.13 AR 3.3.1.1.14
- b. 2nop 1.2 G
SR-3.3.1.1.9 M/A 81 3.3.1.1.14 i
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4/28/92 rinal Draf:
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RPS Instrumentation 3.3.1.1 9 'Jrbine Step Valve t (4C16 1
$R 3,3.1,1.9 e (5) 4 closed
.1eeuPe ATP I*3 3R 3.3,1,1.13 SR 3.3.1.1.14 sR 3.3,1,1,15
$R 3.3.1.1.16
- 10. Turbine Control Valve t (401%
E 8R 3.3.1.1.9 4 (5001 peig Tast C1ossra. Emergency RTF(*)
8R 3.3.1.1.13 Trip Systen Cil SR 3.3.1.1.14 Pressure--Low ER 3.3.1.1.15 81 3.3.1.1.16 li.8uppression Pool 1.3 T
SR 3,3.1.1.1 5 (
l
'F Temperature==Righ SR 3.3.1.2.9 SR 3.3.1.1.12 SR 3.J.1.1.14 (a) with any control red withdrawn from a core cell sentaining one or meio fuel assemblies (b) Trip automatically bypassed within each 8Kmf (aad not reg 21 red to be OPEAARZ.8) et resoter power levela 5 (1C*41% RTP (c) Trty automatically bypasses watnin eseh APM (and not regained to 1pe CVEP.LS:.31 at reanter power leve's 1 (801% RTP (d)
!= { Flow (t ) = 1 X Flowit.3 seuende). Si t riow; A=
( ),
y =
[ ]
(e) Trap automatically bypasseo within esca etvistenst A S TLU at reacter power levels 5 (4014 RTF. as apprumisated by a stagle turbine flast stage pressure instrument channel in e sh divisten I
4 J
4 t
4/28/92 rinal eract 3. 3..t. :.- a Aswa srs l
Ar". 40 yt
- TUfy.
et.7KLIF7.twr,
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@m r.1F16 RPS Trip Actuation 3.3.1.2 3.3 IMSTRUMENTATION 3.3.1.2 Egac*er protection System (RPS) Trie Actuatien I.C0 3.3.1.2 Four RPS automatic trip channels and 1 RPS manual trip channels shall be OPERABLE.
APPLICA3ILITY:
MODE 1 and 2, MODE 5 with any control red withdrawn from a core cell containing one or more fuel assemb, lies ACTIONS CONDITION _
REQUIRED ACTION bCMPLETION TIME A. One RPS automatic A.1.1 Place channel in 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> trip channel bypass.
AHQ A.1.2 Restore channel to 7 days OPERABLE statun.
B. Requ.'. <d Actions and B.1.1 Place inopezable 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> associated Completion RPS automatic trip Times of Condition A channel in trip.
not met.
Q3 B.1.2 Perform SR 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> 3.3.1.2.1 on CPERABLE-RPS
-AHL automatic trip channels.
Once per 7 days thereafter hM2 B.2 Restore inoperable 31 days channel to OPERABLE status.
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4/28/92.rinal Draf t 3.3.1.2-1 ASWR STS j
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@~5rr 7,TT7TV R95 Trip Actuation 3.3.1.2 C. Two RPS automatic C.1 Place one channel
) hour trip channels in bypass and tne inoperable.
other in trip.
AE2 C.2 Restore one 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> channel to OPERABLE status.
D. One RPS manual trip D.1 Place channel in 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> channel inoperable.
trip by disconnectir.g power to the t.ssociated scram t ilot valve
- )lenoids AE2 0.2 Restore channel to 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> OPERABLE status.
E.
Required Action and E.1 Be in HODE 3.
12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> associated Completion Time of Condition B, C or D not met in MODE 1 or 2.
F. Required Action and F.1 laitiate action to Immediately associated Completion insert all Time of Condition 5, irsertable control C or D not met in rods in core cells MODE 5 with any containing one or control rod withdrawn more fuel from a core cell assemblies.
-containing one or more fuel assemblies.
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4/28/92 rinal craf t 3.3,1,2-2 ABWR STS
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RPS Trip Actuation 3.3.1.2 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SJRVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3 3.1.2.1 Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST for 31 days automatic and manual scram channels.
SR 3.3.1.2.2 Perform CHANNEL TUNCTIONAL TEST for
( *., '.no n t h s Reactor Mode Switch--Shutdown Position scram function.
SR 3.3.1.2,3 Perferm LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST.
[18) conth':
e 4/28/92 Final Draf t 3.3.1.2-3 ASWR STS l
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