ML20095E907
| ML20095E907 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | San Onofre  |
| Issue date: | 04/03/1992 |
| From: | Ray H SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON CO. |
| To: | Zimmerman R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20095E868 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9204280065 | |
| Download: ML20095E907 (5) | |
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23 PARMEn 5TREET IRVIN E. CA LirORNIA 92718 NAROLQta RAY ttstecohg sa=+= vcapaas ntat n4.sa*4oo April 3, 1992 Mr. Roy Zimmerman, Director Division of Reactor Safety and Projects U.
S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 1450 Maria Lane, Suite 210 Walnut Creek, California 94596-5368
Dear Mr. Zimmerman:
Subject:
Docket Nos. 50-361/362 Response to NRC Requalification Examindtion Report for San Onofre Nuclear Generatino Station _ Units 2 and 3
Reference:
Letter from Mr. Roy Zimmerman (NRC) to Mr. Harold B. Ray (SCE) dated February 26, 1992 The referenced letter forwarded NRC Examination Report No. 50-361/362-OL-92-01 which addressed the Units 2/3 operator requalification program.
This letter identified three findings of particular concern to the NRC and required a reply within 30 days of receipt of the examination report.
These findings fall within the following two areas:
1)
Lack of clear performance standards for command, control, and communications by management, and 2)
Improved simulator maintenance me.y be needed to ensure its continued use for license examinations.
During the first quarter of 1991, Operations and Nuclear Training initiated an effort to incorporate clear command, control, and communication performance standards into the daily operational routine.
Subsequent to this year's examination, additional actions were taken to ensure this concern is adequately addressed.
The attachment provides details of the progress made toward implementing the performance standards.
The problems mentioned in the Examination Report regarding-simulater performance have been corrected.
The attachment contains the details of the actions taken to correct those problems.
Although the simulator is believed to be maintu ed as a reliable evaluation tool, its performance will continue
, be monitored closely to ensure its proper performance and reliability.
9204280065 920417 PDR ADOCK 05000361 G
Mr. R. Zimmerman 2
April 3, 1992 9
If-you have any questions or comments, or if you would like additional-information, please let me know.
i Sincerely, g
arold B.'
R Senior Vic-resident Attachment cc:
J. B.. Martin, Regional Administrator, NRC Region V C. W. Caldwell, NRC Senior Resident Inspector, San Onofre Units 1, 2,
and 3 4
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i ATTACEMENT 1.
Performance Standards for Operators During the evaluation of operators for the 1990 requalification year, it was noted that many operators exhibited significant weaknesses in the use and understanding of the SONGS Units 2 and 3 Functional Recovery Procedure.
It was also noted that improvement in command, control, and communications would be needed.
Command, control, and communications practices were continuously discussed during training conducted in 1991, but the use of the Functional Recovery Procedure received the primary emphasis.
A decision was made after last year's operator license exams that the primary focus of the 1991 Licensed Operator Requalification program would be on improving the operators' understanding and use of the Functional Recovery Procedure.
This improvement was noted by the NRC examination team in January of this year.
On February 12, 1992, subsequent to this year's examination of Units 2/3 operators, a management team met consisting of the Operations Manager, Unit 1 and Units 2/3 Plant Superintendents, Unit 1 and Unita 2/3 Assistant Plant Superintendents, the Nuclear Training Division (NTD) Manager, and the NTD Operations Training Supervisor.
The team discussed the actions needed to fully implement performance standards in the areas of communication and control room coordination (command and control).
The action plan is summari=ed below.
o In March 1992, improve the enforcement of the Good Operating Practice on Communication during training on the Simulator.
O By April 1992, develop a Good Operating Practice on Control Room Coordination.
o By August 30, 1992, develop evaluation standards for the Good Operating Practices of Communication and Control Room Coordination.
o During the Professional Operator Development training in 1992, emphasize that the Good Operating Practices on Communication and Control Room Coordination must be utilized both in the Control Room and in the Simulator, o
During 1992, evaluate the usage of the Good Operating Practices on Communication and Control Room Coordination and make changes as necessary.
This will ensure operators are meeting or exceeding requirements set by the evaluation standards, both in the Control Room and during Simulator training.
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- Attachment 2
April _3 1992 O
During 1992,' incorporate the Good Operating Practices _on Communication and Control Room Coordination into the initial Operator _ License Training and the Stift Superintendent Training Program lesson plans.
This training will emphasize the requirements for providing clear direction, requiring feedback-and followup, and for periodic supervisory overview briefings.
2.
Unit 2/3 Simulator Actions In. response.to the Examination Report, SCE evaluated the adequacy of the simulator maintenance program.
Although problems were noted during the examinations, SCE believes the current maintenance program ensures the simulator is maintained as an effective training, examination, and evaluation tool.
Nevertheless,-SCE will continue to closely monitor the simulator to ensure its proper performance and reliability.
The four problems identified in the Examination Report have been corrected as described below:
The simulator locked up during one of the examination o
scenarios. -In addition, _the facility-staff had experienced simulator lockup prior to the exam; however, troubleshooting did not identify the cause until after the exam.
This problem is believed to De the result of a faulty power supply in the simulator's Master Computer.
The suspect power supply has been-replaced.
A voltage monitor was inctalled on the simulator on March 16, 1992, to ensure that
~.his problem has been resolved.
o Two of the problems that occurred du.ing the exam were associated with the simulator?not allowing the performance cr2 uynamic-Job Performance Measure (JPM) _ tasks.
Both of these-problems resulted-from software-interactions within the simulator program.
The JPMs worked during the validation. testing and_for some of the operators 1during the exam.
However, the problems associated with these interactions.were sporadic; and therefore, they-were not idet tified-prf or-' to the exams.
The first problem was that the output breaker of the Diesel Generators did not always close unless synchronization took' place at a rate slower than that allowed by the plant operating procedure.
This problem was corrected by increasing the execution rate of the simulator software.
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" Attachment 3
April 3,
1992 The second problem related to the inability of an operator to manually operate the Feedwater Control system during shutdown of a Main Feedwater Pump.
This-problem was corrected by tuning the feedwater control system and feedwater turbine control system.
O The fourth problem experienced during the exams involved modeling plant systems interactions.
The simulator did not.
y model the proper safety injection flow when the Chemical and-Volume Control System (CVCS) charging header was crossed with the High Pressure Safety Injection system followed by an event that caused actuation of the safety injection system.
This configuration (system line-up) had been validated and used on the simulator prior to the exams but not in conjunction with a safety injection actuation.
This system-line-up was not' originally intended for.use with a safety injection actuation during the simulator exams.
During the exams, a change was made that placed this alignment into the scenario which included a safety injection actuation.
However, there was no-opportunity during.the exam to validate the change and the simulator staff incorrectly concluded the simulator would model the scenario.
Subsequent to the exam, the simulator se#- are was adjusted-and the configuration-has now been validated to be corr?ctly modeled by the simulator for a safety injection actuation, 1
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