ML20094J858
| ML20094J858 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Harris  |
| Issue date: | 08/09/1984 |
| From: | Clewett J JOINT INTERVENORS - SHEARON HARRIS |
| To: | |
| References | |
| OL, NUDOCS 8408140478 | |
| Download: ML20094J858 (38) | |
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P. ELATED CCP.2270" :NCE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA-- -
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OGiqirm J31,.q( '
BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD
- 0A AGO13 In the Matter of ) A10:59 L: .
CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY Docket NO . ibe4 jDL and NORTH CAROLINA EASTERN ) 6dl4 l 'OL MUNICIPAL POWER AGENCY )
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(Shearon Harris Nuclear Power )
Plant, Unit 1) )
TESTIMONY OF JOHN CLEWETT ON BEHALF OF JOINT INTERVENORS ON JOINT CONTENTION I.
0 Please state your name.
A. John Clewett.
O. What is your educational background?
A. I received a Bachelor of Arte degree in economics from Stanford University in 1972. I received my law degree from the University of California at Los Angeles law school in 1975.
O. Where have you been employed since your granduation from law school?
A. From 1975 - 1980 I worked for the Federal Trade Commission. During 1981 and 1982 I worked with the Christic Institute. During 1982 and 1983 I worked for the Critical Mass Energy Project. I am currently doing consulting work and some private legal practice.
O. As part of your responsibilities with the Critical Mass Energy Project', were you in charge of preparing a report?
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-A. . .Yes. I was-in charge of preparing a report. entitled "Public Citizen 1983 Nuclear Power Safety Report". A copy of that report is attached to this testimony as Exhibit A.
O .~ How was that report prepared?
A. We obtained a variety of Nuclear Regulatory Commission documents from the Public Documen,t Room, and also as a result'of requests made under the Freedom of Information Act. Those documents covered the operation of all of the nuclear power plants in the United States during 1982 and part of 1983. The report consists of a compilation and summary of the inf~ormation contained in those documents.
The methodology we employed is described at pages 30 and 31.
O. As a result of that study of NRC documents, did you reach any conclusion concerning the management of the Brunswick Nuclear Power Plant?
A. Yes. As indicated at page 7 of the report, we concluded that, for the period covered by the report, the Brunswick
- i. Plant was the worst-managed operating nuclear plant in the United States.
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* ' '..*.*.' ...- ... O *W7w By John Clewett and the Critical Mass Energy Project staff Critical Mass Energy Project 215 Pennsylvania Avenue, S.E.
Washington, D.C. 20003 (202) 546 4996 gg m _ __ m _ _.
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- Public Citizen 1983 Nuclear Power Safety Report
22:T CO N TENTS Research and Writing Assistance l Introduct. ion Sheila Mayberry David So 3 Major Mishaps 3 Ginna Editorial Assistance The Worst 5
Michael Totten Anna Gyorgy 7 Plant Management Ratings Jan Pilarski 10 Worker Exposure to Radiation Production Assistance 13 Security Threats Pat Thompson Lawrence Scott 15 Fines Alan MacDuMe 16 PLANT SCORECARD Jh 18 Particularly Significant Mishaps Sus? n Herne ie Waterman 23 Emergency Planning Special Thanks To 25 Elizabeth Maasen Generic Safety Problems Melody Moore 29 How Reactors (Often Don't) Work Kate Sullivan Stanley Campbell 30 Methodology 31 NRC Research 31 Local Public Document Rooms Critical Mass Energy Project (CMEP) was founded in 1974 by Ralph 34 Special Offer Nader at the first Critical Mass Conference, and is a part of Public Citizen. The president of Public Citizen is Joan Claybrook. The dir. ector of CMEP is Michael Totten. Critical Mass Energy Project 215 Pennsylvania Avenue, S.E. Washington, D.C. 20003 (202) 546 4996 1
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brinae Gen.e.e., Public Citizen 1983 Nuclear Power Safety Report ISBN 0 937188 22 0 u sw Critical Mass Energy Project e .. w t' 215 Pennsylsania Ase. S E.' Washington, D.C. 20003 qD / (202) 546-4996 {y].
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West.nghouse Mooel 44 steam generator Fig.1: The Stearn Generator at Ginna
PuBifcQHzen 1983 Nuclear Power Safety Report Introduction in 1982 nuclear power plants showed themselves once 1982, and six plants had three or more threats. The Salem again to be an unreliable, expensive and potentially very (NJ) site, operated by Public Service Electric and Gas, had dangerous power source. the highest number, with six security threats. Five were For the fourth year in a row, Public Citizen's Critical sabotage, apparently done by plant " insiders." One inci-Mass Energy Project has examined a crucial aspect of dent led to an airborne release of 19 curies of Xenon-133. nuclear power - the safety of operating plants. Among There were 34 bomb threats, including sixteen in a seven our findings: week period at Indiana's Marble Hill. A bomb device was
- There were 4,500 mishaps reported at nuclear power set off in the reactor building at the Bellefonte plant under plants during the 1982 calendar year, op more than 10% c nstruction in Alabama.
from the 1981 total. Ten plants had more than 100
- As of July 1983,24 nuclear plant sites lacked state or mishaps each, county emergency evacuation plans.
- Of the mishaps in 1982, 253 were considered par- The sources we have used in reaching these conclu-ticularly significant, according to NRC reports. Nineteen sions are NRC documents, many obtaSed using the reactors suffered five or more "particularly significant Freedom of information Act (FOIA). These documents mishaps,"' with Brunswick 2 (Southport, NC) and Salem reflect the agency's evaluation of which nuclear mishaps 2 (Salem, NJ) heading the list with ten each. are most important for their safety significance and
- Nearly 50 percent of the mishaps in 1982 were due to relevance to.other nuclear plants.
equipment problems or failures, and more than 20 per- ^* "8 the m,shaps i in 1982 that were considered par-cent involved defects in design or fabrication. More than ticularly s.ignif,i cant by the NRC: 25 percent involved human error.
- January 25, Ginna (NY): a steam generator tube rup-
- More workers than ever before,84,322, were exposed tured causing violent fluctuations in pressure throughout to measurable amounts of radiation. The number of ex- the reactor system and leading to the release of a substan-posed workers has increased 113-fold since 1969, con- tial amount of radioactivity into the atmosphere.
siderably higher than the 25-fold increase in nuclear elec-
- February 1, Salem (NJ): 23,000 gallons of radioactive tricity generated over the same period. . water spilled onto 16 v orkers.
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- One of every three nuclear plant workers with
- February 4, Palisades (MI): A hydrogen explosion in a mrasurable radiation doses received more than 500 generator injured a worker and started a fire.
millirems (.5 rems), three times higher than the recom-m nded maximum exposure to the general public (170
- March 3, Nine Mile Point (NY): Severe pipe cracking mi irems, or .17 rems). forced the complete replacement of the reactor coolant recirculation system.
- The NRC levied 23 fines to 20 utilities in 1982 for a total of $1,895,125. Boston Edison paid the heaviest fine,
- June 1, Ind.uin Point (NY): A worker was exposed to a d se of radiation equivalent to more than 400 chest
$550,000, for making false statements to the NRC, and for their inability to control combustible gases after a possible Lrays.
loss-of coolant accident at the Pilgrim (MA) plant, and
- June 19, Peach Bottom 2 & 3 (PA): Because of a design Carolina Power and Light was fined $600,000 in 1983 for problem in the electrical systems at Unit 2, the emergency failure to adequately test the safety systems at the systems at Unit 3 were accidentally triggered.
Brunswick (NC) plant in 1982.
- November 11, Point Beach (WI): A 5 foot metal bar and
- There were over 60 security threats to nuclear plants in a 6 inch "C" clamp were found inside one of the steam generators. This is symptomatic nf the recurring problem
*The total number of "particularly significant mishaps" cannot of loose parts in the steam generators of pressurized water be directly compared to the total number of "especially signif;. reactors, which can harm the delicate steam generator cant mishaps" cafculated last year, because of methodological tubes. The Ginna accident was caused by loose parts in-differences. For a description of methodology, see page 30 side one of its s* cam gener3 tors.
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2 Public Citizen 1983 Nuclear Power Safety Report These mishaps and many others are discussed further in mishaps, appear on page 5.
.this report. They clearly show that nuclear power opera- 1983 could well be the last year for which complete in-tion threatens the health and safety of the public with a formation about reactor mishaps is publicly available. This seemingly endless series of mishaps caused by human er. is because the NRC is planning to drastically change its ror, design defects, and equipment failures. LER reporting system, starting on January 1,1984. The The primary source documents we used to analyze new system, published as a final rule on July 26,1983 (48 nuclear plant mishaps are Licensee Event Reports (LERs), F.R. 33850), will hold all utilities to a single reporting re.
which utilities are required to submit to the NRC quirement. which is good, but it wili completely eliminate whenever an " event" occurs that is reportable according the current requirement to report individual component to the terms of its operating license. Although LERs con. failures. In theory, these will be reported to the voluntary tain useful information on a 8reat number of mishaps, " Nuclear Plant Reliability Data System" (NPRDS) of the there are several problems with this reporting system. Institute for Nuclear Power Operations (INPO), an in-For example, not all plants have the same reporting re- dustry organization set up in the aftermath of the Three quirements. In particular, newer plants have more strin. Mile Island accident. The NRC says the new system will gent reporting requirements than old ones, so they are re- save the utilities money they would ordinarily spend on quired to report certain incidents that older plants would preparing LERs, which are expected to be reduced by at not have to report. least half under the new rules. Another problem is that the managerial attitude toward reporting events varies from plant to plant, in the words of one NRC staff member, "some utilities report them as facts and others as fiction and others don't even report Of an NRC samnle r of sometimes." For instance, although Turkey Point 3 (FL) reported that the laundry room fire doors were inoperable 704 Component [al/Ures (LER-250-82-016), a diligent search failed to find any Turkey Point LER that reported the serious mishap of April Only 27 Were reported tO 29, 1982, when a pump problem led to the automatic DD 8 n + shutdown of Unit 3, and because of a design problem also forced Unit 4 to shut down, causing the blackout of 700,000 customers. There are several problems with reporting nuclear plant Nor can any LER be found from Sequoyah 1 (TN) that mishaps to the industry itself instead of to the NRC. One is reports the fact that on January 19,1982, a transformer at that utility participation in NPRDS has so far been very that plant literally exploded, shaking the control room, poor. Of an NRC sample of 104 component failures in the starting a fire and making noise that could be heard a mile first three months of 1982, only 21 were reported to away. NPRDS by the end of April. If the pattern remains the sarne, even highly significant component failures may not be reported, such as the August 20,1982 failure of a The new system will shutdown system breaker at Salem 2 (NJ) that
, , foreshadowed the complete failure of the automatic shut-elimmate the requ/rement . .
down system at Salem 1 five months later. A second problem is that although the Institute for tO report m. dividual Nuciear eower Operations provides information such ,, COmnonent t' faffUres* NPRDS to the NRC, it does so under an agreement that prohibits the NRC from releas,ing it to the public. This amounts. in effect, to a loophole in the Freedom of Infor-
) mation Act. Because of the agreement with INPO, the in spite of these inconsistencies, the number of LERs NRC refused for a second year in a row to give Critical reported is a useful index of the relative safety of the Mass access to INPO's Signi/icant Event Reports, which various nuclear plants. In the past when the NRC has describe plant mishaps, and the NPRDS data willprobably ranked the plants on safety, plants with higher numbers of be treated the same way, so that the public will be kept in LERs have generally gotten lower rankings. the dark about many of the mishaps at nuclear plants.
In addition to tabulating the total number of mishaps at A related problem is that plant managers will often be each plant, we also tabulated the total number of par- faced with the choice of reporting a mishap to the NRC as ticularly significant mishaps in 1982. This total is taken an LER, or considering the event as a component failure from NRC sources that focus on mishaps of particular reportable only to NPRDS. This option will allow them to safety significance because of their direct health and safe. hide information about major mishaps from the public by j i ty risks or their safety implications for similar plants to be characterizing them as primarily component failures. aware of. Because of methodological differences, the total it is unfortunate that the NRC is retreating from a i number of particularly significant mishaps cannot be relatisely open system of reporting nuclear mishaps to 1
- directly compared to the total number of "especially one that will be largely hidden from the public. It shows significant mishaps" for 1981 reported in last year's study, how the "mindset" of the NRC, so thoroughly criticized The methodology we followed is explained on page 30. by the Kemeny and Ro8ovin reports after the Three Miie Tables of the worst plants, in terms of the total number Island accident, is still more concerned with the welfare of of mishaps and the total number of particularly significant the nuclear industry than the welfare of the public.
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, Public Citizen 1983 Nuclear Power safety Report 3 Major Mishaps Among the 500 reactor mishaps reported by the NRC impossible.
in 1982, more than 250 were analyzed in some detail by One of the most threatening types of accidents, and one the NRC's safety experts, because of their direct or poten- that the NRC has recognized as an Unresolved Safety tial safety significance. All of these "particularly significant Issue, is " Station Blackout," a loss of the electrical power mishaps" are listed beginning on page 18, along with needed by the plant to function. Several mishaps during rcferences to find further information. Some illustrative 1982 showed how great the risk of this type of accident is. examples of the mishaps viewed as particularly significant *At the Quad Cities UL) plant, Unit 1 lost all of the by the NRC are discussed in greater detail below. - emergency diesel generators which act as backup if off-
*On January 25,1982, the Ginna (NY) plant suffered site power is lost, and Unit 2 lost all but one emergency the largest steam generator tube rupture in history. The diesel generator and all offsite power. If it were not for NRC declared this to be an " Abnormal Occurence," the one remaining diesel generator, Unit 2 would have meaning that it caused a " major reduction in the lost all AC power.
degree of protection of the public health and safety." The incident started at 5:25 a.m. on June 22,1982. The Ginna accident is discussed in detail elsewhere on this page. e Two of the most potentially dangerous incidents of 1982 were caused not by equipment failure or human error, l but by the elemental forces of nature itself.
*One such mishap occurred at the Dresden UL) plant, The worst single nuclear power plant accident during on December 3.1982. The Illinois River, swollen by 1982 occurred on January 25 at the Robert E. Ginna rain, flooded to a level more than two feet higher than nuclear plant near Rochester, New York. At 9:25 in the had ever been previously recorded. The plant declared morning, with the plant funning at 100 percent power, a an official Alert, and began to shut down the reactors, steam-generator tube ruptured, spilling 760 gallons a when the water had reached a level only 4 inc.. " minute of highly radioactive water from the " primary" below the floor of the " crib house" that holds the coolant (the pressurized water that cools the reactor core) emergency fire pumps and the service water pumps. into the " secondary" coolant (which turns into steam that The fear was that the water would disable the electrical spins a turbine connected to an electrical generator).
circuitry and motors of this vital equipment, which is Steam generators are one of the most troublesome parts of nuclear power plants, as discussed in Public Citizen's recently released book, Tube Leaks: A Consumer's and A design Change by wo,,,,., cu_,de to steam Generator probrems at nuciear Westinghouse made the Power Plan:s. The leak, at such a high rate, created two problems for valves look open when the operators of the plant - too much water in the steam generator, and not enough in the primary coolant. Within in [aCf they were Closed. the first few minutes of the accident, the pressure in the primary cooling system dropped from 2200 pounds per needed for fire protection and to cool the reactor when square inch (psi) to 1200 psi, and because of the reduced it is shut down. Because of the " decay heat" produced pressure, steam began to form in the reactor vessel. by the reactor fuel, it is necessary to cool the reactor At 9:28, the automatic safety systems " tripped" the ' even after the atomic reaction has been shut down. If reactor, and initiated the emergency "high pressure this function were impaired for a prolonged time, the coolant injection" (HPCI) pumps, which pumpea a large water in the reactor core could all boil away, causing quantity of water into the reactor vessel, and drove the the fuel to melt, pressure back up, to 1350 psi. For the time being, this col-The water crested at 5% inches above the floor of the lapsed the steam bubble in the reactor. Leaking into the crib house, but fortunately no damage was done to steam generator continued, at about 400 gallons per vital electrical equipment. ) minute.
'Another flood occurred that same day at the Arkansas During the first fifteen minutes of the accident, the plant l (AR) plant, where 12 inches of rain fell in 24 hours. operators didn't know which steam generator was leak- '
Water entered the turbine building and auxiliary ing, but at 9:40, with the use of a hand held radiation building sumps, and knocked out all telephone com- monitor, it was confirmed that the "B" steam generator munication with the outside world. Lightning had was the source of the problem. struck the meteorological / radio tower the day before Knowing this, the operators isolated the steam and disabled it. The only form of communication generator by closing its main steam isolation valve (MSIV). l available was by microwave relay system. Had the But this didrb't stop the flow of water through the ruptured water continued to rise, it could have disabled vital pipe. The water flow posed a problem because if the equipment in the auxiliary building, such as the pressure in the steam generator became too great, it emergency core cooling system pumps. And if the would force open a relief valve and release radioactive plant had been seriously disabled, emergency com- steam to the atmosphere. muni ations from the site could have been practically continued on p. 6 l
4 Public Citizen 1983 Nuclear Power safety Report (. when an operator accidentally pulled the wrong fuses, shutdown system would fail in 1983. On August 20, disconnecting power to various plant systems, in- one of the two circuit breakers in that system failed ciuding one of the reactor cooling pumps, and leading because of mechanical binding in the undervoltage trip to a reactor shutdown. Shortly thereafter, the Unit 2 mechanism, the same part of the breaker that caused main transformer failed, leaving Unit 2 without any off- the ATWS accidents in 1983. In response, the plant site power at all. Two emergency diesel generators management simply replaced the breaker and started started up to supply power. One of these is available the plant back up. only to Unit 2 and one is shared by Units 1 and 2. Shortly after starting, however, the shared diesel The following tables list other plants that had automatic generator failed, leaving Unit 2 completely reliant on shutdown-system breaker failures in 1982 and prior to 1982*
. the one remaining diesel generator to supply electricity efir of the s are die i generator also left. Plants with Automatic Shutdown System Pmblems in 1%2 Unit I without any diesel generator power because the Number of Number of other diesel that serves Unit I was out of service for Plant Problems Plant Problems maintenance. Had offsite power to Unit 1 failed, as it Arkansas 1 Rancho Seco 5 1 had to Unit 2, the plant would have had no electricity Arkansas 2 Robinson 2 1 2 at all, leaving the plant without the use of any vital Calvert Cliffs 3 Salem 1 motor-driven pumps, such as the emergency core cool- North Anna 1 ing system pumps, or the auxiliary feedwater pumps.
Because of the seriousness of this mishap, the NRC Plants with Automatic Shutdown System Problems declared it to be an Abnormal Occurence in its quarter. Prior to 1982 ly report to Congress. Number of Number of Plant Problems Plant Problems Other plants where the diesel generators failed in 1982, Arkansas 1 3 Oconee 3 4 and where offsite power was also lost, are listed on page Arkansas 2 2 Point Beach 1 1
- 27. Calvert Cliffs 3 Point Beach 2 2 The NRC also declared the following mishap to be an Crystal River 3 1 Robinson 2 3
" Abnormal Occurrence": Davis-Besse 2 St. Lucie 1
*At the Farley (AL) plant, on October 24,1982, the Haddem Neck 1 Surry 2 1 operators discovered that the containment spray Kewaunee 3 Three Mile Island 1 4 system was inoperable because certain isolation valves North Anna 1 Zion 1 2 were locked shut. The containment spray system is a Oconee 1 2 Zion 2 3 crucial safety system used to condense steam released source cenene imphcations of ATWs hents at the salem Nuclear from the reactor cooling system. If the reactor has a loss Power Plant.NUREC-1000 t1983).
of coolant accident, a great deal of steam would need to be condensed in order to keep the pressure ,m the The President's Commission on Three Mile Island (the containment building within the kmit it was designed to Kemeny Commission), in reviewing the TMI accident and the wclear . industry as a whole, wrote .in its report that withstand, so that radioactive steam would not be released to the atmosphere. ,the fundamenial problems are people.related An investigation revealed that the containment spray problems. That observation is still true, as can be seen by system had never been workable since before the plant the role human error played in a number of 1982 mishaps, was first started up, on May 8,1981. The problem was F r example: due to operator error and to a design change by
- On November 9,1982, at San Onofre (CA), a techni-
> Westinghouse, the manufacturer of the reactor, which cian knocked a power cord out of its socket, causing a made the valves look like they were open when in fact sharp drop in feedwater flow to one steam generator they were closed. and decreased water levels in both steam generators. One of the most important safety systems at a nuclear The operators then shut down the reactor as a precau-plant is the system that automatically shuts down or ti n. Meanwhile, the techn,ician plugged the cord back
" scrams" the reactor when an accident starts to happen. in, causing too much water to flow to the steam Because of the importance of this function, nuclear plants generators, which caused excessively rapid cooling of have two separate systems to automatically scram the the reactor, and partial depressunzation of the reactor reactor. These systems received a great deal of attention C olant system. In a pressurized water reactor an in early 1983 when the Salem I reactor experienced an ,overco ling transient,, can lead to a Pressunzed Ther-
" Anticipated Transient Without Scram" (ATWSi in which mal Shock accident, where high pressure and low both of its automatic shutdown circuit breakers failed, and temperature could crack the reactor vessel and cause a the plant operators failed to notice it until both failed Isv 6c lant accident, of a type the plant is not again three days later. designd to hade. Omseh, if the primary coolant is not kept at high enough pressure, steam can form in Although Salem was the first time that both systems the reactor vessel, preventing the adequate cooling of have failed simulataneously, one of the two automatic the reactor core.
shutdown systems failed at a number of plants in 1982. This is only a very brief list of some of the major mishaps
- The most ironic of these mishaps occurred at Salem of 1982. For a complete list:ng of the "particulariy signifi-2 (NJ), the twin of the plant wher the entire automatic cant mishaps" of 1982, see page 18.
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. , Public Citizen 1983 Nuclear Power Safety Report $
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The Worst . More than 100 Mishaps 3 or More Particularly Greatest Number of Deaths in a in 1982 Significant Mishaps in 1982 Worst Case Accident Plant Number Plant Number Plant Deaths Grand Cu!f 185 Brunswick 2 to Salem 1 140.000 San Onofre 2 170 Salem 2 109.000 Salem 2 157 McGuire 1 . 10 l Peach Bottom 8 Limerick 108.000 Brunswick 1 150 North Anna 1 8 ' Waterford 105.000 Brunswick 2 141 Hatch 2 7 Susquehanna 95.000 Hrtch 2 139 Oconee 3 7 Three Mile island 74.000 LaSalle 1 132 Pilgrim 1 7 Indian Point 64.000 Surry 1 121 Trojan 7 Millstone 61.000 Cook 2 116 Brunswick 1 6 Dresden 55.000 Cook 1 113 Palisades 6 San Onofre 55.000 Salem 1 6 Sorry 54.000 Arkansas 1 5 Haddam Neck 52.000 Farley 2 5 LaSalle 1 5 Millstone 1 5 Highest Costs in a Worst Case Accident Rancho Seco 5 Plant Cost (Billions 5) San Onofre 1 5 Indian Point 314 San Onofre 2 5 Limerick 213 Ln2 5 San Onofre 186 Millstone 174 Seabrook 163 Diablo Canyon 158 Shoreham 157 For more information on mishaps, see pp.16 2t; on worst case ac. Salem 150 cidents, pp. 22 24. on capacity factors. pp.16-17; on worker esposure to Zion 146 radiation pp.1011: on plant management ratings. pp. 710. Susquehanna 143 Fermi 135 Nine Mile Point 134 Waterford 131 Worst 1982 Capacity Factors Most Workers Esposed to Braidwood 127 Plant Capacity Factor Measurable Doses of Radiation Beas er Valley 122 Three Mile Island 1 00.0 Plant W orker, Three Mile Island 122 52n Onofre 1 13.4 Brunswick 1/2 4957 LaSalle 120 Indian Point 3 17.0 Hatch 1/2 3418 Peach Bottom 119 Ft. St. Vrain 19.7 Browns Ferry 1/2/3 3277 Comanche Peak 117 Nine Mile Point 20.9 Salem 1/2 3228 Byron 114 Brunswick 2 26.2 San Onofre 3055 Rancho Seco 113 Oconee 3 27.2 Turkey Point 3/4 2956 South Fexas 112 ) North Anna 1 30.2 North Anna 1/2 2872 Callaway 110 La Crosse 31.5 Pilgrim 1 2854 McGuire 110 Oyster Creek 35.4 Peach Bottom 2734 Beaver Valley 1 36.0 Dresden 1/2/3 2572 Worst Lifetime Capacity Factcrs Highest Percentage of Exposed Workers Who Were Exposed to 0.5 Rems or More The Worst Managed Plants Plant Capacity Factor Ft. St. Vrain 20.9 Plant Percentage Under Beaver Valley 1 35.8 Quad Cities 1/2 73.42 Construct,on Operat.mg i Palisades 38.3 Zion 65.33 McGuire 1 38.5 La Crosse 58.11 1. Brunswick 1/2 1.Waterford 3 Three Mile Island 1 39.9 Dresden 1/2/3 55.68 2. Arkansas 1/2 2. Watts Bar 1/2 Davis Besse 40.2 Cinna 54.43 3. Browns Ferry 1/2/3 3. Byron 1/2 Brunswick 2 40.9 Point Beach 1/2 48.50 4 Duane Arnold 4. Midland La Crosse 45.5 Nine Mile Point 48 45 5. San Onofre 1 5.Clinton Salem 1 46 8 Indian Poir.t 3 47.05 6.Crand Gulf 6.WPP55 3/5 Indian Poir't 3 47.0 Cooper Station 46.30 Brunswick 1 48.5 Indian Point 1/2 46.08 Rancho Seco 49.2 Sequoyah1 49.2 ' l l
6 Public CEizen 1983 Nuclear Power Safety Report 4 continued from p. 3 , the third release, the operators finally cut off the high To slow down the leak rate, there is a " power-operated pressure injection. They later turned it on again as a relief valve" (PORV) that can ordinarily be opened to precaution against loss of too much reactor coo! ant release some of the pressure on the primary side. But this pressure after a reactor coolant pump was restarted, and valve was not functional, because automatic shutdown the steam generator relief valve opened twice more, at systems had disabled the instrument air system necessary 11:19 and 11:37. After the last opening, it failed to fully to control the PORV. In the words of Robert Pollard, a close, and leaked radioactive water until abor' 12:25 pm. nuclear safety engineer at the Union of Concerned Scien- Shortly after the steam generator's leaking safety valve tists (UCS), "It's guaranteed not to work when needed." reseated at 12:25 pm, the pressure between the reactor UCS had pointed out this failure to the NRC after the coolant system and the steam generator reached Three Mile Island accident, in which the same valve equilibrium, and the leak through the ruptured pipe stop-played a key role, but no change was made at Ginr a. ped. Meanwhile, radioactive water continued to pour' Slowly the plant crawled toward a safe shutdown. The through the hole, completely filling the "B" steam pressure in the reactor coolant system was maintained at generator. Later, the attached main steam line also flood- 25 psi less than that of the steam generator so that the ed. radioactive water could slowly be drained through the By 10:07, the instrument air system had been restored, ruptured tube into the reactor coolant system. By 6:40 pm and the operators were able to open the PORV to release the steam generator water level indicator came back on some of the pressure. It successfully cycled open and scale. Finally, at 6:53 the following evening, January 26, closed three times, but then stuck open tjust as the PORV 1982, the licensee declared the plant to be in a cold shut-had done during the Three Mile Island accident). Pressure down condition. It would not operate again for four mon-in the reactor core dropped, from 1350 psi to 850 psi, ths, until May 25. causing steam to form in the core once again. The NRC Although it was impossible to tell exactly how much estimated that the size of this steam bubble reached 300 radiation was released from Ginna, the NRC estimates cubic feet in size. that 90 curies of " noble gases" such as krypton were released, along with 25 curies of tritium, 5 curies of iodine, and 1.3 curies of cobalt, molybdenum, barium The accident was caused and cesium. (A curie is a unit of radioactivity equano 37 bv a forelan
/ O obiect 1 in billion radio ctive disintegrations per second.) During the first three hours of the accident, when most of the the steam generator. radioactivity was released, the wind was blowing toward the southeast. Because of snow and moist cold air, most of the radioactivity fell to earth fairly close to the plant.
The danger posed by a steam bubble in the reactor core The cause of the Ginna accident was probably a foreign of a pressurized water reactor is that it can prevent water object that found its way into the steam generator, starting from adequately cooling the core, which could lead to a a sequence of events that led to the tube rupture. During melting of the fuel, the most serious of reactor accidents. various modifications to the steam generators, beginning To avert this, the reactor operators closed the " block in 1975, quality control was inadequate, and objects that valve" leading to the PORV, so that pressure could build fell into the steam generators were not detected. These back up. objects damaged the outermost tubes, some of which Another way to relieve some of the excess primary were eventually plugged to avoid leakage or rupture, system pressure would have been to turn off the high. Eventually, however, some of the plugged tubes were pressure injection pumps that were pumping large damaged so badly that they collapsed and in some cases amounts of extra water into the reactor core. After the severed altogether. These tubes damaged tubes nearby, block valve was closed, at 10:11, the pressure in the core which were, in turn, p!ugged. Some of these also severed, j increased enough that operators could have turned off the until eventually the fated tube "R42C55" (so called I' safety injection system And the water level indicator in because it is m Row 42, Column 55 of the steam the " pressurizer" was high, usually a good indication that generator) became damaged. The wear on tube R42C55 there is enough water in the core. occurred in a gradual enough manner that it did not show But the operators hesitated to turn off the safety injec. any small-scale leakage before rupturing completely. tion, because they knew there was a steam bubble in the Although Ginna was the most drastic, at least 17 other core. During the TMI accident, such a bubble drove water nuclear plants had smaller tube leaks during 1982. Nor is into the pressurizer, leading the operators to think there the problem of foreign objects in the steam generators was too much water in the system, when in fact the core unique to Ginna. In 1982 alone, 7 plants discovered loose was uncovered, overheating and becoming damaged. objects in their steam generators, including Cook 1 (MI), After the TMI accident, the NRC had recommended the McGuire 1 (NC), North Anna 1 (VA), Point Beach 1 and 2 installation of a reactor vessel water level indicator, but (WI), San Onofre 1 (CA), Turkey Point 4 (FL) and Zion 1 Ginna hadn't installed one yet.. (IL). This debris can damage the delicate steam generator So they left the safety injection system on, and the leak. tubes, causing leaks or a dramatic tube rupture like the ing into the steam generator continued, untilits pressure one at Ginna. reached 1080 psi at 10:19, forcing open a steam generator relief valve that released radioactive steam to the at. F r a discussi n f generic pr brems with generator problems, mosphere, until the pressure fell by about 50 psi. When se page 2L For an in-depth look at steam generator problems, the pressure built up again, it opened again, releasing see Public Citizen s book Tube leaks: A Consumer's and Worker's Cuide to Steam Cenerator Problems at Nuclear Power Plants, more radioactive steam, at 10:28, and again at 10:38. After available from Critical Mass.
Public Citizen 1983 Nuclear Powr Safety Report 7 Plant Management Ratings One measure of the safety of nuclear plants is how well in the meantime, however, it is still possible to derive they are managed. A well managed plant is less likely to useful information about oserall management at par-have a serious accident, and staff and machines are more ticular nuclear plants by averaging the ratings given for the likely to respond properly after an accident begins than a various areas rated. Cntical Mass has dorie this, based poorly managed one. upon the most recent SALP report for each operating For several years, the NRC has regularly evaluated the plant and each plant under construction, with the results management of nuclear plants. This " Systematic Assess- for each functional area, and the overall average, shown ment of Licensee Performance" (SALP) program is intend- in the tables on the next two pages. (Some plants were ed to help the NRC understand how each plant's manage- evaluated along with operating plants even though they ment " directs. guides, and provides resources for assuring 'were only in pre-operational stages.) plant safety." The NRC explains the various ratings as follows: Until recently, the NRC gave overall management 1. " Reduced NRC attention may be appropriate. ; ratings of 1,2 or 3, with a rating of 1 being above average, Licensee management attention and involvement are ag- ' and 3 being below average. The NRC published the gressive and oriented toward nuclear safety; licensee results in NUREG-0834. (These ratings are listed in Public resources are ample and effectively used such that a high Citizen's Nuclear Power Safety Report: 1981, on p. 7.) level of performance with respect to operational safety or Because of the adverse publicity that publication of this construction is being achieved." data brought on the owners of the below-average plants, 2. "NRC attention shoulo be maintained at normallevels. the NRC revised its procedure in 1982 so that overall Licensee management attention and involvement are evi. I ratings are no longer officially made, and so that the dent and are adequate and are reasonably effective such ratings are reviewed by the NRC regional offices rather that satisfactory performance with respect to operational l than by NRC headquarters in Washington, D.C. safety or construction is being achieved." Although the official ratings are now based on various 3. "Both NRC and licensee attention should be increas-functional areas such as maintenance, radiological con- ed. Licensee rnanagement attention or involvement is at-trols and the like, rather than on the state of the whole ceptab!e and considers nuclear safety, but weaknesses are plant, Critical Mass has discosered that the NRC staff still e,ident; licensee resources appear to be strained or not calculates an overall average rating for its own use. In a effectively used such that minimally satisfactory perfor-notebook obtained through the Freedom of Information mance with respect to operational safety or construction Act from the NRC's Office of Inspection and Enforcement, is being achieved." there is a tabulation of the SALP results for each plant by The worst. managed plants, overall, ace shown in the category, and in a column that has been erased, numbers tables below. can still faintly be seen that correspond to averages cf the . ratings for the various areas covered by the report. The THE WORST-MANAGED NRC staff has confirmed that these numbers have been OPERATING NtJCLEAR PLANTS Average erased, but stated that the erasure occurred before our SALP Freedom of information Act request was made. (If it took Plant Location Rating place after the request was made, it would violate federal 1. Brunswick 1/2 NC 2.57 law.) 2. Arkansas 1/2 AR 2.45 These average ratings are potentially very useful to the 3. Browns Ferry 1/2/3 AL 2.43 NRC and the public, because poor overall ratings tend to 4. Duane Arnold IA 2.38 show across the-board management problems and point 5. San Onofre 1 CA 2.36 , to the plants that need closer attention from the NRC in 6. Grand Gulf MS 2.33 order to be run more safely. The co'nnection between poor management and unsafe THE WORST-MANAGED PLANTS
" " #* U
- plant operation was brought into stark contrast recently because of the February 22 and 25,1983, " Anticipated Plant Location YL[
Rating Transient Without Scram" (ATWS) accident at the 1. Waterford 3* LA 2.50 Salem 1 plant in New Jersey. The Commission was hor. 2. Watts Bar 1/2 TN 2.40 rified to learn that the plant's managers didn't everi realize 3. Byron 1/2 IL 2.30 that there had been a failure of the automatic reactor- 4. Midland Mt 2.29 shutdown systems until it happened again three days 5. Clinton IL 2.25 later. A later investigation showed that the failed shut. 6. WPP55 3/5 WA 2.25 down equipment had not been classified as safety related, had not been oiled in 7 years, and was subsequently The very worst plant under construction is almost certainly lubricated with the wrong oil. the Zirrmer plant. Because of widespread quality. assurance pr blems at that plant, tFe NRC has ordered construction Because of this shock, the NRC has been reevaluating its halted pending an investigation. SALP program and may decide to go back to a numerical grading system of overall performance based on a in addition to comparing the results of various plants, it weighted average of the ratings for each individual area, is revealing to consider the average rating given by each of and may reevaluate poorly managed plants more often the NRC regions, because there is a considerable variation than well managed ones. in how tough the regions are on the plants they inspect. In
". a ., , a Public Citizen 1983 Nuclear Power Safety Report Management Ratings:
Operating Nuclear Plants
- i xEv: See nase e.1 NRC MLP Average Plant Name State Region Date A B C D E F G H I l K ETC Rating Arkansas 1/2 AR IV 08'82 3 2 3 3 2 3 2 2 2 2 -
3 2.45 Beaver Valley 1 PA I 03/82 2 1 3 2 2 2 3 2 2 - - - 2.11 Big Rock Point MI !!I 09/82 1 3 1 2 2 2 2 1 2 3 - 2 1.91 Brunswick 1/2 NC ll 05/82 '3 3 3 2 3 2 2 N N - - - 2.57 Brown's Feny AL 11 10/82 3 '3 .2 2 3 N 2 2 N - - - 2.43 Calvert Cliffs 1/2 MD 1 11/82 2 1 -2 1 1 1 2 1 2 - - 3 1.60-Cook 1/2 MI 111 05/83 2 2 2 2 3 2 2 2 2 - 2 - 2.20 Cooper NB IV 08/82 1 2 1 1 1 3 1 1 1 2 - 2 1.45 Crystal Rwer 3 FL 11 10'82 2 2 3 1 2 2 2 2 3 - - - 2.11 Davis-Besse OH 111 06/82 2 1 3 2 2 1 2 1 2 - 3 2 1.91 Dresden 1/2/3 IL 111 OW82 3 3 2 2 3 1 1 1 1 - - 3,2 2.00 Duane Arnold lA til 10/82 2 3 2 2 2 3 2 ) N - - - 2.38 Farley 1/2 AL 11 12/82 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 - - - 1.22 Fitzpatrick NY l 05/82 3 3 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 - - - 2.11 Fort Calhoun NB IV 10'82 1 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 1 - 3 2.2 1.83 Fort St. Vrain CO IV 11/82 3 2 1 2 1 2 2 N 1 - - - 1.75 Cinna NY l 09/82 1 2 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 - - - 1.33 Crand Culf M5 11 01/82 3 2 N 3 N 2 2 N 2 - - - 2.33 Haddam Neck CT I 10'82 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 - - - 1.00 Hatch 1/2 GA !! 09/81 2 2 2 2 2 N 1, 2 N - - - 1.86 Indian Point 2 NY I 05!82 2 2 2 3 2 2 1 2 2 - - - 2.00 Indian Point 3 NY l 05/82 - 2 1 1 1 1 2 2 N 2 - - - 1.50 Kewaunee WI Ill 05/83 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 1 2 - - - 1.78 La' Crosse WI lil 09/82 3 2 1 2 2 3 2 2 2 - - 2 2.10 La5'alle 1/2 IL 111 05/83 2 2 1 3 2 2 3 1 2 -
- 3.2.2.2 2.08 Maine Yankee ME I 09/82 3 2 2 2 1 2 2 N 2 -
3 -- 2.00 McGuire i NC 11 09/82 2 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 2 - - - 1.44 Millstone 1 CT I 10/82 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 - - - 1.11 Millstone 2 CT I IG'82 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 - - - 1.22 Monticello MN 111 09/82 1 2 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 - - 2 1.40 Nine M;le Point 1 NY I 06/82 2 3 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 - - - 1.78 North Anna 1/2 VA 11 01/83 2 1 2 2 2 2 1 1 2 - 2 - 1.70 Oconee 1/2/3 SC 11 09/82 2 2 1 2 2 1 1 1 2 - - - 1.56 Oyster Creek 1 NJ l 04!82 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 - - - 1.89 Palisades MI til 09'82 2 3 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 - 2.00 Peach Bottom PA I 07/82 2 3 2 2 3 2 2 2 1 - - - 2.11 Pilgrim MA I O & 82 3 2 2 2 3 1 2 2 2 - - - 2.11 Point Beach 1/2 WI til 05/83 1 2 1 1 3 3 2 2 2 - - - 1.89 Prairie Island 1/2 MN ll1 09/82 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 2 2.2 1.38 Quad Cities 1/2 IL 111 03/82 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 - - 2 1.70 Rancho $eco 1/2 CA V 11/82 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 - - 3 1.80 ) Robinson 2 SC 11 05/82 2 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 N - - - 2.13 Salem 1/2 NJ l 31/82 2 1 1 1 2 2 3 1 2 - - - 1.67 San Onofre 1 CA V 0 &82 3 3 3 2 2 1 3 N 2 - 2 2,3 2.36 San Onofre 2/3 CA V 08/82 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 1 2 - 2 1 1.73 Sequoyah 1 TN ll 10/81 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 N N - - - 2.14 Sequoyah 2 TN ll 10/81 2 N N 2 2 2 2 2 N - - - 2.00 Shoreham NY I 04/82 N 2 2 N 2 N 2 2 2 - - - 2.00 St. Lucie l "FL 11 10'82 1 1 2 1 2 2 2 1 2 - - - 1.56 Summer SC 11 07/82 2 N 2 2 N 1 2 2 N 2 - 2,2 1.69 Surry 1/2 VA 11 01/83 1 2 2 1 2 2 1 2 2 - 2 - 1.70 Susquehanna 1/2 PA I 06/82 2 N 2 N N 2 1 N 2 - 2 2 1.86 TMil PA i 11/82 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 N 1 - 1 2 1.30 Trojan OR V 10'82 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 - - 1,2 1.36 Turkey Point 3/4 FL li 10/82 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 - - - 1.78 Waterford 3 LA IV 10/82 2 N N 3 2 N 1 N N - - t 2.15 Watts Bar i TN li 10/81 N N N 2 2 N 2 3 N - - - 2.25 WPP55 2 WA V 09/82 2 2 N N N N N N. 1 - 22,2,2 1.86 Vermont Yankee VT I O&82 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 - - - 1.11 Yankee Rowe MA 1 08/82 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 - - - 1.00 Zimmer i OH ll1 06/82 N 2 N N N 2 2 N 2 - - - 2.00 Zion 1/2 IL Ill 04'82 2 3 2 2 N 2 2 1 2 - - 3.2 2.10
- m. 3 go .m. . a - , .
.w m.,z , o Public Citizen 1983 Nu-lear Power Safety R'eport 9
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Management Ratings: ' Nuclear Plants Under Construction NRC SALP Average Plant Name State Region - Date R S T U V .W X Y ~Z ETC Rating Beaver Valley 2 PA I 03/82 1 2 2 N N 2' N N - 1 1 60 ' Bellefonte 1/2 AL !! 10'81 N 1 2 2 N 2 2 N - -- 1.80 Braidwood 1/2 IL 111 04'82 .N 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 - - 2.00 Byron 1/2 IL - til 05/83 N '. 2 2 2 3 3 N 1 3 :2.3.2 2.30 Callaway 1/2 MO 111 02/82 2 2 2 2 N 3 N 1 - - 2.00 Catawba 1/2 SC 11 09/82 N 1 2 2 N 2 N 2 - - 1.80 Clinton 1/2 IL 111 04'82 2 2 3 2 2 N 2 2 3 - 2.25 Comanche Peak 1/2 TX IV 10/80 N N 2 2 N 2 2 N - - 2.00 Diablo Canyon CA V 05'81 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 N - - 2.00 Fermi 2 MI 111 O&'80 2 2 3 2 N 2 2 N - - 2.17 Grand Gulf 1/2 M5 11 01/83 N N 2 N 2 2 2 2 2 - 2.00 Hope Creek 1/2 NJ l 11/82 1 2 1 2 2 N N N - - 1.60 LaSalle 1/2 IL 111 04/82 N 2 2 2 N 2 2 2 - 2 2.00 Limerick 1/2 PA I 08/81 N 2 1 2 N 2 2 N - -- 1.80 Marble Hill 1/2 (N lit 11/82 2 1 2 1 2 ,2 N 1 1 2 1.56 McGuire-2 NC II 09/82 N N 1 N 2 1 1 2 -
'1 1.33 Md!and 1/2 MI Ill 10'81 3 2 3 2 1<
3~N 2 - - 2.29 Millstone 3 CT I 10'82 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 - 2 1.22 Nine Mile Point 2 NY I . 04'81 2 2 2 2 N 2 2 N - - 2.00 Palo Verde 1/2/3 AZ V 05/83 1 1 2 1 2 2 2 1 - - 1.50 Perry 1/2 OH lil 01/83 N 1 2 2 2 N N 1 - 2.2 1.71 River Bend 1/2 LA IV 10'82 N 2 2- 2 N 2 N 2 - 2.2 2.00 San Onofre 2/3 CA V O&'82 N 1 2 2 2 1 2 2 1 1,1 1.50 Seabrook 1/2 NH I 09/82 1 2 3 2 1 2 1 2 - 2 1.78 Sequoyah 2 TN li 10'81 N 2 1 2 N 2 N N - - 1.75 Shearon Harns 1/2 NC 11 03/82 2 2 2 2 N 2 N N - - 2.00 Shoreham NY I 04/82 N N 1 N. N 2 2 N - - 1.67 St. Lucie 2 FL !! 10'82 N 2 2 1 3 1 1 2 - 1 1.63 Summer SC 11 07/82 N 1 2 N N 1 1 N 1 2.2,2 1.50 Susquehanna 1/2 PA I 06/82 N N N N N 2 2 2 - - 2.00 Vogtle 1/2 CA ll 09/81 2 2 2 2 N N N N - - 2.00 Waterford 3 LA IV 10'82 N 2 3 3 N 2 3 2 - - 2.50 Watts Bar 1/2 TN 11 10/81 N 2 3 3 N 2 2 N - - 2 40 . WPPSS 1 WA V 09/82 N 3 2 2 3 2 N 1 - - 2.17 WPPSS 2 WA V 09/82 2 2 2 2 N 3 2 1 - - 2.00 WPPSS 3/5 WA V 11/82 2 3 2 2 2 2 N 2 - 3 2.25
) Wolf Creek KS IV 09/82 N 1 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1.67 KEY:
R - Soils and bndatinn A - Plant operations 5 - Containment and other safety-related stn,ctures. 8 - Radiological controls, induding radiatiori protection, y _ p;p;ng Systens and supports, induding welding and prewrvice radioactive waste ma..agement, transpretation and eftbt inspation. control and monitorins U -Safety-related components, induding reactor sessel and inter-C - Maintenarxe nds and pumps D -Surveillance, induding in-wrsice and preopnationd testing y -Support esteens, induding heating, ventilating and air condi-I - fire protettaon tioning, radnaste and fire protntion systems F - Emergency,preparednes w .4latrical power supply and distnbution G - Snurity and safeguards X -Instrumentation and control systems H - Refueling, induding initid fuel loading Y - Licendng achities I- Licensing activities
!- Training Z -Quattr> aurarxe iic - Othe, wrW not listed above K - Quality assurance N -Not essed
- inme plants were esduated on the nperating-pl.n. categorin even though they are only in preoperational stages.
t The Waterford 3 plant was rated on 9 areas in addition to those listed, with ratings 1, 2, 3, 2,1. 2, 3, 3 and 3. Sourte: "5 ALP FILE," NRC Offce of Insprsiion and Enfortement.
~
., it Public Chen 1983 Nuclesr Power Safety Report fact, one of the problems faced by the NRC in reinstituting an overall rating is that the administrators of the five rtgions haven't been able to agree on how to'do it, accor-ding to the NRC's Director of Inspection and Enforcement Or er X 0 SUN Richard DeYoung. Expo >ure of nuclear plant workers to radiation in 1982 The following table shows the average SALP ratings by continued at record highs, according to unpublished NRC region. data obtained by Public Citizen's Critical Mass. For the third gear in a row, the total dose to the workforce ex-AVERAGE SALP RATING GIVEN BY EACH ceeded 50,000 person rems. The 1982 total dose figure of NRC REGIONAL OFilCE No. of 52,190 person. rems was somewhat (3.5%) less than Rated 1981's high of 54,142, but follows significant increases of Operatmg Under Plants 35% in 1980 and 20% in 1979.
NRC Region Plants Construction In Region historically, the annual total dose to workers has in. 1 (King of Prussia, PA) 1.64 1.71 28 , $ '*n 'Ellyn 'j 1 i creased more than forty fold since 1969, when exposure totalled 1,247 person rems, while the number of plants has increased only eleven-fold, from 7 to 74. IV (Arlington. TX) 1.93 2.04 9 V (Walnut Creek CA) 1.82 1.90 11 More plant workers were exposed to measurable doses of radiation in 1982 than ever before. A total of 84,322 From this chart it can easily be seen that the region workers were exposed,2,139 more people than in 1981. which gave the best ratings is the NRC's Region I, which These statistics indicate a trend within the nuclear in-covers Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, the District of dustry to spread the risk of cancer and genetic damage to Columbia, New York, New Jersey and the New England more workers every year. Because there is a legal limit on states, is Region I going easy on utility managers in its the amount of radiation exposure any one worker can areal it might be supposed that the plants in that region receive, but no limit on how many people can be exposed are simply better managed, but that does not seem to be to get a job done, the industry hires more and more an adequate explanation for the strikingly different ratings workers every year to do its dirty work. Because of this, from Region 1. The NRC's Region I gave good grades to the number of exposed workers has increased dramatical-such plants as: ly - more than a hundred-fold since the NRC began col-
- Salem, the management of which was scrutinized by the lecting data in 1969.
Commission itself after the failure of the automatic shut. The increasing number of temporary workers at nuclear down systems and soundly criticized for its lack of "in- plants is a serious problem. These employees are known tellectual curiosity" about how its plant operates; and as " jumpers" or " sponges" because they work in radioac-
*Three Mile Island I, which has been shut down since the tive hot spots and soak up radiation as they make repairs.
accident at TMI 2 and which has been among the slowest Utilities hire as many temporary workers as necessary to of all plants to install new safety systems required after the finish a job, ther lay them off when they have absorbed TMI 2 accident. TMI 1 has had a serbs of cheating in- the allowable radiation doses. There is an inherent
, cidents on operator license tests, and even the top economic and health inequity to these workers since full management of the plant has been implicated in making time employees generally receive less radiation but are i materially false staterr..:nts to the NRC. Commissioner Vic- entitled to full time salaries and benefits. The utilities do tor Gilinsky has' called for the resignation of the top Worker Radiation Exposure / Electric Power Produced:
management of TMI's owners before allowing Unit I to Sites with Ratios 15 or More Times Higher than the restart. . Lowest in 1982 Results like these under'ine the need for close supervi-sion of the sat.P process by the Commission itself to in- Ra1 oj T es ghu g,,, p9 n sure that the results from various regions are comparable Nuclear Site Electric Power' 1982 Ratio 8 , San Onofre 13.5 67.5 i La Crosse 11.9 59.5 ! Nine Mile Point 9.5 47.5 Big Rock Point 7.5 37.5 Indian Point 3 7.1 35.5
- Brunswick 1/2 6.5 32.5
- Robinson 2 5.1 25.5 Yankee Rowe 4.4 22.0 l
~
,,. Pilgnm 1 3.9 -
19.5 Ginna 3.9 19.5
, Quad Cities 1/2 3.7 18.5
- Oyster Creek 3.6 18.0 p
y1 Monticello 3.4 17.0
,,.+ g- t M.. 4,w Indian Point 1/2 3.1 15.5 l
* " t ,ve. 4 1. Total person-rems of radiation exposure dmded by Megawatt- !
.A ,. l , ., y years of efectricity produced at each site is a measure of the
-v -
amount of worker radiation exposure per unit of power
. .* generated.
.k # . 2. In 1982, Haddam Neck Kewaunee, and Prairie Island 1/2 had Afdal view 'of the Salem nuclear plant, rated highly by the the lowest worker radiation / power produced ratio. 20 person.
NRC's Region I, rems /MW. year. The 1%1 low was .10. at Davis.Beue. l
- s. - -
_ - i- - "- j ... . _ . _ . . _ ,
' f
, p. -
Public Citizen 1983 Nuclear Power safety Report 11 e e WORKER EXPOSURE TO RADIATION IN 1982 O Ra IatlOn Nuclear Site Reactor Collective Workers Type 1982 Dose in Rems Exposed Percentage of Exposed Workers Receiving 0.3 not keep adequate records on temporary workers, and it Rems or tak;s the NRC two years to gather, analyze and publish More the information specific to them. As of September,1983, Arkansas 1/2 PWR 603 1608 2's.73 the most recent available data were ivr 1980, in that year, transient workers comprised 45 percent of the total a{e]a y B j4 Browns Ferry 1/2/3 BWR 2220 3277 42.17 workforce, a 35 fold increase since 1972. Brunswick 1/2 BWR 3792 4957 38.33 What effect does exposure to radiation have on nuclear Calvert Cliffs 1/2 PWR 1057 1805 36.40 workersf Medical findings have conclusively linked radia* Cook 1/2 PWR 699 1527 32.22
-ion exposure with cancer and genetic damage, and thes e Cooper Station BWR 542 743 46.30 is no known safe threshold for radiation exposure. But Crystal River 3 PWR 177 .780 12.44 because its damage is not manifest for as many as 30 Davis.Besse PWR 164 1350 4.89 y;ars, radiation gets lost in the statisticci crowd of other Dresden 1/2/3 BWR 2923 2572 55.68 Duane Arnold BWR 229 524 24.43 cancer-causing substances. Expert opinion varies on the number of deaths among nuclear workers that will result W j 22 from their cumulative expcsure in 1982 to more than 1(2*
, Fort Calhoun PWR 217 604 18.54 50,000 rems. Based on the figures of the National Cinna PWR 1140 1117 54.43 Academy of Science (NAS) Advisory Committee on the Haddam Neck PWR 126 559 10.73 Biological Effects of lonizing Radiation (BEIR), there will Hatch 1/2 BWR 1460 3418 23.57 be between three and ten additional cancer deaths. Other Humboldt Bay BWR 19 71 15.49 sources such as the Mancuso study of atomic workers,in- Indian Point 1/2 PWR 1635 2144 46.08 dicate the BEIR estimates may be too low by a factor of 30 indian Point 3 PWR 1226 1477 47.05 or more, Kewaunee PWR - 101 352 18.70 Exposure to radiation has a cumulative health effect. La Crosse BWR 205 148 58.11 Maine Yankee PWR 619 1295 32.82 Each additional year of radiation exposure increases the ,
risk of leukemia and of cancer of the bone marrow, ,",7,1)
- 4 B
thyroid, breast, lung, etc. In addition to cancer, radiation Millstone 2 PWR 1413 2083 45.61 exposure at low levels can cause genetic damage, birth Monticello BWR 993 1307 40.09 defects, and miscarriages. A 1979 British study of nuclear Nine Mile Point BWR 1264 1352 48.45 dockyard workers showed three and four-fold increases North Anna 1/2 PWR 1915 2872 30.78 in chromosomal damage after exposures of 2-3 rems per Oconee 1/2/3 PWR 1792 2445 44.73 yzar for 10 years. Oyster Creek . BWR 865 1270 41.73 Existing law allows radiation exposure of U.S. nuclear Palisades PWR 330 1554 11.07 Peach Bottom 213 BWR 1977 2734 45.14 plant workers up to 5 rems annually, and as high as 12 nm B 2 rems in some cases. This is 30 io 70 times higher than the g g p 0.17 rems recommended as the upper limit for the general PWR 22.48 Prairie Ishnd 1/2 229 641 public by the National Academy of Sciences, BEIR Com- Quad Cities 1/2 BWR 3757 2314 73.42 mittee. A dose of 5 rems is comparable to the amount of Rancho Seco PWR 337 766 24.93 radiation in 250 chest X. rays. Dr. Edward Radford, former Robinson 2 PWR 1426 2011 36.20 Chairman of the BEIR Committee, has called for a St. Lucie PWR 272 1045 15.31 minimum reducaon of the limit by ten. fold, down to 0.50 Satem 1/2* PWR 1203 3228 21.78 rzms. In 1982, 29,395 U.S. nuclear plant workers (34.8 San Onofre 1/2 PWR 832 '3055 17.98 percent of those with measurable doses) were exposed to Sequoyah 1* PWR 570 1965 19.49 Surry 1/2 PWk 1490 1676 32.37 0.50 rems or greater. TMI 1/2 PWR 1004 2123 28.50 One index used by the NRC to compare the public benefits to the risks of nuclear power plants is the ratio of fjkey Peint 3/4 21 . person-rems of radiation exposure to megawatt. years Vermont Yankee BWR 205 481 31.19 (MW-Yr) of power produced. This measures the total Yankee Rowe PWR 474 814 35.87 amount of worker radiation exposure divided by the Zion 1/2 PWR 2103 1575 65.33 amount of power generated at a particular site for a given year. Totals and Industry Averace 52190 84322 34.58 According to this yardstick, the best sites in 1982 were Source: Unpublished NRC documents obtained frorn the Manage nent at Haddam Neck, Kewaunee, and Prairie Island 1/2. At Information Branch, Office of Resource Management, NRC. San Onofre, the ratio was 13.5, or 67.5 times higher than
- canted for the first time in 1982 at the best sites. This plant has had the worst occupational set a ceiling on the total dose to tne work force or the size cxposure record for each of the past three years. In addi- of that work force, when combined with the high lesels of tion to San Onofre,13 other sites (listed in the table allowable exposure to individuals, shows a callous below) had exposure / power ratios more than 15 times disregard for the national health. The industry has created higher than the best sites. a genetic time bcmb, the effects of which cannot be in order to protect the workforce, lower total levels of known for several generations.
r:diation exposure are needed, rather than just p 5,y;,og,,pny on go,.geye;,,giat,on ,, aya,1,51e go,5 y,oo 1,om distributing the exposure to more people. The failure to Critical Mass
12 Public Citizen 1983 Nuclear Power Safety Report
- THREATS TO NUCLEAR PLANTS - 1982 ZION (IL) 1/28/82 PILCRIM (MA) 4/15/82 WATERFORD (LA) 7/1982 Videotape deinered to Chicago TV stations Two ' rucks in the con:ractor parking lot Fire set in cable room burned as many as 27 shows plant at night with flares going off, were fire-bombed. cables.
Indniduals who claimed credit said they made tape to show plant's vulnerability to MARBLE HILL (lN) 4/15/82-6/4/82 ARKANSAS (AR) 7/23/82 terrorist attack. Sixteen bomb threats. Police arrested a man with firearms, muni-DAvi5 8E55E (OH) 1/29/82 TURKEY POINT (FL) 4/21/82 Construction workers fired for drug use.
.dr nd r p secur t Bomb threat- the plant.
SHEARON HARRIS (NC 1/29/82 RANCHO SECO (CA) 4/23/82 CALVE RT CLIFFS (MD) 7/2982 Employee arrested for theft of tools. Drugs Bomb threat. found in his possession. Bornb threat. HATCH (GA) 4/2UB2 CALVERT CLIFFS (MD) 7/29/82 SHEARCN HARRIS (NQ 2/4/82 Quality assurance inspector fired for drug :38 caiiber revolver and ammunition taken Bomb threat. into protected area. use. Weld defects found when his work , was re. inspected. SALEM (NJ) 4/28/82 Bomb threat. TUdKEY POINT (FL) 2/4/82 Deliberately mispositioned valves caused a 7 security guards and 4 others imp'icated in sttam generator feedwater pump to trip SALEM (NJ) 8/9/82 drug use' while the pint was at 100% power. ' Pjant tripped because a Control system Cir-cuit breaker was placed in the "off" ZION (IL) 2/5/82 SALEM (NJ) 5/1/82 position, apparently deliberately. Security force supervisor and security force Steam generator water level recorder was training coordinator suspended for drug shorted by a metal clip. COMANCHE PEAK (TX) 8/11/82 use. Sand found in turbine ger erator bearin;, . FARLEY (AL) 5/5/82 DRESDEN (ll) 2/12/82 Employee fired for drug use. SALEM (NJ) 8/1992 Two employees fired for drug use. Diesel generator vai es found to have been ZION (IL) 5/5/82 KEWAUNEE (WI) 2/17/82 Military police arrested ' plant employee intruder arrested trying to break into pro- SALEM (NJ) 9/3/82 abaent without leave from the Army. De am ng vak W to rekase BRUNSWICK (NC) 5/14/82 PEACH BOTTOM (PA) 2/17/82 ' " Site access of two employees remosed for Twelve neutron detector tubes were found suspected drug use. intentionally bent. QUAD CITIES (IL) 9/15/82 5/2U82 PALO VERDE (A7) 2/19/82 Bomb threat. Arrest of two employees for drug use. SALEM (NJ) 10/21/82 5/2U82 Security monitor attempts suicide. PERRY (OH) 2/22/82 8FLLEFONTE (AL) Factory-installed wires in emerge,cy shut. Bomb threat. MILLSTONE (CT) 10/25/82 down panel were cut. Bomb threat. BELLEFONTE (AL) 5/2982 PEACH BOTTOM (PA) 2/25/82 A bomb device, consisting of a piece of DIABLO CANYON (CA) 11/1982 Security guard accidentally fired pistol. pipe filled with acetylene gas, was set off in Arrest of guard for drug use. NORTH ANNA (VA) 3/1/82 the reactor building. MAINE YANKEE (ME) 11/18/82 Bomb threat. BRUNSWICK (NC) 5/2982
!NDIAN POINT (NY) 3/5/82 Nuts, bolts H 3 cupful of metal chips
, Employee fired for drug use, were discovered in the oil reservoir from An instrument containmg 8 microcuries of radioactive cesium was found smashed in a FORT CALHOUN (NB) 6/4/82 which the No. I reactor coolant pump is lubricated, bathroom in a controlled area. Employee reports to work with loaded gu's in her purse. MILLSTONE (CT) 11/19/82 TURKEY POINT (FL) 3/16/82 Bomb threat. M7/82 mb heat FITZPATRICK (NY)
BRUNSWICK (NC) 3/19/82 2 handguns taken onto site. DIABLO CANYON (CA) 11/22/82 Bomb threat- & 7/82 ederal .agets anesW a man for posses-CRYSTAL RIVER LFL) sion of 3 destructive devices with intent to ZIMMER (OH) . 3/22/82 . Loaded .32 caliber revolver found in use them against Diablo Canyon. Bomb threat. employee's briefcase. TROJAN (OR) 12/17/82 BRUNSWICK (NC) 3/23/82 SUMMER (SC) 6/20/82 Bomb threat. Bomb threat. Bomb threat. DAVIS-SESSE (OH) 3/31/82 Employee fired for drug use. QUAD CITIES (IL) 6/29/82 Bomb threat. 3 employees investipted for drug use. ROBINSON (SC) 4/7/82 ZION (IL) 6/29/82 Source: Events through June are / rom . Drugs found in contractor's truck, which "Sa feguards Summary Event lis t, " CALVERT CLIFFS (MD) 4/12/82 was denied access to the plant. NUREC-0525, Rev. 6 (1983). Events from Bomb threat' IUIYon are from NRC Preliminary Nori/ica-LIMERlCK (PA) 6/30/82 tions of Safeguards Events (PNSs) and from a TURKEY POINT (FL) 4/14/82 Fire discovered in 2 cable trays. The cables December 17.1982. letter / rom NRC Chair-Security guard accidentally shot himself in were cut as well as burned indicating a man Nunzio J. Palladino to Rep. Edward f. the leg. deliberate act. Markey fD.MA).
Public Citinn 1983 Nuclear Power Safety Report 13 Security Threats Nuclear energy is a source of power that depends upon another, valves that control the start up of the emergency the smooth operation of a great number of complex diesel generators were found closed. In another event, a mechanical systems that often malfunction even under the metal clip had been used to short out the steam generator best circumstances. Because of this, nuclear power plants water level indicator. And in yet another, the plant had to be are especially vulnerable targets for saboteurs and terrorists. shut down because of an essential circuit breaker that had The vulnerability of nuclear reactors was highlighted at a been placed in the "off" position, apparently deliberately. classified congressional hearing in September of 1982 in ' which horrified members of Congress learned of a govern-
- At Brunswick (NC), twelve neutron detection guide m ntal test of the physical security at the Savannah River tubes had been bent where they leave the reactor vessel Plant (SC) where plutonium for nuclear weapons is made. NP.C Chairman Palladino, in a February 7,1983, letter to During the test, held in 1980, seven " terrorists" infiltrated Rep. Edward J. Markey (D MA), said that if this had not been the plant, seized hostages and took over the control room of discovered before the plant started up, "it would have one of the production reactors that makes plownium. The represented a major degradation of essential safety related management of the plant, which had been notified in ad. equipment."
vance that the test would take place, was so shaken by the case of the takeover that they asked that the rest of the test be cancelled and turned it into a training exercise for the guzrd force. 5.botage directed at vital safety systems of nuclear plants has increased markedly m recent years. These mcidents, PO//Ce arreStea a man which the NRC euphemistically calls " vandalism," rose from one in 1980, to four in 1981, to six in 1982. Even worse, it is With eXp/OSiVeS and a clear that all these acts of sabotage were carried out by plant diagram Of Security at insiders were responsible in all of these cases. Insiders know how to effectively disable the plant, and even a security the Arkgp$35 pfgn(, system that carefully limits entry to only authorized people SePa ra tely, federal cannot keep them out. The guard forces at nuclear plants have long been thought ggggf$ gyyg$ fed g mgp to be one of the weakest links in the overall security effort. A With EXPLOSIVES near the 1977 General Accounting Office study declared the quality of the guard forces to be the greatest smgle shortcoming. Ofghfg {ggygg pfgg[, Although a 1983 GAO study concludes that the situation has improved somewhat, there are clearly many continuing pro-blems in this area. For example, at the Peach Bottom (PA) plant, a guard " accidentally" fired his gun. A subsequent study showed that it could not physically have happened the
- At about 1:30 am on January 28,1982, a young woman way the guard described it. And at Turkey Point (FL), a guard delivered packages containing a note and a videotape to accidentally shot himself in the leg. Another serious problem several Chicago area TV stations. The note said "This is a with guard forces is drug use. At Diablo Canyon (CA) a guard warning. The next time will be for real." The videotope 3
was arrested for drug use, and at Turkey Point (FL) 7 guards showed the Zion (ll) plant site at night w;th flares going off. were implicated in drug use. At Zion (IL) both the supervisor Local police had reported flares near the plant site the of the guard force and the head of guard training were previous night. disciplined for drug use. Page 12 lists events in 1982 considered by the NRC as
- At Maine Yankee (ME), a cupful of metal chips, two nuts security threats. As we go to press, the NRC has still not and two bolts were discovered inside the oil reservoir for the finished evaluating the security threats from the last half of lube oil pumps for the No.1 reactor coolant pump. If uncor-1982, so the events listed for July through December were rected, this could damage the reactor coolant pump and taken from preliminary reports, which may be incomplete. cortpromise plant safety.
Some of the most disturbing events during 1982 that involv-ed the safeguarding of nuclear plants are the following:
- In two separate incidents, men were arrested with ex-plosive devices and diagrams of nuclear plants (Diablo
- At timerick (PA) and also at Waterford (LA), electrical Canyon [CA) and Arkansas {AR]).
cables were damaged by deliberately set fires. Because of the threat to public health and safety posed
- At Salem (NJ), there was a series of sabotage events. In by security threats to nuclear plants, Rep. Markey has urged one, a vent line drain valve was tampered with, causing the the NRC to officially designate sabotage as an " Unresolved release of radioactive Xenon-133 into the atmosphere. In Safety issue."
14 Public CRisen 1963 Nucle:r Power Safety Report 1982 NRC Fines of Nuc! car Utilities
$550,000 1/18/82 l $60,000 6/17/82 $90,000 10/5/82 BOSTON EDISON (Pilgrim) SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON ILLINO15 POWER (Clinton)
Br:akdown in control of several safety. (San Onofre 1) Intimtation of quahty control inspectors rited activities, and failure to correct false Failure to maintain positwe access control and massive breakdown of electrical quali-stat;ments made to NRC Failure to assure to vital areas as required by sacunty plan. ty control. Failure to adequately control that combustible gases could be controlled contractor who was responsible for quality aft:r a loss of coolant accident, and failure ** # *"C' # E'* *
$120,000 6/22/82 to notify NRC when design reviews reveal.
SACRAMENTO MUNICIPAL UTILITY $40,000 10/15/82 cd the problem. Failure to assure that isola. DISTRICT VERMONT YANKEE POWER CO. tion valves would dose when needed. Mat; rial false statements to NRC about (Rancho Seco) (Vermont Yankee) containment purging system compliance Inoperable diesel generator and high Operators did not know that high pressure with regulations. pressure injection pump. Failure to proper, injection system had operated during a ly return emergency equipment to service plant transient until an hour later, resulting after testing. in false reports to NRC.
" O,000 3/29/82 $40,000 10/27/82
' 2ORCIA POWER (Hatch 1) PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC AND GAS
$44,000 6/25/82 Failure to review proposed system changes (Salern)
DUKE POWER (Oconee 1) Failure to maintain tight supervision of pro, inadequate security measures. Change in n requi em nts' physical barner was approved by security cedures affecting plant safety. even though it compromised protection of
$50,000 3/29/82 vital area.
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY $100,000 7/8/82 11/30/82 (Sequoyah 2) COMMONWEALTH EDISON (Zion 1) l $40 000GPb NUCLEAR CORP. (Oyster Exceeded hmiting conditions for operation Failute to adequately evaluate radiation Failure to properly test isolation valve and by failing to maintain adequate starf retrain. hazards before entry into area beneath the failure to properly install and test vacuum ing program and failing to impiement re. reactor vessel. Employee w hole-body breaker. CPU appealed, claiming safety quired procedures. rad ation dose of 5 rems. exceeding legal significance was minimal because redun-dant systems were operable. NRC said
$50,000 5/7/82 redundancy is not meant as"a substitutefor TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY $20,000 7/13/82 good judgment or adequate procedures."
(Browns Ferry 1,2 and J) GEORGIA POWER (Hatch 1,2) $20.000 12/6/82 Failure to maintain positive access control inadequate security procedures. Inade- LOUISIANA POWER AND LIGHT to vital areas and to take initiative in identi- quate search before entering protected (Waterford 3) fying potential problems. area allowed handgun and ammunition to Breakdown in quality-assurance program, be taken into protected area. Inadequate resulting in numerous deficiencies and p sting of guards. discrepancies, due to inadequate control of
$50,000 5/10/82 VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER CO.
c ntractors. (Surry 1) $120,000 7/16/82 $180,000 12/16/82 Exceeded hmiting cond' tion for operation. CAROLINA POWER AND LIGHT CONSOLIDATED EDISON A technician failed to tell his supervisor he (Brunswick 1) (Indian Point 2) had removed fuses from instruments that Failure to recognize a broken safety related Plant personnel exposed to 8.7 rems of mrn of high steam flow in main steam water level instrument and carry out proper radiation because of inadequate lines. Unit brought on line with these in, procedures when it was discovered. radiological surveys. Failure to assess effect struments inoperable, and ran for 10 hours on security of change to physical barrier. t without condition being noticed. $112,000 Failure to properly maintain Safety injec-8/9/82 NEBRASKA PUBLIC POWER DISTRICT n System b r n hetion Tank.
$16,000 5/12/82 (Cooper)
$3,125 12/17/82 CONSUMERS POWER (Palisades) Failure to install and test the prompt public TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY Failure to maintain containment integrity notification system by required deadline, (Browns Ferry 1,2 and 3) during startup and to follow safety-related and making false statements about it to the Two improper shipments of radioactive procedures dunng maintenance of control NRC on three separate occasions. Original.
waste. Eight drums had cracked drum clos-rod drive mechanism. ly assessed at $300,000. ing rings. Four others had unsecured gaskets, and one had two ho!es in it, pro-
$50,000 6/3/82 $40,000 8/13/82 baW caused h foMe Nadet PORTLAND CENERAL ELECTRIC CO. IOWA ELECTRIC LIGHT AND POWER $50,000 12/27/82 (Trojan) (Duane Arnold) FLORIDA POWER CORP.
Fail:d to repair deficiency which could Failure of emergency diesel generator to (Crystal River) have made emergency diesel generator in- start within design requirements and Failure to control access to a vital area and operable. NRC first proposed $60.000 failure to test operability of equipment aner to maintain compensatory measures for an penalty. maintenance. inadequate perimeter alarm system.
- ) ,
i 'l
, Public Citizen 1983 N clear Powr Safetv Report is FeInes in 1982, the NRC levied almost $2 milhon in fines these is the assessment of $600,000 against Carolina
($1,895,125) against nuclear power plant owners, for a Power and Light, owners of the Brunswick plants. The variety of security and management failures. The fines im- NRC found that the Brunswick plants had been operated, posed in 1982 ranged from a low of $3,125 against the for as long as 7 years, without ever testing certain safety T;nnessee Valley Authority for shipping leaky drums of systems and components. Even worse, Carolina Power radioactive waste from its Browns Ferry (AU plants, to a and Light had not corrected the problems even after they high of $550,000 against the Boston Edison Company for had been discovered. The NRC declared this breakdown major deficiencies in management control over the in management control to be an " Abnormal Occurence" Tilgrim (MA) plant. because it raised serious questions about whether The fine against Boston Edison was based on a series of operating the plant would endanger public health and management failures to comply with NRC regulations that safety. require having a system to control the amount of hydrogen in the containment building following certain accidents. At a minimum, this required the Pilgrim plant to have a system to " purge" the containment to the at-mosphere, and to make sure that the system could still . {ygg [hg hjpheSt O NRC work if there was a loss of offsite power of a single compo- fine In blStory IS nOf aS B ston Edison not only failed to instali en adequate muCh Of a Denalty aS system to control hydrogen in an emergency, but its of-ficials falsely told the NRC that the system at Pilgrim met the COST Of aeing Shut all of the NRC requirements. And when the company finally realized that its system was inadequate, it didn't tell dOwn for a Sin 5"le da7"* the NRC about it or correct the earlier false statemer't. A second violation at Pilgrim was the failure of the management to adequately control the maintenance of Other recent fines based on 1982 violations include: safety-related electrical power supplies. Because of this, $140,000 against Philadelphia Electric for insufficient there was no assurance that the containment isolation management attention to plant safety at Peach Bottom: valves would work properly if they were needed to help $100,000 against Commonwealth Edison for inadequate mitigate the effect of a major accident. A third violation quality assurance for safety systems at Braidwood; and was that the containment "drywell" was being operated $100,000 against Niagara Mohawk, owners of Nine Mile at tempe atures far above the limit imposed by the plant's Point, for falsification of documents. license to operate. This causes premature aging of impor- Even though the NRC assessed Boston Edison and tant equipment needed to safely shut down the reactor Carolina Power and I.ight with two of the highest fines in and mitigate serious accidents. This condition has existed the history of nuclear power (the current highest is the for years, and even after Boston Edison became aware of $850,000 fine against Public Service Gas and Electric for the problem, it failed to correct it. In fact, the NRC was the Anticipated Transient Without Scram at Salem 1), the able to point to safety-system failures at Pilgrim that were actual amount is really little more than a slap on the wrist,
, probably caused by this violation of the regulations. because of the financial incentives facing a utility.
The NRC viewed these recurring failures of manage- If a plant is shut down to repair some safety defect, the m:nt to pay adequate attention to safety at the Pilgrim utility trast buy replacement power from other utilities in plant as being so serious that it reported the management order to maintain service to its customers. This replace-deficiency to Congress as an " Abnormal Occurrence." ment power can easily cost $1 million for each day the Abnormal Occurrences are events that involve "a major plant is shut down. Thus, even the highest NRC fine in reduction in the degree of protection of the public health history is not as much of a penalty as the cost of being shut or safety." down for a single day. It's easy to see why a utility would Because of the time taken in reviewing potential fines, let a safety problem drag on, risking an NRC fine, rather often they are not announced until much later than the than the larger and more immediate cost of shutting the original violation. For instance, in July of 1983 the NRC plant down to fix the problem. fined General Public Utilities Corporation, the owner of Until 1980, the situation was even worse: the NRC Three Mile Island, $140,000 because its reactor operators could only fine utilities $5,000 for violating its rules. had cheated on NRC licensing examinations in 1981, and Although the current limit of $100,000 per violation because GPU had lied to the NRC about a cheating inci- (which can be increased by defining each day's violation dent that involved the Supervisor of Operations at TMI 2. as a separate offense) is a big improvement, it is still Several other fines levied in 1983, which arose from viola. thoroughly inadequate to give utilities the necessary finan-tions in 1982, are of particular interest. Foremost among cial incentive to obey the NRC's regulations. l
PLANT SCORECARD / / " AC - AlhvChalmers. BW - Ralw oi.k & W.itos cE - Crunimstum i nginn nng. GA - General Atomic . GE - General IIn tru al. W - Westinghrnne. BWR - lkuhng W. iter Re.u lor, l'WR - [
- i F vwuritest Wates Re.xtor. ItTG - lingh Temperature Gas Onilal Re,x tor. MWc -- De.ign llettoral .
Rating (DE R) espremt in Megawaits.elec tnc. Capacity Factor - the in rientage of the madmum g sustenliat electrical ou e tmt whit h the*plant achieveil, m l'dll anil sint e the Year m whit h the plant in g.m tommercial operainmv g (J[ @p Pl:nt Location Licensee Vendnr Type MWe ./ [. . o'j q AC y Capacity Factor 1982 Lifetime Year Arkansas 1 Russellville, AR Arkansas Power & Light BW PWR fl50 10 9 11 0 5 30 50.0 58.5 1974 Arkansas 2 Russellville, AR Arkansas Power & Light CE PWR 912 12 15 21 2 3 50 47.7 53.2 1980 Arnold Palo, IA lowa Electric Power & Light GE BWR 538 19 27 36 1 2 83 48.4 50.7 1975 Beaver Valley 1 Shippingport, PA Duquesne Light W PWR 852 13 16 29 3 3 61 36.0 35.ft 1976 Big Rock Point Big Rock Point, MI Consumers Power GE BWR 72 10 7 18 0 1 35 57.1 53.4 1963 Browns Ferry 1 Decatur, AL Tennessee Valley Authority GE BWR 1065 25 12 57 2 2 96 (14.5 53.6 1974 ? Browns Ferry 2 Decatur, AL Tennessee Valley Authority GE BWR 1065 9 8 19 0 1 36 47.7 53.1 1975 Browns Ferry 3 Decatur, AL Tennessee Valley Authority GE BWR 1065 14 4 34 2 1 54 52.4 64.2 1977 o Brunswick 1 Southport, NC Carolina Power & Light Brunswick 2 Sc.ithport, NC Carolina Power & Light GE GE BWR BWR 821 821 37 30 81 40 32 65 2 4 6 10 150 141 40.6 26.6 48.5 40.9 1977 1975 {= Calvert Cliffs 1 Lusby, MD Baltimore Gas & Electric CE PWR 845 23 22 36 4 4 85 72.4 70.0 1975 3 Calvert Cliffs 2 Lusby, MD Baltimore Gas & Electric CE PWR 845 17 fl 29 0 3 54 67.6 75.3 1977 Cook 1 Bridgman, MI Indiana & Michigan Electric W PWR ' Cook 2 Bridgman, MI Indiana & Michigan Electric W PWR 1054 1100 45 34 19 46 24 52 3 6 1 113 58.0 64.1 1975 -[ 1 116 72.6 6 7 .11 1978 i Cooper 1 Brownsville, NB Nebraska Public Power GE BWR 778 8 5 13 0 0 26 77.4 63.1 1974 ; Crystal River 3 Red Level, FL Florida Power BW PWR 825 19 23 33 2 4 77 68.0 54.2 1977 i't Davis.tlesse 1 Oak Harbor, OH Toledo Edison BW PWR 906 30 14 22 1 4 67 40.5 40.2 1978 Diablo Canyon Avila Beach, CA Pacific Gas & Electric W PWR 1084 4 4 4 0 1 12 License Suspended E Dresden 2 Morris, IL Commonwealth Edison
- GE BWR 794 13 9 29 2 2 53 73.7 56.9 1970 3 Dresden 3 Morris, IL Commonwealth Edison GE BWR 794 7 8 30 0 1 45 55.9 56.6 1971 4' Dothan, AL Alabama Power W PWR Farley 1 Farley 2 Dothan, AL Alabama Power W PWR fl29 (12 9 14 15 4
5 44 33 1 0 1 5 63 53 71.fl 72.9 55.3 79.4 1977 1931
}
Fitzpatrick Scriba, NY PASNY GE BWR 821 19 10 27 5 4 61 69.0 57.7 1975 ft. Calhoun Ft. Calhoun, NB Omaha Public Power CE PWR 478 ' 2 5 12 1 1 20 (13.2 62.7 1974 f t. St. Vrain Ft. St. Vrain, CO Public Service of Colorado GA IITG 330 16 6 30 2 2 54 19.7 20.9 1979 Ginna Ontario, NY Rochester Gas & Light W PWR 470 11 11 5 0 2 27 Sfl.5 68.6 1970 Grand Gulf 1 Vicksburg, M5 Mississippi Power & Light GE BWR 1250 58 22 59 46 2 Ifl5 Testing Haddam Neck Haddam Neck, CT Connecticut Yankee Atomic W PWR 582 2 4 4 0 1 10 89.0 76.6 1968 Itatch 1 Baxley, GA Georgia Power Co. GE BWR 777 40 14 43 2 4 99 42.3 54.3 1975 Hatch 2 Baxley, GA Georgia Power Co. GE BWR 7fl4 50 12 74 3 7 139 54.3 59.6 1979 Ifumboldt Bay Eureka, CA Pacific Gas & Electric GE BWR 65 1 2 4 0 0 7 Shut Down Indian Point 2 Buchanan, NY Consolidaied Edison W PWR 873 6 9 33 2 4 50 Sft.2 54.9 1974 Indian Point 3 Buch'anan, NY ' PASNY W PWR 965 0 1 2 1 2 4 17.0 47.0 1976 Kewaunee Carlton, WI Wisconsin Public Service W PWR 535 5 9 20 3 1 37 11 1 . 6 75.9 1974 Lacrosse Lacrosse, WI Dairyland Power Co-op AC BWR 50 6 5 9 0 2 20 31.5 45.5 1969 - LaSalle 1 Ottawa, IL Commonwealth Edison GE BWR 1078 55 21 74 2 5 152 Testing Maine Yankee Wiscasset, ME Maine Yankee Power CE PWR 825 12 11 15 2 4 40 62.6 65.6 1972
McGuire 1 Cornelius, NC Duke Power Co. W PWR 1180 36 17 28 2 11 83 41.6 38.5 1981 *' Millstone 1 Waterford, CT Northeast Nuclear Energy GE BWR 660 5 6 21 0 5 32 70.5 62.4 1971 Millstone 2 Waterford, CT Northeast Nucicar Energy CE BWR 870 17 13 20 3 1 53 65.7 64.2 1975 Monticello Monticello, MN Northern States Power GE BWR 545 5 5 4 0 3 14 50.7 70.5 ' 1971 Nine Mile Point Scriba, NY Niagara Mohawk Power GE BWR 620 5 7 3 4 2 24 20.9 57.8 1969 North Anna 1 Mineral, VA Virginia Electric Power W PWR 907 16 Ill 49 5 8 88 30.2 56.4 1978 North Anna 2 Mineral, VA Virginia Electric Power W PWR 907 30 19 30 7 4 86 50.9 61.7 1980 Oconee1 Seneca,SC Duke Power Co. BW PWR 118 7 11 4 5 0 3 20 66.3 57.fi 1973 Oconee2 Seneca,SC Duke Power Co. BW PWR 887 4 6 1 1 4 12 44.2 58.4 1974 Oconee 3 Seneca,SC Duke Power Co. BW PWR 887 4 8 2 0 7 14 27.2 60.0 1974 Oyster Creek Toms River, NJ GPU Nuclear Corp. GE BWR 650 20 0 34 0 4 62 35.4 59.4 1969 Palisades South Haven, MI Consumer Power CE PWR 805 11 10 26 2 6 49 47.4 3fl.3 1971 Peach Bottom 2 Peach Bottom, PA Philadelphia Electric GE PWR 1065 14 5 25 0 2 44 51.4 62.3 1974 Peach Bottom 3 Peach Bottom, PA Philadelphia Electric GE PWR 1065 Il 1 18 0 1 27 91.5 64.4 1974 Pilgrim 1 Plymouth, MA Coston Electric GE BWR 655 26 6 20 3 7 55 57.3 57.1 1972 Point Beach 1 Two Creeks, WI Wisconsin Electric Power W PWR 497 11 8 8 0 2 27 62.1 69.fl 1970 s Point Beach 2 Two Creeks, WI Wisconsin Electric Power W PWR 497 6 3 2 0 0 11 8 2 .11 79.3 1972 5 - Prairie Island 1 Red Wing, MN Northern States Powcr W PWR 530 6 1 6 0 1 13 84.4 70.7 1973 Prairie Island 2 Red Wing, MN Northern States Power W PWR 530 3 1 7 0 0 11 83.1 75.7 1974 g. Quad Cities 1 Ccrdova, IL Commonwealth Edison GE BWR 789 6 9 22 0 2 37 . 46.9 59.6 1973 3 Quad Cities 2 Cordova, IL Commonwealth Edison GE BWR 789 3 3 15 0 3 21 73.2 59.3 1973 3 Rancho Seco Clay Station, CA Sacramento Municipal BW PWR 918 11 8 11 4 5 34 41.9 49.2 1975 5 Robinson 2 Hartsville, SC Carolina Power & Light W PWR 700 0 4 6 0 4 Ill 36.7 63.2 1971 3 St. Lucie 1 Ft. Pierce, FL Florida Power & Light CE PWR !!30 14 8 45 3 3 70 94.4 73.5 1976' r{ Salem 1 Salem, NJ Public Service Electric W PWR 1090 30 9 49 5 6 93 42.9 46.8 n 1977 % Salem 2 Salem, NJ Public Service Electric W PWR 1115 31 37 33 6 10 157 111.3 80.4 1981 i San Onofre 1 San Clemente, CA Southern California blison W PWR 436 12 7 6 0 5 25 13.4 56.2 1968 $ San Onofre 2- San Clemente, CA Southern California Edison CE PWR 1087 46 54 70 0 5 170 Testing r San Onofre 3 San Clemente, CA Southctn California Edison , CE PWR 1100 7 0 3 0 1 10 Testing j Sequoyah 1 Daisy, TN Tennessee Valley Authority W PWR 1148 16 13 48 3 4 80 49.0 49.2 1981 = Sequoyah 2 Daisy, TN Tennessee Va!!ey Authority W PWR 1848 15 14 38 0 1 67 66.6 66.6 1982 3 Summer 1 Columbia, CA South Carolina Electric & Gas W PWR 900 22 6 36 2 0 66 Testing 2 Surry 1 Gravel Neck, VA Virginia Electric Power W PWR 788 25 36 59 1 4 121 79.4 54.2 1972 Sorry 2 Gravel Neck, VA Virginia Electric Power W PWR 788 12 16 42 1 2 71 79.6 56.0 1973 Susquehanna 1 Berwick, A Pennsylvania Power and Light GE BWR 1011 39 13 28 0 1 80 Testing Three Mile is.1 Middletown, PA GPU Nuclear Corp. BW PWR 819 6 3 6 1 0 16 00.0 39.9 1974 Three Mile Is. 2 Middletown, PA GPU Nuclear Corp. BW PWR 906 7 6 20 1 1 34 Shut Down Trojan Prescott, OR Portland General Electric W PWR 1130 11 5 6 0 7 22 4fl.5 51.5 1976 , Turkey Point 3 Florida City, FL Florida Power & Light W PWR 693 9 0 9 1 3, 19 62.0 59.8 1972 Turkey Point 4 Florida Oly, FL Florida Power & Light W PWR 693 6 4 4 0 3 14 63.3 64.6 1973 Vermont Yankee Vernon. VT Vermont Yankee Nuclear GE BWR 514 7 3 16 0 3 26 92.7 70.2 1972 Yankee Rowe Rowe, MA Yankee Atomic Electric W PWR 175 7 12 20 3 1 42 57.5 68.9 1961 Zion 1 Zion, IL Commonwealth Edison W PWR 1040 12 4 34 1 4 51 51.5 58.4 1973 Zion 2 Zion, IL Commonwealth Edison W PWR 1040 5 3 18 0 5 26 56.6 58.1 1974 TOTAL 1306 1170 2161 163 253 4500 --
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is Public Citizen 1983 Nucle r Power Safety Report g - Particularly Significant Mishaps The fonowing hst bnetty oe-BEAVER VALLEY 10/00 - Safety relief valve fail- COOK 1 scribes each of the 253 nuclear 01/19 - Steam generator drain plant mishaps that was counted ed to close. Chher safety relief 07/02 - Foreign objects found as a particularly significant tank recirculation line cracked valves also found iroperable. in steam generators, including 6 because of internal freezing. M16. inch ball of wire, two bronze mishap for 1982. Esery one of LER.334-82 002, P5. these mishaps was addressed in lock nuts, metal object the size 01/27 - During shutdown, BRUNSWICK 2 of a half dol!ar, and parts of a one or more NRC documents
, backup residual heat remova! 01/11 - Frozen pipes led to pocket knife. Mll, N63 24 that discuss significant safety- pump failed because of loss of excess oxygen concentrations in related nuclear power p@nt offsite power due to faulty cable drywell. LER-324 82 004, P5. COOK 2 mishaps. (Because of diner' 12/29 - Low water flow in and because emer6ency diesel 01/16 - Residual heat removal ences in methodology, the total generator was out of service for system inoperable. LER324 emergency core cooling system number of "particularly sig' maintenance. LER-334 82-004 82-005, P2, M1. caused by loose object in nificant mishaps" is not dir. 02/04 - Main steamline high M2 P3" E system, possibly left there during ectly comparable to the total 10/i8 - Reactor trip. partial flow sensing equipment in. repairs in 1981. LER-316-82-113 number of "especially sig- loss of offsite power. P6. operable. N82-13. M19. E.
nificant mishaps" in last year's BIG ROCK POINT 03/01 - High pressure coolant CRYSTAL RIVER 3 report. Methodology is de- injection system inoperable scribed on page 30 t 01/07 - Because of faulty 01/21 .9 gallon per minute sw tch, control rods began to because of switch failure- leak from check valve in high ARKANSAS 1 LER 324-82-044, E. drift into core. Operator then pressure injection system. 04/10 - Hydrogen explosion scrammed reactor manually 05/20 - Crack found ,n core a during repair of high pressure in. N82-09. M1. spray equipment. M8. jection nozzle. M6, P3, N82 28. 01/29 - Reactor coolant pump 05!11 - Hydrogen purge BROWN 5 FERRY 1 07/27 - Isolation valve not leak, caused by cracked weld, system inoperable due to water 09/22 - Because of annun- tested due to personnel error. forced plant to shut down. LER.324 82-091, P5. saturated fi!!er. LER 313-82 010. Ci *P " - LER-302 82-004, M2, P2. E. d !k Units 07/27 - Incorrect testing of 05/10 - Vibration in the 05/25 - Steam generator tube I 2 and 3 also.'M14' reactor watn isolation timing. makeup system repeatedly led 0 - Rp of 18 inch LER-324-82-097 PS. to cracked welds. LER-302-leak from crack caused either by feedwater pipe M18- 08/02 - Failure to adequately 82-037, E. corrosion or vibration. LER 313-82 012, M8. test core spray system and low 11/25 - Improper setting of ef-BROWNS FERRY 2 pressure coolant injection 12/3 - Torrential rains partial. 07/23 - High pressure coolant system. Lf R-324 82100 PS. fluent monitors leads to release ly flooded sumps of turbine injection system switches in. of radiation beyond legal limits. building and auxiliary build.ng. operable. LER 260 82 023, E. 10/10 - Failure of a circuit LER-302-82 073, P7' breaker led to loss of emergency P7- DAVIS-BESSE BROWNS FERRY 3 power. LER 324-82-123, P6. 12/16 - Inoperable contain- 09/28 - Because of annur< 10/29 - Pipt crack in the 04/00 - 50 blades in the low ment atmosphere sensing p* essure turbine were found system, due to personnel error. i ciator failure, plant falsely residual heat removal system. declared an alert. Affected Units LER-324 82-130, M17. cracked, 9 of them seriously. LER 313-8.2-031, N83-23. M6. 1 and 2 also. M14. ARKANSAS 2 BRUNSWICK 1 CALVERT CLIFFS 1 04/19 - Auxiliary feedwater 04!15 - Leakage in the B" 02/11 - Unsoldered wiring 05/14 - Steam generator leak header was damaged by cold steam generator blowdown line, caused spurious actuation of from 7 tubes, which were then water, and parts of the header caused by steam erosion and reactor protection system and plugged. LER 317-82-023. M8. came loose inside the steam accelerated because the wrong emergency core cooling system. 06/02 - Loss of all emergency generator. LER 346-82 019, M6, piping had been used, occurred. Same event occurred three diesel generators. LER-317-82 P3, A3, E. LER 368 82-011, M6. more times the next day. LER- 027,P4. 06/04 - Valves in 3 of 4 high 08/20 - Leakage of the 325-82-023, M3. 06/18 - Inoperable contain. pressure injection lines in. primary manway of the steam 02/16 - Personnel error led to ment atmosphere sensing sys. operable. LER 346-82-023, M9, ge n erat or. LER 368 82 028, spunous actuation of emergency tem. N83 23. N82 35. M12. core cooling system. M3. 11/01 - Unusually large 08/14 - Defective bolt on 10!!8 - Safety injection check 07/01 - Sheared dowel pins number of actuations of . emergency diesel generator s als e stuck open. LER 368 and screws disabled the emer- engineered safety features (12 sheared off during maintenance 82 008. M3. gency diesel generators, between 11/1/82 and 1/12/83, and would not have withstood LER 325-82 078, P5. E. counting Unit 2 as weIII. M19. seismic event. LER 346 82-038, ARNOLD 06/28 - Reactor tripped after E. 01/21 - Water hammer dis- important power supplies lost CALVERT CLIFFS 2 abled low pressure coolart voltage. Post-trip analysis reveal- 06/02 - Loss of all emergency DIABLO CANYON injection system and service ed that undervo!tage relays were diesel generators. LER-318 00/00 - Pressure differentials water system of residual heat 025, M9, P4 in gas monitoring system. not being inspected as required N82-49. removal system. L ER-331 82- by the plant's operating license. 07/20 - Plant reduced power 008, M3.
. . This incident contnbuted to a because a broken valse led to DRESDEN 2 06!02 - Mam steam isolation 5600.000 fine imposed by NRC failure of both salt water heat- 10/00 - Inoperable contain-valve pos: tion switch failed. in 1983. LER-325-82-072, AO. exchangers. LER 318-82-034, ment atmosphere sensing sys-Subsequent mspection showed 83-2. Ml l, E- tem. N83-23.
cracked hydraulic cylinders and 07/23 - Incorrect test pro- 11/01 - Unusually large 12/03 Plet shut down ard broken control valve cap cedures had been failing te screws. LER-331-82-034. M9, P4, number of actuations of Alert declared because of heavy check valves in fire protection engineered safety features hee flooding near site. LER 237 I E. systems. LER 325-82-083 PS. Unit I listing). M19. 050.P7.
Public Citizen 1983 Nuclear Power Safety Report 39 GRESDEN 3 N8311. 039. M18 07/26. - Reictor cora isolation 12/03 - Plant shut down, and HATCH I
- cooling caeck vahes fail to MCGUIRE Alert declared /because of heavy flooding near site. P7.- 04f24 - Chemistry of primary close. LER 373-82-077, 01/11 - Instrument lines coolant violates regulations due 08/16 - Reactor core isolation frozen, causing spurious actua-FARLEY 1 to impunties. LER-321-82-028, valves f ail close.
M7 P3, N82 32, E. to tion of emergency safety 05/10 - Containment spray LER-373 82 097, M12. feat;res. LER 369-82 007. M1, syst;m inoperable. LER 348 07/03 - During a reactor 08/30 - Reactor core isolation P3. E. 021, M8. scam,11 safety relief valses fail- valves tai! to close. LE R-373- 02/12 - Loss of all three cen. FARLEY 2 ed to actuate. LER 32182 060, 82-096. M12. trifugal charging pumps. LER-01/11 - Main feedwater flow M10. P5, N82-41, A3, E. 12/31 - Automatic depres. 369 82-015, M3. N8219, A2, E. tr:nsmitter ir. operable due to 09/24 - High pressure coolant sutaation system valves in- 03/02 - Loss of all residual frozen sensing lines. LER 364 i@ction system failed. LER 321 opera b'e, "B" residual heat beat removal. LER-369-82-024 ooy, p3, 82 088, M14. removal system inoperable, g, 01/11 - Refue!ing water stor- 10/26 - Piping cracked in resj. LER 373-82178. M19. 03/08 - Debris found in steam age tank level transmitter failed dual heat removal system. LER- MAINE YANKEE generator. M4. due to freezing. LER 364 82- 321 82-089. 01/28 - Safety injection actua- 04/23 - Emergency diesel 003 P5,E. HATCH 2 tior' system design error. generator fa'ilure led to reactor 01/11 - Main steam line pres. 03/12 - The pilot sensing tube LER 309-82 002, M2, P3. shutdown. LER-369-82-030. E. sure Iransmitter moperable due was missing from the main 03/10 - Six steam generator 06/05 - Inoperable power to frozen sensing lines. LER 364 steam safety relief valve. LER. manway studs were found operated relief valve. LER. 82-004, M1, P5, E. 366-82-023. E. broken. LER-309 82 005, M4, 369 82-048. E. 10/28 - Inoperable contain- 06/17 - Residual heat removal M6, N82-06 B. 06/13 - 2 of 3 reactor protec. ment spray system. LER 364 82 pump failed to achieve rated 10/00 - Swollen spent fuel tion system channels in. 043. P6, AO-82 7. flow. LER 366 82-061, E. racks, possibly from hydrogen operabfe, reactor shut down. 12/00 - Manual containment 06/27 - Residual heat removal formation , caused fuel binding. LER-369 82-052 M9. sprry isolation valves found in water pump failed to achieve N83-29. 07/05 - Reactor coolant sys-wrong position. M17, rated flow. LER 366-82-059, E. 12/09 - Inoperable excore tem thermal sleese missing. FITZPATRICK 08!25 - Main steam isolation neutron detectors. LER-309-82 LER 369-82-056, M10 N82 30. 02/10 - Incorrect calibration. valve (MSIV) spontaneously since 1974, of high pressure in, closed., causing plant to shut KEY jection system turbine steam down. LERJ66-82-081. M12. line high flow instrument. LER. 08/25 - Safety relief salve in- DATE: The date of the event. 1982's eser.ts: P2, Jan.-Feb.; P3, 333 82-001, M3, M4, N82-16. operable. LER-366-82-091, E. 00" indicates that NRC sources Mar. Apr.; P4, Ma y-Jun.; P5, 05/14 - Containment spray 08/28 - Reactor core isolation discussing event did not give a jul.-Aug.: P6, Sep.-Oct ; P7, system inoperade. LER-333-82 cooling system inoperable. LER- more specific date. Nov. Dec. 023.E. 366 82100. E. LER NUMBER: Utilities do not A: The NRC's Report to Con. 08/00 - Inoperable safety 10/17 - Inoperable contain- always report every important gress on Abnormal Occurances, relief valves. M12' ment atmosphere sensing sys- eet, but if a licensee event NUREG-0090, Vol. 5. The issue report (LER) for an event could number follows the "A". Each 08.,23 -- Two emergency die- tem N83.n INDIAN P' lNT 2 be found, its citation is ;iven issue coveis three months of [33-82 3* ' 02/17 - Emergency battery (the first number is the NRC's 1982: A1, Ja n .-Ma r.; A2, failure. LER 247 82-007, N8311 docket number for that plant. Apr.-Jun.; A3, Jul.-Sep.; A4, FORT CALHOUN 08/30 - Containment isolation 04/23 - Emergency battery f II wed by the year and the Oct.-Dec. Those events officially failure. LER-247-82-016, N8311 event number), designated as " Abnormal Oc-valvrs inoperable. N83-08. OUD1 - Worker received 8.j NRC SOURCE: The various currences" are listed as "AO" FORT 51. VRAIN rems of radioactivity in the head source documents consulted in followed by the NRC's Abnor-06/05 - Improperly calibrated while checking the fuel storage compiling this list are mal Occurrence number. AO s undervoltage relay led to partial pool. N82 31 represented as follows: 82 3 and 82-4 are in A1,82 5 is , loss of power and rnanual reac- " n A4. A 10/00 - Possible cracks of M: The Operating Reactor 3(#"d y 2 3-2 tor scram. LER-267-82-024, M9. steam generator. M16 Events meetings held among top . , . a r. 12/C] - Steam generator tube 90 y INDIAN PO!NT 3 sa ea ar leak. LER 267-82-049, M18. basis. The meetings to discuss events or wer u ea 03/24 - Steam generater 1982 events were held on the nuclear power. GINNA leaks. LER 286-82-001. following dates: M1,01/22; M2, N: The NRC Office of Inspec. 01/25 - Steam generator tube 03/27 - Steam generator 02/11; M3, 03/03; M4, 03/17; tion and Enforcement's "Infor-n'pture. LER-244-82-003, M2, leaks. LER 286 82 002, A2. MS, 03/31; M6, 04/21; M7, mation Notices." The specific P2, AO-82-4. N82-37. 05/05; M8, 05/27; M9, 06/16; number of the Notice is given 10/01 - Rupture of plugged KEWAUNEE M10, 07/07; M11, 08/11; M12, after the "N". steam generator tube. M15. 10/05 - Inoperable contain. 09/08; M13,09/15; M14, 09/29; B: The NRC Office of Inspection GRAND Ct.'LF ment pressure sensing lines. M15,10/13; M16,10/27; M17, and Enforcement's "Information l 00/00 - Various failures of iso, LER 305-82-030, MI5, N83-23 11/24; M18, 12/16; M 19, Bulletin" number 82 02. L; tion valves. N82-25. LA CROSSE .. Copies of memoranda E: A computer printout from the 10/05 - Voltage spike ac- 09/10 - Core spray system meetings summanzmg each of these NRC Office for the Analysis and can be found at the Evaluation of Operational Data tuated emergency core cooling blocked by silt and mud. M13. system, causinE a pressurized 09/26 - Blown ruse scrammed NRC Public Document Room, which listed certain events as h mal shock pressure trans- filed under FOIA-83-266- particularly significant. or and caus spunous P: The NRC publication, Power All of these documents are Reactor Events, NUREC/tiR- available for public inspection HADDAM NECK LASALLE1 0051, Volume 4 The issue 09/17 - Through-wall cracks 05/15 - Inoperable radiation number follows the "P". Each at the NRC Public Document Room, 1717 H St. N.W., m battery power supply. M14 monitor. LER-373-82-021. E. issue covers two months of Washington, D.C. 20555.
20 Public Citizen 1983 Nucle:r Power Safety Report i MILLSTONE 1 reopened in spit 2 of contain. 02/04 - Cooling towir purnp AO82 5, 02/24 - 5 CE relays failed to ment isolation signal. LER 339- trips, triggering reactor ,t rip. 11/00 - Cracked feedwater actuate because they had par- 82-010, E. steam kne atmospheric dump nozzles. M17. tially melted. LER-245 82 005. 04/00 - Steam generator tube and low pressure safety injec. M3. QUAD CITIES 2 tion. M2. 01/15 - Reactc.r coolant sys-03!18 - 3 valves inoperable' ,08/22 degradation. M6,
- Transformer failed, 02/04 - Hydrogen explosion tem leak due to cracked weld.
due to water damage. LER 245- spraying hot oil and triggenng in main generator starts 6re. in. LER 265-82.not, M1. 82 008. E. fire protection water deluge jures workman and damages 22 09/25 - Cracked weld in core system. LER 339 82 053, M12. turbine building wall. M2. back p diese gene a r spray sysiem. LER-245-82-018. P7 04'23 - Steam generator tub ' power. M10. P5, AO82 5. M 14' leaks. 2 tubes plugged. LER 255-OCONEE 1 O!21 ' 09/27 - Safety relief valves fail. 82-012, M5. 03/23 - Inoperable contain- e ura LR 58 9 LER 245-82 019, M14. ment atmosphere sensing 08!19 - Degraded control rod P7.E' 11/15 - Actuation of emergen- system. LER-269 82-008,- N83- drive mechanism. M13. PANCHO SECO cy core cooling system resulted 23'E 08/19 - Potential for loss of in pressunzed thermal shock service w ater pump durir g a loss 04!05 - Cracked makeup noz-05i2i - Overpressure trans. zie. LER-312-82-009. M6 P2, E-transient. M17. sient M9 of coolant accident. LER 255 82 024. E. 0419 - Defor d a xit r MILLSTONE 2 10/14 - Safety relief valves in-01/06 - Loss of cool.ing func- operable due to design pro. PEACH BOTTOM 2 82-010, P3, A2, E. tions during shutdown. blem. LER 269 82-018. M16 06!19 - Design problem with 07/15 - 15 reactor building LER-336 82 002. E. OCONEE 2 Unit 2 electrical system triggers olar crane bolts fail. LER. MONTICELLO 03/0 - Cracked makeup noz. emergency core cooling system 312 82-017 E at Unit 3. M10 M12, P5, N83 09/30 - Pipe cracks disco- zie. M6. P2. 11/21 - Steam generator tube serad ir. jet pump. M15. 03/02 - Cracked high pressure 04. leak. LER 312-82 031, M17. 10/09 - Cracks found in recir- injection nozzle. LER 270-82, 10/24 - Safety relief valve 12/12 - Rupture of 6 it.sh culation piping. LER 263 82-016, 004.E. spontaneously opens. leads t steam line. M18-M l 7. 06/28 - Steam line ruptured, reactor scram. LER 277-82-036. ROBINSON 2 M16, N83-26. 11/02 - Cracks found in recir- injuring three workmen. M10, culation piping. LER-263-82-013, P5 N82-22, A3. PEACH BOTTOM 3 - ter ve s I sho e sgns M1n 10!14 - Pressurizer safety 06/19 - Emergency core cool- cracking. M6. NINE MILE POINT valve malfunction. P6. ing .ystem triggered by reactor 04/23 - Broken reactor cool-03/23 - Cracks found in recir. OCONEE 3 trip at Unit 2. M10. M12, P5. anz pump bolts, probably due to culation piping. LE R-220 02/26 - Cracked high pressure stress corrosinn cracking. LER-009, M5. M6, N82-3, N82 39. E. injection nozzle, displaced ther. PILGRIM M8M01 Pt l 09/09 - Pipe cracking foundin mal steeves. LER.287 82-004. E. 01/T8 - Frozen sensing lines. 08/20 - Steam generator emergency isolation condenser 03/00 - Cracked makeup noz. LER 293 82-002. P3. ower-o erated relief valve return line and shutdown cool- zie. M6, P2. 01/18 - Breakdownin. plant opened due to broken linkage ing return line. M13. 04/30 - Both auxiliary feed safety management declared an and then stuck open. M12. water headers deformed. LER. Abnormal Occurence. 5550.000 NORTH ANNA 1 287 82 006. P3, A2, E. W asessed:A N 2-3. - Re @ M 03/29 - 6 electronic relays breaker fails during testing P7. had improper latching mecha- 06/09 - Thermal shield bolt 04/03 - Inconsistent water heads broke off. LER 287-82408, level readings. M6. - nisms. LER-338-82-008. E. 04/24 - Failed gasket leads to E 06/03 - Incore probe became t o . P4 a e 3 2, u 9 1 1 MS7 y lea . LER-2 7 2 12 o nd o eg un ou si i e g ide tu pins 2 29 . rted an caus re tor ut A2. 12/11 - Steam generator tube down. LER 335-82-040, M12 05/19 22 - Inoperable over. leak. LER-287-82-014. M18. /2 so s an to 09/07 - Reactor shutdown led pressure protection system. P4- OYSTER CREEK LER-293-82-051, MIS. to loss of vital power supply. 11/16 - Main transformer fail- 01/09 - Overheated, smoking 10/13 - Loss of offsite power LER-335-82 041. M12. ed. A hole was blown in the l motor triggered water deluge due to heavy ocean storm. SALEM 1 transformer,s case, anc oil was system, which shorted out sprayed into ad;acent area. Ps. vanous instruments. M1 LER-293-82-051, M16. 02/01 - 23,000 gallons of POINT BEACH 1 radioactive water from spent 12/05 - Main transformer faif- 02/18 - Overheated thearings "to ia ed. Reactor- and turbine trigg* red water deluge system, 01/07 - Steam generator pressure sensing lines frozen. Md n inpped. P7. . whitn shorted out parts of , 12/06 - Both automatic safety emergency core spray system LER 266-82-001, M1, Ps,. p injection systems were in. and containment isolation instru. 11/11 - Steam generator tubes damaged by loose 6 inch "C" 03/16 - Loss of all component operable for almost 24 hours- mentation. LER-21942410. E. g w t r an rvi water LER 338-82-082, E. 08/I4 - Salt wata heat ex- clamp. 58 inch metal bar and other loose parts. LER-266 {oo 12!O7 - Emergency core cool- changers clogged by sealife. _ ing system actuated by mistake. LER 219 82-0005, M12. *
- spurious actuation of emergency LER.338f 2 088. E. 12/00 - Repeated reactor PRAIRIE ISLAND 1 equipment. LER 272-82-031, E. i NORTli ANNA 2 scrams due to excessive valve 08/27 - Human error disabled 08/16 - Notification by West-03/08 - Multiple pilot oper. leakage. M18. P7. emergency diesel generator. nghouse of needed modifica-Pall 5ADES LER 282-82-015. E. tions to avoid problems with ated relief valve failures. LER-339 82-009, E- 00/00 - Severe damage to QUAD CITIES 1 Solid State Protection System.
03/10 - Feedwater and boron check valves in low pressure in. 06/22 - Both diesel generators Salem management decided there l injection recirculation valves jection system. N82 20. . inoperable. LER 254-82-012. PS, was no need to make changes. , 1
j e, Public Citizen 1983 Nucliar Power Safety R1 port 21 LER 272 82 064. E. because operators thought reac. 28182-053 P6 LER 25182-010. Mil. N83 24 10 00 - Manway leakage from 3 of 4 steam generators. M16. for coolant system was leaking SUSQUEHANNA 1 l 09/06 - Pressurizer spras encessisely. Leak testing failed 00!00 - Swing check s alve sa e uuc open causing rapid 10/17. - Inoperable contain- to account for leaks elsewhere problems N82 20. j depressurization of reactor mint atmosphere sensing sys. m system. LER-36182-013. M7 ' coo! ant system and actuation os, tem. LER-272 82-078 N83 23 05!28 - Excessive noise and TMI2 high p essure coolant injection SALEM 2 *'bration in main feedwater line. 01/15 -- Leak from borated ;l avstem. LER 25182-013. M1 M9- " i 01/10 - Steam generator VERMONT YANKEE pressure instruments fail s 1U09 - Operator accidentally , TROIAN because of frozen sensing lines. destodged power cord. cumng 01/12 - Spunous safety r in ec- l 04!24 - Reactor scram. auto-matic start of diesel generator LER 31182 001, M1, power to feedw ater control tion while switching power sup. and nigh pressure injection. Ac-01/14 - Steam generator saie- system. Reactor was manuah inp. plies. LER 344 82-0005. M1. tuation of emergency core cool. ty relief valve stuck open, con- ped and emergency core ccohng 03/02 - Operator error made ing system was not noticed by trol rods fail to respond to system came on, dropping containment spray pump and operators for two hours. M7, P3. manual control. LER 31182- temperature of reactor coolant charging pump unasailable. P6. l 05?13 - Degraded power sup-004, M1, E. system fasenhan operanng hcense 04!26 - Fuel assembhes had ! ply caused anomalous low
~
0418 - Control rod position a!! wt LER 361-82-136. M17, P7 abnorma! cladding degradation ' water level readings from reat-indicator inoperable. LER-311 SAN ONOFRE 3 due to vibration of fuel rods. tor s essel sensors. N83 04 82-026, E. 12/17 - Inadsertent ac uation LER 344-82 006, P3, NP2 27 E. 05/19 - Lightning makes pro-05/03 - Service water leakage of engineered safety features 06/08 - Sneral sheets of cess computer and certain from containmer't fan coil unit. dimages all high pressure safety metal from thermal sleeving of alarms inoperable. M8. LER-31182 028. E. in.iact'on pumps. LER-362 82-006, safety injection system and seseral fuel pellets were I und YANKEE ROWE 05/03 - Low service water mio 11/16 - Release ct radioactivi-flow to con'ainment fan coil SEQUOYAH 1 Wkm sa in wase gas unit. LER-31182-038. E. 01/19 - Explosion of neutral [2,011*9' N82-3 . E' system inadsertenth le't open
,05/19 - Leakage from pipmg grounding transformer caused 08.20 - Licensed operator er- for 58 hourt P7.
to containment fan coil unit. ' by short in main transformer. for made auf matic actuation of Automatic fire system did not I '"8 LER-311-82 040. E. 05/26 - 100 gallon / minute ser. activate although fire lasted thir. n a b r 43 hours. LER-344 82-015, hinges 8 o(' : P6, E.and ' 02/25 30-inch steel 36 nut-bolt Twwasher o vice water leak from contain- ty minutes. M1. ment fan coi! unit motor cooler 06/18 - Containment sump 08/24 - Licensed operator er- assemblies found in primary due to failed weld. LER 311- level instrument found hkely ror made residual heat removal coolant side of steam generator. 82 039. E. to rupture dunng a loss of system unasailable for 5 hours. About 1100 protuding tube ends P6 were dama;;ed. and extenshe 08/20 - Reactor tnp breaker ; coolant accivent, preventing use fziled to work because of failure of containment sump suction for 10 03 - Due to over!y high repairs were necessary. Hinges of undervoltage trip mechanism. emergency core coohng system. tage, lamp sxket broke and LER-31182 72, M12. LER 327 82-070, M11. nto c tro nel, causing 08/21 - Containment fan coil. 09/14 - Reactor coolant pump signal alarm had sounded but unit leak. LER.31182-080. M12. seal failure caused a 70-80 P 'd 09'08 - Containment fan coil, gallon.m,nute leak. M13. i g, '9 ,"'] {8]g"3jg C was ignored. M3. P2. N83 24 un t leak. LER 31182 092, M12. 03/25 - Shut engineer receiv-11/05 - Check valve failed. TURKEY POINT 3 ed whole body exposure of five and part of it came loose, lodg-SAN ONOFRE 1 ing dowr". ream in steam dump 04/29 - B!ackout of 700.00C rems when he entered reactor customers. Condensate pump cavity which had not been 01/12 - Improper design led beader. LER.327 82126. M17. sun eyed for radiation. LER-to potentially incorrect circuit SEQUOYAH 2 malfunction led to loss of feed-water a n d. reactor trip. 295-82-014, P4, N82 51. indication. LER 206-82-001, E. 04/26 - Ice condenser deck 05/10 - Five broken support doors froze shut because drain Emergency diesci generators 09!30 - Control rod drive staned, which cut power to non. failure led to reactor trip. M15. bars and other debris found pan of air handling unit was im- vital loads including Unit 4 con. P6. loose inside steam generator. properly installed. LER 328-82-52, trol rod position indication 10/25 - Unplanned release of a M8, N83 24. E. panel, which tripped that reac. radiation due to leakage trom 05/13 - Flooding of pump bay SURRY1 tor also. M7. wnte gas system. P7. led to the total loss of all salt 01/12 - Fire hydrants inoper. 05/15 - Accidental partial in-watrr cooling capability for 24 ZION 2 able because of frozen water. sertion of control rods led to 01/09 - Steam generator pres-minutes. LER 206 82-015. M8- LER 280 82 004 PS. reactor trip M8. P4,A2. sure channel failed because of 08/13 - Operator error da- 04118 - Relief valve pre. 05/20 - Po.ver lost to control maturely hited, causing unplan, rod drive, causing all contro! frozen sensing kne. LER-304-82-001, P3-mages south salt water coohng rods to insert. M8. pump. LER-206 82 024 A2. ned release of radiation. LER. 03/15 - Reactor trip relay 280-82 047, E. TURKEY POINT 4 burned up because it was not 08/19 - North salt water cool. 06'20 - Safety injection ac-ing pump damaged by leakage cumulators inoperable. LE R- 04/29 - Trip in Unit 3 caused made for voltage as high as of salt water into beanngs. shedding of non vital loads specified in plant design. 280-82-072. E- w hech caused power loss to Unit LER 304-82-004, N83-08. LER 206 82-022. M2. A2. 09/01 - Service water pump 4 control rod pc sition indication 08/27 - Two auxiliary feed-SAN ONOFRE 2 lost suction pressure. LER-280- panel, resulting in a reactor trip. water pumps inoperable. 03/14 - Loss of shutdown 82-087, E. Gnd perturbation tripped two LER 304-82-021, M12. coohng system. LER 36182-002,
~MS,P3. fossil units as well, causing 20 to 10'06 - Control rod drive coils SURRY 2 50 minute blackout of 700.000 found defectne. Possibly caused 03/16 - Boron stratification in 09/01 - Service water pump customers. M7. by steam or boric acid from the refueling water storage tank lost suction pressure. LER-281- 07/12 - Steam generator tube primary coolant leak in 1981.
due to lack of recirculation. 82 057. P6. E. leak due to foreign objects, in- P6. LER 361-82 006, MS, P3. 09/14 - Service water pump cluding pieces of metal, valve 10/25 - Unplanned release ot 04/28 - Plant shut down lost suction pressure. LtR- pins, wire and rods. radiation. P7.
22 Public Citizen 1983 Nuclear Power Safety Report Emergency Planning Statistics Population (Cumulative Totals: 0-10 and 0-50) Plant Site State 0-10 mi 10-20 mi 20-30 mi 30-40 mi 40-50 mi 0-50 mi Arkansas "a 25.000 32.237 29.250 32.6'1 66.622 185.720 Beaver Valley PA 137.000 331.498 1.116.350 1.190.857 809.691 3.585.396 Bellefonte AL 28 000 42.004 76.985 324.341 462.439 B,g Rock Point 933.769 MI 9.700 29.532 18.043 42.'79 62.017 162.071 Braidwood IL 31.000 95.949 332.294 1.027.764 2.773.799 4.250.746 Browns Ferry AL 28.000 102.727 158.010 287.700 129,132 705.569 Brunswick NC 11,000 71.142 56.124 30.071 52.279 Byron 220.616 IL 21.000 227.448 217,990 165.114 310.107 941,659 Callaway MO 7.600 34.324 92.247 132.712 89.218 356.101 Calven Chffs MD 20.000 74.659 116.877 462.080 1.913.857 2.587.473 Catawba SC 74.000 433.470 302.972 285.054 313.466 1.408.962 Chnton IL 14.000 38.307 274.333 192,057 237.035 755,732 Comarthe Peak TX 15.000 17.099 66.698 345.547 480.107 924.451 DC Cook M1 54.000 126.249 346.899 210.936 382.640 1,120.724 Cooper Station NB 5.700 17.053 33.547 43.776 78.115 178.191 Crystal Rwer FL 14.000 30.370 31,926 129.188 191,258 396.742 Davis-Besse OH 15.000 84.918 584.077 373,119 772.905 1,830.019 Unablo Lanyon CA 18.000 82,791 72.500 58.360 38,445 Dresden 270.096 IL 39,000 231,781 627,198 1,824.557 3,749,569 6 472.105 Duane Arnold IA 79.000 98.271 62,869 176.653 159.504 576.297 Farley AL 7.600 80.305 49,514 105,929 92.716 336.064 Fermi Mt 74.000 318.788 1.605,051 1.950.455 Fitzpatnck 1.078.787 5.027.081 NY 42,000 60.116 137,977 413.576 213.353 867.022 Fort Calhoun NB 14.000 293.294 319,716 66.698 53.088 Fort St. Vrain 746.796 CO 11,000 211.847 437.542 816.795 385.159 1.862.343 Cinna NY 39.000 526.437 243,267 155.163 219,287 1,183,154 Crand Gulf M5 10,000 22,177 66.956 84J08 141,481 324.822 Haddam Neck CT 74,000 486.871 1,231.756 635.711 Hatch 1.021.779 3.450.117 CA 5.300 43.538 56.495 50.416 140.297 Hope Creek 25,000 295.046 NJ D8.427 572.971 1,722.036 2,053,140 4,771.574 Indian Point NY 240.000 734.157 3.004.196 5.745.383 5.644.930 Kewaunee WI 15.368.636 11,000 68.450 172.552 103.634 255.171 La Crosse W1 6,600 610.807 84.448 65.686 89.459 98.245 344.438 LaSalle IL 15,000 80.999 185.680 305.787 Limerick PA 376.500 1.163.966 164.000 672.964 2.733.336 2.071.822 1.229.507 6.871.629 Maine Yankee ME 30.000 60,480 154.690 200.195 Marble Hill IN 104.773 550.138 21,000 84.352 435,135 549.168 269.435 1,359,090 McGuire NC 46,000 502.111 378,781 366.088 1.598,743 Midland MI 75,000 305.763 271.995 158.037 133,630 444.841 1,083,503 Millstone CT 114,000 165.040 187,514 748.269 Monticello 1.348.231 2.563.054 MN 24.000 73.921 305.435 874.044 Nine Mile Pomt 855.832 2.133.232 NY 42,000 64.367 130.023 405.106 North Anna VA 217.845 859.941 11,000 50.640 110.786 429.614 Oconee 449.194 1.051.234 SC 51,000 82.766 293.253 252.730 Oyster Creek 237.184 916.933 NJ 71,000 227.634 287.487 771.253 2.136.878 Pahsades MI 3.494.252 34.000 82.794 120.105 353.426 522.802 1.113.127 Palo Verde AZ 2,100 9.259 11.781 189.917 Peach Bottom 695.125 908.182 PA 29,000 274.530 700.282 1,811.174 Perry OH 1.576.189 4.391.175 74.000 183,424 435.255 841.173 884.296 Pilgrim MA 41,000 2.418.148 170,759 698.797 1.308.929 2.033.485 Point Beach WI 4.252.970 21.000 59,963 130.553 194.470 201,566 Prairie Island MN 607.552 23.000 65.291 ' 230.108 1.011.059 808.815 Quad Cities IL 261,222 2.138.273 54.000 160,983 113.482 129.062 719.249 Rancho Seco CA 12.000 184.446 944.319 216,562 471.618 1,828,945 Robinson SC 27,000 49.580 148.514 179.748 Salem 263.622 668.464 NJ 25.000 380,110 580.970 1.692.136 2.068,780 San Onofre CA 49,000 4.746.9 % 286.301 481.212 1,474.780 2.531.643 4.822.936 Sti Lucie FL 88,000 65.892 67.868 90.875 217,557 530,191 Seabrook NH 90.000 248.069 717.427 3,667.207 1.335.721 1.275.990 Seouoyah TN 39,000 317,081 136.093 167.480 137.686 797.340 Shearon Harris NC 20.000 191,416 400.978 342.264 337,732 Shoreharn NY 1.292.390 98.000 491.116 1,288.231 1.200.761 2.159.348 5.237.456 South Texas , TX 2.700 30.193 82,199 19.521 90.360 224.973 Summer SC 8.900 76,'70 336.870 147.047 Surry 253.150 824.537 VA 73.000 193.203 306.827 624.975 1,700.560 Susquehanna 502.555 PA 52.000 301.198 279.820 397,121 557.551 ' 1.587.690 Three Mde Island PA 162.000 515.823 446.054 273.558 Trojan 710.209 2.107.644 OR 65.000 53.287 117.262 613.060 511.062 1.359.671 Turi ey Point FL 58.000 300.202 788.813 574.613 473.577 2.195.205 Verrnont Yankee VT 32.000 95.828 120.829 316.594 787.210 Vogtte 1.352.461 CA 2,200 28.111 275.915 114.204 108.052 Waterford 528 482 LA 56.000 310.759 832.162 309.605 325297 Wans Bar TN 1.833.823 16.000 66.862 144.498 176.961 435.407 843.528 WPP551 WA 1,700 91.662 62.002 43,197 59.853 WPP55 2 WA 258.414 1.700 92.648 56.929 48.182 58.544 258.003 WPP55 3 WA 11,000 45.591 112,689 87,592 213.025 469,897 Wolf Creek K5 5.500 10.686 47.187 52.128 57.968 4 Yankee Rowe MA 25,000 173.469 l 92.040 158.081 396.495 868.482 1.540.098 ' Zimmer OH 28.000 222.912 910.091 403.27I 343.003 Zion 1.907.277 ! IL 249.000 356,234 917.098 2.739.550 2.815.293 7.077,175 l
y Public Citizen 1983 Nuclear Power Safety Report 23 NRC aworst-Case" Estimates Emergency Plan Status Evacuation Time Estimates L f 3 Costs Earf Cancer - Billion State County A b- '
. DeatNs. Deaths Do!!ars P an(s) Plan (s) Normal normal 2.100 3.000 84.9 A A - 3.0 v 17.000 24 000 122.0 D D 5.8 7.3 3'II0 # ISO $$$ k k 1.6 1.3 Until the Three Mile Island accident, the mindset of the 6350 14.200 127.0 D D - -
NRC, as documented by the President's Commission on
'!9.050
$ 15.300
$$ 5[$
114.0
$ 0/2)
C O/2) k C 1 14] the Accident at TMI ("the Kemeny Commission"), was that serious accidents would not happen. But in late 1979, 11.500 9.600 110.0 C C - -
. shaken awake by TMI, the NRC proposed new rules that 4[ g 2g g 1gj:$ D D 1-would require the adoption of emergency plans around 1,600 n000 92.8 D D - - nuclear plants. The NRC sa;d: "Th.e accident showed 1.200 4.800 117.0 C C - -
clearly that the protection provided by siting and
$$ '$$00 'Sh.S !$$$ B }$ I engineered safety features must be bolstered by the utility 900 2.800 53.8 D O 3.0 6.0 to take protective measures during the course of an acci-10 $ $$ 1!ko D D ):! 5:8 dent." Under the new rules, emergency planning and 42.000 13.000 89.6 A 0/2) A 80 -
preparedness would be considered "as equivalent to, 2.900 7.000 53.8 C C 10.6 10.9 rather than as secondary to, siting and design in pubiic S1.0c0S i$ $ i!O 1030 C $$l C (2/3) . 3 pr tection." [44 F.R. 75167, 75169 (December 19,1979).) 17.000 B B 3.8 SJ In due course, the new rules were adopted. Utilities 3.000 3.000 43 5 C C 4.2 - were required to draft on. site and off-site emergency 4.500 14$3.800 10 83.0 B A B A
'. 64 plans for review by the local governmant, the state and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), with
$$ Sk0 C D
C D ik0 1$0 final approval from the NRC after testing the plan. The NRC had to find "that the state of on-site and off-site 50.000 14.000 314.0 B U/3) B 5.2 7.5 emergency preparedness provides reasonable assurance YO 14.000 15.000 k0 120.0 B (2/3) A 0/2) B (2/3) A IO 40
~
that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency." The new rules k$ $(N
~ -
$.$ Oc/2) 0 38 7 w uld either force utilities to prepare for emergencies or 12.000 8.000 87.2 D D - - shut them down until they would.
12.000 26.000 110 0 A 012) A 1.4 1.7 But it has not worked that way in practice. As Three 23$ 3!$
~
1!$ 00/3) k 96 11] Mile Island recedes into memory, so has the NRC's in-500 4.000 44 6 B B 1.5 2.0 terest in emergency planning rules. The agency repeated-1.400 20.000 134.0 C C 3.8 5.7 ly failed to enforce its own deadlines for installation of
}$ j$
13.000 23.000 I[j 79 8
$$$l 8 0/h
$ [$
6.0 Tj 9.0 warning sirens within the 10 mile evacuation zone. And B recently the NRC allowed the Indian Point plant to con-4 $ lS $ 72.000 37,000 N.h B B I .- tinue operation in spite of repeated conclusions by FEMA 119.0 B (2/4) B 3.0 9.0 that Indian Point's emergency plan is inadequate. 5.500 14.000 102.0 D D - - Only thirty miles from New York City, Indian Point has 3$ NS 2.000 4.000 II! 49.5 C
!C 4$
1.8 k0 2.3 almost a quarter of a million peop!e living within ten miles of the plant, and more than 15 million within 50 miles. 12.000 12.000 65.1 B B 12.0 - Three years after the NRC promulgated its rules on 100.000 40.000 150.0 k 0/2) B U/4) [B 0042) ' 6.0 - emergency p anning. and two years after all plants were to have complied with those requirements, Indian Point still 27.000 18,000 186.0 B B 5.0 2.7 5.000 3.000 59.1 D D 6.3 9.0 Population figures are from unpublished NRC data based upon the 7,000 6.000 163.0 D D 4,700 1980 census. Early deaths are radiation-induced non-cancer deaths 29.000 98.6 A 0/3) B 2.2 6.6 within one year of the accident. Figures assume state-of-the-art medical o 3 1 D D [ [ help is avehble. If only normal hospital treatrnent is available, these 18000 000 4.000 112.0 D D - - figures may be understated by a factor of 3 or 4. Cancer Deaths are 5.000 4.000 68.2 A A - - counted over the lifetime of the exposed population, except for leukemia 31.000 23.000 57.8 A 0/2) A 10.0 13.0 deaths more than 30 years aft er the accident. Cost includes lost wages. 67.000 28.000 143.0 B B - - relocation expenses. decentamination expenses and lost property. but 46.000 28.000 122.0 C C 13.0 27.0 not health-care costs, on-site costs. htigation costs and certain other 1.000 5.000 89.7 A A 6.0 6.6 29.000 4,000 48.6 D D 6.1 6.4 costa. Emergency Plan Status is from FEMA's July 1983 report to Con-I7- gress. The status of state and county off. site emergency planning is listed 7$ 96.000 4 000 9 000 0; 131.0 C a3 A (Formal approval of emergency plan by FEMA). B (Joint Exercise has been held to test plan). C (Plan has been submitted to FEMA). or D (Plan C - - 5.000 4.000 86 6 D D - - has not yet been submitted to FEMA). Where the 50-mile emergency 200 4.000 80.4 D D - - planning zone reaches multiple states or counties. the numbers in paren-300- 4 000 77.3 D D - - theses indicate if some but not at; plans have progressed as far as the let-173 4.000 73.7 D D - - ter code indicates. Evacuation time, estimated in hours, is from An 1.000 3.000 105 D D Analysis of [ ten mile) Evacuation Times Around 52 Nuclear Power Plant 1.000 4.000 21.4 8(2/5) B 0.9 1.8 Sites." NUREC/CR 1856. Vo. 2 0981) and are given for normal and 1 1 0/2) 0/2) 1] [ adverse weather conditions. Shorter adverse times reflect lower popula-tion densery during adverse weather seasons.
e 24 Public Citken 1983 Nucle:r Power Safety Report does not meet the minimum requirements. In April 1983, Date FEMA rejected the Indian Point emergency plan, telling the NRC that it "cannot assure that the public health and Unresolved Safety issues Des.ignated safety can be protected in the 10-mile emergency plann. W:ter Hammer 1978 ing zone (EPZ) around indian Point." Asyr metric Blowdown Tube integrity 1978 The NRC has already given the utilities (Consolidated Westinghouse Steam Generator Integrity 1978 Edison runs Unit 2, and Unit 3 is run by the Power Combustion Engineering Steam Authority of the State of New York) plenty of time - it Generator Integrity 1978 set a 120-day deadline for developing a workable plan, B&W Steam Generator hiegrity 1978 then failed to enforce it. Then it set another 120-day
- Mark i Short Term Program 1978 deadline, and failed to enforce that deadline either. Mark I Long Term Program 1978 Following FEMA's rejection the NRC gave the utilities still
- Mark 11 Containment Pool Dynamic Loads 1978 more time to solve the plan's deficiencies, threatening to . Anticipated Transient Without Scram 1978 shut the plants down unless they met the minimum stan. BWR Feedwater Nozzel Cracking 1978 dards by June 9,1983. Reactor Vessel Materials Toughness 1978 NRC Commissioner John Ahearne said " people are wat. Steam Generator and Coolant Pump Supports 1978 ching to see if we stand behind our regulations. If we do Systems Interaction 1978 not, I expect emergency planning will deteriorate nation. Qualifications of Electrical Equipment 1978 wide." Reactor Vessel Pressure Transient Protection 1978 But when the deadline came, Ahearne backed down, Residual Heat Removal Requirements 1978 and so did the majority of the five Commissioners. Even Control of Heavy Water Loads Near Spent Fuel 1978 though FEMA still found the plan inadequate, the NRC Safety Relief Valve Pool Dynamic Loads 1978 once again failed to enforce its own rules. NRC Chairman Seismic Design Criteria 1978 Nunzio Palladino explained it by saying that the utilities Pipe Cracks in Boiling Water Reactors 1978 had made the " commitment" to resolving the flaws in the Containment Emergency Sump 1978 emergency plan, and added that shutting down the plants Station Blackout . 1978 would cost money. Shutdown Decay Heat Removal Requirements 1981 Commissioner James Asselstine dissented, saying, "This Seismic Qualification of Equipment 1981 makes a mockery of our emergency planning Safety !mplications for Control Systems 1981 regulations." Hydrogen Control and Burns 1981 The failure of the NRC to enforce its own rules took on Pressurized Thermal Shock 1982 added significance in 1982 following the release of a study cormiered done for the NRC by the Department of Energy's Sandia 3ource. unresosed safety issues Summary. NUREG0606.
National Labs. It showed that " worst-case" accidents at nuclear power plants could cause as many as 100,000 ear-Generic Safety Issues with "High Priority" Rankings ly deaths and 5300 bilh,on worth of damage. The NRC's previous estirnates, in the controversial "Rasmussen - (includes TMI Action Plan items) report of 1970, were that a worst-case accident could Reactor Coolant Pump Seal Failures cause 3,300 early deaths and 514 billion in damage. For- Bolting Degradation or Failure tunately, these " worst-case" accidents are not very likely. Adequacy of Safety-Related DC Power Supplies Loads. Load Combinations, Stress Limits The NRC assumes that the likelihood of a severe reactor accident is one in 100,000 per reactor-year, and factoririg Behavior of BWR Mark Ill Containments Diesel Reliability in the worst conceivable weather conditions would lower the probability of the worst-case accident still further. ". Steam Line Leakage Control Systems But even with good weather, a severe reactor accident Training and Qualifications of Operating Personnel would be catastrophic. And, in fact, the NRC's estimates Revise Regulatory Guide 1.8 eq emem f 7 O perator Fitness of the chances of a severe accident may be greatly understated. The NRC's Advisory Committee on Reactor e warc on hammg 9mdators Review (Simulators for Conformance to Cn,teria Safeguards (ACRS), which acts as the agency's technical Expand Quality Assurance List conscience, has noted that there is " general agreement that large uncertainties exist in our ability to predict both Behavior of Severely Damaged Fuel the probabilities and the consequences of severe ac- e avi r f Core Melt , cidents." This is true for many reasons. One is that in spite Risk Reduction for Operating Reactors at Sites with High of a 25 year history of reactor accidents, there have not af n Densm, es Rulemaking Proceeding on Degraded Cere Acc, idents been enough really severe accidents to be able to reliably calculate theie likelihood. Another problem is that nterim Reliability (Engineering) Evaluation Program although one can test a machine to see how soon it Continuation of interim Reliability (Engineering) Evalua-breaks, there is no adequate model to calculate the
** 8'*
- i l likelihood of human error. And the NRC freely admits that o ai n ent Integri y Check it doesn t even try to calculate the probability of sabotage.
- Although the NRC is losing its mterest m emergency Examine TMI-2 Containment Structure Radiation Protection Plans plann,ing, the dangers base not gone away. The table on the preceeding two pages shows how great the human Assess Safety Decision Making for Currently Operating Reactors suffering and cost could be for people iiving near a nuclear plant, if their luck runs out. Source. A Pnonteation of Genene issues. NUREG0933 0983).
r . Pubhc Cition 1983 Nrcle r Power Safety Report 25 Generic Safety Problems Among the most ominous dangers of nuclear power are tions against the cost of developing and implementing those that arise from the designs of the plants themselves. solutions. Such problems are referred to as generic issues, and ex- The number of serious problems identified by these tend to all similarly designed reactors. Generic problems various programs (Unresolved Safety issues, the TMl Ac-have been considered particularly serious both by the tion Plan, and the Prioritization of Generic issues)is stag-government and nuclear critics, because in a, accident, gering. For example,122 items have been labeled either even if plant equipment and operators do their jobs as as " priority one," "high priority," or as an Unresolved they are supposed to. faulty plant design could result in a Safety Issue because they all have the potential to cause dangerous accident. serious accidents at nuclear power plants. But the NRC is The NRC continues to identify generic deficiencies but well-known for foot dragging on tough safety issues. The is slow to find solutions to the problems they pose. At pre- backlog, lack of staff and resources, and lack of commit-sent, more than 300 of these safety design flaws are un- ment to finding solutions delay the resolution process solved. A group of 27, designated as " Unresolved Safety while the health and safety of the public is compromised Issues," are considered by the NRC to be the most impor- by the continued operation of unsafe plants. tant safety problems. These Unresolved Safety issues are A few of the most important unresolved problems are defined by the NRC as problems for which no final resolu- the following: tion has been developed and that involve conditions not likely to be acceptable over the lifetime of the affected Steam Generator Tube Intes;rity plants. Yet resolutions have been fully implemented for (Unresolved Safety issuel only three. The Unresolved Safety issues are listed below. In addition to official Unresolved Safety issues, many The accident at the Robert E. Ginna plant in upstate other serious generic issues still exist. After the accident at New York in early 1982 has dramatized the problem of Three Mile Island, intense investigations by Congress, a steam generator tube integrity (see p.3). A steam special presidential commission and the NRC itself reveal. generator is like a radiator, with thousands of small tubes ed that the agency had largely ignored many aspects of that carry the highly pressurized cooling water that has nuclear power plant operation with crucial impact on passed through the reactor core, circulating it through a plant safety. In response, the NRC developed the "TMI second flow of cooling water that boils to form the steam Action Plan," a program aimed at resolving 347 specific that makes electricity. Ruptures and leaks in these tubes safety issues. These were divided into four broad areas: can be caused by any number of things, from foreign ob-operational safety, including operator training and jects left inside the steam generator to corrosion. Steam redesign of the control room to make it less confusing to generator tube ruptures are serious, and can even lead to operators; siting and design; emergency preparedness, in. a meltdown. If a number o' tubes rupture at once, cooling cluding improved communication during emergencies water will be drained from the reactor core. If steam and devising evacuation plans; and practices and pro- builds up in the reactor vessel, it could prevent water from cedures. the Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) from effec-The NRC began to implement the Action /lan about a tively removing the heat of the reaction, thereby causing year after the TMI accident, but even now, more than four the core to melt. yrars after the accident, only 55 percent of the items have Ginna was only the latest in a series of dramatic tube 3 been completed. And of the 155 items remaining, almost ruptures. The table below shows the history of major tube half are " priority one" items. ruptures in the United States. According to the pro-The list of safety problems goes on. There are now 67 babilistic calculations of the NRC, such accidents were new "8eneric issues" defined by the NRC after the TMI supposed to happen only once every 40 years, instead of Action Plan items were identified. And finally, there are once every year or two. scores of other generic problems that have fallen through the cracks. According to one NRC official, " Engineers are MAJOR STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURES IN THE not interested in the seemingly small problems. They tend UNITED STATES to shy away from (them)." These problems have been Masimum teak placed into different categories and programs. Plant State Date of Event Rate in March,1983, the NRC issued a report on generic Point Beach I WI February 26.1975 125 Callons/ minute issues not covered in the TMl Action Plan or as Unresolv. Surry 2 vA Sepember 15,1976 330 Callons/m nute ed Safety issues. Issues were placed into one of four rank, Prairie Island MN October 2.1979 336 Callons/ minute ings: high, medium, low and drop. Assignment of a high cinna , NY January 25. M82 760 CaCons/ minute priority meant that, " strong efforts to achieve an earliest Source: " Evaluation of Steam Generator Tube Rupture Events." practical resolution are appropriate because an important WRM651 (M80b "NRC Repod on the January 25,1982 Steam safety defic.iency is nvolved." In most instances, a cost- Generator Tube Rupture at R.E. Gmna Nuclear Power Plant, NUREG-0909 (1982h benefit analysis was done that balanced safety considera.
m - - j
,, 26 Public Citizen 1983 Nuclear Power Safety Report Plants with Steam Generator Problems Dramatic ruptures are not the only steam generator pro-blem. Even more common than tube ruptures are tube
$leam Problems leaks, denting and Corrosive attack. In fact, fully 45 of the Plant Vendor Generators in 1982 49 pressurized water reactors in the U.S. have had steam Arkansas 1 (AR) BW 2 generator problems at some point during their life, as TL Arkansas 2 (AR) CE 2 shown in the table to the left.
TL This continuing problem was evident in 1982 as well. As Beaver Valley 1 (PA) W 3 TL Calvert Cliffs 1 (MD) CE 2 can be seen in the table to the left,16 plants other TL Calvert Cliffs 2 (MD) CE than Ginna had to shut down because of leaking steam 2 Connecticut Yankee (CT) W 4 generator tubes. And in an effort to prevent damaged Cook 1 (MI) W 4 FO,OT tubes from leaking, seven plants permanently plugged Cook 2 (MI) W some of their tubes in 1982 to stop the flow of water com-2 TL,OT Crystal River (FL) pletely. BW 2 Davis-Besse (OH) BW 2 The Ginna accident was caused by a foreign object Farley 1 (AL) W damaging the delicate tubes in the steam generator, in 3 1982, eight other plants discovered debris of various sorts Fort St. Vrain (CO)* CE 2 TL Ginna (NY) W 2 TR,TL in their steam generators. At Point Beach 1 (WI) a large Indian Point 2 (NY) W "C" clamp was discovered in the steam generator. And at 4 Indian Point 3 (NY) W 4 Turkey Point 4 (FL), an NRC staffer quoted the utility as TL Kewaunee (WI) W 2 saying that it had "a bucket of parts" in its steam generator. Maine Yankee (ME) CE 3 PT,OT McGuire (NC) W 4 Other plants had still other steam generator problems. FO Millstone 2 (CT) CE 2 For example, at the Salem 1 plant in New Jersey, water North Anna 1 (VA) W 3 FO had actually leaked out of the steam generator, through North Anna 2 (VA) W 3 the "manway" (a human entrance to a steam generator), Oconee 1 (SC) BW and at Cook 1 (ll) a leaking safety valve was found. A leak-2 TL Oconee 2 (SC) ing safety valve played a big part in the release of radiation BW 2 Oconee 3 (50 at Ginna. BW 2 TL Palisades (MI) CE There has been no resolution to the tube leak problems 2 TL W of steam generators. There are " band. aid" measures of Point Beach 1 (WI) 2 TL,PT,FO Point Beach 2 (WI) W 2 PT,FO plugging or " sleeving" individual tubes, but eventually Prairie Island 1 (MN) W 2 the steam generators have to be replaced, at huge costs W both in terms of radiation exposure to workers and finan-Prairie Island 2 (MN) 2 Rancho Seco (CA) BW 2 TL cial costs,.which utilities try to pas: on to their ratepayers. Robinson 2 (SC) W 3 TL,PT At Turkey Point 3 and 4 in Florida, steam generator Salem 1 (NJ) W 4 PT, OT replacement exposed workers to 2,184 person. rems and San Onofre 1 (CA) W TL,FO cost an estimated 5190 million in capital costs and 5422 3 St. Lucie 1 (FL) CE 2 million for replacement power while the plants were , hut Sequoyah 1 (TN) W
, down.
3 Surry 1 (VA) W 3 Ralph Nader has aptly called steam generators "the Surry 2 (VA) W single biggest product failure in the annals of American 2 Three Mile Island 1 (PA) BW business." 2 Three Mile Island 2 (PA) BW 2 ) Trojan (OR) W 4 For a discussion of the Ginna accident, see page 3. For a Turkey Point 3 (FL) W 3 general discussion of steam generators, see Tube Leaks: A Turkey Point 4 (FL) W 3 TL. FO Consumer's and Worker's Guide to Steam Generator Problems Yankee Rowe (MA) W 4 TL,PT at Nuclear Power Plants, available from Public Citizen. Zion 1 (IL) W 4 PT, FO Zion 2 (IL) W 4 Pipe Cracks in Boiling Water Reactors (Unresolved Safety issue) Source: NRC Licensee Event Reports: " Steam Generator Esperi- i ence and Requirements," NRC briefing paper,1/18/82; In boiling water reactors (BWRs), boiling water cir-Atomic industrial Forum. l Culates through the reactor core, carrying away heat ,n i vendor: sw - Babcock & wilcox: CE - Combustion Enginee,. the form of steam. Since 1960, the pipes in these BWRs ing; W - westinghouse have experienced cracking, which could lead to a major Problem: TR - Tube rupture; TL - Tube leak; PT - Tube had to loss of coolant accident and a core melt. In 1978, the NRC be plugged; FO - senerator problems1982. m, Foreign object; OT - Otherdesignated steam this problem as an Unresolved Safety issue.
- Fort St. Vrain is a High Temperature Cas Cooled Reactor rather than Since that time, the problem has grown. In 1982, at the rP surized Water Reactor. Its steam generators have also had pro- Nine Mile Point reactor in Oswego, New York, cracking 1
1 I
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F . e Public Citizen 1983 Nucleir Power Safety Rep 9rt 27
*,, l l
inspections for all BWRs. Large cracks have been found at so as plants age, the reactor vessels become brittle at Peach Bottom 2 and 3 in Lancaster, Pennsylvania, and higher and higher temperatures, so that a Pressurized Hatch 1 and 2 in Baxley, Georgia. Because the stafifound Thermal Shock event can happen more easily. cracking at the vast majority of reactors it inspected, the The NRC is studying what can be done about Pressuriz-NRC decided to immediately shut down and inspect the 5 ed Thermal Shock to at least slow down the embrittlement BWRs not yet inspected, The nuclear industry responded process. Options include replacing the outermost fuel with tremendous pressure on the NRC, which reversed its rods with dummies, running the reactor at a lower power decision the next day, agreeing to wait to inspect the output, or, although this has never been tried, anneal-plants untilindustry studies were done, a delay of months. ing" the entire reactor vessel by heating it to attempt to The NRC Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards reverse the embrittlement process. blasted the NRC for this reversal and strongly objected to the method of inspection the industry was using. That PLANTS MOST VULNERABLE TO THERMAL SHOCK method, which used ultrasonic testing checks the depth aisted in order of suinerability) of the cracks in the piping but has proven to be an unreliable measure of the actual severity of the cracks. L Rens n 2 8. Rancno Sao IE Arkansas 1 The NRC has known for a long time now that these cracks,ifignored, can eventually rupture the pipes. Th,si is [ }",'['[ ,"[n"' 4. p ,'3 Fon calhoun k 2 l a
- 11. Point Beach 1 18. San Onofre I crucial because the pipes most often mvolved in this 5. Maine Yankee 12. Oconee t 19. Zion 2 cracking are the large pipes that recirculate unboiled 6. Indian Pcint 3 13. Zion 1 20. Palisades water back into the reactor. If they ruptured, the reactor 7. Yankee Rowe 14. Indian Pomt 2 21. Crystal Rwer 3 core might be unable to retain water, and if that happen-ed the core would overheat and melt, source: Memorandum from william Dircks, NRC Esecutive Director go, ope,at;ons, to the Commission, SECY 82-46s, November 23,1982.
Pressurized Thermal Shock (Unresolved Safety issue) Station Blackout (Unresolved Safety issue) The rapid cooling and increased pressure that occurs when emergency cooling water floods the reactor core is Safety systems at nuclear power plants depend on a.c. referred to as pressurized thermal shock (PTS). A reactor power to operate in emergencies. When a plant shuts vessel, typically 40 feet high and 15 faet wide, is made of down,it turns from using its own power to offsite electrici-welded segments of 8-inch steel, and holds the reactor ty produced by other power plants. If the switch to offsite core under enormous pressure. Fissioning uranium in the power fails, as it often does, then onsite diesel generators core bombards the vessel with neutrons. Over time this can provide emergency power. constant neutron " flux" weakens or "embrittles" the Diesel gen'erators, however, are a notoriously unreliable vessd s steel walls. The vessel must be kept at high source of emergency back-up power. In an accident, if temperatures in order to be strong enough to withstand the diesel generator fails during a loss of offsite power, the enormous pressure under which the reactor coolant then the plant would be unable to remove the reactor's water is kept so it does not boil. If the temperature drops, heat (which builds up even after the reactor is shut down). and pressure remains high, " Pressurized Thermal Shock" Severe core damage could occur and the core could melt. could rupture the reactor vessel, causing a meltdown. The NRC defined the loss of all power as a station Scientists and engineers have known for years that blackout and designated it as an Unresolved Safety issue neutron radiation weakens steel, but the embdttlement in 1977. Both the loss of offsite power and diesel process is occurring much faster than previously thought generator failure have frequently occurred independently possible. Reactor vessels were supposed to last the life of of one another since that time. It is highly probable that the plant - estimated at 30 to 40 years - but recent they will eventually occur simultaneously, yet there is still studies suggest some vessels have become dangerously no solution to this potentially lethal problem. brittle in less than 10 years. The Commission has only recently stepped up its atten-tion to these problems. In late 1981, the NRC formally ac, Plants Which Lost Off Site Power and knowledged that the containment vessels of 44 of the na- Emergency Diesel Generator Power in 1982 tion's pressurized water reactors are aging prematurely and may crack under certain conditions. In 1982. Brunswick i Oyster Creek Pressurized Thermal Shock was designated as an Brunswick 2 Pdgnm 1 Unresolved Safety issue. Calven Clins 1 Quad Cities 1 The greatest cause of concern is for reactors built before Cahen Clies 2 Quad Cities 2 1973 that have copper in the welds that hold the vessel crand culf San onofre together. Copper is more eas;ly damaged by neutron Nonh Anna 2 St. Lucie bombardment, making these reactors more susceptible to embrittlement. But the most inexorable factor is 5 urce: NRC Licensee Event Reports. time - the effect of the neutron flux is cumulative, and
r- , i 28 Public Citizen 1983 Nuclear Power Safety Report
.8 -
Plants Which Lost nozzels and valves that recirculate the water. Without this Emergency Diesel Generator Power .tn 1982 water, the uranium fuel could be exposed and melt. Resolution of these probems is not yet completed e nd delays in implementation are likely. Arnold Oyster Creek Big Rock Point Paksades Browns Ferry 1 Pilgrim 1 Operator Training (TMI Action Plan item) Browns Ferry 2 Point Beach Brunswick 1 Prairie Island 2 Brunswick 2 Quad Cses 1 The NRC has not only dragged its feet on finding and Calven a ffs 1 Quad Cities 2 implementing solutions to technical issues. It has been Calvert Ciffs 2 Rancho Seco slow in solving human-factor problems as well. One such Cook Salem example is operator training. The NRC concluded that the Crystal River 3 San Onofre chief cause of the TMI accident was the operators' failu.e Dresden 2 Sequoyah 1 Dresden 3 Seouoyah 2 to diagnose and respond properly to the unfolding emergency. A series of events similar to those at TMi had r rick u m I happened 18 months earlier at the Davis-Besse plant in Fort St. Vrain Surry 1 Ohio, but the opentors managed to avoid a serious acci-Grand Culf Surry 2 dent. Therefore, the Action Plan gave top priority to im-Hatch 2 Susquehanna 1 proving the quality and training of operators. Kewaunee TMI2 in December of 1982, however, the General Accoun-LaSane Troian ting Office issued a critical report on nuclear power plant Maine Yankee Turkey Point 3 WHstone 1 operator training. That report, " Problems and Delays Vermont Yankee Millstone 2 Overshadow NRC's initial Success in improving Reactor Yankee Rowe M nticeu Operators' Capabilities," found that the NRC had made Ln2 some initial gains in this area by requiring that more per-Source: NRC Licensee Esent Reports-sonnel be assigned to the control room and making utilities design more rigorous training programs. However, the report concluded that these short-term gains were 'argely negated by the NRC's delay anc per-Bolting Degradation or Failure vasive lack of commitment. For example, the NRC (High Priority issue) delayed for a year and a half before reviewing plans to upgrade training programs. And long term actions to im-prove operator training have been hampered by a lack of Nuclear reactors are seamed together with thousands of data, because the NRC failed to do a complete analysis of bolts. In recent years, it has been discovered that many of the specific duties and responsibilities of each key plant these bolts are s'usceptible to corrosion, cracking and position to establish proper standar'ds for training. Irakage at the joints. According to the NRC, failure of The GAO report also criticizes the NRC for failing to bolts could lead to a major loss of coolant accident commit enough resources to effectively administer the (LOCA) and release large quantities of radiation: TMI Action Plan. Since the Action Plan responsibilities 66 percent of the reported incidents have a direct potentialfor were divided among staff who already had other com-causing a large break LOCA due to botting or studfailure in peting responsibilities, "the training and qualification pro-restraints for large pipir:g. component suppons, or steam gr m began to lose priority and emphasns." generator man ways when these holddown devices have degraded The Three Mile Istand reactors offer an exampie of the + to the point that they will not provide the necessary support need for improved training. An NRC administrative law following a water ha,nmer or seismic event. judge found that there had been widespread cheating on The NRC also notes that degradation of bolts can poten- NRC operator-licensing examinations at Three Mile tially go undetected until they fail completely. The present Island, and that several members of the plant manage-inspection program does not require visual inspection, ment were i,mplicated. In one incident, the Supervisor of which is the only reliable method to detect degradation. Operations at TMI-2 cheated on an examination, and the TMI management lied to the NRC, falsely certifying that he had passed the examination. Containment Emergency Sump _ (Unresolved Safety issue)
,,,,,,nc,,
in a loss of coolant accident (LOCA) in a PWR, water Precursors to Potential Severe Core Damage Accidents: 1969-1979. that collects on the floor of the containment flows down NUREME2497 0982t Wmorandum frorn Miam Dirch, Emwin Director for Operations. to the Commission. SECY 82-463 (November 23. throuSh a sump and is recirculated to the core to prevent 1982t Unresohed Safety issues Summary. NUREC-0606 0982L A a core melt. However, testing has shown that debris, such Prioritization of Generic tuues. NUREG-0933 0983t Three Mile island as from piping insulation, will collect in the screens of the Action Plan. NUREC-0737 0983h Steam Generator Tube Emperience. sump, not allowing enough water to run the pump, spray NUREC 0880 0982t Ucensed Operating Reactors. NUREC-0020 0983). l l l l l
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s . Public Citizen 1983 Nuclear Power safety Report 29 How Reactors (Often Don't) Work . r 3
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Schernatic diagram of Westinghouse-designed pressurized roter reactor of Rothes. v Gas Er Electric Corporation's Ginna Nucles. Povver Plant lowe<e: NRC A nuclear reactor is an elaborate machine made to do reactor, control rods, which absorb the excess neutrons, one simple thing: boil water to produce steam. The steam are inserted into the reactor core, stopping the chain reac-generates electricity by spinning a turbine connected to tion. If the control rods are not inserted when needed, the an electrical generator. There are two main types of reac- reactor can very quickly overheat and start to melt. With a tors in the U.S., pressurized water reactors (PWRs) and reactor at full power, this can start to happen in as little as boiling water reactors (BWRs). 90 seconds. For this reason, automatic systems are design. , in a BWR, steam is generated in the reactor core itself. ed to shut the reactor down in response to various condi-in a PWR, the water flowing through the reactor core is tions in the plant. A failure of this system is known as an kept under such great pressure (around 2,250 pounds per anticipated transient without scram (ATWS). square inch) that it does not boil. This hot, pressurized The major problem to be avoided in a reactor is an in-water is then pumped through thousands of tiny tubes in a ability to cool the core. A loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) st:am generator, where a separate flow of water on the can happen if cooling pipes break or through operator er-outside of the tubes absorbs the heat, turning to steam. ror, and can lead to a meltdown and a large release of Most U.S. reactors are PWRs, made by Westinghouse, radiation to the surrounding environment. To mitigate the combustion Engineering or Babcock and Wilcox. Almost effects of a LOCA there is an emergency core cooling all the others are BWRs, of which General Electric made system (ECCS) which can " inject" additional water into all but one, the La Crosse (WI) plant, made by Allis- the core. The ECCS does not insure that the core will stay Chalmers. One plant, Ft. St. Vrain (CO), is a high- covered with water, however, one reason being that temperature gas cooled reactor made by General Atomic, steam bubbles can form during an accident, preventing that uses helium to transfer heat from the reactor core to the ECCS water from reaching the core.
- steam generators. Figure 2 illustrates some of the systems in a PWR. The The source of the heat in the reactor core is nuclear fis. primary coolant loop of pressurized water carries heat sion, which occurs when uraniurn atoms in the fuel rods away from the core, preventing it from overheating and split and give off neutrons, which in turn split other melting. The primary coolant is in turn cooled by a secon-uranium atoms in a chain reaction. To shut down 'he dary coolant loop, which draws off heat by boiling in the
i , 30 Public Citizen 1983 Nucleir Power Safety Report e: steam generators. After driving the Nrbine, this steam is condensed to water again by a tertiary coolant, which is either water from a river, lake or ocean, or air flowing M/ through cooling towers. gJ Figure 3 shows the reactor vessel of a BWR, which does not need a steam generator because steam is generated in Almost all of the sources used in this report were the reactor itself. BWRs have an additional element not Nuclear Regulatory Commission documents. The two found in PWRs, the recirculation system that takes water main avenues of research were the Freedom of Informa-that has not boiled in its first passage through the core and tion Act (FO!A) and publicly available material in the redirects it, together with the mcoming feedwater, toward NRC's Public Document Room (PDR). the bottom of the reactor, forcing it to flow through.the in compiling the total number of mishaps we counted reactor core again. only those mishaps occurring in 1982 for which a Licensee The recirculation piping has been a major source of Event Report (LER) was submitted to the NRC. If a mishap problems in BWRs, because they develop cracks due to was mentioned elsewhere, but we could not find an LER stress and corrosion. A major recirculation pipe break for it, we did not add it to the total number of mishaps, to would constitute a very serious loss of coolant accident avoid any chance of double counting. We also read each that could quickly lead to a meltdown. At Nine Mile Point LER to cate8orize it by cause: equipment failure, human (NY), the entire recirculation system had to be replaced error, design defect or other cause. because of pipe cracking. Several sources address those mishaps that the NRC To mitigate the effects of serious reactor accidents, considers to be of particular safety significance, because there are many engineered safety systems at nucbar of the risks they entailed or their safety implications for plants, including the containment building itself, which is other nuclear plants. The sources for the list of " par-meant to contain any releases of radiation. It typicaly has a ticularly significant mishaps" included: containment spray system which can spray water into the containment to condense radioactive steam that has leak-
- A computer printout, obtained through the FOIA, ed from the cooling system, as in a LOCA, so that it showing the ratings of safety significance given to most doesn't escape to the atmosphere. mishaps by the NRC's Office for the Analysis and Evalua-These safety systems are designed to insure that a single tion of Ope ational Data (AEOD). AEOD gives a rating of failure will not disable the plant. But the extreme com- "1" to mis laps with such obvious safety significance that plexity of nuclear plants means that there are a very large they shoukt immediately be investigated further, a rating number of things that can go wrong, as demonstrated by of "2" to n ishaps which appear to be safety significant, the increa>ing number of mishaps that occur each year at and a "4" to those with no apparent safety significance.
nuclear plants, many insolving the malfunction of the very ("3" is a temporary rating which is changed to either a safety systems that are designed to protect the public. "2" or a "4".) No ratings of "1" have ever been given Even the plant operators do not always understand how since the. rating system began, in 1982. Those mishaps the plant works, as with the Farley (AL) plant, where the rated "2" were counted as "particularly significant containment spray system was inoperable for eighteen mishaps." Unfortunately, AEOD had not categorized all months because the operators could not tell that valves of 1982's events by the time we went to press. Nor does controlling the system had been left shut. AEOD investigate all of the important events. As AEOD of-ficials have said, "about 30 percent of all LERs have some element which suggests that a followup review is war-
, , ranted; yet, we study in depth only a portion of these."
; Thus, AEOD's ratings are an incomplete record pf par-
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ticularly significant mishaps. n
, l' '
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- Memoranda, obtained through the FOIA, that sum.
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marize NRC meetings held every two or three weeks by top NRC safety officials to address important recent reac-
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,- the worst mishaps of 1981, they were discontinued.
Because the NRC does not now distinguish among these T mishaps by their safety significance, we have counted all
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of them as particularly significant mishaos. This methodological difference makes direct compar! son with last year's tabulation of "especially sign!ficant mishaps" impossible. Fig. 3: A Boiling Water Reactor (Grand Gulf) . .
- Informat. ion Bulletm.s and Information Notices sent
~ - Public Citizen 1983 Nuclear Power Safety Report 31 t^ to r'eictor own:rs by the NRC Office of Inspection and En- O forcem nt to inform them of important safety mishaps at Q(d l{
- Power Reactor Events, NUREC/BR-0051, a bimon-thly NRC publication discussing important mishaps in greater detail than LERs.
{
- The NRC's quarterly Report to Congress on Abnor-mal Occurrences, NUREC-0090, which lists officially designated Abnormal Occurrences and other safety.
rziated mishaps as well. ALABAMA
- GETR Vallecitos
. Browns Ferry Betty zimmerman
- Maude S. Miller Nuclear Regulatory Commission We carefully cross-checked these sources to make sure Athens Public Library Region V, Onice of Public Affairs we did not count the same particularly significant mishap gh ns$t twice. The list of the 253 particularly significant mishaps 3561: Maria Lane
- Far- walnut Creek, CA 94596 addressed by one or more sources begins on page 18. Bettye7orbus COLORADO G.S. Houston Mem. Library
- Fort St. Vrain 212 W. Burdeshaw Street Shirley Soenksen Dothan, AL 36303 Greeley Public Library I RC Re. Search
- Bellefonte Peggy McCutchen Scottsboro Public Library City Complex Building 919 7th Street Greeley, CO 80631 1002 South Broad Street Scottsboro, AL 35768 CONNECTICUT if you need facts not found in th,si report, or want to
- Haddam Neck AgtzoNA Phyllis Nathanson study a particular plant in greater depth, important infor- Russell Library
. Palo Verde mation can be found through the Freedom of Information Mary Carlson 119 Broad Street Act (FOIA) and the NRC's Public Document Rooms. Each Phoenix Public Library Middletown, CT 06457 plant is required to file reports of various sorts with the science and Industry Sectior-
- Millstone NRC, and these are organized in separate docket files for Do " "
$Eas ,
8 ae d Public Library each plant. The docket file is broken into subcategories, 49 Rope Ferry Road such as category "S" for all Licensee Event Reports. ARKANSAS Waterford, CT 06385 Booklets describing the NRC's document classification
- Arkansas Nuclear One FLORIDA system are available at the Public Document Room, and
- Crystal River fo'm$n\"n ry the librarians there are knowledgeable and helpful, and Arkansas Tech University h B. BonsaH can even help you conduct computer searches for hard to Russellville, AR 72801 find material. You can request documents over the f68 . Frst A enue CALIFORNIA Crystal River, FL 32629 phone, which can be duplicated and mailed to you for 5 . Humboldt Bay
- St. Lucie cents per page. Dee Sockbeson Mrs. R. Scott The main Public Document Room is located at 1717 H Humboldt County Library Indian River Community College Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20555, (202) 634-3273. S'yt933g3 C
in addition, there is at least one local Public Document Re urc s e ter
- UCLA Research Reactor 3209 Virginia Avnue Room (LPDR) near each nuclear plant. A list of LPDRs Mrs. Fontayne Holmes Ft. Pierce, FL 334A across the country appears at the end of this section. West L.A. Regional Library
- Turkey Point if you need documents that have not been publicly 11360 Santa Monica Blvd. (Emergency Plan Only) released, you may request them under the Freedom ofit'- L s An , CA 90025 e 2 ,g ,}Ce e Public Library formation Act (FOIA), a landmark enactment giving Aan Douth Homestead Branch citizens the right to obtain any government documents San Clemente Public Library 700 North Homestead Blvd.
that do not fall within certain narrowly-defined exemp- 242 Del Mar Homestead, FL 33030 tions. To request NRC documents under the FOIA, write San Clemente, CA 92672
- Turkey Point to Mr. Joseph Felton, Division of Rules and Records,
- St2" gT nv n tan Urban NRC, Washington, D.C. 20555. If you plan to publicize stanislaus C7u"nty Free Library ^ffairs Library or otherwise share the requested information you may re- 1500 I street Florida intemational University quest a fee waiver since the information will be used in Modesto CA 95345 Miami, FL 33199 the general public interest.
- Rancho Seco
- Offshore Power Systems For more information on the FOIA, a useful pamphlet. Diana Gin (Floa Nuclear Plants) g "The FOIA - What It is and How to Use it," may be ob- 5,"c0 m '"'",khN't HayJon Bums Library
,y tained free from the FOIA Clearing House, Box 19367, 82815treet 122 North Ocean Street Wtshington, D.C. 20036. A step-by-step guide to using Sacramento, CA 95814 Jacksonville, FL 32204 the FOIA, as well as an excellent manual for litigation
- Diablo Canyon GEORGIA uyder the FOIA, may be obtained from the Center for Na- Chi Su to:nal Secun,ty Studies, 122 Maryland Ave., 9 . and Maps Dept. Mrs ynell Bush N. E.,
Cal. Polpechnic State University Appling County Public Library W shington, D.C. 20002, (202) 544-5380. Robert E. Kennedy Library 301 City Hall Drive ! San Luis Obispo, CA 93a07 Baxley, GA 31830 1
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- i. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION CO2 TD BEFORE THE ATOMIC ~ SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of )
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CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY ) Docket NohI'U80 04D 0 nOL r
.and NORTH CAROLINA EASTERN ) %.'$0l'hL" MUNICIPAL POWER AGENCY )
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'(Shearon Harris Nuclear Power ) ,
Plant, Unitl). )
'This is to certify that the foregoing document was served on all parties _.by placing it in the United States Mail, postage prepaid , addressed as follows: -
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'EERVICE LI'ST James L. Kelley, Esquire John D. Runkle, Esquire Atomic Safety . and Licensing Board Conservation Council of North U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission _ Carolina Washington, DC 20555 307 Granville Road Chapel Hill, NC 27514 M. Glen O. Bright .
Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Dr. Richard D. Wilson U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 729 Hunter Street Washington, DC 20555 Apex, NC 27502 Dr.. James H. Carpenter Mr. Wells Eddleman Atomic _ Safety and Licensing Board 718-A Iredell Street U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Du rham, NC 27705 ) Washington, DC 20555 Thomas A. Baxter Charles A. Barth,-Esquire Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge Janice E.-Moore, Esquire 1800 "M" St. N.W. Office of Executive Legal Director Washington, DC 20036 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washir.gton,' DC 20555 Richard E. Jones, Esquire Vice President and Senior Counsel Docketing and Service Section Carolina Power & Light Company Office of the Secretary P.O. Box 1551 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Raleigh, NC 27602 . Washington, DC 20555 6 ,,
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'Dr. Linda W. Little Mr. Daniel ~F.: Read, President Governor's Waster Management Board 3: ' CHANGE .513 Albermarle Building
_P.O. Box 2151 325 North Salisbuty. Street-Rcleigh, NC 27602 Raleigh, NC 27611 tBradley w. Jones,' Esquire
- Steven F. Crockett, Esquire U.S.' Nuclear Regulatory Commission
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Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Region II Panel 101 Marrietta Street U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Atlanta, Georgia 30303 Washington, DC 20555 Mr. Robert P. Gruber Administrative Judge Harry Foreman Executive Director Box 395 Mayo Public Staff - NCUC University.of Minnesota P.O.' Box 991. Minneapolis, Minnesota 55455 Raleigh, NC 27602 This the - f )tday 4E of August, 1984. 7 4- -,-wf. / i,._3-M. Travis Payne [A O
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