ML20094B500
| ML20094B500 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 11/24/1975 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| References | |
| NUREG-75-087, NUREG-75-087-02.4.9, NUREG-75-87, NUREG-75-87-2.4.9, SRP-02.04.09, SRP-2.04.09, NUDOCS 9511010098 | |
| Download: ML20094B500 (3) | |
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NUREG 75/087 fpreg a
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U.S. NUCLEAR RESULATORY CCMMISSI'3N
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STANDARD REVIEW PLAN OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION v
SECTION 2.4.9 CHANNEL DIVERSIONS REVIEW RESPONSIBILITIES Primary - Site Analysis Branch (SAB) l Secondary - None I.
AREAS OF REVIEW In this section of the applicant's safety analysis report (SAR) the geohydrologic design basis is developed to assure that the plant and essential water supplies will not be j
adversely affected by natural stream channel diversion, or that in such an event. alternate Water supplies are available to safety-related equipment.
The review includes:
i l.
Historical channel diversions including cutoffs and subsidence.
2.
Regional topographic evidence which suggests that future channel diversion may or may not occur (used in conjunction with evidence of historical diversions).
3.
Alternate water sources and operating procedures (coordinate review with that of SAR Section 2.4.11.6).
l II. ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA The analyses will be considered acceptable if at least the following are addressed:
1.
A description of the applicability (potential adverse effects) of stream channel diversions.
2.
Historical diversions and realignments.
3.
The topography and geology of the basin and its applicability to natural stream channel diversions.
4.
If applicable. the safety consequences of diversion and the potential for high or low
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water levels caused by upstream or downstream diversion adversely to affect safety-related facilities or water supply.
III. REVIEW PROCEDURES Site-specific publications and maps are reviewed to identify historical channel diversions j
and evaluate (by independent conservative calculations and professional judgement) the USNRC STANDARD REVIEW PLAN s,.w
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potential for future diversions. Where an alternate safety-ralated cooling watsr supply is provided, the criteria for SAR Section 2.4.11.6 apply and are checked for consistency.
The above reviews are performed only when applicable to the site or site region. Some items of review may be done on a generic basis.
IV. EVALUATION FINDINGS For construction permit (CP) reviews and when applicable, findings will consist of a brief general description of historical channel diversions. If the staff concurs with the appli-cant that channel diversion is unlikely or that the plant is protected and alternate essential water supplies meet the criteria of Regulatory Guide 1.27, the findings will so indicate. if the staff evaluation does not support the applicant *s contention of channel stability, an alternate source of water may be required.
For operating license reviews, findings will consist of the same material, updated as required to reflect new Information available since preparation of the CP findings.
A sample CP-stage statement follows:
" Diversions of the A River are well-documented in historical and topographic data.
Oxbow lakes, low-lying swamps, sand bars, and chutes provide eloquent evidence of historical diversion. Others are planning a further bank protection measures, additional to the existing levee system, in the vicinity of the plant intake structure. However, the diversion of the main channel by degradation / aggradation within the confines of the levee system, or by breaching the west levee during major floods, cannot be discounted. The ultimate heat sink (as discussed in Section 2.4.9) is not directly dependent on the river intake. We conclude that channel diversions present no safety-related hazard to the plant."
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V.
REFERENCES No specific publications can be cited for general use; however, site-specific publications and maps can be obtained from the United States Geologic Survey, Soil' Conservation Service, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Corps of Engineers, and state and other agencies and organizations, to ihntify historical and potential future channel diversions.
1.
Regulatory Guide 1.70, " Standard Format and Content of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants " Revision 2.
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2.4.9-2 11/24/75 4
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