ML20093M123

Transcript of 830713 Deposition.Name & Contents Partially Deleted

ML20093M123
Person / Time
Site:	Catawba
Issue date:	07/13/1983
From:	AFFILIATION NOT ASSIGNED
To:
Shared Package
ML20093M082	List: ML20093M113 ML20093M123
References
NUDOCS 8410190392
Download: ML20093M123 (23)

Text

{{#Wiki_filter:.. ..=.:. .-.a .:-- -j Ij A ttachr.E nt #21 9 l l 'l l l j

1. NI T E D TTATES OT A M ERIC A l.

N 1. C ' E A R EECULATORY C OM MISSIO N l O ft k BEFORE THE A T O !.! ! C SAFETY AND LIC E NSING D O A.:. 8 i i i e 1 In the Matter of: ) ) D U r! E P O V. E R COM PA NY, et al') Docket Nos. 50 413 ) 50 414 (C a tawba Nu cle a r S t a tio n, ) i Units 1 and 2) ) l .] m= = 2~=,'=..._.'-. .x .f -n - ; p,.;-.- s:'O m T C : j i: Ti ^ g -,;;;:::.7..:.:..C -

==* -t L.._M.. . N...A s, i. L..~~..*=. l .ai:. -4 1 ~.:=.~ ~: * * =

• J.

L. : =..: ::~: =. l J t; L Y 13, 1983 5 S:32 A.M. I I I I i H l e l l i i l I D E PO SITIO N OT: l l b 0A0522 g410h03920Cg 050004t3PDR -e PDR Esel)n Berger Assodates G srcaerns ac onnwa scavice g I p.o.somseu.

M. '.: t. 1 C C :.c ; r. o r r. ! : ;. W. 6 i 2 J. Cooc r.c t ni n g. i t a 3 [ C You have been p r e viou sly sworn and you 4 ,are under oath. I i 5 j 3 y,,, 6 C I want to show you a d o e u rr. e n t and tell 7 4 you this was made a v aila ble to us in Discovery. 1: i 6 is represented to rr. e to be the handwritten notes of .Y 10 Did g. M in te rvi e w in the course l 11 of r e vi e win g the Task Force work? I 12 /.

Yec, sir.

I 13 O V ould that have been a pp r o xi m a t e l y the 14 Sth of February,

1962, to the best of your r e c o l l e c :i :. r.

I 15 A I couldn't r e e t 11 the a pe cifi c date. I 16 ! C I w a.r.t to direct your c tt e n ti on to e c :. e 17 . s p e cifi c p r. r t s o f t h a. t. Take a m o m e r. t

a. n d look i

IS ! through it. 19 It b e r i r. : with your c r e d e r. t i t l e, fi r : t. I 20 !Have you seen those notes bef 6:e ? l 5 21 3 go, j 22 C/ V. e are g oin g to go through those, hon. i 23 It might be helpful if he could use your copy and he 24 would have one in front of him. ___________.-_______M___

~ t: cet i

===_ ll 1' 1! documen: to be a tt a c h e d. Feb? It was c: I the bottom cf the stack. 3l .M R. GUI'3: No, J'll get to that in l' 4h a minute. i 5 b i. 6 EY

h. E.

GUILD: i 7! C $ M, hand that ba c k to me, p l e a s e*, i 8 and we will mark this as the next Exhibit to ?.; r. l' 9 M Depo sition. j. 10 i (W h e r e upon, the h a n d w ri tte n oo:e t I 11 j dated 2/5/B2, were marked and I 12 received by the Court R-e p o r t e r as I 13 4 Exhibit' A and entered inte 14 the R e c o rd. ) 15 i 16 EY I.. CUILD: 17 I C ! know you cannot r e c c 11 the j 18 date exa c tly, but given the time frame when the T a s i. 19 l, .T o r c e wLe c* o i r. g itr work and when @. w c 20.1:l on site r e v i e w i n i. the T a a '. Torce's work p;an, w o u l :. r 21 the 5th of February have been likely the date on 22 w hi c h you were int e r view ed ? 23 A It could very lik e l y have been, yes. 24 C You talked g e n e r ally about the w eldin g 25 t o e o ccolon amnaern and your n,,, ntenn nr ,w. s..r.

M - Dir a c t li 1 1 I n g i r. c e r at 1.: c G i r e now, I b eli e v e is his title. 2 O F. a s he ever worked at Cat awba ? t i 3 A To my kno wle d g e, ne. I L 4 i C If would have been the T hi r d 5 ; Level S u p e r vi s o r at M c G uir e -- .6 A

Yes, I

7 l C --.who would have been,the Se con d L eve! l 1 t l' 8 Su p e r vic o r in the w e ldin g area, if you kn ow ? l 9' A As I r e c a ll that would ha ve beer. W l 1: g 10 ~ i l j 11 c M would have occupied the p o r i:i d l 12 t h s. t war c o r. p a. r a b l e to G.6 7 l' 13 i A Yer. t 14 0

v. h e. t job w a. s that?

15[, J. T e chnic al.c up e rvi r o r is the po ri:lo t title. 16 l ,.11 r i ; t t, cir; he w :, u l d h s. v e also h a. :. 17 r e s po c r ibili ty fo r r e v i e w ir. g nonc onforming ite mc at i 18 ... c C u i r e ? I 19 Up un til 1901; c, f c our s e, the Senior e 20 ' E n gin e e r r e vie w e d--le t :.e L t. c l. up a li t t l e bit--the 21 t 11 C I form us ed to be a Senior E ngine er r e vi e w; and 22 i while it had that en it, the F e:d o r E n t i r. e e r would 23 review. 24 As the procedure w a s, r e v i s e, d that was I ar. p Q 1

g. ect i 1jdone that, I d on 't know at h* c C u i r e. 2 Mr. h did it at C a t a wb a, 3 C Mr 6 sas the T e c hnic al S u p e r vi s b r i 4 A' Yes. 5 C V. h o w ou ld have been the Fenior En gine e r ? l 6 'YJould that have been 6 7 l f 7 A

Yes, he was the Senior CC En gin e e r at I

8 ' M c Gui r e for a long pe rio d of tim e. ~ 9 C-In your judg=ent, did the 10 diff e r en c e s in there management pereonnel a c c cunt I: 11 the diff er enc e s in c o mmu nic a tio n at L. c G ui r e ? 12 2 They could, tEr.t c ould be a factor in t h r. t. 13 C . A ll right, sir; now I'm intererted in i 14 I dir e c tin g your attention to the second half of Pate T i 15 i In October, 'EC, N T. C Inspector M t z w e l l i r. f o r r. e d 16 ' % t h s. t

7.

• r are t rin ging p roble m s to him."

17 Y ha t kind of p ro b1 c m e did

h. r.

.t: s r e e l '. ltell 18 you 'rJ e l d i n g Inspectors were ha vin g ? 19 He d i d t. ' t ;o into e p e cific c ; Le jurt otid 20 t h a. : rsme of the belding In s pe c to r e htd mentioned 1 21 thin g s to hi m that they w e r e n't be.ppy about, and he 22 was l ettin g me know that. 23 C Y.hy7 '.? b o u l d k n o ve 24 A He felt li k e that maybe we 25 that and chould do, make an effort to [p e y _ _ _ _m o_r e__ a t t e n

M-c -.= ~ l 1 ' ti on p e r h s. ;. : to be sure t h ;. t the.. e l d i r. g 2capectcre 2 'were s a tis fi e d with things. i 3 11 e th ou g h t they mi g h t be keeping n ot e s fn i 4. books, and he said, "You might re e d :o be aware of 5 that and make sure that you are doing what you g 6 !should do in terms of s a tis f yin g t h e m. ' 7 O Eut he did not have any s p e c if*. : problem 6 thct he wLnt e d you to address? i 9j A No, no s p e c ific pr oble m o r s p e cific i 10 l in divi du al. . l E I 11 C It h r. c here, " Q,"I asnume t h a. t ' s y o u,I 12 l" felt that.t h e N r. I " i n e p e c t o r ; ic th.t refereccin; I 13 I M r.

h. m xw e ll ?

i 14 l 1. I asrume so. l 15 C "...had, in f e e t, c e lici t e d thic." V. h t t I t i 16 : cnes that mein? ? 8 17 ' lell, ). r. . - t r. w e l l, ae I r e c all,

c. : :. r.

l 18 VcnDoorn doco, w o u l d b e. crocnd th e job, vculd have i 19 f r e e. zccers to all the cerple cc the job;

. d 1 fel:

20 li k e he mi;b: be tching I r e p e c t o r e, " / r e 3eu l t v i r. ; 21 any p ro ble m s, or if you are h a vi n g cny p r o ble m e 22 you are not bcppy with, come see me." 23 And I thought that might be an explanation 24 for why they may be exp r e s sin g t h r. t. ~ 25 C The use of the term "s oli ci t e d " was that j,

6 - Oirec t 1: 1 ycur word? ? 2 A I don't remember s p e c ifi c c 11y, but I mig h t. i 3 have used that word. i 4 O Is that in c on si s t e n: with th e context in 5 whi c h you were di s c u s sin g this subject with him ? I 6 A No. i 7 O The word " s oli c i t e d, " ca r rie s with it to m4 0 i 8 6, the im pli c a ti on that the concerne did I 9 not exist other t h a r. as a r e s ult of them being crea:ed 10,or in s till e d or s oli cit e d by Mr. M a xr ell. 11 Y.' a s that your in t e n tio n in th e use of that' 12 word 7 i 13 A No, the way I would use that was in the 14 process of carrying out his job 'o n site he had 15 occasion to talk with inspectors, C raf t s men, a lot IE,of dif fe r e nt people; and he might ask them, "Oo you li h a. v e any p r ob le m s or are there any thi n g s you don't 18 li k e that a r en 't being done right or.what is going oc i 19 i that you don't li k e, " o u e s tionin g men, c o 11 c i tin g in M lthat secec. l 21 And then the concern that I ha d wa s that 22 in so doing that, if that is what he was

doing, he i

23 might be l ea vin g the im p r e s sion with th e inspectors 24 that anything th e y didn't li k e, they should go to him 25 as opposed to g oin g to their ma na g emen t, or if their j ]

h __..__.'; .i h I m a nt.g. c Csd s ome thin g t h e y-didn't like, they 2 shoult . r,

c him as opposed to c onf r on tin g their 3

mac g em en: with it. 4 C. \\'hy s ho ul d n 't t: inspector to to the !!.: C? 5 A Mo problem with the inspector going to thc-l 6

NRC, but se have procedures and recourse procedcre l

7 lin place. i 8 Of ccurse, they should use those alse. 9 C Should theyuse those fir s t ? 10 /. I my vi e w,

yes, as an e mplo ye e they r i c t.

11 'use thos e avenues fi r s t. There is nothing thtt p r e v e r-12 I th e m from going to the N n C :. t r. y time about acy i 13 iissue th ey want to, i 14 l'! C A ll right, " G a s i c a lly NCIs not safety re. 15!1ste." Is the.t your judgment :. 'c o u t !!CIe

e r. e r

. ; 1 -

16 o; the enes tht:.. r. ' i t x r e.11 h a :i i t. m i r. d ? 17 " /. I r e c t.11, I b e li e v e ?.. r. I.. & x w e l l said l } ( 18 they h r. d givc= him a litt of" revert! NCIr t h s. : t h e. - 19 tt!ked to him

s. b o u t ; sci :. c

e c t.1 *,

h e. i n d ;, c t. t t. d l 20 ,that' i lot =f them or mo r t cf t h e rr. were n:t even 21 I I r.

.fety related crets of the plant.

22 C Only one was cited by :he ine pec ter ? j p 23 /,

Yes, and I'm

r. o t po citiv e o n' t h r. t point, 24 but as I under stand it, as I r e c all it,

'r.

4 a x w e ll 25 may have indicated thet there war on1v one of the

--J

a h - Direct ~L l [. 1. F C .a the: he felt lik e a c o c c e : r.

r.. i t he be le ci:: ma te 2

ove;, C rid he inve s ti ga t e that p articula r one? 3 I 4 i A I as sume that he did, he did not indicate 5 to me when this was or anything lik e that. 6 C Do you know whe th e r his r e vie w of an N CI, 7 1 was ever r e fl e c t e d in an in s p e c tio n report? 8 I A 1 don't know. 8 C " Inspectors keep books--are enecuraged te 10 do." 11 .r. 'I h a t was my r e c oll e e tio n o f d i s c u a s i o r. c 12 then. Mr. .a xw ell f elt li k e they would k e e p in a 13 bin c h book a list oI it ems they were not h a p ;. y with; 14 and I b e li e v e he indicated they may be encouraged to I 15 ! do tha'. 8 16 c

y g..

, 3,7, 7 l 17 A Ke didn't in di c a t e, just that in general 18 this might Le L thing that they are e r. c o u r s g e d to do. II L .c (ncoura;td t h e n. ? 20 po, 21 C

You, 22 l

j,

. o.

nobody i n, p :. r t i c u l a r, just t h s. t that i 23 p ra c tic e might be encouraged. 24 O VJ h o did you understand he... i g h t be re-

o h. 2: I; 1 /, I r e a,11 y did:'t u r. d e r e t a n d it to be acy -2 , pa r tic ula r i n d i v i d u :.1, just as a pr a c tic e a mo= g the..- 3 iselves they felt that was s o m e t hing that they s h o u l'd I 4 : be doing and encouraged others to do. i I 5 I Q lt says f o llo wi n g, ' 4," you, "m e t with 6, s up e r vis io n as a r e r uit. " /s a result of M. a x w e l l ' s -7 l c ontac t ? i 8 j. Yez. f. 1 9 O " Di s c u s s e d M a n d N" 10 f. yee. 11 C /.nd S. @ t.nd the Iirst Ievel F. u p e r. I 12 > v i s :.., I i 13 A Yes. 14 O hhat did you discuss about N r.cd 15 M st thtt :ime ? l 16 i

• l. c.11, we d i s. c u s e e :. w:at h :. d g c.e e r.

v. ' t :.

I 17

my m e e tin g with Mr.

1.* a x w e l l t r. d t h s. t we needed to t 18 he sure our people understood thtt if they had c o r. - 19 corns cr il ca y htd i t e.~. c they were dia s a tir f; d 20 liwith, we h r. d recourse p r o c e d t. r e s in place that they 21 could a.c d s h o u l d use. i l 22 C "o httdle those concerrs? T hi s war in 23

1980, did you have a recource procedure et that tim e '

24 /. Yes; Cetober of 'EC, may

r. : t be correct i

2 5._

6-Jirect 21 ( .) Iisumr:.er, l o f. C. i 2 l' !i C So it may have been e a rlie r ? l, 3 l,, l' 1 A

Yes, my be s t r e c o ll e c tio n would probably i

l' 4 be that was in the s umm e r of 19C0, as opposed to I 5 Cetober. { t .6 C It would have been before Mr. M a x w ell i i 7 l1 eft as a R e sident ? I i 8 /.

yes, l

C And the m e e tin g with the s u p er vi ci on 9 10 ref e renced her e wo uld ha ve occurred in the same t i :r. e 1 11 .fra=e ac your m e e tin g w i t h !.i r. 2.~ a :: w e l l, summer of i 12 'EZ or t h e r e a. b o u t s ? i l 13 A Yes. l 14 l C Y. hat is the s i gnifi c a n c e of the reference ,to M a:d $ at 15 the.t point? 16 There is

r. o p :. r t i c u l e r ri t r. i f ! c e. r c e t h e r e.

17 iVhat I war t e lli n g him here.

2. s I r e c t.11, i: wer

hri i

i 16 l,' at a r e s ult of that I met with both su pe rvisio n a r. d i i 19 the V. < ! d i r ; :.crecters te be sure they u r. d e r r i a r. d 20 we had th e recourre it e m,

z. r c' If they h :. d

. r. y c o.-. I 21 cerns about

r. n y work to he done, the.t is the properi 22 procedure to f ollo w, a r. d t ). a t they choc!d f o l '. o w tha:

23 procedure. 24 C A gain, at that time you had recourse I 2 5 m .m_,_. _ u _, _r _ _ _. _ _ _ .I

M Tiree: 23 1 A Yes. i 2 i C In the summer of '80? 3 j A Yes. l 4 O Help me id e n tif y what that was. I 5 A We ha d the recourse procedure, as I re-6 c all, t h.e fir s t one came into o f fi ci a l writin g in 1977 '7 or1978, and it was part of the c on s t ru c tio n p ra ctic e I 8 book that was put out. 9' Later on it c a me out when the mana ge m ent 10 procedures came out. It came out as a corporate f management 11 procedure in that book. 12 C When would th e corporate ma na ge ment pre-i i 13 i cedure have come o ut ? i e i 14 j A I don't know, I would just be guessing. 15 C Is that the one in effect now? I 16 ; A

Yes, th a t one is s till in effect now.

17 C % ere either of these procedures regularly l 18 e mplo ye d as a device to voice te chnic al p r o ble m t ? 19 A Those procedures were k n o v. n to the 20, e mplo y e e s, and they were us ed; I would have to say 21 in e f f e c tiv e ly used, for it e m s where the e mplo ye e was 22 di s s a tis fie d. I 23 I don't r e c all any s p e cific technical issues 24 that that was used for. ~ 20 O P ~

D i I t f. t = l --.) 1 I 1 that purpose? 'i 2 A Yes. 1 3 i Q "S olic i t e d WIs to come to him before 4 Nuclear h e gula to r y C o mmis sio n in s pe e tion s. " l 5 l A Yes. I l 6 O That is ba si c a lly use our procedures before '7 A Yes, you have the right to go talk to the 8 lNRC In s pe ctor s at any ti m e about anything, but we I 9,have those procedures in place, and we want you to t i 10 use those procedures. 11 Q

Okay, "At ths.t time Bryant," the V.elding 12 In s pe cto r ?

e i 13 A Yes. 14 i O " Brought up 50.SSE it e m, other then that. l 15 , r. o t h i n g. " And the SSE being a s i g n i f i c a. n t d e fi c i e :c y t 16 reported to the NLC? 17 A

yes, i

18 C Vihat did be b rin g up? e 19 A s p e cifi e r.lly I don't r e c all r.11 the d e t aile. 1 20 ; It had to do with welding around penetratione in th.. \\ l 21 R ea ctor B uildin g. 22 During tho s e m e eting s the V. e l d i n g In s p e c t e-23 I asked them if the y had any concerns cf a t e chnic al 24 na tu re ; we would look into them, and if they had any 25 .they ahould bpimr Ghem un. I

h ?irect 25 ,l. 3 And I don't re c a ll s pe cific ally how John ' b r o u p.t this o r. e up. I don't think he brought it up 2 3 ias a c o r.c e r n, he brought it up as a qu e s tion. 4 I don't think he even brought it up before. I 5 )He brought it up as s o m e thin g he had a qu e s ti on 6 iabout, and I said, " V.~ e need to look into that." 7 And he looked into it. As I r e c all it end-- I 3 led up b e i r.g a 50.55E. I i 's MR. C I B S O N': Excuse me a minute, I ! l { am not sure whether he me an t M, 10 I 11 the V. e l d i n g Inspector, or Jack Br) ant from 12 NR C. 13 MR. GUILD: M r. M axwell wa s the l 14 R e sid en t Inspector and this was the V. e l d i n - I 15 l Inspector B r y s. n t ? 16 THE V. I T N E S S : Yes. l I i 17 '! I l 18 .EY h! R. G l* I L D : 19 C Vi h a t was his q u e s t i c r.

r. b o u t the SE E 7 l

20 /. I think he had some que s tion a bout the vty t 21 th e weld was being made or the way it had been w e l :!. l 22 l e d, I don't re c all s p e cific ally; but we did assign b l.v. 23 to go look into that, get the f a ct s' on tha t. 24 Q A nd ultimately it was written up as a 21- [ m t e a 1 f l e m n t ,a,_f_t_,_i_,_a_,_o S I.

6

i.-

2. w-1l A Tha t is my r e c olle c tion, yes. I 2 Q R ela t e d to a s p e cific piece of w eldin g 3 work? l 4 A Yes. 5 O A ga in, the reference to Oc to be r, '80, 6 would have been in error; it would have been the i 7 l summer ? I 8' A As I r e c all it would ha ve been th e s u m r. e. 9 of '80 10 -Q O k t. y. third page, tgain I guess i r. the sa 11

context, "Seau began to de velop a t titud e--v on 't 12 accept r e s olutio n s he doe sn't agree with.

Had te bc I 13 ! directed by supe rvis or but did c om ply. " I i 14 Y. hat do you mean by that? 15 A R ef er rin g to the f e elin g on my pa rt that 16, if :l e a u, being the 7irst i. i n e S up e r vi s o r, he vould 17 - have occasion to seek : e s olu tion s to NCIs, a r. d if he t 18 saw one tha: he did not agree with we would look ints 19 .it, get bach with the people v/ h o

v. r o t e it, s atir fr I

20.ourselves; and it wns very difficult to get him to be 21 ' s ati s fied wi th t h a t. 22 I C With the r e s olu tio n by the s u p e r vi c ie n at: I I 23 him ? 24 A To be s a tis fied with the r e s olu tion and the 25 nnannmnnamm nhnrt LN n mau Nm mn----------

h. a _.-..

.::c:t 27 I 1 r 7bt* world be th e r e s olu tion that you would i 2 deciet at t.. s t tim e ? I I 3 ll J. No, the r e s olu ti on would be pu t on the 4 i N CI by the T e chni c al Group that was cs sign ed to 5 i r e s olve it. ~ l ~ 6 O V/ h e n you had reference to r e s olu tion s, 7 did y o u m e r. n re s olution s in that sense? 8 A Thct is the w s. y I re c a ll it. 9 C So it wo u l d have been by the techoical i' 10 p e o ple, not by the CC in di vid u a l and th e o rigin a tion 11 process? I 12 A Right. doing when he dis-13 O V. hat was 14 l a g r e e d, when he did not accept r es olution s ? I i 15 /. A gain, this ic a g e r. e r a.1 s t at e m en t here. 16 1 d o r.' t hovc t r. y e p e cific r it uc ti on : :n m:nd fer h i rr., t 17 ' but if an NCI had a r e sc i u t i o n, for example, thtt said 18 Ithat the V elding In s pe cto r should be trained in this i i 19 p s. r t i c u l t. r L r t. L or Wh&tcVer, and he did AQt thish l 20 ' t h a t was appropriate, he setid

say,

" I d e r. ' t tLink i 21 , th a t 's right," and we w o uld loch into that situation. I l 22 talk with the peopic that put it on there, come to a i ~ t l 23 decision ce to whether it wts a ppro p ria te or not; l 24

s. n d if we de cide d it was, it was very dif fic ul t to getl 25

_ h i ra 0 9) n g rr o n winh ohnt, i' i

M.:. Q.. . - - - = - - - - l 1( Q Vihat was his r e s pon s ibility, if a n y, witt 2 respect to agreein; er.. e t agreeing with that i 3 , r e s olution ? 4 A V.* e l l, he did n' t have any direct r e s po n si-t 5 , b ili t y for the r e s olutio n. He had r e s pon s ibilit y for i I 6 carrying out the a c tio n. .? Of course, anythin g that is involved in that l 8 l process, if you see r o me thin g you think is wrong or 9 incorrect, I feel he ha a r e s p on sibilit y to bring that 10 ,up. l l 11 G In this instance it is not a que s tion of = l t 12 lseeing s o m e thin g he do e s n't agree with, it is a c c e p t '. I I 13 ling the r e s olu tion of that i d e n tifi e d d efi cie nc y ? l i 14 A

Right, as I r e c a ll this c on ve r s a tion.

i 15 O Is it your pe ritt e n he did not hcve

r. n y l

16 ' r e s c o = e ibili t y with r e;ard to the r e e olu: ion ? 17 A T h a t 's correct. 18 C Unle s s he war directed to do c o m e thin g ? 19

• A Thet'r correct, utlerr he wer directed :c 20 l r e r. o l v e it and sign the r e s olu tion.

And the e r. s. m p i c 21 that comes to mind is a re s ele tio n that c a ll e d for 22 tr a icin g of an in s p e c t o r. 23 !' O

Yes, how about the r itu a ti on where the I

i 24 r e s olu ti on s p e cifie d to accept weld s as is; wo ul d i 25 that have been an ex a m ple of a situ ation ? jH g t.a u n. nr.:. i

o 6 - Oirect 29 1 - A It mig h t be, I d o n 't r e c a ll any s p e cific a. 2 O W h s.t does the reference mean "b a d to be I t 3 directed by supervision " S-U-P-R, "did c o mply" ? 4 A When he would bring the ite m up to his 5 s u p e r vi s io n the su pe rvi s io n would look into it and give 6 him an answer, and be might not like the answer; but T the s u p e rvis or w ould tell him that is the answer on 4 8 th e qu e s tion. 9 C And the supervisor w ould h av e been your-10 self? 11 A a: ore than likely $. but it might 12 have been m e. i 13 C Did you have to direct him to c ompl) ? 14 A 1 d on 't r e c all any s pe cific cases of that, 15 bu it could have occurred. i l Q A nd the n e r.t paragraph, "h, " w o u l d 16 I I il t i. t t be W. @ ( 18 A I a s sum e so. i 19 'J "6 ma de effort to get c on c t ru c tion

• 20

' side o'! d i s p u t e - - m a'd e bert d e ci sion -- di d not c o mp ro-21 mise in favor of c on s t ru c tio n. " 22 V. t s that in a c o mp ro mis e of @ M i l 23 g etti n g the c o n s t ru c t i o n side of the is su e ? i 24 j, ' Yes, in that context it was indicated

r-4 ,..e s O C - N / h ' i.arret g a r \\ e. ( s. s e s 1 [i Q Okay, when the GC war in C o n s t ruc tion, [. a-1 I 2 this was before the Cuality Control In s p e c to r s were i. I r 3 'placed, und e r th e Q u a li t y /seurance Department? { 4 A C o r r e c t, I a s eume it is. h. 5 Q 'W h e n CC was under Co n s t ru c tio n-- t 6 i A A nd it was changed and put under C /.. yes; - t l 7 O It was QC's job to d et e r min e a c c e p t a bility ? b 8 l A I don't know wha t you

c. r c e by "d e t e r mine J

l 9 ' a c c e p ta bili t y. " It was their job to do the in s p e c tice b t 10 and perfor m the in s p e c tio n, that wac their job before i- = h 11 and is now. i k 12 O Whit was CC's job with r e c p e c t to accept.! i L 13 a bilit y before? l [ l l 14 /. E s s en tially th e re is no dif f e r e =c e. r 15 l 0 i hat dif f e r e n c e

r. t ell?

= r 16 A /. s far

r. s their job, the only dif f e ren c e 5

17 '. w o u l d be the d epar tm nt they w 'e r e 'i n. l r 18 C "After CA/CC needed t e c h n i c e.1 cupport to } 19 ' tc k e load cff scrervleer reddo t e c h n i c :.1 c v t l u t t i o r...' l t 20 imche de ci rion s. " 2 j 21 i e A I don't r e c a ll anythinr along those lin e s, I 22 ard I don't know what that might met =. g 1 i 23 Q Okay, whet, if anything, cha n g e d' with 24 rolls [ respect to technical su pp or t's r e s po n cibilitie s or 25 ,.ith c on stru c tion d eficie ncie s ? i

6 >1 rect 33 t 1 A Mone because of the CA or OC mo vin g irte 2j CA part. 1 I 31 O Tor any rearon what changed? l. i 4 !! A The p ro g r am was the same; the only chang' 8: o 5. wa s that a d mini s t r a tiv ely now in terms of hours I i 6

worked, that type thing, that was handled in the QA 7

De p a rt me n t; whereas before it had be en h a n dl e d in 8 C on s t ru c ti on. 9' C "Needed technic al s u ppor t to take load of f. I 10 s up e r vi si o n. " Was technieni support needed to take 11 load off s up e r vi sio n ? 12 A No, Con s t r uc tion technical support did the; 13 same thin g b ef or e as they did af t er, just as CC did i 14 the same thing the y did before as af t e r. i i 15 7 hey just reported to a dif f e r e n t depart. 16 ; m e n :. I 17 O li o w was r e p o r tin g for the C o n s t r uc tio n 18 Techolcal Depa r tm ent changed? t 19 f, ,, g that g g n. e when CC wet brousbe i t. t o the ! 20 0 8. Depc rtmt r t ? 21 I Q A n yt hin g, how was it chanced? 22 A At that tim e it w a r r. ' t changed at all to my 23 kno wl e d ge. C on s t ru c ti on has had some o r g a n i z a ti o n s 1,- 24 changes throughout the project, a n el I could not i 25

ll . g. 34 = - I 0 1 l C I war

• t-seterstand how the o r g a niz a tion 2

or r e s p on sibi'it v of C o.s t ru c tion technical support i 3 has changed. i 4 A B a s i c a ll :- I would say they have e s s e n tially 5 been th e same th r ou g h ou t. i. 6 O No changes? ,7 A No s i g n i fi c a n t changes. 8 O No changes to take load off s u pe rvi sio n ? 9 A No. 10 C No changes with respect to t e c h n i c s.1 i 11 evalua tion s ? l 12 I. No. 13 O Where did 6. M get this ides? i 14 A I don't know, you would have to ash hi m I i 15 th a t. i 16 ] C. Yc c r. n do that, but this it on t note of I 17 rn in te r vi e w he htd with you, Rh I'm try-18, int, to u nder s t an d if you know a n y thi n g. I 19 I don't rect!

that, what hc's o: writt en i

20 . d o w n

r. e r e at t subject we discussed or if vc e did, i

l 21 I don't r e e n 11 wh a t we said. 1 22 It do e s n't rir.g any bell with m e in terms 23 of my discutsiona with him. I 24 O Not only don't you r e c all haeing any such 25 4L:tnetrt'Anewh -A^ = --

. g. fract 31 ~ l 3 about the o r g a ni z a tio n ? I 2. A Not C on s t ru c tio n technical support. 3 C How about technical support? 4 A T echnic a l support refers to C on s t ru c tion 5I technical support. !,i 6 j! C

Okay, so thi,s is a ll in error, it does not ll r e fl e c t 7

the way thing s are? i 8 A 1 do n't have any r e c olle c ti on, I mean you : i 9 ' might r ef r e sh me, and I might remember s o m e t hin g l i i 10 about it. i 11 O

Okay, "NRC said too many N CI s over in-i l

12 significant items." f 13 A W.e had R2 as th e y were used in othe r 14 l areas th at would handle a lot of thin g s that in weldi g i 15 i w ou ld be an N CI. i 16 C The NRC said thtt? I t i 17 A As I r e c all in one of their in s pe ction l i 18 ! r e p o r t s they indic a te d th ey thou g ht we had too many 1 19 I in si g nific an t NCIs. I i 20 Ct And that wts the source that you had in i 21 mind here? 22 A ye,, 23 C A n in s pe c tio n report? j 24 A Yes. !l l 2E o And would this have been in the summer

6 - Direct s i 1 of '8 0 time f rame ? ~ 2 i A I don't r e c all wh e n that would ha ve b e e n; 3 I ca n't say. 4 .Q Did the NRC d e t e rmin e that those NCIs were 5 not rela te d n e c e s s a rily ? 6 A I cadt say, that was not a d e t e r mi n a ti o n that 7 they had. saiety 8 O That they did s ay the y were not a 9 rela te d ite m ? 10 A No, they did not say they we re safety i I 11 rela te d ite m e. I 12 C But the y did s a y the y we r e insignific an t ? j 13 A Yes. I I 14 O Or minor? I i 15 A They tried to reduce NCIs by lo okin g fo r 16 l o the r ways to handle tho s e. 17 O VJ hi c h i s the reference here; when did you 18 do that? i 19 ^

r. c I r e call the NEC looked Lt the NCI pro.

20 cess during one of their in s pe c tio n s in 19 81, maybe 21 F e b ru a r y of 19 81; a n d w e lo ok e d a t--ok a y--w e in a y b e 22 .w r i ti n g t o o many NCIs on min o r, i n s i g ni fic an t ite m s. 23 There may b e a b ette r way to handle those, 24 and that r e ally wa s probably the s t a r ting of o ur con-25 cept, hey, we have R2A that we use in other areas and. ~ u rtemRrwocyo - -.--- A'

.3, -. ;; :=Es { *g y - } !:UC'.E A=. F.E GUL ATO.=.Y CO:.'.M:SS;Di;.

f. E WASHINGT ON. D. C. 2C515

$ hg,.l!!* ~%/ 4 January 9, igm CHAIRMAN The Hon:rabie Morris K. Udall, Chairman Com.ittee on Interior and Insular Affairs United States House of Representatives Washincten, DC 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Your letter of November 1,1983 expressed concerns over the Nuclear Regulatcry Cc=iissien's (HRC) efforts to pursue aliegaticr.s of safety-related defi:iencies at nuclear construction sites includin; Caiaw'ca. While we share th se general concerns, it wculd be ina;;r:;riate te comment specifically on Catawba because it is the subject cf a pending adjudicatory pro:eeC*i.;. Your letter also focused on the potential advantages of using confiden-tiality as an investigative tool. At the outse agrees that confidentiality is a powerful tool,t, we assure you that NRC when it is needed to provide added cer.fidence that ind:viduais wil1 not suffer recriminations for bringing safety-related issues to the NRC's attention. That tool is beino used by this agency whenever it is deemed 'necessary. It is now formally'~ incorporated in the procedures of our Office of Investications, a copy of which is en:1csed, and those of our Office cf Ins;e:t:r and Auditor. The NRC has drawn a distinction between providing safety-related information about safety prchlers which reovire prompt res:'uti: to assure public health ar.d safety, and the source of that inf:--i-i:. It has been and centir.ues t be NE pclicy that safety-related :rcb'.e:s will be.brcught to h. the attentien of the proper orga,nization which can ccrrect these problems. N To do othernise would run an unacceptable risk of permitting problems to -l centinue without swift and complete resoluticn. As a resuit, the N?.C, has, qs in the.past, tried to protect the identity of the scurce of the information D rather than the' infctmation itself. However, due to the high degree of O: l -specialization of functiq'ns at a nuclur piar.:, the ir,caut'icus disclesure of --{ ! informa-ica may in itseif point to the responsible s:urce. _.{ It is clear tha't we need more specific policies ar.d prccedures to gcvern O l NRC's har.dlinc cf information so the sources can have ccr.fidence that the I l bureaucratic irecess will prc.tect their identi.ies

. ::.e ex ent pessible.

h0l l Thus, the staff is reviewing NRC's current c: #idi-tiality ;0licy to assure that it is_reascned and ' capable of meaningful application. NRC is also consultino with the Dep'artment of Justice (003) on this matter. 00J is l ~ currently reviewing a report and recomiendaticas developed by a nonagency advisory ccmmittee ate MRC request., We expect to receive their ccm.ents in the near future.

s. 4-i- c st: t. ,~. e The Honorable P. orris K. Ucaii. Following this review, we plan to issue an improvec liRC pt,licy applicable to til tiRC employees whc ccr. duct ir.spections or ir.vestigatior.s. This policy wili address specific issues such as who should be granted confidentiality, the manner and form in which it should be granted, the.ircumstar.ces under which it should be grar.ted, the-extent of the grar.. ar.d ar.y c;her relevant ccr.siderations. Sincerely, 0:isinal signed by k n-io J..hi h di,e Nunzio J. Palladinc, 'Eh.ci csure : 01 Investigative Procedere F.emorandum cc: Rep. Manuel Lujan Cleared with all Cmrs' Offices by SECY Ref.-CR-83 170 i l I p Y b \\J Orininatino Offke: 01 \\ V

,= 1 0FFICE OF INVESTIGA.TIONS INVESTIGATIVE PROCEDURE MEMORANDUM NO. 82-008 SUBJECT,: CONFIDENTIALITY OF INF0FFANT5/ WITNESSES OBJECTIVES (1) To provide the NRC with the broadest possible latitude in making use of infor ration from informants and witnesses while still providing those individuais with adequate assurances that their identities will be protected as fully as possible. (2) To minimize the possibility of subsequent claims that individuals were offered confidentiality, when it was not cranted either as a matter of policy or because it was not specifically requested. GENE:.1.'. PO' ICY Investigators will not routinely offer confider.tiality to individuals making allegations or otherwise providing inforTretion during the course of an NRC investigation. The subject of confidentiality, i.e., the protection.of tihe identity of an inforfr. ant or witness, normally should not be raised iriitially by the investigator during an NRC interview. Tf an incividual recuests ancnymity, or if in the opinion of the investigator the information will not otherwise be forthcoming, the investigator may then grant confider.tiality. ,.,n EXTENT OF CONFIDENTIALITY AVAILASLE Esfore cor.fidentiality has been granted, the individual should be infermed that, although the pledge is not absolute, it is NRC policy not to divulge to others the ider.tity of people granted confidentiality, either during or subsecuent to the ir.vestigaticn; further, the ir.dividual sh:uid be tcid that his/her name will l not normally appear in the publicly released report of. investigation. It should I be pointed out, however, that the nature of the allegations or the limited number of individuals privy to the subject information iray provide a basis for guessir.g his/her identity. Such " guesses" will not be confirred or otherwise responded to by NRC. Finally,.the individuai shcuid be made aware that, if the results of the - ir.vesticatior, form the. basis for an enforcement actien, either civil or criminai, and a hearing ensues, it may not be possible to raintain his/her anonymitv. The individual should be infont.ad that the infor7:ation my is g'iven to Congress and/or cther Federal ager.cies. f.e/sheshculd aisc be advised of the prctection afforded by section 21Dfcf the Energy F.eorcar.ization Act of 1574 te employaes who may be discharged or otheroise discriminated against for providing information or assistance to the NRC. CONFIDENTIALITY AGREEMEh7 -~ ~ ~

s_

• it ;:., M.

. ;,.. f c,: i:::t :.. H ] have.infermation that I wish to provide in confiden:e to the U. S. Ne:1 ear Regulatory C:n-issien (NRC). I request an. express ;; edge ef c:r fiie.tiality at a conditicr. cf provicing this informaticn to the NRC. I wili r.:t pr: vide this o information voluntarily to the NRC without such c nficentiality being extended -to me. It is mf understanding, consistent with its legal obligations, the NRC, by agreeing to this cenfidentiality, will adhere to the f:lioving c:r.ditions: (1 ) The NRC will not identify me b'y name or personal identifier in any NRC initiated document, conversation, or communication released to the public which relates directly te the information provided ty me. 1 understand the term "public release" to encompass any distribution outside of the NRC with the exception of ether public agencies which may require this infon.ation in futherance of their responsibilities under law or public trust. (2 ) The NRC will disclose my identity within the NRC only to the extent i required for the conduct of NRC related activities. ~. (3) Durin'g the course of the inquiry or investigation the NRC will also make evehy effcrt consister.: with the investigative needs of the Commissi:r

av:id acti:ns which would clearly be expected to result in the disclosure of my identity to persons subsequently contacted by the NRC.

At a later stage I understand that even though the NRC will make every reasonable effort to protect ry id, entity, my identification could be.ccmpelled by orders or subpoenas issued by courts of law, hearing boards, or similar legal entities. In su:h cases, the basis for < ~ ~ granting this promise of confidentiality and any other relevant it:ts will be communicated to the auth:rity ordering the disclosure in an eff:rt te maintain M-my confi dentiality. If this effort proves unsuccessful, a representative of the NRC will attempt to inform me of any such acticr. before dis:1: sing ry identity. I also understand that the NRC will consider me 'to have waived cy right to c:nfidentiality if I take any action that may be reas:nably expe:ted :: dis cles s ry identity. I further understand. that the NRC will ::nsider es

have waived my rights to cer.fidentiality if I provide (or have previously pr:vided) inferma:icn to any other party that contradicts the information that lprovided to the NRC or if circumstances indicate that I am intentionally pro.viding false informatic:

to the NRC. Other Conditions: (if any), I have read and fully understand the contents.of this agreement. I agree with its provisiens. Date Signature of source of informaticn ' Typed or Printed Name and Address

4 in s:.dstar.tially the same fem. The fem provides a spite for " ether c:.:itier.s" which may be 1: sed to address particular teds; h:. ever, investigators may not allow such conditions to alter tne general scope of confidentiality authorized. Af ter the form is signed by both the individual and the investigator, the original copy should be previded to the individual; the investigator should retain either a photocopy of the executed agreement or a diplicate original of the agreement. The NRC copy will be retained in the O* Field Office file for'the investigation. 4 i G ~ e 9 6 e e O e e *, e, e e e G e 9 8 e e l' e s-e 4 9 e, e e 9

v.a n - ^ , u.: _ ~ ~- U.S. NUC EAR REGULATORY COMMtsslON

• *f Inspector and Auditor

o... i,.,,,,,.. Feb rua rv 10, 1984 Report of Interview Peter K. Van Doorn,. Senior Resident Inspector (SRI), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission (NRC), Catawba Nuclear Station (NS), Rock Hill, South Carolina, was interviewed concerning his knowledge of NRC's handling'of various allegations raised by welding inspectors employed by the Duke Power Company (DPC) at 4

Catawba NS. During the interview Van Doorn provided the following information in elaboration of.the testimony he provided to the Atomic Safety and Licensing + Board Panel in the matter of Catawba NS: 1 In July 1980, as a result of information developed by George F. Maxwell, the SRI at Catawba NS at that time, that welding surveillances were not being properly documented, Van Doorn visited the Catawba site and reviewed iecords which documented surveillances. Van Doorn's review of the records disclosed that during a several month period their were no records in the records vault documenting surveillances being conducted by welding inspectors. During interviews of first line supervisors, Van Doorn learned that random welding surveillances were being conducted on a regular basis as required by the quality.assurarice (QA) program that DPC comitted to as part of Appendix B, 10 CFR. However, the fact that surveillances were being conducted was supposed to be documented on DPC QA Form M-19. The types of problems typically discovered during surveillances and documented on a Fonn M-19 were minor and did not appreciably affect the quality of work, and Van ~Doorn never got the impression that welding -inspectors were not following up on significant nonconformances with proper documentation. Additionally, any significant problems not documented during surveillances would be identified later during required code inspections. Van Doorn opined that the lack of i documentation was the result of a misunderstanding on the part of the inspectors concerning when the M-19 fonns were supposed to be completed. Van Doorn concluded that the surveillances were being completed but were not being properly documented. Van Doorn documented his finding as Item 3 on Inspection Report 80-15, and, consequently. a violation was issued for improper documentation of surveillances. Because the problem was a i documentation problem, the violation issued was the lowest category. Van Doorn did not review any of the black books that the welding inspectors allegedly used to document their findings. Inspection finding 80-15-03 was i eventually closed out in Inspection Report 80-24. In February 1981, Van Doorn began his assignment as SRI at Catawba NS. When Van Doorn arrived at Catawba NS he was not aware of any current, concerns of QC welding inspectors. Region II had conducted a special inspection at Catawba NS in November 1979. A requirement of this inspection was a minimum February 1, 1984 Catawba Nuclear Station ,,,,, 83-52 o ge A. Mulley Jr. ,, February 10, 1984 ma *me"d&"*;"lM"%D*ta

p of 30 craftsmen (including quality control inspectors and craft foremen) involved in safety related work be randomly selected and interviewed privately. They were asked whether they had any concerns about quality of construction; were they aware construction which did not meet prescribed codes or standards; and were they aware of any problems or irregularities affecting quality that NRC should be informed of. Twenty-eight persons were selected at random and interviewed. An additional twenty-nine persons came forward on their own to talk to the NRC inspectors. None of the persons interviewed had any knowledge of substandard work that had not been found by quality control (QC) and corrected. The results of this inspection were documented in Inspection-Report 79-21. In January - February 1981, a trial construction team inspection was conducted at Catawba. Durin number of DPC personnel (including QC personnel)g this inspection, a large were interviewed concerning any indications of harassment of inspectors or workers and the relationship between different work groups. As a result of this inspection, which was reported in Inspection Rc,wrt 81-02, it was learned that employees were free to express opinions and tnat no one believed that they might be pressured or harassed into performing or accepting low quality work. The inspection developed no indication that craftsmen and inspection personnel were not working well together. Van Doorn was aware of the findings contained in these inspection reports and there was nothing to indicate to Van Doorn that there were any widespread QC inspector problems at Catawba NS. Van Doorn could recall only two incidents in 1981 regarding inspector complaints. In August 1981, a DPC inspector came to Van Doorn's office and complained that nonconforming items (NCI) were not properly handled. Van Doorn followed up this concern which eventually resulted in an NRC violation. A second incident occurred in December 1981, when Van Doorn received an anonymous note which stated he should look into an incident of harassment of a welding inspector. Van Doorn was also informed of this incident by DPC at the same time. Van Doorn, as a result of his review of this concern, concluded that DPC took adequate corrective action as a result of this incident. Van Doorn stated that other than these two incidents, there was nothing to indicate any widespread problems. l To the best of Van Doorn's knowledge, the concerns of the welding inspectors first became apparent in the Fall of 1981, when during discussions with welding inspectors over a pay adjustment, DPC learned of concerns of welding inspectors that included technical issues. As a result, in December 1981, DPC informed NRC Region II that a DPC task force was formed to look into these At the ed of December 1981, the task force completed its report. concerns. In January 1982, DPC received additional technical and non-technical concerns from welding inspectors; therefore, DPC appointed a second task force to investigate the technical concerns. These welding inspectors' concerns were first detailed by DPC to Region II and Van Doorn during a meeting on January 29, 1982, when they were informed by DPC that a second task force was formed to review all concerns of welding inspectors at Catawba and a consultant would review the task force results. DPC requested to be allowed to pursue their investigation on their own and that they would provide all the information to NRC for review. Near the end of February 1982, DPC appointed a third task force to investigate the non-technical concerns expressed by the welding inspectors. Both the technical and non-technical task forces completed their investigations on March 19, 1982. The task force made many recommendations for corrective action on the part of DPC.

3 Van Doorn's involvement with the welding inspectors began on February 1,1982, when the @hnical concerns.elding inspectors came to him and informed h'm of techn and non-tec Again, on March 3,1982, MI welding l inspector came to Van Doorn and expressed a technical concern. All of the L concerns provided Van Doorn had already been discussed with DPC. Van Doorn believed that the welding inspectors did not think they were being supported l by management in their efforts to implement the welding QA progran. The welding inspectors thought the second and third level QC supervisors leaned too much toward construction and did not want the welding inspectors to write NCIs on violations. They also made broad allegations of possible harassment and that they were told by their supervisors to sign corrective action records they did not agree with. The welding inspectors claimed DPC would attempt to " whitewash" the technical concerns of the welding inspectors. In his memorandum to Alderson, Van Doorn used the word " falsify" to describe the situation where welding inspectors signed corrective actions they did not agree with. The word was used only by Van Doorn, not by the welding inspectors, and was intended only in its broadest meaning. Van Doorn used this word to describe to Region II the concern of the welding inspectors that l they were pressured to sign documents they did not agree with. Van Doorn also l noted that the term " whitewash" was used by only one welding inspector. From his interviews with the welding inspectors, which took place over several days, Van Doorn determined that the major non-technical issue was inspectors signing for items they disagreed with and harassment. The technical issues raised involved DPC compliance with procedures and handling of NCIs. The welding inspectors were also concerned that NCIs which had been written in the past had not been properly evaluated and documented. Van Doorn detemined that in regard to the technical concerns, the specific issues would have to be evaluated to determine whether significant technical discrepancies had occurred as a result of possible DPC mishandling of discrepancies identified by welding inspectors. As a result of the concerns expressed to him by the welding inspectors, Van Doorn telephoned his supervisor, Jack Bryant, Chief, Reactor Projects Section, Region II, NRC, and reported the results of the interviews of welding inspectors. Additionally, he documented the interviews on two memoranda, dated March 15, 1982, which he forwarded through Bryant to Carl E. Alderson, Director, Enforcement and Investigation Staff, Region II. Jack Bryant directed to Van Doorn to conduct preliminary reviews of the DPC task force efforts to ensure adequate records were available for a future, more detailed, review by NRC. Van Doorn explained that since the welding it.spectors had initially reported their concerns to DPC, DPC was given credit by NRC for l first identifying and reporting the concerns. For this reason, it was decided that DPC would be allowed to perfonn its own evaluation of the concerns and to implement corrective actions. Subsequently, NRC would conduct an in-depth evaluation to detennine the adequacy of DPC actions. Additionally, in accordance with Appendix C, 10 CFR Part 2, since DPC identified the concerns to NRC then an NRC violation would only be issued if the deficiencies were determined to be at severity level I, II, or III. Van Doorn emphasized that the decision to allow DPC to conduct its own investigation into the welding inspectors' concerns was in keeping with NRC policy. Since DPC reported the concerns to NRC in a timely manner and formed a task force to address the issues, DPC indicated their willingness to cooperate with the NRC. Additionally, since there was no fuel on site, there was no imediate threat to public health and safety.

Y f [ i During February - April 1982, Van Doorn conducted a preliminary review of each of the concerns that-had been provided him by the welding inspectors. -Van Ooorn discussed the concerns with DPC inspectors and the progress of the task-force with DPC management. Van Doorn also. reviewed DPC documentation and the original concerns provided DPC by the welding inspectors. Van Doorn held ' discussions with DPC engineers, construction and QA/QC management, tech-nicians, _ and inspectors and he.did not notice any reluctance by DPC to conduct ~ a thorough and accurate evaluation. l I During Van Doorn's preliminary review, he detemined that although he could not identify any significant hardware discrepancies, there were strong indica-tions of a consnunications problem within the QA Department. Some QC inspectors were signing for NCIs they were not sure were acceptable.- Conse- [ quently, the inspectors believed they were not being fully supported by their supervision regarding implementation of the QA program. Van Doorn explained that many of the NCIs written involved interpretation of procedures to i ascertain whether an NCI was appropriate. It was within the authority and ( responsibility of second and third level QC supervisors to make these ( decisions. In the few instances where a mictake was made, it was an error in judgment and not an attempt by QC supervisors to cover-up a deficiency, for example, a decision to accept an NCI made by a QC supervisor that should have been made by a design engineer. Although some procedural deficiencies were i not documented because of a faulty judgment call, Van Doorn identified no significant hardware problems that went uncorrected. During the time that Van Doorn conducted his pr~eliminary review of DPC task l force efforts to ensure DPC conducted a thorough inquiry with complete l documentation. Van Doorn held regular telephone discussions with Bryant, Alderson, and other Region II management and investigative personnel. l Van Doorn also discussed the situation with James Y. Vorse, Chief Investigator, Region II, and during May - June 1982, sent him a memorandum l with copies of concerns, some technical evaluations, and a two page DPC general task force report. In the memorandum Van Doorn used the words falsification and harassment to emphasize issues; however, these tenns were used to describe what was really disagreements between inspectors and staff. Van Doorn stated the memorandum to Vorse was procedural in nature and meant tc inform him of the problems at Catawba. It was not a request for assistance. During the discussions with Region II management, it was decided that Van Doorn could adequately look into the welding inspectors' concerns by reviewing the work of the two DPC task forces; therefore, Region II decided that pending further developments there was no need for involvement by Region II investigators. Van Doorn documented his preliminary review in Inspection Report 82-21/82-19. In August 1982, Van Doorn began a detailed review of the findings of both the technical and non-technical task forces. During this review, Van Doorn ensured every welding inspector concern had been addressed and appropriate corrective action had been taken by DPC. Van Doorn verified on a sample basis that corrective actions were innplemented by DPC. Van Doorn also reviewed the procedures and NCIs brought up by welding inspectors in their concerns. He conducted fonnal interviews of 19 welding inspectors and 9 welding inspector supervisors. These interviewees included the site supervisors mentioned in the welding inspectors' concerns and other supervisors, plus all 15 inspectors who had technical concerns, the 13 inspectors who had non-technical concerns,

i 5 and two inspectors who had no concerns. Additionally, during his review, Van Doorn addressed four specific concerns of Region II that C.E. Alderson identified in a September 30, 1982, memorandum to Jack Bryant, Van Doorn's supervisor. Concerning the non-technical concerns of qualifications of inspectors, adequacy of technical and management support, resolution of NCIs, responsibilities of QC personnel, implementation of procedural requirements, falsification, and harassment, Van Doorn concluded that the basic problem was lack of comunication, primarily within the QA Department. Reasons for management and technical decisions were not comunicated to the inspectors. Management personnel believed that they had good reasons for the decisions they made and were not attempting to cover up safety significant deficiencies; however, some of the issues were not'sufficiently documented. This lack of-comunication caused the inspectors to doubt the ability of QA management and technical oersonnel to make valid decisions about the QA program. Lack of comunication was a significant problem in regard to feedback of NCI evaluations which resulted in the inspectors not understanding the reasons for many of the decisions made by their management pertaining to NCIs. Van Doorn's review of the technical concerns of welding inspectors disclosed 1 the DPC technical task force properly evaluated the technical concerns and made appropriate recomendations for corrective actions. Van Doorn reviewed a sample of the corrective actions and concluded they were being properly j implemented. During his review of the concerns, Van Doorn could identify no significant technical discrepancies at Catawba'which had not been corrected or were being corrected at the time of his review. Van Doorn determined that the comunications problem within the QA Department caused many of the technical concerns of welding inspectors. Due to the lack of comunication, inspectors did not trust management and were not willing to accept management decisions as being correct. Many of the technical concerns pertained to the handling of NCIs. The DPC technical task force made appropriate recomendations to correct these problems. This problem with NCIs had already been recognized by NRC in early 1981 and Inspection Report 81-02 documented several violations of the DPC NCI program. Van Doorn, apart from the task force, had been reviewing NCIs since 1981 and had continued his review of all NCIs for about two years. At the date of interview, Van Doorn was reviewing NCIs on a sample basis. The fact that Van Doorn could identify no significant technical discrepancies during his review of the task force efforts, indicated to him that the DPC inspectors did not allow any pressure they felt cause them to allow signifi-cant deviations from requirements. Interviews that Van Doorn held with inspectors indicated to Van Doorn that in spite of the pressures, the QC inspectors maintained a high degree of integrity. -Regarding the issue of harassment, Van Doorn's review of DPC documentation revealed that DPC took what Van Doorn considered to be appropriate actions. DPC comunicated to craft personnel that intimidation, coercion, and kidding I of QC inspectors would not be tolerated. A QA Department Harassment Procedure l was implemented which was reviewed by Van Doorn. Van Doorn noted that the problems between inspectors and craft included situations of inspectors being sworn at; being called liars; and being threatened by having a rifle pointed at an inspector off-site, an inspector being threatened with being pushed off e a scaffold, or an inspector being told he was going to get his teeth knocked i out. All of the allegations involving harassment were historical, the last =., ,,n-,.-r-4 . ~,. -,,,.,,,.. _ _,,,..

g one occurring in 1981. Van Doorn did not investigate these incidents because of their age; however, Van Doorn inspected the hardware that may have been effected by harassment of a QC inspector and identified no hardware problems that resulted from harassment. j Regarding the issue of falsification, Van Doorn's review revealed that 0 although inspectors had signed their approval for inspection items they f disagreed with, there was no falsification. In these cases, the supervisor believed his decisions were justified and he had the authority to make the judgment in question. Van Doorn did not consider this method of obtaining = inspection approval appropriate because it did not specifically identify the 2 person responsible for making the decision to accept an inspection item. Van Doorn's review disclosed that all of the specific instances cited by QC '-,= inspectors were addressed by the technical task force and no technical inadequacies having safety significance were found. DPC implemented a clear policy which required that inspectors not sign for items they do not agree with and supervisors not require them to do so. As a result of his review of the DPC Technical and Non-Technical Task Force results, Van Doorn detennined that DPC properly evaluated the problems and i made appropriate corrective actions. It was noted that the inspectors went first to DPC management with their concerns and DPC reported the concerns to NRC. NRC Enforcement Policy states that an NRC violation will nomally not be = issued if the violation is Severity Level IV or V and has been identified by the licensee; therefore,' Van Doorn had to ascertain if there were any violations identified at Severity Level I, II, or III. If any Severity Level I, II, or III, violations were identified then NRC policy requires that 3 these violations be considered for escalated enforcement even though they were identified by the licensee. During Van Doorn's review, he did not identify any Severity Level I, II, or III violations; therefore, no notices of violation were issued. Van Doorn believed that NRC conducted a thorough, independent, and objective review of DPC's handling of the welding inspectors concerns. Additionally. NRC will continue to monitor DPC actions to ensure their effectiveness in 2 correcting problems identified by DPC inspectors. The fact that no signifi-cant technical discrepancies were discovered during the inspection of welding inspectors' concerns, indicated to Van Doorn that the QA program at Catawba was working. On December 20, 1982, Van Doorn discussed Inspection Report 50-413/82-32 and h 50-414/82-30witQ This inspection M report documented tie results of van Doorn's final review of DPC Task Force actions concerning welding inspectors' concerns. As a basis for discussion, 4 Van Doorn prepared a synopsis of interviews he conducted of welding inspectors and QC supervisors concerning their perceptions of the effectiveness of the DPC task force. During the briefing, Van Doorn provided@a copy of the synopsis. Van Doorn asserted he did not violate the confidentiality of any of the individuals he interviewed because the interviews were scheduled through j the first line supervisors and were overt interviews conducted on site. The ] DPC Task Force had interviewed these same individuals because they were the people who first reported their concerns to DPC. Additionally, confiden-tiality was not even an issue because no names were mentioned in con ~ unction with the comments in the synopsis. Van Doorn only discussed with what 2

e,. 7 was said by the interviewees. Van Doorn stated the synopsis he prepared was a factual su r of interview results and was used only as a basis for discus-sion with , the synopsis as such was not incorporated into the body of the inspection report. Van Doorn did not think he violated any NRC restric-tions pertaining to release of draft reports to licensees. Van Doorn completed his review of DPC corrective actions regarding welding inspector concerns on January 25, 1983, and concluded that DPC took or will take appropriate actions to correct the concerns identified by the welding inspectors. This review was documented in Inspection Report 50-413/82-33 and 50-414/82-31. In a memorandum to Carl E. Alderson, Director, Program Support Staff, Region II, NRC on February 1,1983, Van Doorn provided the results of his review to Region II. l l

8 . [. p ase

• g'

@+ UNITED sT ATES o NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ds B.d I nrGION II / >~ d pg nV) ici unmt n a sT.. uw. suit t 3ioo [, ATL ANTA GEORGIA 303o3 ....+ MEMORANDUM FOR: Carl E. Alderson, Director, Enforcement and Investigation Staff THRU: C. Bryant, Chief, Reactor Projects Section 2A FROM: P. K. VanDoorn, Senior Resident Inspector, Catawba

SUBJECT:

ALLEGATIONS CONCERNING QC WELDING INSPECTION AT CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION On February 1,1982,6QC welding inspection personnel requested appointments with me to discuss concerns about the welding inspection program at Catawba Nuclear Station. Each of these individuals had expressed his con-cerns to Duke Power Company (DPC) management prior to meeting with me. DPC has established a task force to review each specific issue. DPC management discussed ~ this task force with NRC:RII personnel (R. C. Lewis, J. C. Dryant, P. K. VanDoorn) on January 29, 1982. Each individual expressed to me his con-cern that DPC would attempt to " whitewash" the technical concerns

• i.e., to say that the concerns were related to a recent pay adjustment.

It should be noted that Wof the individuals (leading man and supervisor) that talked to me were not affected by the pay adjustment. They each stated that a lack of support for implementation of the welding QA program by QC welding inspectors has existed for years. They are raising the issues now because they feel that for the first time, they have the attention of off-site management. They stated that they have tried -to implement the letter of the QA program and have repeatedly been beat back by site management; i.e. told they were overinspect-ing, told they misinterpreted a procedure, told not to write NCI's on some significant violations of the QA program, been harassed on the job, witnessed answers on NCI's that were inaccurate and written to make the inspector look bad, and told to falsify records (see enclosure 2). Identificatien of persons interviewed and specific concerns are contained in enclosures 1, 2 and 3. I suggest that we allow the DPC review to be completed before we begin our in depth review of the concerns. I will inform you of any additional concerns which come to my attention. k 'T h ') s f / 4 P. K. VanDoornN fv'

Enclosures:

1. Confidential 2. Confidential g fM@% j 3. Confidential l l l NCyrE: Enclosures 1, 2, and 3 are not being publicly released due to their confidential nature. (OIA) k.

3h' - h3 9 'pg#e e UrJITED STATES F *% s ' ',A NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 34(Ik I REGION ll 1 Q I 101 MARIETTA ST., N.W., $Ulf E 3100 / g j ATLANTA, GEORCIA 30303 (( MEMORANDUM FOR: C. E. Alderson, Director, Enforcement and Investigation Staff A THRU: .'. Bryant, Chief, Reactor Projects Section 2A, DPRP FROM: P. K. Van Doorn, Senior Resident Inspector, Catawba J

SUBJECT:

CONCERNS EXPRESSED BY A QC WELDING INSPECTOR AT CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION On March 3,1982,k QC welding ir.spector expressed concerns to me relative to forced air coolin f pipe welds. The inspector indicated that has been a Duke employee for years and has been a welding inspector for years. He had witnessed force air cooling of a 2-inch stainless steel soc et weld and was concerned about the technical acceptability of this practice. His concern was evaluated by Duke under provisions of the Duke technical recourse procedure. He was unsure tnat the answer he received was technically correct. He provided me with copies of related documents including the Duke metallurgical report. I have englosed this information. I reviewed the documentation and discussed metallurgical considerations in detail with the inspector. I indicated that the Duke evaluation was acceptable. He indicated that he was now satisfied with the evaluation of forced air coa. ling but had several additional technical. concerns which were being evaluated by the.special Duke task force (see previous correspondence concerning special task force formed to address QC welding inspector concerns). I indicated to him that we will be reviewing all actions taken by the task force. $f h? P.UK. Van,'f .s 'l Doorn

Enclosure:

DPC Documentation of Inspector Concerns NCfrE: Enclosure is not being publicly released due to its ccnfidential nature. (OIA) u O rntn/nf1h y) u Wt LF UV / l l L ~~ naxwmciL5L9}}