ML20093J829
| ML20093J829 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palo Verde  |
| Issue date: | 09/28/1984 |
| From: | Van Brunt E ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE CO. (FORMERLY ARIZONA NUCLEAR |
| To: | Bishop T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| References | |
| ANPP-30683-TDS, DER-83-10, NUDOCS 8410170036 | |
| Download: ML20093J829 (4) | |
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T Arizona Public Service Company p
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September 28; 1984 Di M E ANPP-30683-TDS/TRB 1
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- U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region >V.
Creekside Oaks Office Park 1450 Maria Lane - Suite 210
. Walnut Creek, California. 94596-5368 Attention: Mr. T. W. Bishop; Director Division of Resident.-
Reactor Projects and Engineering Programs
Subject:
Final Report, Revision 1 - DER 83-10 A 50.55(e) Reportable Condition Relating to Main Steam Relief Valves Tests Exceed Specified 5 Percent Blowdown Limit.
File: 84-019-026; D.4.33.2 v
Reference:
A) Telephone Conversation between P.' Narbut and G. Duckworth on February 28; 1983 B) ANPP-23271, dated March 17; 1982 (Interim Report)
C) ANPP-24004, dated June 8,1982 (Time Extension)
D) ANPP-27394, dated July 25,1982 (Time Extension)
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E) ANPP-27975, dated October.7,1983 (Time Extension)
F) ANPP-28258, dated November 18,1983 (Time Extension)
G) ANPP-28609, dated January 12, ~ 1984 (Time Extension)
H) ANPP-28953, dated February 28, 1984 (Final Report)
Dear Sir:
Attached is Revision 1 to our final written report of the deficiency, referenced above, which has' been determined to be Not Reportable under the requirements of 10CFR50.55(e). This revision provides clarification to the Analysis of Safety Implications.
Very truly yours, 1
i G.A.l OL E. E. Van Brunt, J r.
APS Vice President, Nuclear ANPP Project Director
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. Attaclaient cc See Page Two
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' 1 Mr! T. W. ~ Bishop DER 83-10 Page Two
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Richard DeYoung,; Director Office of Inspection and Enforcement U..S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission-Washington, D. C.
20555 T. G. Woods, Jr.
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D. B. Fasnacht A. C. Rogers L. A. Souza T. D. Shriver D. E. Fowler J. Vorees J. R. Bynum A. C. Gehr W. J. Stubblefield W. C. Bingham R. L. Patterson R. W.' Welcher H. D. Foster D. R. Hawkinson L. Clyde D. Canady J. D. Houchen J. E. Kirby D. N. Stover Records Center Institute of Nuclear Power Operations 1100 Circle 75 Parkway, Suite 1500 Atlanta, CA 30339 Mr. E. Licitra U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Phillips Building 7920 Norfolk Avenue Bethesda, MD 20814 I
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FINAL' REPORT - DER 83-10:-
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.~ DEFICIENCY ElALUATION 50.55(e)_
. ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY (APS).
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PVNGS UNITS 1,12L.3 II; Description of Deficiency The twenty Unit 1 Main Steam Safety Relief Valves (MSSV's) supplied; by Combuston Engineering (C-E)-and manufactured, by Dresser Industries, _ were isent ' to Wyle Laboratories for inspection and '
testing - due. to ~ a concern regarding ' the means of. interim storage used i at the Palo Verde site (see Deficiency Evaluation Report 82-54). :In addition to set pressure and leakage checks,~ APS ' requested that the blowdown be measured. Blowdown had not been' verified prior to the-original delivery to the' site because of ' test facilty limitations at that time. The Tag Nos. for the Unit 1 MSSV's 'are as follows:
SGE-PSV-554~
SGE-PSV-559 SGE-PSV-574 SGE-PSV-579-555 560 575 691 556 561 576-692 557 572
'577 693 558 573 578 695-The M5SV's were first disassembled and cleaned by Wyle. - It was found that no permanent material damage had occurred to the valves, permitting testing to proceed on January 19, 1983. The first ten MSSV's tested failed to meet C-E's blowdown requirement of less. than-or equal to 5%. Blowdown for the tested valves ranged f rom 7% to 15%.
In addition, in some cases inadequate lift,-galling, and nonadjustability occurred.
The Dresser tests established that the valve design was deficient with regard to the blowdown adjustment, and corrective design changes were taken to drill the disk holders and to provide a simple anti-rotation pin. The latter change was not a deficiency. per se but was done to better assure adjustability. These' design modifications were implemented on the ten failed valves at Wyle and Dresser so that testing could proceed.
Also, C-E's review of the system requirements established that the minimum (valve closure) blowdown pressure could be 1,175 psig for all valves. This change was made to the C-E Testing Specification.
Retesting was successful for the low pressure setpoint valves only.
af ter much trial and error during testing. Two other higher setpoint valves passed successfully ~at this time.
As agreed with C-E/ Dresser, the other 14 valves were shipped to Dresser for rework (drilling disk holders,and providing pins).
These valves were subsequently sent back to Wyle for testing on March 29, 1983. Upon retesting, af ter factory rework and retesting, six of the fourteen valves failed. The six valves which failed were subsequently reworked by Wyle under Dresser's supervison and successfully tested on April 16, 1983.
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. Mr. T. W. Bishop
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DER 83 -
i Page Two The six failures were 'due to inadequate lif t and disk holder
. galling. One valve which passed the test had a questionable resenting characteristic. This valve was disassemble and found to have inadequate > clearance for disk holder movement..
- II.
Analysis of Safety Implications For. events other than steam generator tube rupture, there will be no -
l change in the integrated steam flow to atmosphere. Acco rdingly, L
there will be no significant changes to either the accident analysis or of f site.. radiation exposures.
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- For a steam generator tube rupture, the slight increase in radiation i
. exposure is still' well within 10CFR 100 limits. CE has confirmed that the greater blowdosn does not have any significant thermal l
hydraulic consequences which would aggravate FSAR Chapter 15-analyses.
Accordingly, this condition is evaluated as not reportable under 10CFR50.55(e) since if lef t uncorrected the condition would not represent a significant safety hazard.
III. Corrective Action 1.
The MSSV's for Unit i have been corrected, returned to the jobsite, and reinstalled.
2.
The MSSV's for Units 2 and 3 have been returned to the Dresser factory for rework.
l 3.
Af ter rework each Unit 2 and 3 valve will be tested and corrected at Wyle Laboratories in the same manner as the Unit l
1 valves.
4 C-E Specification 14273-PE-701 Revision 5 (Bechtel Log No. N001-6.04-11) has been issued to specify a i
blowdown pressure of 1175 psi.
5.
CESSAR table 5.4.13-2 is being revised by C-E to reflect revised blowdown criteria.
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