ML20093J599
| ML20093J599 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palo Verde  |
| Issue date: | 09/26/1984 |
| From: | Van Brunt E ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE CO. (FORMERLY ARIZONA NUCLEAR |
| To: | Bishop T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| References | |
| ANPP-30664-TDS, DER-84-52, NUDOCS 8410160708 | |
| Download: ML20093J599 (4) | |
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f RECEIyEa
- HRC Arizona Public Sen' ice Company
' September 26, 1984-gggg'.j N ANPP-30664-TDS/TRB U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission -
Region V Creekside Oaks Office Park 1450 Maria Lane - Suite 210 Walnut Creek, California 94596-5368 Attention: Mr. T. W. Bishop, Director
' Division of Resident Reactor Projects and Engineering Programs
Subject:
Final Report - DER 84-52 A 50.55(e) Condition Relating to The Atmospheric Dump Valve.
File: 84-019-026; D.4.33.2 Ref erence: A) Telephone Conversation between L. Miller and T. Bradish on August 10, 1984 B) ANPP-30473, dated September 10,1984 (Interim Report)
Dear Sir Attached is our final written report of the deficiency referenced above.
Very truly yours,
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E. E. Van Brunt, Jr.
APS Vice President Nuclear Production ANPP Project Director EEVB/TRB/nj Attachment cet See Page Two i
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Mr. T. W. Bishop DER 84-52 Page Two ec:
Richard ' DeYoung, Director Office of Inspection and Enforcement U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington,' D. C.
20555 T. G. - Woods, Jr.
D. B. Karner W. E. Ide
,s' D. B. Fasnacht A. C. Rogers L. A. Souza l
-D. E. Fowler T. D. Shriver C. N.' Russo' J. Vorees J. R. Bynum
'l J. M. Allen -
D. Canndy i
A. C. Gehr W. J. Stubblefield Y
i W. G. Bingham R. L. Patterson l
R. W. Welcher l
H. D. Foster D. R. Hawkinson i
R. P. Zimmerman L. Clyde M. Woods T. J. Bloom D. N. Stover J. D. Houchen J. E. Kirby Records Center Institute of Nuclear Power Operations 1100 Circle 75 Parkway, Suite 1500 Atlanta, GA 30339 e
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,3 FINAL REPORT
' DER 84 DEFICIENCY EVALUATION 50.55(e)(
ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY ~(APS)
- PVNGS UNITS 1, 2; 3 -
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Description of Deficle'ncy
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The atmospheric dump valve and-its associated resistor (diffus'er) were manufactured by Control Components, Inc. (CCI)'
-and purchased together.. CCI was ~ provided with general design,
criteria via specification 13-JM-601A to supply.the subject '
cp componsnts. -Bechtel Engineering designed and provided the interface-(interconnecting)-piping-between the valve which is f.
installed at the' elev.143' of the Main Steam Support Structure' and the diffuser which is installed above the valve
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on' the roof. 'Bechtel Engineering used the base flange of the resistor as an anchor to support part.of the interconnecting.
piping assembly, s Subsequently, CCI submitted, their seismic
. report.(Bechtel Document Log.No; ~ J601A-158-2) to Bechtel for approval. During the review of this report, Bechtel determined that the actual piping loads on the resistor base flange had not been considered and that when these loads were considered, the resistor base flange would become overstressed during a seismic event..
CCI perf ormed another seismic analysis using actual piping loads supplied by Bechtel and determined that, in order to meet the loading requirements, the thickne'ss of the resistor base flange must be increased f rom one inch to approximately two inches.
Evaluation 1
i The root cause of this condition is that the piping load information was not transmitted to the supplier; however, Bechtel Engineerits had not released the design of this system until confirming that the total installation would meet project seismic requirements. The final installation of the atmospheric dump valve system has been contingent upon Bechtel's acceptance of CCI's seismic report and the-review of the seismic report disclosed the need to increase the thickness of the resistor base flange.
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Analysis of Safety Implications i
p This condition, if lef t uncorrected,.could possible constitute L.
a safety condition during a seismic event since the piping l'
assembly could become Jlsengaged at the resistor base flange and fall upon safety-et uted equipment.- A detailed analysis of safety implications was not pursued since the condition is
'being corrected.
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-Mr. T. W. Bishop
~ DER 84-52 Page Two III.
Corrective Action DCPs 1-SJ-S'G-117, 2-SJ-SG-117, and 3-CJ-SG-117 were initiated to increase the thickness of the resistor base flange to two inches for the installations.in Units 1, 2, and 3 respectively.
CCI's revised seismic report -is logged under Bechtel Document Log No. J601A-158-3 To preclude recurrence, a training session was held to make all engineering disciplines aware of the need to transmit the load inf ormation to other disciplines (or suppliers) for incorporation into other specifications, Reference IOM-E-11451.
(MOC 332730), dated 8/16/84 r
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