ML20093H994
| ML20093H994 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palo Verde  |
| Issue date: | 07/11/1984 |
| From: | Van Brunt E ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE CO. (FORMERLY ARIZONA NUCLEAR |
| To: | Bishop T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| References | |
| REF-PT21-84-366-000 ANPP-29939-TDS, ANPP-29939-TDS1, DER-82-76, PT21-84-366, PT21-84-366-000, NUDOCS 8407250475 | |
| Download: ML20093H994 (6) | |
Text
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ITECE!VED tmC Arizona Public Service Company 3 M 16 PH 2.;7 July 11,1984 ANPP-29939-TDS/Fs5 tittle U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission Region V Creekside Oaks Office Park 1450 Maria Lane - Suite 210 Walnut Creek, CA 94596-5368 Attention: Mr. T. W. Bishop, Director Division of Resident Reactor Projects and Engineering Programs
Subject:
Final Report - DER 82-76 A 50.55(e) Reportable Condition Relating To Target Rock Valves Do Not Meet Specification / Test Requirements.
File: 84-019-026; D.4.33.2
Reference:
A) Telephone Conversation between P. Narbut and G. Duckworth on November 24, 1982 B) ANPP-22590, dated December 23, 1982 (Interim Report)
C) ANPP-23223, dated March 10, 1983 (Time Extension)
D) ANPP-23641, dated May 3,1983 (Time Extension)
E) ANPP-27523, dated August 5, 1983 (Time Extension)
F) ANPP-28247, dated November 17, 1983 (Time Extension)
G) ANPP-28608, dated January 12, 198'+ (Time Extension)
H) ANPP-28884, dated February 15, 1984 (Time Extension)
I) ANPP-29288, dated April 12, 1984 (Time Extension)
J) ANPP-29612, dated May 29, 1984 (Interim Report, Rev. 1)
Dear Sir:
Attached is our final written report of the Reportable Deficiency under 10CFR50.55(e), referenced above.
Very truly ours,
~.
QL
-enLL E. E. Van Brunt, Jr.
APS Vice President Nuclear Production ANPP Project Director EEVB/TRB:db Attachment cc:
See Page Two 8407250475 840711
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1 PDR ADOCK 05000528 I g_y S
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I ll Mr. T. W. Bishop DER 82-76 Page Two l
l cc:
Richard DeYoung, Director Office of Inspection and Enforcement l
U. S.-Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 I
l
[-
T. G. Woods, Jr.
D. B. Karner W. E. Ide D. B. Fasnacht A. C. Rogers L. A. Souza D. E. Fowler T. D. Shriver C. N. Russo J. Vorees J. R. Bynum J. M. Allen J. A. Brand A. C. Gehr W. J. Stubblefield W. G. Bingham R. L. Patterson R. W. Welcher H. D. Foster D. R. Hawkinson L. E. Vorderbrueggen R. P. Zimmerman S. R. Frost J. Self D. Canady T. J. Bloom Records Center Institute of Nuclear Power Operations 1100 circle 75 Parkway, Suite 1500 Atlanta, GA 30339
__._________m.________
FINAL REPORT - DER 82-76 DEFICIENCY EVALUATION 50.55(e)
ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY (APS)
PVNGS UNITS 1, 2, 3 I.
Description of Deficiency l
Combustion Engineering (C-E) has reported deficiencies with thirty (30) target rock solenoid valves supplied to PVNGS. Of these, twenty-four (24) one-inch valves Model 77L-001 were assigned to be installed as Safety Injection Tank Valves (eight per unit) and are identified by the following unit tag numbers:
1JSIAHV605 2JSIAHV605 3JSIAHV605 1JSIAHV606 2JSIAHV606 3JSIAHV606 1JSIAHV607 2JSIAHV607 3JSIAHV607 IJSIAHV608 2JSIAHV608 3JSIAHV608 1JSIBHV613 2JSIBHV613 3JSIAHV613 1JSIBHV623 2JSIBHV623 3JSIAHV623 1JSIBHV633 2JSIBHV633 3JSIBHV633 1JSIBHV643 2JSIBHV643 3JSIBHV634 Additionally, six (6) two-inch Model 77L-003 Target Rock solenoid valves were assigned to he installed as Pressurizer Auxiliary Spray valves (two per unit) and are identified by the following unit tag numbers.
IJCHAHV205 2JCHAHV205 3JCHAHV205 IJCHBHV203 2JCHBHV203 3JCHBHV203 To support the PVNGS equipment qualification program, C-E determined that four (4) valves would he returned to C-E for additional testing in accordance with NUREG-0588. Units 1 & 2 valves were already installed at this time, so valves were selected from Unit 3 stock and identified by model numbers, serial numbers and size as follows:
Model No.
Serial No.
Size Unit Tag Numbers 77L-001 17 1"
3JSIAHV605 77L-001 18 1"
3JSIAHV606 77L-003 5
2" 3JCHBHV203 77L-003 6
2" 3JCHAHV205 It was during the inspection of these valves by C-E that the deficiencies were revealed. These are classified as items which can he identified by visual inspection prior to testing, and items found during the testing program as follows:
- 1. Prior to environmental testing
- a. Incorrect Valve Assembly -- Examination found an off-center insulating washer wedged in the land between the pressure housing and the lower case of the reed switch housing. This prevented pressure frou the assembly nut being transmitted to the hottom of the solenoid housing and the lower 0-ring seal.
The misalignment was corrected.
M 9
Mr. T.1W. Bishop
-ANPP-29939 Page Two
- b. Significant Missing Parts -- The delivered valves lacked 0-ring seals on both valves [5] and [6]. In addition, rubber grommeta protecting the solenoid leads from chafing by the housing were missing on valves (17] and [18]. The~ missing 0-rings were replaced.
- 2. Attributed to environmental testing program
- a. Limit switch valve position indicator failurea, due to
. improper curing within the reed switch assembly.
- h. Va:ve Failed to Open - About 75% through the seismic tent, val.e [5] failed to open due to an electrical short in the solenoid. On disassembly, the solenoid was observed to be free to move in all directions.
The lead wiren of the other valve tested [18] were alao damaged to the extent of exposing the conductors, but they had not as yet come into contact either with each other or with the housing, where the grommet was missing.
- c. Valve Failed to Close -- Although valve (18] was still operating electrically at termination of the test, it was unable to seat properly in the closed position because the sof t seat ring.had started to come out of its retention groove in the end of the plunger.
II.
Analysis of Safety Implications C-E has reviewed the impset of the reported condition and has determined the following:
" Failure of the Safety Injection Tank (SIT) Valve does not present a significant nafety hazard because shutdown and depreraurization can be accomplished without it.
Removal of SIT from service for repair in also permitted by the technical specification."
" Failure of the Prennurizer Auxiliary Spray Valves could present a significant safety hazard because, in the Palo Verde design, these valven play a vital role in the principsi path to cold shutdown for accident situations involving extended loss of off-site power".
Based on the above, thin condition is evaluated as reportable under the requirements of 10CFR50.55(e), since if the Pressurizer Auxiliary Spray valves defects were to remain uncorrected, it would represent a significant safety condition.
C-E has subsequently reported thin condition.under the requirements of 10CFR Part 21.
h
Mri T. W. Bishop
- ANFF-29939
- Page Three III. Corrective Action A. C-E letter V-CE-19075 providen the corrective action fcr modifications of the existing solenoid operators (Top Works) for
. the Model 77L-001 (Target Rock) one-inch Safety Injection Tank Vent valves for all 3 Units. The modifications are based on acceptance of Target Rock requalification testing in accordance with the requirements of NUREG-0588. The valves are identified by the following unit tag numbers:
1JSIAHV605 2SIAHV605 3SIAHV605 1JSIAHV606 2SIAHV606 3SIAHV606 IJSIAHV607 2SIAHV607 3SIAHV607 1JSIAHV608 2SIAHV608 3SIAHV608 1JSIBHV613 2SIBHV613 3SIBHV613 IJSIBHV623 2SIBHV623 3SIBHV623 IJSIBHV633 2SIBHV633 3SIBHV633 IJSIBHV643 2SIBHV643 3SIBHV643 C-E has submitted revised Target Rock Test Plan TP-ESE-024, Rev. 1 (Log N001-1.01-351-2) and Target Rock Modification Report No. 3862 to support ongoing qualification for NUREG-0588.
Bechtet will implement the required modifications to the T/R Solenoid operators by the following Design Change Packages prior to fuel load in each Unit:
ISM-SI-301 2SM-SL-301 3CM-SI-301 C-E will nuhait revised drawings, manuals and qualification documentation as required.
B. The corrective action required for the two-inch Pressurizer Spray Valves is as follows:
Replace existing Unit 1 Model 77L-003 Target Rock nolenoid operators with Unit 2 refurbished solenoid operators of the same model (Tag numbern IJCHAHV205 and 1 CHBHV203). This will be an interim solution to support PVNGS Cycle 1* scheduled require ments.
Final dinposition will be determined on availability of modified Model 77L-003 nolenoid operators or replacement available Valcor Model V526-563-9 two-inch solenoid valves.
Replace 'all Unita 2 & 3 Target Rock Model 77L-003 two-inch solenoid valves with Valcor two-inch solenoid valven Model V562-563-9, obtained from Tennennen Valley Authority (TVA).
C-E states that Valcor is qualified for 40-year life and replacement was bened on supporting construction schedule.
se.
- Mr. T. W. Bishop ANPP-29939- - -
Page Four The Valcor valves will assume the following unit tag numbers:
2JCHAHV205 3JCHAHV205 2JCHBHV203 3JCHBHV203 Bechtel will implement the required valve modifications and valves change-out prior to fuel load in each Unit via the
-following Design Change Packages:
ISM-CH-307 2SM-CH-307 3SM-CJ-307 C. C-E will submit revised drawings, manuals, and qualification documentation, to support corrective action.
D. C-E has issued Bulletin 82-11 dated November 9,1982 notifying all utility clients of this deficiency.
E. Bechtel has identified twelve (12) additional Target Rock solenoid Model 77L (77L-002 and 77L-004) supplied by C-E to PVNGS. These valves are not included in the PVl!GS Equipment Qualification (EQ) Program and, therefore, the EQ problems identified in this DER are not applicable. However, Bechtel has issued Investigation Request -(IR) No.18 to inspect the following valves for missing parts:
1JCHNHV526 2JCHNHV526 3JCHNHV526 1JRCEHV403 2JRCEHV403 3JRCEHV403 1JSIBUV659 2JSIBUV659 3JSIBUV659 1JSIAUV660 2JSIAUV660 3JSIAUV660 Any additional NCR's initiated as a result of this activity shall cross reference this DER for reportability.
- Cycle 1 is the first refueling assignment, approximately 18 months from commericial operations.
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