ML20093C578

Final Part 21 & Deficiency Rept Re Refueling Water Tank Penetration Sleeves.Initially Reported on 840717.Design Change Packages Will Be Issued to Perform & Document Required Grouting Work.Pipe Connections Will Be Checked

ML20093C578
Person / Time
Site:	Palo Verde
Issue date:	09/24/1984
From:	Van Brunt E ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE CO. (FORMERLY ARIZONA NUCLEAR
To:	Bishop T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V)
References
REF-PT21-85-051-000 ANPP-30632-TDS, DER-84-46, DER-84-66, PT21-85-051-000, PT21-85-51, NUDOCS 8410100603
Download: ML20093C578 (5)

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HSCEIVED Mac' Arizona Public Service Company.

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September 24;-1984 ANPP-30632-TDS/ g gfgyg)y U.1 S. Nuclear R'egulatory Commission g

Region V

- Creekside Oaks Office Park I

1450 Maria Lane - Suite 210 Walnut Creek; - Calif ornia 94596-5368-2-

Attention: Mr. T. W. Bishop; Director Division of Resident Reactor Projects and Engineering Programs

Subject:

Pinal Report - DER 84-46 A 50.55(e) Reportable Condition Relating to Refueling Water Tank Penetration Sleeves.

Pile: 84-019-026; D.4.33.2-

Reference:

A) Telephone Conversation between D. Hollenbach and T. Bradish on July 17; 1984 B) ANPP-30259, dated August 16,1984 (Interim Report)

C) ANPP-30446, dated September-6, _1984 (Time Extension)

Dear Sir:

Attached is our final written report of the Reportable Deficiency under 10CFR50.55(e), ref erenced above.

i Very truly yours, 1

CA LA---

l E. E. Van Brunt, J r.

APS Vice President Nuclear Production ANPP Project Director EEVB/TRB/nj Attachment-i cc: See Page Two 8410100603 840924 PDR ADOCK 05000528 S

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Mr. ' T. W. Bishop DER 84-46 Page Two

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Richard DeYoung, Director Office of Inspection and Enforcement U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C.

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- T. G.. Woods, Jr.

D. B. Karner W. E. Ide D. B. Fasnacht A. C. Rogers L. A. Souza D. E. Fowler T. D. Shriver C. N. Russo J. Vorecs J. R. Bynum J. M. Allen J. _ A. Brand A. C. Gehr W. J. Stubblefield W. G. Bingham R. L. Patterson R. W. Welcher H. D. Foster D. R. Hawkinson L. E. Vorderbrueggen R. P. Zimmerman S. R. Frost L. Clyde M. Woods T. J. Bloom D. N. Stover Records Center Institute of Nuclear Power Operations 1100 Circle 75 Parkway, Suite 1500 Atlanta, CA 30339 i

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FINAL REPORT - DER 84-46 DEFICIENCY EVALUATION 50.55(e)

ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY ( APS)

PVNGS UNITS 1, 2, 3 I.

Description of Deficiency Following completion of the final stress calculation f or the Chemical and Volume Control system (CH), it was determined that no design calculation had been perf ormed for the sleeve-to pipe cap plate connection for two 20-inch diameter pipes penetrating the Refueling Water Tank (See Figure 1).

Calculations were performed and revealed that the connection would be overstressed during a seismic event due to loads resulting f rom seismic anchor movement.

Evaluation In the original configuration, relative movement between the Refueling Water Tank and the Essential Pipe Tunnel during a seismic event would cause a relative transverse movement between the sleeve and the pipe. This movement created the overstress condition in the sleeve-to pipe connection. To prevent this movement, the annular space between the sleeve and the pipe shall be filled with non-shrink grout.

Calculation No.13-CC-CT-015 has been perf ormed to verify that this modification will prevent the overstress condition. This action will ensure that the system will not fail in the event of an SSE and that the leak-tight integrity of the Refueling Water Tank will be maintained.

The root cause is an oversight on the part of design engineering to perform a required evaluation. The final stress calculations provide a check on this type of oversight, and the lack of this calculation was discovered during final stress analysis.

II.

Analysis of Safety Implications

'The condition described herein affects the safety injection purp suction nozzle connection for the CH system and could prohibit that system f rom performing its intended safety function during or af ter a safe shutdown earthquake (SSE).

Based on this, the condition is evaluated as safety significant and reportable under the requirements of 10CFR50.55(e). In addition, due to the design deficiency, the PVNGS project has evaluated the condition to be reportable under the requirements of 10CFR Part 21.

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. Mr. T. W2 Bishop _-

DER 84-46

,Page Two III..

Corrective Action

1. Remedial Action Design Change Packages (DCPs) ISC, 2CC,~ and 3CC-ZY-134 have been prepared and will be issued to perform and document the requirad grouting work for all 3 Units.

2. Action te Preclude Recurrence All Pipe connections to safety-related tanks will be checked to verify that a final calculation has been.

performed and that the proper noczle loads have been considered in the final design. Any deficiency identified during this check will be documented in accordance with Project Procedures and will cross-ref erence this' DER. A training class was given on August 21, 1984 to reemphasize the need to ensure that the interfaces between piping and equipments / structures be properly addressed.

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