ML20093A382
| ML20093A382 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Perry  |
| Issue date: | 06/08/1984 |
| From: | Edelman M CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ILLUMINATING CO. |
| To: | James Keppler NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| References | |
| (RDC-99(84)), NUDOCS 8407100419 | |
| Download: ML20093A382 (2) | |
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Serving The Best Location in the Nation MURRAY R. EDELMAN VICE PRESIDENT NUCUAR Mr. James G. Keppler Regional Administrator, Region III Office of Inspection and Enforcement U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 799 Roosevelt Road Glen Eliyn, Illinois 60137 RE:
Perry Nuclear Power Plant Docket Nos. 50-440; 50-441 HPCS Interfaces to the Suppression Pool Clean-up System [RDC 99(84)]
Dear Mr. Keppler:
This letter is the final report on the potential significant deficiency concerning the design of the High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) interf aces to the Suppression Pool Clean-up System.
Mr. P. R. Pelke of your office was notified on February 16, 1984, by Mr. B. D. Walrath of The Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company (CEI) that this problem was being evaluated and two interim reports, dated March 16 and April 30, 1984, were also submitted. This discrepancy was identified during a safety system functional capability review performed for CEI by GDS Associates.
This letter contains a description of the deficiency and an evaluation of this condition.
As a result of our evaluation, we have determitted that this condition is not reportable pursuant to the requirements of 10CFR50.55(e).
Deccription of Deficiency The nonsafety-related Suppression Pool Clean-up (SPCU) System takes suction from the High Pressure Core Spray suction via valve E22-F015. The HPCS System will automatically start upon a Level 2 Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) signal but the clean-up pump suction valves close on a Level 1 LOCA signal per elementary diagram B-208-065.
In this situation, the HPCS pump will experience opposing pump suction from the SPCU pump.
In addition, due to the non-seismic classi-fication of the SPCU system, this situation would create a non-seismic interface with the HPCS system.
Evaluation of Potential Deficiency Our Architect / Engineer, Gilbert / Commonwealth, Inc., has completed their evaluation of this discrepancy. The results of the evaluation are that no reduction in the ability of the HPCS System to perform its intended safety function can be postulated. Therefore, this condition is not reportable pu rsuant to the requirements of 10CFR50.55(e).
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8407100419 840608 vuN 121984 PDR ADOCK 05000440 h
2-June 8, 1984
'Mr. James G. Keppler i
A design. change for Unit I will be instituted to change the logic for the SPCU isolation valves so that they will close upon a Level 2 LOCA signal. A
- similar situation does not exist in Unit 2 as the respective isolation valves currently close on a Level 2 LOCA signal.
Please call if there are any questions.,
Sincerely, h
Murray R. Edelman Vice President Nuclear Group i
MRE:pab cc:
Mr. J. A. Grobe 1
NRC Site Office 4
Director ~
Of fice of Inspection and Enforecment
. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20535-U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission c/o Document Management Branch Washington, D.C.
20555 Records Center, SEE-IN Institute of Nuclear Power Operations 1100 Circle 75 Parkway, Suite 1500 Atlanta, Georgia 30339
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