ML20091M377

Interim Deficiency Rept Re Dimension Not Maintained by Craft Nor Inspected by Qa,Thus Creating Potential for Spherical Bearings to Become Totally Disengaged.Const Procedure CP-385 Revised Re Verification of Dimension

ML20091M377
Person / Time
Site:	Catawba
Issue date:	05/29/1984
From:	Tucker H DUKE POWER CO.
To:	James O'Reilly NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
References
NUDOCS 8406110270
Download: ML20091M377 (3)

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Dons POWER GoMatNY P.O. IDOX 331tM)

CllAMI.CTTE, N.C. 28242

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Pl?. ' 23 May 29, 1984 g3 5 Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Regional Administrator U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II 101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900 Atlanta, Georgia 30303 Re: Catawba Nuclear Station Units 1 and 2 Docket Nos. 50-413 and 50-414

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.55e, please find attached Significant Deficiency Report No. SD 413-414/84-12.

Very truly yours,

h. &

Hal B. Tucker

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LTP/php Attachment cc: Director INP0 Records Center Office of Incpection & Enforcement Suite 1500 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 1100 Circle 75 Parkway Washington, D. C. 20555 Atlanta, Georgia 30339 NRC Resident Inspector Mr. Robert Guild, Esq.

Catawba Nuclear Station Attorney-at-Law P. O. Box 12097 Palmetto Alliance Charleston, South Carolina 29412 21351 Devine Street Columbia, South Carolina 29205 Mr. Jesse L. Riley Carolina Environmental Study Group 854 Henley Place Charlotte, North Carolina 28207

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w JP0/HBT/LTP s May 29, 1984 DUKE POWER COMPANY CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION l

REPORT NUMBER: SD 413-414/84-12

. REPORT DATE: May 29, 1984 '

i FACILITY: Catawba. Nuclear Station Units 1 & 2 IDENTIFICATION OF DEFICIENCY:

To accommodate thermal movements and to prevent overstressing the load bolt and/or to prevent the spherical bearing from disengaging, the installed "S" dimensior for clamps installed with Figure 306/307 snubbers and struts must be naintained with a given tolerance. Due to inadequate manufacturer's e installation guidelines, construction procedures required to maintain this fit were not implemented until 1-20-84.

An investigation / evaluation determined that approximately 165 Unit (1) &

! 42(Unit 2)Bergen-Patersonclamps(Part#6202-1.5) installed prior to i

construction procedures being implemented had suspect "S" dimensions. This l problem was officially documented by NCIR #18294 on 4-4-84.

INITIAL REPORT:

1 On May 2,1984, Virgil Brownlee, NRC Region II, Atlanta, Georgia was notified of the deficiency by J. L. Ritchie, R. Carroll, and T. L. Utterback of Duke Power Company, Charlotte, North Carolina. '

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COMPONENT AND/0R SUPPLIER:

BergenPatersonClamp(Part#6202-1.5) 6

v JP0/HBT/LTP s

May 29, 1984 DESCRIPTION OF DEFICIENCY:

To prevent 1 KIP Figure 306/307 Mechanical snubber load pin spherical bearings from becoming disengaged, 3/4" thru 3" Bergen-Paterson pipe clamps (Part # 6202-1.5) must be insta11t.J such that the spacer washers (one on each side of bearing) and the spherical bearing fit tight between the clamp ears or such that the "S" dimension is no greater than 0.84375 (either fit is acceptable). The "S" dimension is the distance between clamp halves at the load pin. Design Dwg.

CN-1684-00-MAT-2 Revisions 2 and 3, which details this criteria, has been issued to Construction.

This "S" dimension was not maintained by the craft or inspected by QA until Construction Procedure CP-385 was revised to incorporate this requirement on 1-20-84. This problem was identified on NCIR #18294 dated 4-4-84. A subsequent investigation by Construction Technical Support revealed that only 13 clamps (12 Unit (1) & 1 Unit (2)) had installed "S" dimensions which would allow spherical bearings to potentially become totally disengaged.

ANALYSIS OF SAFETY IMPLICATIONS:

The consequences of comnlete disengagement of the spherical bearing would be to invalidate the original analytical assumptions used in the piping system analysis, potentially creating an overstress condition in the piping system or overloading the supports. This would be more significant for the seismic event since it would change the dynamic characteristics of the piping system and lead to impact loads that may damage the piping or supports and adversely affect safety of operation.

CORRECTIVE ACTION:

Construction procedure CP-385 and QA Form M51E (Serial #CN1) used to dimensionally verify component supports has been revised to now require the "S" dimension be verified to be in accordance with Design Dwg. CN-1684-00-MAT-2 on all future installations.

The "S" dimensions of all 165 Unit (1) & 42 Unit (2) clamps installed prior to CP-385 & form M51E being revised have been inspected by Constructinn and QA. The 13 clamps with unacceptable "S" dimensions have been adjusted and are now in accordance with CP-385, Form M51E & Design Dwg. CN-1684-00-MAT-2.

Based upon the foregoing Analysis o"f Safety Implications, this problem could have adversely affected safety of operation. However, all deficient clamps have now been verified to be in compliance with the above noted procedures and drawings.

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