ML20091K060
| ML20091K060 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Limerick  |
| Issue date: | 06/04/1984 |
| From: | Conner T CONNER & WETTERHAHN, PECO ENERGY CO., (FORMERLY PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC |
| To: | |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8406060397 | |
| Download: ML20091K060 (18) | |
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IRC M '6 Al();l9 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board In the Matter of
)
)
Philadelphia Electric Company
)
Docket Nos. 50-352
)
50-353 (Limerick Generating Station,
)
Units 1 and 2)
)
APPLICANT'S' ANSWER TO " REVISED ISSUES OF CONCERN OF THE CITY OF PHILADELPHIA IN THE AREA OF 1
[OFFSITE] EMERGENCY PLANNING" Preliminary Statement On May 18,
- 1984, the City of Philadelphia
(" City")
filed its revised " issues of concern" regarding emergency planning for the ingestion pathway Emergency Planning Zone
(" ingestion. pathway EPZ") as it affects the City.W Al-though negotiations have resulted in the withdrawal -of
'-1/
Preliminarily, it is noted that the City, by its cover letter dated May 18, 1984, requested an opportunity to reply to the responses of other parties to its revised issues.
-Such. requests are not routinely granted because 10 C.F.R. 52.730 (c) "would nc.mally permit an answer only," not a reply to an answer.
Long Island Lighting Com:?any (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit
Where the party seeking to ' reply has not even reviewed - the briefs to which it would respond if permitted, the request is clearly what another licensing board criticized as the i
"Last-Word Syndrome. "
Public - Service Company. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), Docket Nos. 50-443-OL and 50-444-OL, " Memorandum and Order" (January 13, 1984) (slip op. at 3 n.4).
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certain issues, the issues designated City-1, 3,
7 and 9 remain.
As discussed below, each of the City's proposed " issues of concern" involves either a misreading or overextension of regulatory requirements.
Essentially, the City wishes the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
(" Commonwealth"),
Applicant Philadelphia Electric Company
(" Applicant")
and other concerned planning agencies and organizations to engage in a far-reaching, detailed-level of planning which is simply not required by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(" Commission" or "NRC")
for the ingestion pathway EPZ.
For this less af fected area, as opposed to the plume exposure EPZ, more generalized planning, utilizing a_d hoc responses during an d
actual radiological emergency, is appropriate.
Accordingly, the City's proposed issues should be denied.
Argument When Applicant responded to the City's initially designated issues, it discussed how the City had failed to meet the requirements for proper contentions, including specificity and bases.
Applicant also discussed the general philosophy of the NRC and the Federal Emergency Management Agency
(" FEMA") in the implementation of protective actions in the ingestion pathway EPZ.
These agencies have long recognized that, in a hypothetical emergency, actions in the ingestion pathway EPZ,-unlike the plume exposure EPZ, need not be taken immediately.
In the interect of brevity, Applicant refers the Licensing Board to its previous
discussion of these basic principles.2/
A discussion of the City's revised issues follows below.
City-1:
As revised, this issue now encompasses con-cerns previously expressed in City-1, 2 and 6.
Although no
" issue" per se_ is specified, the thrust of the issue is that the Commonwealth's Disaster Operations Plan - Annex E Fixed Nuclear Facility Incidents
(" Annex E")
" fails to designate the Access Control Points at which food and agricultural products moving from and through the Plume Exposure Pathway EPZ toward and into the City of Philadelphia Ingestion Exposure Pathway will be stopped and the food and agricultural products sampled and tested."-
once again, the City appears to confuse the level of planning required for the ingestion pathway EPZ with that which is appropriate for the plume exposure EPZ, i.e., areas immediately affected by a radiological emergency.
Although the City cites the applicable regulations under 10 C.F.R. 550.4 7 (b) (10) and (c) (2) and the standards under NUREG-0654, Criterion II.J.ll, it fails to identify anything in those provisions which require the designation in Annex E of the specific Access Control Points at which food will be interdicted for sampling.
Nothing in these general planning 2_/
See Applicant's Answer to Offsite Emergency Planning Contentions at 56-58 (February 13, 1984).
3/
City Revised Issues at 1 (May 18, 1984).
6.
guidelines requires Annex E to particularize the precise sector points and personnel which will perform this function.
The City evidently has made the unwarranted inference that food interdiction and sampling at such Access Control Points will be conducted in isolation of other protective measures which will also be implemented in the event of a radiological emergency.
As basically described in Annex E, the Department of Agriculture will.
Serve as the lead State agency and in coordination with the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA),
other Federal agencies, PEMA, BRP and the Department of Health to develop and issue guidance to-counties and the agricultural community concerning plans and actions necessary to evaluate and prevent radioactive contamination of agricultural, dairy and food products, to control and dispose of such products should they become contaminated, and to recommend protective actions for domestic animals within' the ingestion
- pathway exposure pathway EPZ of fixed nuclear facilities.
(See Appendix 2).5_/
4/
Annex E,
Appendix 17 states that the Department of Agricultural-will coordinate with the Bureau of Radiation Protection and the' Department of Health "in the collection and disposition of contaminated commodities and food products in accordance with recommended limits of radioactivity established by ~ the Federal Food and Drug Administration."
Annex E,
Appendix 17, SIII.A.l.b.4.
Nothing in NUREG-0654 requires anything more in the statement of this commitment.
5f Annex E at E-15.
Annex - E, Appendix 17 describes the various measures which will be taken to assure that all stages of the food chain have been covered.
For example, Annex E notes: "Most foods can-easily be decontaminated by fairly simple food preparation procodures.
These procedures are described in Attachment B to this Appendix."
Annex E, Appendix 17 also notes that guidance to prevent contamination is provided to food processors in Annex E as well as the emergency plans for the Department of Agriculture and the Department of Environmental Resources.1!
Additionally, Annex E, Appendix 17 provides protective action information to be used by the general public as a precaution to minimize exposure to contaminated food products through ingestion in the event of an emergency._/
Accordingly, adequate plans are in place to 8
assure-against the distribution of contaminated
- foods, foodstuffs and agricultural products from entering Philadelphia from the plume exposure EPZ without designation in Annex E of the particular Access Control Points which will be utilized in the event of an actual emergency.
City-3:
This proposed contention alleges that Annex E does not provide sufficient guidance for protecting existing water supplies from contamination, preventing the use of 6/
Annex E, Appendix 17, SV.B.2.
7/
Id. at SVII.
8/
Id. at SV.A.
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contaminated water, and providing alternative sources of water for the City.
As the City itself states, however, the
" thrust of [its] concern here is that the State Plan does not contain a proper and adequate water transport model" for the Schuylkill River.
Nowhere in the NRC's regulations or NUREG-0654 does the City find any support for its claim that such modeling is even contemplated, much less required.
Rather, the planning standards from NUREG-0654 cited by the City merely require
" identification of major exposure pathways from contaminated.
. water and the associated control and interdiction points and methods" (Criterion I.D.l.b),
that " protective actions for the ingestion expo-sure pathway EPZ appropriate to the locale have been devel-oped" (Criterion II.J), and that plans identify procedures "for detecting contamination, for estimating the dose commitment consequences of uncontrolled ingestion, and for imposing protection procedures such as impoundment, decon-tamination, processing,
- decay, product diversion, and preservation" (Criterion II.J.ll).
In short, nothing supports the City's evident ipse dixit that any modeling study is necessary.
In the event of an actual emergency involving contamination of the Schuylkill River by discharge from the plant or airborne particulates in rainfall, the responsible authorities would rely upon the extensive fixed and field monitoring
capabilities which will be in place.9I As Annex E states, the Department of Environmental Resources has responsibility to "[tlake water samples from appropriate public reservoirs, water intake points, water treatment plants, groundwater and surface water" and to
"[m]aintain plans for timely notification of downstream water companies regarding resources."b!
Given the measures contamination of water which are in place to rapidly monitor any potential con-tamination of water resources to obtain real time data, it will be unnecessary for the responsible State officials to
-9/
As regards Applicant's offsite monitoring
- systems, considerable information was provided to the Licensing Board by Applicant in its prepared testimony submitted in response to Contentions VIII-14 (c),
(d) and (e).
This was also the subject of oral testimony at the hearing on Applicant's Emergency Plan.
Also, as the Board is aware, Applicant has adopted procedures under EP-318 "to provide the calculation method for estimates
.of population exposure due to the ingestion of drinking water at various locations downstream of the plant."
other procedures under EP-319 "to provide the-calculation method for estimates of the maximum populat' ion exposure due to the ingestion of fish from the Schuylkill River," and, finally, procedures under EP-287 "to provide information te contact downstream users of the Schuylkill River."
The City has completely ignored these monitoring systems and procedures in alleging a need for water modeling.
10/
Annex E at E
- 9.
See also Annex E,
Appendix 17, SII.A.2.b.
As noted elsewhere in Annex E at E-12, the Bureau of Radiation Protection, in coordination with the' Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency ("PEMA"),
serves "as the lead State
- agency, for providing
. technical guidance and assistance to State agencies and county and municipal governments regarding radiation detection, hazards of radiation
- exposure,
-decontamination and protective actions."
concern themselves with surface water transport or dose modeling.11
The City asserts that Annex E
is inadequate in monitoring because it has defined " abnormal discharge" into the Schuylkill at Limerick as one involving the Maximum Permissible Concentration
("MPC")
of radiological contaminants at the Limerick outfall.
It then asserts that the State will not commence monitoring until such an
" abnormal discharge" has occurred and that this may be insufficient monitoring to protect the City's drinking water.
No attempt is made to relate the hypothetical MPC discharge from Limerick to any regulatory standard or limit.
The City simply alleges that such an " abnormal discharge" could result in a concentration at the City's intakes of approximately the U.S. EPA National Interim Primary Drinking Regulations.N!
Water From this, the City infers that it "could be in violation" of the Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. S300f et seq., if the MPC were exceeded.
Aside from the evident lack of any basis, it is clear that the City is addressing a non-emergency situation for which the NRC's emergency planning requirements are 11/
It is unclear how Applicant's submission to the City of an analysis it requested regarding the effect of a liquid release from Limerick adds any weight to the City's claim or is indeed relevant.
12/
See 40 C.F.R.
Part 141.
Implementation of these standards is covered in Part 142.
c.
4.
inapplicable.
The City acknowledges that the State will l
l-commence monitoring if the MPC limits of 10 C.F.R. Part 20 are exceeded.
The City's concerns for discharges below Part 20 limits fail to raise any litigable emergency planning issue.E
- Also, the standards to which the City refers would'be far different in the event of an actual emergency.
State protective action guides
(" PAG's") for drinking water, i
utilizing the EPA National Interim Primary Drinking Water Regulations, set much higher levels of concentration and associated dose commitments for " uncontrolled discharges to surface water and in circumstances where the water supply is influenced by contaminated runoff and fallout " EI Accordingly, the City's allegations are wholly baseless and speculative, and do not on their face raise any litigable issue as to the State's monitoring of the Schuylkill for discharges below MPC levels.
13/
As the Board is aware, Applicant's procedures require declaration of an unusual event for any radioactive I
liquid discharge exceeding technical specifications.
The interim Radiation Survey Team would be immediately activated to obtain samples and verify that the discharge has stopped.
See Table 4-2, Item XI.
14/
Annex E,
Appendix 12, 59.8.8.C.2.
Thus, while the associated dose commitment for controlled discharges in the course of an accident is 4 mrem /yr to any organ, it
-is 50 mrem for uncontrolled discharges generally and 330 mrem for " acute crisis conditions where no other Wdter supply is available and duration is less than 30 days."
M. at $9.8.8.C.2 and 3.
I
r e.
As a final matter, the City alleges that Annex E is invalid because it is not based upon the PAG's to which NUREG-0654 refer and which the City asserts are set forth in the FEMA reprint of the EPA Manual of Protective Action Guides and Protective Actions for Nuclear Incidents (September, 1981).
Contrary to the City's assertion, NUREG-0654 merely requires that State and local planning "shall be consistent with the recommendations of EPA regarding exposure resulting from passage of radioactive airborne plumes.
. and with those of DHEW (DHHS)/FDA regarding radioactive contamination of human foods and animal feed" (Criterion II.J.9).
As indicated by the statement in Chapter 3 that PAG's for whole body exposure and ingestien (including water) are
" Guidance to be Developed," no PAG's as such are contained in the FEMA / EPA Manual. b Rather, the Bureau of Radiation Protection has adopted PAG's for drinking water which expressly include the criteria for drinking water concentrations contained in the U.S.
EPA National Interim Primary Drinking Water Regulations.N!
15/
The City cites page 1.30 of the Manual as a source of PAG's.
Table 1.4 at that page is labeled " Initiation Times for Protective Actions."
It has nothing to do with-dose recommendations contained in PAG's.
16/
See Annex E, Appendix 12, 59.8.8.C.
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Although the Manual describes a number of options to deal with contaminated water supplies, as the City notes, it does.not suggest that all alternatives or any particular alternative must be utilized for planning purposes.
,Specifically, the: Manual states at page 1.47:
The protective actions for water can be ' either to prevent contamination or decontamination of the water supply o r_
to condemn the use of the water for consumption.
[ Emphasis added.]
Thus, contrary to the City's assertion, there is no legal basis under the NRC's regulations or NUREG-0654 for requiring contingency plans to protect existing water supplies from contamination or to provide alternative sources of water for downstream users.
Protective responses to protect against "the dose commitment consequences of uncontrolled ' ingestion,"NI such as disposal, quarantine, processing and the like may be utilized, depending upon the actual situation at the time.
There is no legal basis for the City's assertion that contingency plans must be in place for1 each of the individual-options it has. enumerated.-
City-73 This proposed contention alleges that Annex E does.~ not provide adequate guidance for-recovery.: actions as f'
.regards decontamination:of the City's water supply,and water.
distribution system. lAs such, the: contention'is redundant
.with City-3, discussed above.
Nothing is. added to the~
l
. H/_-NUREG-0654, Criterion J.ll.
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e City's basic contention by putting it under the rubric of
" recovery and reentry," as discussed in Annex E,
Appendix 18.
The City has confused the reinstatement of normal milk, produce and water supplies under Annex E,
Appendix 12, Section 12.3 (Recovery) with decontamination of existing supplies as a possible protective action under other aspects of the plan.
As the City itself notes, 10 C.F.R. 550. 47 (b) (13 )
requires the development of only general plans for recovery and re-entry.
Although certain protective actions are taken for the ingestion pathway
- EPZ,
" recovery and reentry" actions as such concern only the plume exposure EPZ, which does not concern the City.
Applicant is unaware of any provision of 10 C.F.R.
S50.47 (b) (13) or NUREG-0654 which requires " recovery and reentry" in the ingestion pathway EPZ. 'It is also well recognized that these actions involve long-range considerations for which only skeletal planning is required, considering that a_d, hoc decisionmaking will be d
necessary under the widely varying circumstances of any particular emergency.EI A similar contention was rejected M/
Thus, under S50.47 (b) (13), only "[gleneral plans for recovery and reentry are necessary."
In Pacific Gas and Electric Company (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-82-70, 16 NRC 756, 766 (1982), the Board observed that the State's roles in reentry and recovery do not " require immediate response in an emergency.since they do not deal with immediate life
' threatening situations."
See also Southern (Footnote Continued) l
- ).
on this basis in Shoreham in which the Board held that
" [ t] here is no basis for requiring the type of detail suggested here in a before-the-fact recovery and re-entry plan."El Elsewhere, the City simply reiterates its point that the Manual of Protective Action Guides and Protective Actions for Nuclear Incidents discusses decontamination of water, among other alternatives, as a possible protective action.
As discussed above, the existence of this option provides no legal basis for imposing it as a planning contingency by the Commonwealth for the City's potentially affected reservoirs.
- Finally, as the City acknowledges, consideration of funding and financial resources for planning functions lies beyond the scope of NUREG-0654 and licensing actions by.the NRC.
Such matters are ultimately for the
" individual nuclear utilities and the involved State and local governments who must prepare emergency plans to support the nuclear facilities." El (Footnote Continued)
California Edison Company (San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3), LBP-82-39, 15 NRC
- 1163, 1207-08 (1982),
aff'd, ALAB-717, 17 NRC 346 (1983).
19/
Long Island Lighting Company (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), Docket No. 50-322-OL, " Memorandum and Order" (August 19, 1982) (slip op. at 24).
20/
NUREG-0654 at p.
25.
See generally. Union Electric (Footnote Continued) i.
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, y City-9:
This contention alleges that there is present-ly no agreement between Applicant and the Commonwealth identifying "the emergency measures to be provided and the mutually acceptable criteria for their implementation" and
-specifying "the arrangements for exchange of information" as required by NUREG-0654, Criterion II.A.3.
While the City correctly cites the provision requiring such an agreement, I
it has evidently overlooked the existing Letter of Agreement dated February 29, 1984 from the Director of PEMA to Appli-cant, contained in Appendix A of Applicant's Emergency Plan.
The existing Agreement meets the requirements of NUREG-0654.
Inasmuch as the City has incorrectly alleged the absence of any agreement and has alleged no particular deficiencies with the existing agreement, its proposed contention must be denied.
Conclusion For the reasons discussed more fully.
- above, the proposed contentions submitted-by the City of Philadelphia either misinterpret or greatly exceed the bounds of emergen-cy planning requirements for the ingestion pathway EPZ as stated -in the NRC's regulations or 'NUREG-0654.
While further - actions undoubtedly will be taken among the coop-erating~ federal,. State,
- county, municipal agencies and (Footnote Continued)-
Company'
'(Callaway.
- Plant, Unit 1),
Docket
-No.
STN-50-483,
" Memorandum and ' Order (Specification of-Conter.tions) " (December 7, 1982) (slip op. at 4-5).
F
).o authorities and. Applicant, no litigable issue has been stated by the City.
Accordingly, the contentions proposed by the City should be denied.
Respectfully submitted, CONNER & WETTERHAHN, P.C.
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Troy B. Conner, Jr.
Robert M. Rader Counsel for the Applicant June 4, 1984
)
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k Sw S
s UNITED STATES OF AMERICA g
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSI.ON In the Matter of 3
)
Philadelphia Electric Company
)
Docket Nos. 50-352
)
50-353 (Limerick Generating Station,
)
Units 1 and 2)
)
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that copies of " Applicant's Answer to
' Revised Issues 'of Concern of the City of Philadelphia in the Area of [Offsite]
Emergency Planning'" dated June 4,
1984 in the captioned matter have been served upon the following by deposit in the United States mail this 4th day of June, 1984:
Lawrence Brenner, Esq. (2)
Atomic Safety and Licensing Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Panel Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Commission-
. Washington, D.C.
20555 Washington, D.C.
20555
' Docketing and Service Section
- Dr. Richard F. Cole Office of the Secretary Atomic Safety and U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Licensing Board Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Washington, D.C.
20555 Commission Washington, D.C.
20555
- Ann P. Hodgdon, Esq.
Counsel for NRC Staff Office
- Dr. Peter A. Morris of the Executive Atomic Safety.and Legal Director Licensing Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Commission Washington, D.C'.s 20555 Washington, D.C.
20555
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., Y Hand Delivery,,
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l Atomic Safety and Licensing Angus Love, Esq.
Board Panel.
107 East Main Street j
j U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Norristown, PA 19401 CommJssion Washington, D.C.
20555 Robert J. Sugarman, Esq.
Sugarnan, Denworth &
Philadelphia Electric Company Hellegers ATTN:
Edward G. Bauer, Jr.
16th Floor, Center Plaza Vice President &
101 North Broad Street 3
General Counsel Philadelphia, PA 19107 2301 Market Street Philadelphia, PA 19101 Director, Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency Mr.. Frank R. Romano Basement, Transportation 61 Forest Avenue and Safety Building Ambler, Pennsylvania 19002 Harrisburg, PA 17120 Mr. Robert L. Anthony Martha W.
Bush, Esq.
Friends of the Earth of Kathryn S. Lewis, Esq.
the Delaware Valley City of Philadelphia 106 Vernon Lane, Box 186 Municipal Services Bldg.
Moylan, Pennsylvania 19065 15th and JFK Blvd.
Philadelphia, PA 19107 Limerick Ecology Action P.O. Box 761 762 Queen Street Spence W. Perry, Esq.
Pottstown, PA 19464 Associate General Counsel Federal Emergency Charles W. Elliott, Esq.
Management Agency Brose and Postwistilo 500 C Street, S.W,, Rm. 840 1101 Building Washington, DC 20472 lith &'Northampton Streets Easton, PA 18042 Thomas Gerusky, Director Bureau of Radiation Zori G. Ferkin, Esq.
Protection Assistant Counsel Department of Environmental Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Resources Governor's Energy Council Sth Floor, Fulton Bank Bldg.
.1625 N. Front Street Third and Locust Streets Harrisburg, PA 17102 Harrisburg, PA 17120 Jay M. Gutierrez, Esq.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 631-Park Avenue King of-Prussia, PA 19406
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. 1 James Wiggins Senior Resident Inspector U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission P.O. Box 47 Sanatoga, PA 19464 Timothy R.S. Campbell Director Department of Emergency Services 14 East Biddle Street
- West Chester, PA 19380 d cifv Robert M. Rader 1
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