ML20091J454
| ML20091J454 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palo Verde  |
| Issue date: | 05/24/1984 |
| From: | Van Brunt E ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE CO. (FORMERLY ARIZONA NUCLEAR |
| To: | Bishop T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| References | |
| ANPP-29585-TDS, DER-83-64, NUDOCS 8406050517 | |
| Download: ML20091J454 (5) | |
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- Giy!b Arizona Public Service Company
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,,, O l r-May 24, 1984 C'IG '
ANPP-29585-TDS/1RB U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region V Creekside Oaks Office Park 1450 Maria Lane - Suite 210 Walnut Creek, CA 94596-5368 Attention: Mr. T. W. Bishop, Director Division of Resident Reactor Projects and Engineering Programs
Subject:
Final Report - DER 83-64 A 50.55(e) Reportable Condition Relating to Pressure Relief Valves By Target Rock Failed To Meet Prerequisite Tests file: 84-019-026;- D.4.33.2
Reference:
A) Telephone Conversation between P. Johnson and R. Tucker on September 28, 1983 B) ANPP-28096, dated October 26, 1983 (Interim Report)
C) ANPP-28371, dated January 26, 1984 (Time Extension)
D) ANPP-28956, dated February 29, 1984 (Time Extension).
E) ANPP-29177, dated March 28, 1984 (Time Extension)
Dear Sir:
Attached is our final written report of the deficiency referenced above, which has been determined to be Not Reportable under the requirements of 10CFR50.55(e).
Very truly yours
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E. E. Van Brunt, Jr.
APS Vice President Nuclear Production ANPP Project Director EEVB/TRB:ru Attachment cc:
See Page Two 8406050517 840524 PDR ADOCK 05000529 S
PDR ff-2 7 r \\
.Mr. T. W. Bishop DER 83-64 '
Page Two cc:-
Richard DeYoung, Director Office of Inspection and Enforcement U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 T. G. Woods, Jr.
D. B. Karner W.'E. Ide D. B. Easnacht A. C.-Rogers B. S. Kaplan L. A. Souza D. E. Fowler J. Vorees J. R. Bynum J. M. Allen P. P. Klute A. C. Gehr W. J. Stubblefield W. G. Bingham R. L.' Pa tterson R. W. Welcher H. D. Foster D. R. Hawkinson L. E. Vorderbrueggen G. A. Fiore111 S. R. Frost J. Self D. ' Canady Records Center Institute of Nuclear Power Operations 1100 Circle 75 Parkway, Suite 1500 Atlanta, GA 30339
FINAL REPORT - DER 83-64 DEFICIENCY EVALUATION 50.55(e)
ARI_ ZONA PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY (APS)
-PVNGS UNITS 2, and 3 I. Description of Deficiency During a visual inspection of Unit 2 subsystems 2EC01 and 2EC02, it was revealed that external factory applied calibration seals to Target Rock Model 76-Q-XXX Pressure Relief Valves (PSV's), supplied under. specification purchase order 13-JM-691, were broken. Field investigation could not detect the exact cause of broken seals.
Vendor delivered valves did not have broken seals. The valves were removed and sent to APS for re-testing in accordance with Station Test Procedure 73ST-9ZZ01 and are identified by the following unit tag numbers:
2J-ECA-PSV-0075 2J-ECB-PSV-0076 2J-ECB-PSV-0098 2J-ECB-PSV-0100 The re-testing of these ' valves determined that they failed performance testing, due to excessive l seat leakage.
Based on the sample valve test failures, all installed Unit 2 and 3 valves were removed and re-tested by APS. A total of twenty-nine (29) out of the thirty (30) valves tested failed on-excessive seat leakage and are identified as follows:
- 2J-ECA-PSV-0075 2,3J-ECB-PSV-0076 2,3J-ECA-PSV-0095 2,3J-ECB-PSV-0096 2,3J-ECA-PSV-0097 2,3J-ECB-PSV-0098 2,3J-ECA-PSV-0099 2,3J-ECB-PSV-0100~
2,3J-ECA-PSV-0101 2,3J-ECB-PSV-0102 2,3J-ECA-PSV-0103 2,3J-ECB-PSV-0104 l' '
2,3J-ECB-PSV-0105 2,3J-ECB-PSV-0108 2,3J-ECB-PSV-0117 Unit 3 valve passed performance test L
The Target Rock (T/R) field representative conducted a verification test program, at the jobsite, using a T/R supplied test rig apparatus.
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~ Final Report DER 83-64 Page Two For the test program, four (4) valves were selected. Two (2) new unpackaged valves were retrieved from the jobsite warehouse and two (2) valves were selected from the previous failed performance testing and are identified as follows:
eM Nnpackaged Vdives
'PreviEus Failed VElves 3J-ECB-PSV-0106 3J-ECA-PSV-0095 3J-ECB-PSV-0109 3J-ECA-PSV-0101 The four (4) valves were tested, using the T/R. test apparatus, with the results as follows:
New-Unpackaged Vdives PreviEus Ediled' Valves 3J-ECB-PSV-0106 3J-ECA-PSV-0095 3J-ECB-PSV-0109 3J-ECA-PSV-0101 Valves passed setpoint Valves failed test, and leakage requirements, based on excessive leakage.
4 Valves 3J-ECA-PSV-0095 and 0101 were disassembled. It was revealed that the disc seating areas of both valves had surface -indentations which prevented the valves from reseating properly thus causing excessive leakage.
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T/R has ~ attributed this condition to foreign material contained in the~APS test media, and lack of an accumulator on the APS test rig.
T/R has stated that the lack of an accumulator and entry of foreign materials were the probable cause of the hammered peening effect on the disc areas.
T/R letters TRC-C-31340 and C-420 and ANPP Conference Notes No.
CN-E-1416 support the T/R claim that performance failures of the valves were due to inadequate field test apparatus and entry of
. foreign materials during testing.
7 i
A review of Unit 1 valves, determined that no deficiencies were documented during hot functional testing. The valves were installed as received from the vendor and were not removed for additional testing.
II.- Analysis of Safety Implications These relief valves are in the Essential Chilled Water (ECW) System, and leakage from them would deplete the water supply in the Chilled Water Expansion tank. Safety-grade instruments would detect this depletion. When - the water in this tank reached the " Low-Low" level, makeup water would automatically be added from the Demineralized Water (DW) System.
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Final Report DER 83-64 Page Three If, for any reason, makeup water is no't available from the DW System, then the plant operator will get an alarm signal so he can select makeup water from the Condensate Storage Tank. Thus, if this condition had been left uncorrected the ECW System would still have been able to fulfill its function with no adverse impact on the safety of plant operations. Based upon the above, this condition is evaluated as not reportable under the requirements of 10CFR 50.55(e).
Since this condition does not represent a defect in a delivered component, but is due solely to improper field testing, it is evaluated as not reportable under the requirements of 10CFR Part 21.
III. Corrective Action A.
The T/R test apparatus will remain at the jobsite for APS use until procurement or fabrication of an adequate test rig is achieved.
B.
NCRs SM-2216 and 2885 will be dispositioned to return defective valves to T/R for refurbishment. Valve refurbishment is scheduled to be completed prior to fuel load for the respective units.