ML20091H978

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Final Significant Const Deficiency Rept 57 Re Mercury Co of Norwood,Inc Instrumentation & Control Sys Installations Not in Accordance W/Design Specs.Vendor Reworked Installations, Reassigned Personnel & Undertook Retraining
ML20091H978
Person / Time
Site: Waterford Entergy icon.png
Issue date: 05/22/1984
From: Gerrets T
LOUISIANA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To: Jay Collins
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
References
57, W3K84-1218, NUDOCS 8406050351
Download: ML20091H978 (5)


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Louisiana P OW E R & LlG H T/ INTER-OFFICE CORRESPONDENCE

$iuSiYS SYS May 22, 1984 W3K84-1218 Q-3-A35.07.57 Mr. John T. Collins Regional Administrator, Region IV @ g U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission {g i ij 611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 1000 I

Arlington, Texas 76012 f.ffd' 2 g lgg

REFERENCE:

LP&L letter W3K84-0812 dated April 5, 1984 .

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Dear Mr. Collins:

SUBJECT:

Waterford SES Unit No. 3 Docket No. 50-382 Significant Construction Deficiency No. 57

" Inadequate Instrumentation and Control Installations Turnover Documentation" Final Report In accordance with the requirements of 10CFR50.55(e), we are hereby providing two copies of the Final Report of Significant Construction Deficiency No. 57,

" Inadequate Instrumentation and Control Installations Turnover Documentation".

If you have any questions, please advise.

Very truly yours, f '

T. F. Gerrets Y

Corporate Quality Assurance Manager TFG:CNH:VBR Attachment ec: Director Office of Inspection & Enforcement U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 (15 copies) 8406050351 840522 gDRADOCK05000 y g.y 7 I\

Mr. John T. Collins May 22, 1984

.W3K84-1218 Page 2 cc: Director Office of Management Information and Program Control U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Mr. E. L. Blake Shaw, Pittman,' Potts & Trowbridge 1800 M Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20036 Mr. W. M. Stevenson Monroe & Lemann 1424 Whitney Building New Orleans, Louisiana 70130 i

Records Center Institute of Nuclear Power Operations

1100 Circle 75 Parkway, Suite 1500 Atlanta,' Georgia 30339 Mr. W. A. Cross 7910 Woodmont Avenue Suite 1200 Bethesda, Maryland. 20814 I

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FINAL REPORT SIGNIFICANT CONSTRUCTION DEFICIENCY NO. 57

" INADEQUATE INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL INSTALLATIONS AND TURNOVER DOCUMENTATION" o

INTRJDUCTION t

This final report is submitted pursuant to 10CFR50.55(e). It describes

Instrumentation and Control (I&C) System Installations which were not in accordance with the design specifications. Additionally, the recently prepared system "as-built" drawings did not accurately reflect the actual installed conditions. These problems are considered reportable under the requirements of 10CFR50.55(e). To the best of our knowledge, this problem has not been reported to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission pursuant to 10CFR21.

DESCRIPTION In preparation for ECCS Flow Testing and Primary System Cold Hydrostatic j

Testing, Mercury Company of Norwood, Inc. (Installation Contractor for j Instrumentation and Control Systems), submitted their installation,

! inspection, and-test documentation and "as-built" drawings for the following plant start-up systems:

! a) Start-Up System (SUS) No. 59 - Containment Spray

.. b) SUS No. 60A - High Pressure Safety Injection c)- SUS No. 60B - Low Pressure Safety Injection d)' SUS No. 60C - Safety Injection Tanks f

The Mercury submittal contained exceptions such that final Quality

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- ' Assurance / Quality Control certification was not provided, i Audits of the I&C System documentation in conjunction with As-Built Drawing i

review and walkdown surveillance revealed the following:

a) The "As-Built" drawi gs did not accurately depict existing installations.

l- The problems consisted of (1) incorrect slope indications for tubing i- runs, (2) incorrect designations for seismic supports, (3) dimensional  !

errors, and (4) inadequate design consideration for thermal expansion of

f. , tubing.

b) The actual installations had the following physical problems: (1) tubing runs with reverse slope, (2) uninstalled supports,-(3) improper bolting and-(4) tube touching track or bolt heads thereby causing tube deformity.

-As a result of the system walkdown on-SUS 608, the Mercury Co. was informed of r the deficiencies noted above.

After Mercury reworked I&C installations associated with Start-Up System 60B and Mercury's Quality Control organization accepted the rework, many of the E --same' generic-type problems were found to' exist.

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SCD 57 Page 2 SAFETY IMPLICATIONS Instrumentation associated with these systems are Safety Class 2 and 3. The subject instruments are required for plant parameter monitoring and for safe shutdown of the plant. If the deficiencies were left uncorrected, degradation could have occurred resulting in failure of the instruments to provide reliable information required by the Reactor Operators.

CORRECTIVE ACTION

.On June 23, 1982, Mercury Company of Norwood, Inc., by direction of the Engineer, initiated implementation of the following corrections:

a) Reassigned crafts off safety-related systems installations and rework.

b) Identified rework _ teams of Craft, Foremen, Fiald Engineers, QC Inspector and Supervision who, upon completion of the retraining program satisfactory to the Enginear, proceeded with rework required for acceptable construction completion, documentation, and turnover of the aforementioned systems, c) Developed documented retraining program, related to correcting the problems encountered.

d) After approval by the Engineer, this retraining program was implemented under the review of the Engineer with the rework teams identified in (b) above.

e) Subsequent to concurrence by the Engineer that this retraining program was properly executed for the teams, the Engineer authorized reassignment of craft to safety-related work.

f) The retraining program was extended to all Mercury personnel consistent with a training schedule.

g) Organizational changes were implemented resulting from a meeting with LP&L and Ebasco on June 24, 1982.

The retraining of Mercury personnel was performed in accordance with the Ebasco approved training program. The Training Program addressed project and Mercury Quality Program requirements with particular emphasis on deficient

> areas described in this SCD. The training addressed the general program requirements as well as the specific requirements for the Construction, Engineering, and Quality Assurance organizations _within Mercury.

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l Mercury;was allowed to begin. safety related work, using personnel that had completed'thel retraining program. Walkdown teams were formed, comprised of

, ' Mercury Engineering and Quality Control, Ebasco Construction Engineering and

, ' Louisiana Power & Light Quality Assurance, to reinspect the systems. The

?walkdown teams' generated punchlists of their findings. The punchlist items were addressed.as required by Mercury's Quality Program. Upon completion of the required rework.. Mercury Isometrics were walked down, revised as necessary, and

' signed as '.'as-built" drawings.

Additionally,-Ebasco placed personnel.in the contractors engineering, and

construction departments to assure corrective actions were effective and the work performed subsequent to the identification of the deficiencies met project
' requirements. 'Also, Ebasco supplemented Mercury management personnel to assure completion of the contract in accordance with project requirements.

All corrective. action is completed on SCD No. 57 and the applicable documentation has been reviewed.'

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This report is submitted as the Final Report.

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