ML20091G101

Control of Heavy Loads (C-10),Iowa Electric Light & Power Co,Duane Arnold Energy Ctr, Technical Evaluation Rept

ML20091G101
Person / Time
Site:	Duane Arnold
Issue date:	05/30/1984
From:	Vosbury F FRANKLIN INSTITUTE
To:	Singh A NRC
Shared Package
ML112240732	List: ML20091G101
References
CON-NRC-03-81-130, CON-NRC-3-81-130, REF-GTECI-A-36, REF-GTECI-SF, TASK-A-36, TASK-OR TAC-07988, TAC-7988, TER-C5506-352, NUDOCS 8406040148
Download: ML20091G101 (31)

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This report was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an agency of the United States

. Government. Neither the United States Government nor any agency thereof, or any of their d

employees, makes any warranty, expressed or implied, or assumes any legal liability or responsibility for any third party's use, or the results of such use, of any information, appa.

ratus, product or process disclosed in this reporte or represents that its use by such third party would not infringe privately owned rights.

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A Division of The Franklin Institute The Benpearen Frankhn Partn=ey. PMa, Pa.191C3 (215) 444 1000

TECHNICAL EVALUATION REPORT

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s CONTROL OF HEAVY LOADS (C-10) ll IOWA ELECTRIC LIGHT AND POWER COMPANY 4

DUANE ARNOLD ENERGY CENTER NRC DOCKET NO. 50-3.h1 FRC PROJECT C5506 NRCTAC NO. 07988 FRC ASSIGNMENT 13 NRC CONTRACT NO. NRC-03 81-130 FRC TASK 352 e

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Prepared by i

Franklin Research Center Author:

F. W. Vosbury, C. Bomberger 20th and Race Streets Philadelphia, PA 19103 FRC Group Leader: I. H. Sargent Prepared for Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Lead NRC Engineer:

A. Singh May 30. 1984 This report was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an agency of the United States Government. Neither the United States Government nor any agency thereof, or any of their employees, makes any warranty, expressed or implied, or assumes any legal liability or responsibility for any third party's use, or the results of such use, of any information, appa-ratus, product or process disclosed in this report, or represents that its use by such third party would not infringe privately owned rights.

Prepared by:

Reviewed by:

Approved by:

p/s a A?aJe, A7t La Principal Author d Project Manager Department Dire tor 8

1. /S[od Date:

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4 00.Franklin Research Center A Division of The Franklin Institute h Ben,emn Frenun Portrwey. Ph,le.. Pe. 19:03 (2131448 1000

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.c TER-C5506-352 h

CONTENTS S-etion Title Page 1

ERTRODUCTION.

1 1.1 Purpose of Review 1

1.2 Generic Background.

1 1.3 Plant-Specific Background 2

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9, 2

EVALUATION

~l 4

2.1 General Guidelines.

4 2.2 Interim Protection Measures P

19 3

CONCLUSIONS.

24 3.1 General Provisions for Load Handling 24 3.2 Interim Protection Measures

.- 24 4

REFERENCES 26 G

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TER-C5506-352 i

FOREWORD t

k This Technical Evaluation Report was prepared by Franklin Research Center under a contract with the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (Office of 0

Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Division of Operating Reactors) for technical

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cocistance in support of NRC operating reactor licensing actions.

The technical evaluation was conducted in accordance with criteria established by tha NRC.

Mr.

F. W. Vosbury, Mr. C. R. Bomberger, and Mr. I. H. Sargent contributed w

to the technical preparation of this report through a subcontract with WESTEC Services, Inc.

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TER-C5506-352 1.

INTRODUCTION 1

i 1.1 PURPOSE OF REVIEW This technical evaluation report documents an independent review of ganaral load handling policy and procedures at the Iowa Electric Light and Pow 3r Company's Duane Arnold Energy Center (DAEC).

This" evaluation was performed with the following objectives:

to assess conformance to the general load handling guidelines of o

NUREG-0612, " Control of Heavy Icads at Nuclear Power Plants" [1],

Section 5.1.1

)

to assess conformance to the interim protection measures of o

NUREG-0612, Section 5.3.

P 1.2 GENERIC BACKGROUND Generic Technical Activity Task A-36 was established by the U.S. Nuclear Ragu'latory Commission (NRC) staff to systematically examine staff licensing criteria and the adequacy of measures in effect at operating nuclear power plcnts to ensure the safe handling of heavy loads and to recommend necessary chcnges in these measures.

This activity was initiated by a letter issued by tha NRC' staff on May 17, 1978 [2] to all power reactor licensees, requesting information concerning the control of heavy loads near spent fuel.

The results of Task A-36 were reported in NUREG-0612, " Control of Heavy Lords at Nuclear Power Plants."

The staff's conclusion from this evaluation wnc that existing measures to control the handling of heavy loads at operating plcnts, although providing protection from certain potential problems, do not cdequately cover the major caus,es of load handling accidents and should be upgrcded.

In order to upgrade measures for the control of heavy loads, the staff d;valoped a series of guidelines designed to achieve a two-part objective using an accepted approach or protection philosophy. The first portion of the cbjective, achieved through a set of general guidelines identified in NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.1, is to ensure that all load handling systems at

g TER-C5506-352 nuclear power plants are designed and operated so that their ' probability of failure is uniformly small and appropriate for the critical tasks in which they are employed.

The second portion of the staff's objective, achieved i

through guidelines identified in NUREG-0612, Sections 5.1.2 through 5.1.5, is to ensure that, for load handling systems in areas where their failure might result in significant consequences, either (1) features are provided, in cddition to those required for all load handling systems, to ensure that the potential for a load drop is extremely small (e.g., a single-f ailure-proof crane) or (2) conservative evaluations of load handling accidents indicate that the potential consequences of any load drop are acceptably hna'11.

i AcceptabilityofaccidentconsequencesisquantifiedinNUREG-03$2intofour accident analysis evaluation criteria.

p p.

A defense-in-depth approach was used to develop the staff guidelines to Gnsure that all load handling systems are designed and operated so that their probability of failure is appropriately small.

The intent of the guidelines is to ensure that licensees of all operating nuclear power p'lants perform the following:

define safe load travel paths through procedures and operator training o

so that, to the extent practical, heavy loads are not carried over or

• near irradiated fuel or safe shutdown equipment provide sufficient operator training, handling system design,-load o

handling instructions, and equipment inspection to ensure reliable operation of the handling system.

Staff guidelines resulting from the foregoing are tabulated in Section 5 f

of NUREG-0612.

Section'6 of NUREG-0612 recommended that a program be l

initiated to ensure that these guidelines are implemented at operating plants, 1.3 PLANT-SPECIFIC BACRGROUND On December 22, 1980, the NRC issued a letter [3] to Iowa Electric Light and Power Campany, the Licensee for DAEC, requesting that the Licensee review pecvisions for_ handling and control of heavy loads at DAEC, evaluate these pecvisions with respect to the guidelines of NUREG-0612,;and provide certain additional ~ information to' be used for an independent determination of l

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l TER-C5506-352 csnformance to these guidelines.

On August 6, 1981 [4] and December 15, 1981

[5), Iowa Electric Light and Power Company provided initial responses to this l

requ:st.

l A draft hchnical Evaluation Report (TER) was prepared, informally trcnsmitted, and discussed with the Licensee [6].

Following this discussion, I:wn Electric Light and Power Company provided supplemental responses on t

Deccaber 2, 1982 [7), August 22, 1983 [8), September 22, 1983 [9], and May 15, 1984 [10] addressing unresolved issues identified in the draf t TER.

This TER is based on information provided in References 4 through 10.

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TER-C5506-352

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2.

EVALUATION i

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h This section presents a point-by-point evaluation of load handling provisions at the Duane Arnold Energy Center with respect to NRC staff guid lines provided in NUREG-0612.

Separate subsections are provided for both the general guidelines of NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.1 and the interim measures cf NUREG-0612, Section 5.2.

In each case, the guideline or interim measure is pecsented, Licensee-provided information is summarized and evaluated, and a conclusion as, to the extent of compliance, including recommended additional acticn where appropriate, is presented.

These conclusions are snmmarized in L

Tablo 2.1.

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l 2.1 GENERAL GUIDELINES y

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The NRC has established seven general guidelines to provide the 1

defcnge-in-depth appropriate for the safe handling of heavy loads.

They are identified under the following topics in Section 5.1.1 of NUREG-0612:

Guideline 1 - Safe Load Paths Guideline 2 - Load Handling Procedures l

Guideline 3 - Crane Operator Training Guideline 4 - Special Lif ting Devices Guideline 5 - Lifting Devices (Not Specially Designed)

Guideline 6 - Cranes (Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance)

Guideline 7 - Crane Design.

i These seven guidelines should be satisfied by all overhead handling ty;tems and programs used to handle heavy loads in the vicinity of the reactor vess01, near spent fuel in the spent fuel pool, or in other areas where a load drop may da.nage safe shutdown systems.

2.1.1 Overhead Heavy Load Handling Systems c.

Summary of Licensee Statements and Conclusions The Licensee conducted a review of all overhead handling systems at DAEC t3 determine which overhead handling systems are subject to this review.

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Ef ene Arnold /NUREG-948 2 Compliance flats te I,

1 Weight Int es te Inte:Im os Caeldeline I Culdeline 2 Culdeline 3 Culdeline 4 Caldeline 5 Culdeline 6 Culdeline 7 Measuse I pessuse 6 f

Capacity Safe Road Crane Operator Special Lifting Crane - Test Technical Special mener toads (tonal

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Reactoe Main ISS C

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C P

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Crane Osywell Head 42

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C R

R C

Reactor vessel 52 C

C R

R C

Need Steam Dryer 24 C

C N

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Shroint Need 33.4 C

C R

and Steam R

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C

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C Pluge I at 75 2 at 67.5 Plugs between I et 65 C

C R

R C

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C Reactor Well I et 6.5 R

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and Fuel Storage Poni sereIce Sup-5 C

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• 8.lcensee has proposed reelslons/swwllficatione designed to comply with NUREG-0612 Culdeline.

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II stelght Interim Intesln or Culdeline I Goldeline 2 Culdeline 2 Culdeline 4 Culdeline S Caldeline 6 Guideline 2 eteasure 1 Measuee 6 Cepecity Sa f e 8<.c 4 Crane Operator Special Littlng Crane - Test Techalcel Special f

Reavy inade Stonel Pothe Psocedures Tsetning Deelces 8 tings and Inspectiog Cgene Deep es Specificatione Attention p

Invessel teork i

Platform C

C R

R C

y and e.eei wall shield a

.eesel Read C

C B

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lasulation Ree Fuel C

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Spent Fuel I

Caet 6S C

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R C

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2. l Turbine seale. li25 C

C C

{R.ellding fee l 21 C

C C

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Righ-Freasure 60 R

R B

Turle g ne espper Shell C

Eshavet 65 R

R R

Rarwl A Embauet SS R

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tenrul 8 Ine-Pr e ssur e 49 R

R R

tipper Innet I

caelng A Ine-Pr e s sur e 49 R

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weight Integle Intesin 25 of Guldeline B C=Ideline 2 Celdeline 3 estdeline 4 Caldeline 5 coldeline 6 Goldeline 7 stessese 1 enee s e 6

'Cepecity Sete lead Crane operatot special Lifting Csome - Test Technical speclet Res*y teeds 1 tonal tethe Procedoree Trotning Revlees Silnee end Inspectica Ctene Reelen Speciflectione Att,ention n

lF Righ-Freesese 44 R

R R

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tow-Psessese 125 R

R 2

Rotog A Inw-Pseesesse 129 9

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Toshine ple*4 s egno I _, sees e 2.,

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Teshine Diephangne Centsal 9

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Velve Paste seeln step 29.3 -

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1 TER-C5506-352 Lic;ncee identified the following overhead handling systems and' equipment as thoso from which a load drop could result in damage to plant shutdown or decay h:ct rcmoval systems:

J o reactor building crane 9

o turbine building crane I

i o recirculation pump motor hoist l

i o shield blocks and personnel lock hoist o

fuel pool domineralizer area hoist i

l l o steam valve area monorails I

f o drywell maintenance hoists

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s' l t spent fuel pool gamma-scan collimator port hoist o

e o torus monorail.

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During the course of this review, the Licensee also identified other load handling systems at DAEC which need not, in accordance with NRC staf f critoria, be considered within the scope of NUREG-0612.; Such systems were i

cxclud:d on the basis that either they are not capable of carrying a heavy le:d or they are located so that they cannot carry a heavy load above or near 1

fu:1 ce safe shutdown equipment.

b.

Evnluation and Conclusion The Licensee's conclusions concerning load handling systems subject to

tho g:neral guidelines of NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.1 are consistent with the i

j cbjcctives of.NUREG-0612.

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2.1.2 Safe Load Pa ths (Guideline 1, NURE.G-0612, Section C. l. l(1) )

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" Safe load paths should be defined for the movement of heavy loads to minimize the potential for heavy loads, if dropped, to impact irradiated fusi in the reactor vessel and in the spent fuel pool, or to impact safe

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shutdown equipment.

Tne path should follow, to the extent practical,

-structural floor members, beams, etc., such that if the load is dropped, tha structure is more likely to withstand the impact.

These load paths should be defined in procedures, shown on equipment layout drawings, and cicarly marked on the floor in the area where the load is to be handled.

Deviations f rom defined load paths _ should require written alternative procedures approved by the plant safety review committee."

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,TER-C5506-352 3,

Summarv of Licensee Statements and Conclusions 4

Tho Licensee stated that safe load paths have been established for loads s

crried by the reactor building crane.

These safe load paths follow tructural floor members, beams, or concrete walls, where practical, so that f tha load is dropped, the structure is more likely to withstand the impact.

,fo lond paths are defined on equipment layout drawings.

Procedures used to sntrol the handling of heavy loads by the reactor building crane define the t

oth of movement that is to be followed for each load handled by this crane.

Heavy loads handled by the turbine building crane and by monorail and ixed hoists which are moved in the vicinity of safe shutdown equipment but go not carried over spent fuel in the storage pool or reactor vessel ill be Entrollcd by general load handling procedures.

These procedures will 4

Iovida, in addition to the information discussed in.Section 2.1.3.a, guidaYice Br cofo load path selection.

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A procedure is being developed for future handling of the spent fuel 0

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01pping casks which warns the user to ascertain and document a safe load path l$

ig inco n3 specific data are available about the casks.

The Licensee h*

Dticipntes no spent fuel shipments in the near future.

1 In lieu of safe load path markings, the Licensee stated that procedures 11 ba written to require the presence of a crane supervisor / signalman who E

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11 dircet heavy load movements according to the safe load path drawings.

victions from defined safe load paths must be reviewed and documented by o,

E itt n procedures approved by the DAEC Operatons Com'nittee.

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! 'E Evaluation h

DAEC substantially satisfies the criteria of Guideline 1 on the basis t lord paths have been developed and incorporated into drawings for all c p: r, ada, with the exception of those handled by the turbine building crane and g

@croil/ fixed hoists.

For the turbine building crane, the Licensee stated kbg

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f TER-C5506-352 I,

m that procedures which include guidance for safe load path selection will be A

writtsn.

Development of similar load path guidance for monorail / fixed hoists I

is c1ro to be provided, although it is recognized that such guidance will be E

minimal since the path for load movement is fixed in such cases and a load path

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c:n ba cpecified by a travel limit.

. Intended Licensee actions to develop a E3 proliminary load path for the spent fuel shipping cask and provide a signalman 5

to direct load movements, as well as to develop procedures for handling I

s)cvictions from any approved load path, are consistent with requirements of e

g thio guideline.

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Conclusion and Recommendation wO Development of safe load paths at DAEC satisfie,s the criteria of f

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Buid211ne 1.

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$.1.3 Icad Handling Procedures [ Guideline 2, NUREG -0612, Section 5.1.1(2) 1 E

' Procedures should be developed to cover load handling' operations for hacvy loads that are or could be handled over or in proximity to irradiated fuel or safe shutdown equipment.

At a minimum, procedures chould cover handling of those loads listed in Table 3-1 of NUREG-0612.

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These procedures should include:

identification of required equipment; h

incpect' ions and acceptance criteria required before movement of load; the i

F ctaps and proper sequence to be followed in handling the loadt defining E

tha s'afe path; and other special precautions."

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Summarv of Licensee Statements and Conclusions fj

'!i DAEC's procedures for the handling of loads by the reactor building crane

.i nd tho refueling platform hoists above the refueling floor of the reactor k

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('uilding include the followi*ng:

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identification of required equipment o

inspections and acceptance criteria required before movement of a s

o heavy-load

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the steps and proper sequence to be followed in handling the load l

o jt saf e load paths for the movement of heavy loads.

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TER-C5506-352 The Licensee expressed its intention to provide general loa'd handling including instructions on selection and use of equipment, Q

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,varification of current inspection, and bases for load path selection, for I

ethor loads handled in the vicinity of safe shutdown equipment.

y Loads that cro carried over spent fuel in the storage pool or reactor vessel will be

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covered by specific procedures.

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A procedure for handling a spent fuel shipping cask is being developed k.

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Eveluation h

Load handling procedures at

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j 1-I DAEC for the reactor building crane' satisfy i' f tha criteria of this guideline.

As previously stated by the Licensee, no I r

jE written procedures exist which cover the handling of heavy loads with the r

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%urbino building crane or monorail-mounted and fixed hoists.

The Licensee h.

intsnds to provide general written procedures for those loads handled in the

.' g icinity of safe shutdown equipment but not carried over spent fuel in the j,

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tercgo pool or reactor vessel.

As also addressed in Guideline 1, the l'

icencoo is preparing load handling procedures for the spent fuel cask (rocedures should be implemented for full compliance with Guide e

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Conclusion 4

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. Lord handling operations at DAEC are consistent with Guideline 2 based on C.

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< o Liccnsee's verification that (1) procedures for loads handled by the x ; h.

'EI occtor building crane are consistent with this guideline, (2) general

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.roceduras consistent with this guideline will be written for the turbine h

hilding crane and monorail-meunted and fixed hoists, and (3)

["

specific f

GocedurGs consistent with this guideline will be prepared for handling of the w

hnt fuel cask.

i k

D hi.4 Crane Operator Training E

l IGuideline 3, NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.l(3))

{t "Crcne operators should be trained, qualified and conduct themselves-in g

l accordance with Chapter 2-3 of ANSI B30.2-1976,

[11)."

' Overhead and Gantry ik Crcnes' u

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TER-C5506-352

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summnry of' Licensee Statements and Conclusions The Licensee stated (4):

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'A new~ procedure has been prepared which contains all of the elements neccssary to establish a program for crane operator training, qualifi-cation, and operator conduct in accordance with Chapter 2-3 of ANSI B30.2-1076, ' Overhead and Gantry Cranes'."

Evr.laation and Conclusion 3

j Crcne operator training, qualification, and conduct at DAEC will be ppportcd by administrative controls consistent with Guideline 3.

j e

?

s

,1. 5 special Lifting Devices (Guideline 4, NUREG-0612, Section 5.1. l (4 ) }

o

' "Special lifting devices should satisfy the guidelines of ANSI f

- N14.5-1978, ' Standard for Special Lifting Devices for Shipping Containers kj We'ighing 10,000 Pounds (4500 kg) or More for Nuclear Materials' (12).

'W This standard should apply to all special lifting devices which carry hacvy loads.in are'as as defined above.

For operating plants certain f

i inspections and load tests may be accepted in lieu of certain material rcquirements in the standard.

In addition, the stress design factor

{

stet;d in Section 3.2.1.1 of ANSI N14.6 should be based on the combined v

i j

maximum static and dynamic loads that could be imparted on the handling Osvice based on characteristics of the crane which will be used.

This is in lieu of the guideline in Section 3.2.1.1 of ANSI N14.6 which bases the strcas design factor on only the weight (static load) of the load and of l_

tho in'tervening -components of the special handling device."

m c

l E

Summmry of Licensee Statements and conclusions h:.

g Tho following special lifting devices have been identified by the fen:OotobeinuseattheDuaneArnoldplants o h0ad strongback s

o* dryer-separator sling

/

o rotor lifting beam.

Insaddition to these lifting devices, the Licensee stated that a special

) ting d0vice may be used at some future date to handle spent fuel casks, but j

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-13'

1 TER-C5506-352 that the supplier of such a device would be required to meet th'e requirements of ANSI N14.6-1978.

The lifting devices currently in use were designed and fabricated prior to tho issuance of ANSI N14.6-1978 and therefore may not meet the requirements of this standard.

Design of all three devices has been compared with ANSI N14.6-1978 criteria related to component design and load handling relia-bility.

The results of this review indicate that the dryer-separator sling coccmbly and the rotor lifting beam have been shown to comply with ANSI crit:ria.

A modification has been made to the vessel' head strongback to

, provide safety margins of 10:1.

A load test to 200% of rated load h$s been performed on the dryer-separator sling, and the vessel head strongback w(11 be load tested to 150% as a result of modifications.

The Licensee stated that a load test of the rotor lif ting beam has not been performed 'and is not deemed neconcary for the following reasons:

1.

Maximum working load is no greater than 1/5 of the'ainimum breaking strength of the wire rope and fittings used.

2.

Maximum working stress in lifting beams shall be no greater than 1/3 of the minimum yield strength or 1/5 of the minimum tensile strength, whichever is smaller, of the beam structure and its attachments.

3.

All welds were done by welders qualified to Section IX of the ASME Pressure Vessel Code (or equivalent) and were magnetic particle tested.

4.

Loads that are carried by the lifting beam do not have unacceptable consequences if dropped.

Regarding testing to ensure continuing compliance, the Licensee stated

' thct future maintenance anQ testing will be performed in accordance with ANSI

N14.6-1978, Section 5 requirements, which include:

i implementation of the responsibilities of Iowa Electric as the owner o

or user o

acceptance testing of any new or modified special lifting device in accordance with Section 5.2 l

l '

u m

n TER-C5506-352 testing to veriti continuing compliance in accordance'with Section o

5.3.1 o maintenance and repair nondestructive testing procedures, personnel qualification, and o

acceptance criteria in accordance with Section 5.5.

The Licensee also stated that the testing for continuing compliance will be performed once every 5 years rather than annually, based on the following canaiderations:

the devices are used approximately four times every refueling outage o

the option to proof-test these devices would increase the~ usage of o

these devices by 25%

o it is believed that the recommendations for testing in ANSI N14.6-1978 are intended for high-usage lif ting devices and therefore an exception to these requirements is justified.

b.

Evaluation Although it cannot be determined that the specific requirements of ANSI N14.6-1978 for component design and fabrication have been satisfied for the sp;cial lifting devices in use at DAEC, it is apparent from the Licensee's roeponse that these devices will provide a high degree of load handling relicb'ility.

Adequate information has been provided to demonstrate that d sign safety margins of these devices are consistent with the criteria of the ANSI standard and satisfy other concerns related to load handling relia-bility.

Load tests of the dryer-separator sling and the vessel head strengback also provide reasonable assurances of the workmanship of the d vicss.

Information provided by the Licensee for the rotor lifting beam has c1co been evaluated and is sufficient to conclude that a load test of this d vica is not warranted.

Licensee programs to ensure continuing compliance are consistent with the requirements of this guideline and ANSI N14.6-1978.

Further, relaxation of i

the frequency of periodic inspections is reasonable considering the. limited usa of these devices.

l 0

/

4 TER-C5506-352 Conclusion and Recommendations c.

Docementation of design and programs for continued use of special lifti dGvices at DAEC are consistent with the requirements of Guideline 4 ng i

2.1.6 Lifting Devices (Not Soecially Designed) [ Guideline 5, NUREG-0612, Section 5.1. l(5) 1

" Lifting devices that are not specially designed should be installed and However, in selecting the proper sling, the load used shou of the static and maximum dynamic load.

sling should be in terms of the The rating identifie 1 static and dynamic load.

' static load' which produces,$ on the the maximum Where this restricts slings to usd#on only certain cranes, the slings should be clearly marked as to the cranes with which they may be used."

f

~

Sammary of Licensee Statements and Conclusions a.

The Licensee made a commitment to replace all lif ting devices that were not specially designed with new rigging which.will satisfy ANSI B30.9-1971 criteria and will be accompanied by proof test certification.

All slings will

, b3 permanently marked with their rated " static load" capacity.

Sling capacity hoc been derated according to the impact allowance from CMAA Specification 70 which th"e Licensee stated is a more conservative method than NUREG-0612.

Dynamic loads which could be imposed by individual hoists will be ccenunted for individually.

Any slings that are restricted to use on certain loads will be clearly marked to so indicate.

The Licensee also indicated that the inspection, maintenance, and repair or rcplacement of these lif ting devices will~ be in accordance with the require-menta of ANSI B30.9-1971.*

b.

Evaluation The Licensee has agreed to replace all lifting devices that are not specially designed with devices that comply with ANSI B30.9-1971.

Sling -

captcity will be derated to include the impact allowance; the system to be TER-C5506-352 used for rating of rigging is a safe and conservative altern'ative to the system specified in NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.1.

The Licensee's rating is equivalent to, and in some instances more conservative than, the rating method required under this guideline.

The Licensee satisfies the requirements of guideline based upon its commitment to perform inspection, maintenance, and repair or replacement in accordance with ANSI B30.9-1971.

c.

Conclusion Proposed Licensee actions for the selection and use of slings are consistent with Guideline 5.

af 2.1.7 Cranes (Inspection, Testino, and Maintenance) -[ Guideline 6, NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.1(6))

"The crane should be inspected, tested, and maintained in accordance with Chapter 2-2 of ANSI B30.2-1976, ' Overhead and Gantry Cranes, ' with the exception that tests and inspections should be performed prior to use where it is not practical to meet the frequencies of ANSI B30.2 for periodic inspection and test, or where frequency of crane use is less than the specified inspection and test frequency (e.g., the polar crane inside a PWR containment may only be used every 12 to 18 months during refueling operations, and is generally not accessible during power operation.

ANSI B30.2, however, calls for certain inspections to be performed daily or monthly.

For such cranes having limited usage, the inspections, test, and maintenance should be performed prior to their use). "

a.

Summarv of Licensee Statements and Conclusions A program has been developed which satisfies the criteria of Guideline 6 for inspection, testing, and maintenance of overhead and gantry cranes.

b.

Evaluation and Conclusion Crune inspection, testing, and maintenance at DAEC will be consistent with Guideline 6. m;..

m si u. i.

4 1

TER-C5506-352

.3.1.8 Crane Design [ Guideline 7, NUREG-0612, Section 5.1. l(7).1 "The crane should be designed to meet the applicable criteria and guidelines of Chapter 2-1 of ANSI B30.2-1976, ' Overhead and Gantry i

Cranes,' and of CHAA-70, ' Specifications for Electric Overhead Traveling Cranes' [14).

An alternative to a specification in ANSI B30.2 or CMAA-70 may be accepted in lieu of specific compliance if the intent of the specification is satisfied."

i Summarv of Licensee Statements and Conclusions

- c.

With regard to the turbine and reactor building crane designs, the

=

Licensee provided a list of deviations ~ from the applicable criteria of Chapter

} 1 cf ANSI B30.2-1976 and CMAA-70.

The following is a summary of.,those

. devictions and, where provided, the Licensee's commentary on the signifLcance cf cuch discrepancies.

f 1.

Motor Branch Short Circuit Protection.

Both CHAA-70 and ANSI B30.2 i

require that wiring and equipment conform to the latest issue of the National Electric Code (NEC).

. The current NEC specifies that ' crane hoist and monorail hoist motor branch circuits be protected by fuses or inverse time circuit breakers rated in accordance with tabulated values in the 1981 NEC.

Both the turbine building and reactor building cranes were built to the specifications of the 1971 NEC, which did noc include any requirement for motor branch circuit protection.

i 2.

Clearance.

CMAA-70 requires that electrical equipment conform to the latest issue of the NEC.

The current NEC specifies that 2-1/2 feet of working spac0 be available for examination, servicing, and maintenance of parts, and that where such parts are enclosed in cabinets, the doors either open to 90* or be removable.

Both the turbine building and the reactor building cranes were built to 1971 NEC specifications, which.do not include any provisions for control clearances.

3.

Pendant Pushbutton Arrangement..Both'CMAA-70 and ANSI B30.2 specify-an arrangement of pushbuttons in a -vertical line, whereas the push-j buttons on the pendant stations at both the turbine building and the i

reactor building cranes are arranged _in two sections.

Furthermore, CMAA-70 requires that the "stop" pushbutton. be red, and the stop pushbutton is black for both the reactor building and the turbine building cranes.

i

TER-C5506-352 i

4.

Operator's Circuit Breaker.

For cab-operated cranes, ANSI B30.2 may be padlocked in an open position, located in the le runway conductors.

open this switch, which sets the holding brake.When in the cab, the oper i:

On the reactor building and turbine building cranes, such a switch is mounted on th'e bridge platform rather than in the cab; however, the cab contains a brakes on the crane.pushbutton which controls the contactor and will set all hol 5.

Pendant Pushbutton Station Groundino Conductor.

CHAA-70 specifies the provision of a grounding conductor between the crane and a grou d tecninal in the station for-pendant pushbutton stations n

building crane interconnection drawings do not show thisIfeature The reactor

.it is in place in the pendant pushbutton cable.

, but

,,d 6.

Wheel Icad.

loadings for various rail sections and wheel diameters.CMAA-70 estimated wheel load for the turbine building crane exceeds the The l'

maximum value specified by CMAA-70 by one percent, concludes will not have a negative effect on crane operation.which the Licensee The Licensee's evaluation concluded that the safe operation of these t wo crancs is not downgraded.

b.. Evaluation The enumerated deviations of the design features of the turbine -building cod reactor building cranes from the design requirements of CMAA-70 and Chcptor 2-1 of ANSI B30.2-1976 are judged to result in no significant reduction

.-of cvarall load handling reliability.

c.

Conclusion Design of cranes at DAEC is consistent with Guideline 7.

2.2 INTERIM PROTECTION MEASURES Tho NRC has established six interim protection measures to be implemented

' ot. operating nuclear power plants to provide reasonable assurance that cloada will be handled.over the spent fuel' pool and that measures -

no heavy exist to-

[reduca the potential.for' accidental load drops to impact on : fuel in the core i

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k TER-C5506-352 cr Cpent fuel pool.

Four of the six interim measures of the ' report consist of g:ncral Guideline 1, Safe Icad Paths; Guideline 2, Icad Handling Procedures; Guideline 3, Crane Operator Training; and Guideline 6, Cranes (Inspection, Te ting / and Maintenance).

The two remaining interim measures cover the f211owing criteria:

...m

1.. Heavy load technical specifications

-5-S;.*

2.

Special review for heavy loads handled over the core.

Licen. _s,k A.T.

.:g ee. implementation and evaluation of these interim protection mescures is contained in the succeeding paragraphs of this section./,

J 2.2.1 Technical Soecifications [ Interim Protection Measure 1, NUREG-0612, Section 5.3 (1))

' Licenses for all operating reactors not having a single-f ailure-proof overhead crane in the fuel storage pool area shoold be revised to include a specification comparnble to Standard Technical Specification 3.9.7,

' Crane Travel - Spent Fuel Storage Pool Building,' for PWR's and Standard Technical Specification 3.9.6.2, ' Crane Travel,' for BWR's, to prohibit handling -of heavy loads over fuel in the storage pool until implementation of, measures which satisfy the guidelines of Section 5.1. "

a.

Summarry of Licensee Statements and Conclusions At present, the reactor building crane is not single-failure proof.

The Lic nxee made a commitment to upgrade the reactor building crane to comply with the single-failure-proof guidelines of NUREG-0612, Appendix C; completion i

cf tha modification is scheduled for July 1985.

1 To comply with the interim mencure, control procedures have been modified to prohibit movement of heavy loads over the spent fuel, pool.

b.

Evaluation, Conclusion, and Recommendation Licensee programs intended to prevent movements of heavy loads over the j

tpent fuel pool until the single-failure-proof crane modification is completed

' cro consistent with Interim Protection Measure 1.

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2.2.2 Administrative Controls n

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(Interim Protection Measures 2,'3, 4, and 5 i

NUREG-0612, Section _S.3 (2)-5.3 (5 ) 1_

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• Procedural or administbative meiddres [ including safe load pathD l

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handling procedures

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completiori'of na16a6ns and modifications to satisfy the guid for.ma. -..- -.

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' ' Sn=maries 'of the Licensee's statements and conclusions ? 'fY5U

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v gener.al. guidelines in Sections 2.1., "2.'113;

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Evaluations, ' Conclusions *, Mand 'Rechamendations

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,3 Evaluations, conclusions, and recommendations are contained in di -

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of the respective' gener:al' gu.' delin..

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2.2.3 Special Reviews,for Heavy Imads Over the Core [ Interim Protectio J'~ U$.

Measure 6, NUREG-0612, Section 5.3 (611 n

a

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!Special attention should be given to procedures, equipment I

personnel for the handling of heavy loads over the core, such as vessel

, and internals or vessel inspection tools.

the following for these loads:

This special review should include-(1) sufficient detail is provided and that instructions ar concise; (2) visual inspections of' load bearing components of cranes slings, and special lifting devices to identify flaws or ' deficiencies that could lead to failure of the component; i

(3) appropriate repair and k

replacement of defective components and (4) verify that the crane operators have been properly trained and are familiar with specific j

procedures used in handling these loads, e.g., hand signals, conduct of operations, and content of procedures. "

O Summary of Licensee Statements and Conclusions a.

1he Licensee stated that it is committed to upgrade the reactor buildi

[

crane to the single-failure-proof guidelines of NUREG-0612, paragraphs ng 1

4 i

~

t TER-C5506-352 i

5.1.6(1) and (3).

In the interim, an inspection of that crane ;will be per-form d in accordance with ANSI B30.3-1976, paragraph 2-3.2.1.1, subparagraphs j

o, b, and d.

This inspection will be made before the next refueling outage.

The Licensee made no further statements or conclusions regarding this intorim protection measure, b.

Evaluation Interim Protection Measure 6 requires a special review of four issues for tho h ndling of heavy loads over the core:

1 1.

Re, view of procedures to ensure that sufficient detail is provided and J

that instructions are clear and concise i

P for installation of rigging or lifting devices a.

b.

for movement of the load.

2.

Visual inspections of load-bearing components to identify flaws or deficiencies that could lead to failure of the component a.

for cranes b.

for slings c.

for special lifting devices.

3.

Appropriate repair and replacement of defective components a.

of cranes b.

of slings c.

of special lifting devices.

4.

Verification regarding crane operators F

of proper training a.

b.

of familiarity with specific procedures used in handling loads.

Section 2.1.1 of this

• report describes the definition of safe load paths, cnd S:ction 2.1.2 describes procedures for the handling of loads by the rc ctor building crane.

These measures fulfill the requirements for review of procedures for movement of heavy loads over the core.

k Tho Licensee stated that the reactor building crane will be inspected b;ftro the next refueling outage.

This statement is summarized, above, in t

this cection.

Section 2.1.6 of this TER quotes the Licensee's assurance that i

e i.'

4 TER-C5506-352 intpection,of lifting devices which are not specially designed'will be incpscted in accordance with ANSI B30.9-1971.

Section 2.1.5 verifies that

-DAEC fulfills the criteria of ANSI N14.6-1978 for testing, maintenance, and c:ntinued compliance of special lifting devices.

These three statements indicate that the procedures for visual inspection for load-bearing components of cranes, slings,. and special lifting devices have been reviewed.

Section 2.1.7,of this report confirms that DAEC's program for maintenance of crcnes fulfills Guideline 6.

Section 2.1.5 states that the Licensee satis-fico the criteria of ANSI N14.6-1978 for maintenance and continued compliance cf sp;cial lifting devices.

In,Section 2.1.6, Iowa Electric has ind.icated that inspection, maintenance, und repair or replacement of all other lif ting d vicca will be performed as required by ANSI B30.9-1971.

These three p ctatorents fulfill the requirements of Interim Protection Measure 6 for cppropriate repair and replacement of defective components.

Section 2.1.4 of this report quotes the Licensee's statement that a new procedure has been preparkd to establish a crane operator training program in cecordance with ANSI B30.2-1976.

This constitutes a special review of crane operator training.

c.

Conclusion The Licensee's review of procedures, equipment, and personnel for the roretor crane fulfills all criteria of Interim Protection Measure 6.

~

1 TER-C5506-352 s

3.

CONCLUSION This summary is provided to consolidate the results of the evaluation contoined in Section 2 concerning individual NBC staff guidelines into an cvarell evaluation of heavy load handling at the Duane Arnold Energy Center (DAK:).

Overall conclusions and recoassended Licensee actions, where cyprcpriate, are provided with respect to both general provisions for load handling (NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.1) and completion of the staff r: commendations for interim protection (NUREG-0612, Section.5.3).

h 3.1 GENERAL PROVISIONS FOR IDAD HANDLING e

The NRC staff has established seven guidelines con'cerning provisions for handling hea ry loads in the area of the reactor vessel, nsar stored spent fu3l, or in other areas where an accidental load drop could damage equipment required for safe shutdown or decay heat removal.

The intent of these guidolines is twofold'.

A plant conforming to these guidelines will have dsvoleped and implemented, through procedures and operator training

, safe load trcyc1 paths such that, to the maximum extent practical, heavy loads are not entried over or near irradiated fuel or safe shutdown equipment.

A plant conforming to these guidelines will also have provided sufficient operator training, handling system design, load handling instructions, and equipment inspection to ensure reliable operation of the handling system.

As detailed in Section ?, it has been found that load handling operations at Duane Arnold Enorgy Center can be expected to be conducted in a highly reliable manner etnsistent with the staff's objective as expressed.in these guidelines.

3.2.

INTERIM PROTECTION MEASURES

'Ihe NRC staff has established (NUREG-0612, ' Section 5.3) that certain Dcc:uros should be initiated to provide reasonable assurance that handling of-

):3vy leads will be performed in:a safe manner until final implementation of

'tha g:n ral guidelines of NUREG-0612, Section 51 is compl t e e.

Specified nocturos include the implementation of a technical specification to prohibit tho hnndling of' heavy loads over fuel in the storage poolf compliance with i

i' l,

D

c TER-C5506-352 Guidelines 1, 2, 3, and 6 of NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.1; a review of load htndling procedures and operator training; and a visual inspection program i

including component repair or replacement as necessary of cranes, slings, and special lifting devices to eliminate deficiencies that could lead to component failure.

Evaluation of information provided by the Licensee indicates that mercures have been properly implemented which ensure compliance with the attff's measures for interim protecion at DAEC.

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e TER-C5506-352 4.

REFERENCES 1.

NUREG-0612

" Control of Beavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants" NRC, July 1980 2.

V. Stello, Jr. (NRC)

Letter to all licensees

Subject:

Request for Additional Information on Control of Beavy Loads Near Spent Fuel May 17, 1978 3.

NRC Generic letter 81-07 Il December 22, 1980 y

=

4.

Larry D. Root (Iowa Electric)

I' Letter to D. G. Eisenhut (NRC)

Subject:

Control of Beavy Icads at Nuclear Power Plants August 6, 1981 5.

L. D. Root (Iowa Ele' tric) c Letter to H. Denton (NBC)

Subject:

Icads at Duane Arnold Energy CenterTransmittal of Response to Request for Inf December 15, 1981 6.

I. H. Sargent and F. W. Vosbury (FRC)

Telephone Memorandum

Subject:

Conversation with F. Clemenson (NRC) and DAEC March 12, 1982 7.

L. D. Root (Iowa Electric)

Letter to H. Denton (NRC)

Subject Control of Heavy Loads at Duane Arnold Energy Center December 2, 1982 8.

R. W. McGaughy (Iowa, Electric)

Letter H. Denton -(NRC)

Subject:

Control of Heavy Icads August 22, 1983 9.

R. W. McGaughy (Iowa Electric)

{

Letter H. Denton (NRC) i

Subject:

Control of Heavy Imads September 22, 1983

! h..

~

r e

TER-C5506-352 10.

R. Ji. McGaugby (Iowa Electric)

Letter H. Denton (NRC)

Subject:

Control of Heavy Loads May 15, 1984 11.

ANSI B30.2-1976

" Overhead and Gantry Cranes" American Society of Mechanical Engineers 1976 12.

ANSI N14.6-1978

" Standard for Special Lif ting Devices for Shipping Containers Weighing 10,000 Pounds (4500 kg) or More for Nuclear Materials" American National Standards Institute, Inc.

13.

ANSI B30.9-1971

" Slings" American Society of Mechanical Engineers 1972 14.

CHAA-70

" Specifications for Electric Overhead Traveling Cranes" Crane Manufacturers Association of America, Inc.

1975

.