ML20091D966
| ML20091D966 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 05200001 |
| Issue date: | 04/08/1992 |
| From: | Marriott P GENERAL ELECTRIC CO. |
| To: | Pierson R NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM), Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| MFN-086, MFN-86, SLK-9252, NUDOCS 9204130208 | |
| Download: ML20091D966 (5) | |
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A GE Nuclear Encryy nnv ie ; ce;n 1!' (y:*w,,,:v %m ju CA % '
April 8, 1992 MFN No. 086 Docket No. STN 52 001 SiX 9252 Document Control Desk U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Coumission i
Washington, D. C. 20555 Attention:
Robert C. Pierson Director Standardization and Non Power Reactor Project Directorate
Subject:
Section 4 of Tier 1 Design Certification Material for the GE ABVR Design, Stage 2 Submittal
Reference:
Letter, P. W. Marriott to Robert C. Pierson, " Tier 1 Design Certification Material for the CE ABVR Design, Stage 2 Submittal," Docket No. STN 52 001 dated.\\pril 6, 1992.
Enclored are thirty-four (34) copies of the Section 4 of the Tier 1 Design Certification material for the GE ABVR design, Stage 2 submittal.
Section 4 was inadvertently omitted from the submittal transmitted by the r
referenced letter.
Please insert the enclosed Section 4 into the material transmitted by the referenced letter.
GE regtets any inconvenience caused as a result of this omission.
Sincerely, J
P. W.-Mafr ott, Manager Regulatory and Analysis Services M/C 444,-(408) 925 6948 Enclosure cc:
F. A. Rosu - DOE N. D. Fletcher DOE C. Poslusny, Jr. - NRC R. C. Berglund - CE J. F. Quirk - GE L
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ABWR cosign occument 4,0 Interface Tier 1 Material p
J 10 CFR Part 52 addresses the issue ofinterface requirements that must be inet by those portions of the plant for which the design certification applicani does not seek certification. Part 52 stipulates that these requirements must be sufficiently detailed to allow completion of the final safety analysis as well as the design specific probabilistic risk assessment called for by the regulatioas. In addition, the certification application must include conceptual design of the interfacing facilitt features that has suf ficient detail to support review of the application.10 CFR Part 52.47(a)(1)(viii) requiresjustification that interface requirements are verifiable through inspections, tests or analyses and that the method to be used for this verification he included as part of the ITAAC requir ed by Paragraph (a)(1)(vi) of Part 52. The purpose of this section is to proside the necessary Tier 1 material forinterface items. No Tier i treatment is proposed for the conceptual designs of portions of the plant not within the scope of design o tification.
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ABWR oesign Document
' 4.1 Ultimate Heat Sink Design Description The uhimate heat sink (UllS) is not within the scope of the certified design. It is intended that a specific J1IS will be selected and designed for any facility which has adopted the certified design. This plant specific UliS will meet the interf ace requirements defined below.
Interface Requirernents The UliS prosides sufficient cooling water to the Reactor Senice Water (RSW) system to per mit safe shutdown and cooldown of the unit and maintain the unit in a safe shutdown condition. The UHS is sized so that makeup water is not required for at least 30 dap following an accident. During this period design basis temperature and water chemistry limits are not exceeded.
During normal plant operation, the UllS remo,es the heat load of the RSW system during all phases of plant operation.
The UliS can withstand the most severe natural phenomena or siteaclated event (c. g., SSE tornado, hurricane, flood, free /ing, spraying, pipe whip,jer forces, missiles, fire, flooding as a result of pipe failures or u ansportation accident) and reasonably probable combinations ofless severe phenomena and/or events, without impainng its saf ety f unction.
The safety related portions of the UllS can perform their required cooling function assuming a single active failure in any mechanical or electrical sys'em.
The safety related portions of the UliS are mechanicaDy and electrically separated. The UHS can withstand any credible single f ailure of man-made structural features without impairing its safety function. The UllS and any pumps, valves, structures or other components that remove heat from safety systems shall be designed to Seismic Category I and ASME Code, Section 111, Class 3, Quality Group C and applicable IEEE requiremeau.
Inspection, Test, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria Table 1.1 provides a definition of the inspections, tests and/or analyses together with the associated acceptance criteria which will be used to verify that the UHS meets interf ace requirements.
O 4.1 1 3/30/92
Table 4.1: Ultimate Heat Sink System -
inspections Tests; Analyses and Acceptance Criteria -
i
' Certified Design Commitment.~
Inspecticos, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria '
1.
UHS can remove sufficient heat to permit 1 The heat removal capab;Iity will be '.
1 Sufficient heat removal capacity provided.
safe shutdown and cooldown of the unit '
- determined by a review of design and and maintain the unit in a safe shutdown.
condition.
2 ' Makeup water will not be required for at '
' 2. The trW keup requirements of the as-built 2.
Makeup water is not required for at least 30 least 30 days following an accident.
- facilitv will be evaluated by analysis and days fo!!owing an accident.-
. review of design documentation.
3.
UliS can remove the heat load of the HSW 3.
Heat removal capability of the as-built 3.
Sufficient heat removai capacity provided.'
system during all phases of normal plant -
facility will be evaluated and compared to operation, requirements..
4.-
UHS can withstand the most severe natural '
4.
A review of the as-built facility will be 4.
Ability to withstand phenomena or events phenomena or site-related event and conducted.
is confirmed.
reasonably probabic cornbinations of less severe phenomena and/or events without -
impairing its safety function.
I 5.
Safety related portions of UHS are.
5.
Seps..k,J features of the facility will be 5.
Separation and ability to function afterany mechanically and electrically separated reviewed by inspection and analysis.
single active failure confirmedJ and can perform their safety related Ability to fur.ction after any single active function assuming a single active failure in failure wili be determined by analysis of any mechanical or electrical system.
the installed system.
6.
UHS and any pumps. valves, structures, or 6.. Adherence to codes and standards is 6.
Adherence to codes and standards ather components that remove heat from determined by inspection of as-built confirmed.
safety systems are designed to codes and equipment documentation.
standards in the Design Description.-
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