ML20091B779

Responds to NRC Re Violations Noted in IE Insp Repts 50-413/83-56 & 50-414/83-42.Corrective Actions: Procedure Changed to Prevent Miscalculations & Personnel Counseled to Perform Fuel Pool Vent Sys Test

ML20091B779
Person / Time
Site:	Catawba
Issue date:	04/06/1984
From:	Tucker H DUKE POWER CO.
To:	James O'Reilly NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
Shared Package
ML20091B745	List: ML20091B779 ML20091C270
References
NUDOCS 8405300394
Download: ML20091B779 (4)

Text

V q 1

DUKE POWER GOMPANY P.O. BOX 33189 CHARLOTTE, N.O. 28242 HALB. TUCKER Teternown

== races == S g ** h 3(704) 373-4531

= == = r.o==>o= April 6, 1984 17 Mr.. James P. O'Reilly, Regional Administrator U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II 101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900 Atlanta, Georgia 30303 Re: RII:PKV/PHS 50-413/83-56 50-414/83-42

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

Please find attached responses to Violation No. 413/83-56-04 and Violation No.

413/83-56-06, as identified in the above referenced inspection report. Duke Power Company does not consider any information contained in this inspection report to be proprietary.

Very truly yours, M

Hal B. Tucker LTP/php Attachment cc: NRC Resident Inspector Catawba Nuclear Station Mr. Robert Guild, Esq.

Attorney-at-Law P. O. Box 12097 Charleston, South Carolina 29412

~ Palmetto Alliance 2135 Devine Street .

. Columbia, South Carolina 29205 I I

1 i

. 8405300394 840514 lgDRADOCK 05000413 PDR

I . , ,

JP0/HBT/LTP April 6, 1984 DUKE POWER COMPANY CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION VIOLATION:

10CFR50, Appendix B, Criterion X1 and the Duke Power Company QA Topical Report, " Quality Assurance Program", Duke-1-A (Amendment 6), Section 17.2.11, requires that test results be evaluated to assure that test requirements have been satisfied.

Contrary to the above, the licensee did not adequately evaluate the test results of procedure TP/1/A/1250/05, Main Steam Safety Valve Setpoint Test, in that the data sheets for valves ISV6, ISV9, ISV20, ISV21, and ISV23 were found to have setpoint errors. Analysis of data recorded for valve ISV21 indicated that the valve failed to lift within the acceptable tolerance range.

RESPONSE

(1) Duke admits the violation as stated.

(2) The reason the violation occurred was because math errors, made in the field during the testing of the main steam safety valves, were not discovered or corrected during the final review of the completed procedure.

In response to the violation concerning valve ISV21, where the analysis of recorded data indicated that the valve failed to lift within the acceptable tolerance range, it is agreed that if the hydroset pressure recorded for test 2 was used, the valve would be out of its acceptable range. This was the case when the second lift was performed.

The data sheets were only intended to incorporate the final three consecutive lifts within the acceptable range. This valve (ISV21) required five tests to achieve the three consecutive lifts in tolerance.

When the first test was performed, the lift var within the acceptable range and recorded on the data sheet. After the second test was recorded on the data sheet and set pressure calculated, it was discovered that the valve had lifted out of the acceptable range. Because of this, the data recorded for test 1 and test 2 had to be crossed out. The recorded hydroset pressure was mistakenly not crossed out since it stands alone on the right side of the data sheet. Af ter a valve adjustment, three consecutive lifts were made within the acceptable range. These setpcints were recorded on the data sheets with the corresponding differential pressure and system pressure. But since the earlier recorded hydroset pressure had not been crossed out, the new recorded differential pressure did not correlate with the recorded hydroset pressure.

(3) A thorou'gh review vas made on the completed test procedure TP/1/A/1250/05.

The errors cited in this violation were corrected and documented per procedure change three (3). The Dresser service engineer's test report and data sheets were-attached to the procedure change to verify the set pressure for 15Y21.

. , , W JP0/HBT/LTP R

April 6, 1984 Page 2 .

Greater emphasis has been placed on the thoroughness required of each completed test procedure review.

(4) A change in the procedure forrat for testing main steam safety valves will be made to include every lif t performed instead of just the final three. This will eliminate the possibility of errors caused by trans-posing data from notebook paper to the procedure data sheet. It is also intended to eliminate any confusion created by having to cross out any recorded data not within the acceptable range.

(5) Full compliance has been achieved involving this specific test. Future test procedures that involve the testing of main steam safety valves shall have modifications added to their data sheets to incorporate every lift performed on each valve. This modification to the data sheets will be done before the first refueling outage of Unit One or before Hot Functional Testing of Unit Two, whichever comes first.

L

, . W DUKE POWER COMPANY JP0/HBT/LTP CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION April 6, 1984 VIOLATION:

Materials License No. SNM-1920 authorizes use of licensed material in accordance with the conditions specified in the licensee's application dated November 22, 1983. The Facilities and Equipment Section, Paragraph A.5 of the licensee's application requires, in part, the performance of seven tests prior to initial fuel receipt.

Contrary to the above, the licensee did not implement all test requirements contained in the application for a materials license in that procedure TP/1/B/1450/15, Fuel Pool Ventilation System Functional Test had not been completed prior to initial fuel receipt. As of January 17, 1984, steps 7.2, 7.3 12.5, 12.6, 12.11 and 12.12 of the procedure had not been performed: ,

l the first shipment of fuel was received on January 4, 1984, and placed in the new fuel storage area.

RESPONSE

1. The violation occurred as stated.

2. The violation occurred because the personnel responsible for the completion of TP/1/B/1450/15 Fuel Pool Ventilation System Functional Test were not adequately informed that the license application required completion of the test before fuel was received.

3. Although the license requires that TP/1/B/1450/15 be complete prior to receiving fuel, there is no technical basis that would require that TP/1/B/1450/15 be complete in order to protect the health and safety of the public and integrity of the new fuel. The fuel pool ventilation system is designed to prevent release of radioactive materials in the case of a spent fuel handling accident.

We currently plan to complete the test prior to Unit #1 fuel loading.

4. The license application has been reviewed to detect other areas where items which should have been completed prior to fuel receipt, may not have been completed. No further problems were found.

5. The test TP/1/B/1450/15 will be completed prior to Unit #1 fuel loading.

l L _ -__ __ __ - *