ML20091A145

First Interim Significant Const Deficiency Rept 108 Re Potential Failure to Comply W/Fsar Safe Shutdown Commitment. Initially Reported on 840412.RCS Pressure Indication Cabling Rerouted to Ensure Availability During Cable Vault Fire

ML20091A145
Person / Time
Site:	Waterford
Issue date:	05/11/1984
From:	Gerrets T LOUISIANA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:	Jay Collins NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
References
108, W3K84-1139, NUDOCS 8405290284
Download: ML20091A145 (3)

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.i I l 0UISIANA 44a attAnoNot srntti P O W E R & L i G H T! P O BOX 6000

• NEW ORLEANS. LOUISIANA 70174

• (504) 366 2345 urwits sysitM May 11, 1984 W3K84-1139 Q-3-A35.07.108 M@M0WM >

Mr. John T. Collins Regional Administrator, Region IV 3))f l,gy 2 l lgg4 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 1000 . //

Arlington, Texas 76012

REFERENCE:

Telecon T. Heatherly (LP&L) and Eric Johnson (NRC Region IV) on April 12, 1984

SUBJECT:

Waterford SES Unit No. 3 Docket No. 50-382 Significant Construction Deficiency No. 108

" Potential Failure To Comply With FSAR Safe Shutdown Commitment" First Interim Report In accordance with the requirements of 10CFR50.55(e), we are hereby providing two copies of the Interim Report of Significant Construction Deficiency No.

108, " Potential Failure To Comply With FSAR Safe Shutdown Commitment". This item was previously reported as PRD No. 165.

If you have any questions, please advise.

Very truly yours, YW T. F. Cerrets tt%

Corporate Quality Assurance Manager TFG:CNH:SSTC cc: Directo Office of Inspection & Enforcement U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 (15 copies)

Director Office of Management Information and Program Control U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 0405290284 840511 1 6 -3.7 g \

PDR ADOCK 05000302 PDR g

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'6-Mr. John:T. Collins May.11, 1984-W3K84-1139 Page 2 cc: Mr. E. L. Blake.

'Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge 1800 M Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20036 I

Mr. W. M. Stevenson' Monroe & Lemann 1424 Whitney Building i New Orleans, Louisiana 70130 I

Mr. W.-A. Cross l 7910 Woodmont Avenue i Suite 1200 Bethesda, Maryland 20814 Records Center Institute of Nuclear Power Operations

'1100 Circle 75 Parkway, Suite 1500 Atlanta, Georgia- 30339 i

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i; 2 INTERIM REPORT OF SIGNIFICANT CONSTRUCTION DEFICIENCY NO.108

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" POTENTIAL FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH FSAR SAFE SHUTDOWN COMMITMENT" INTRODUCTION This report is submitted pursuant to 10CFR50.55e. It describes a deficiency in the implementation _ of -the 10CFR50 Appendix R FSAR Safe Shutdown Analysis (SSA).

The description that follows only addresses those deficiencies in the SSA which reflect a failure to meet FSAR commitments. This problem is considered reportable under the requirements of 10CFR50.55e and has not been identified to

the Nuclear Pegulatory Commission-pursuant to 10CFR21. Findings stemming from the NRC Fire Protection Audit of April 9-13, 1984, which reflect the NRC's nonconcurrence with certain FSAR SSA commitments and assumptions are not included. These will be handled separately as part of the overall Audit Corrective Action Plan.

DESCRIPTION OF PROBLEM 4

L In: the process of developing a procedure for shutdown of the plant from the

. remote shutdown panel (LCP-43) for a cable vault fire, it was determined that the FSAR commitments to protect all essential cables from the effects of such a 3

fire were not fully met. Specifically,Section III of Appendix 9.5A commits to ensuring that at least one train of equipment deemed essential for hot standby

(- would be available either in the control. room or at LCP-43 in the event of a cable vault fire.' Contrary to this, it.has been determined that RCS pressure indication could be lost both in the control room and at LCP-43 in the event of a cable vault fire. In addition, neither satisfactory access, i.e. handwheel access and emergency lighting, to the Atmosphere Dump Valve ' (ADV) handwheels for

local manual operation nor controls for remote operation from LCP-43 could be available af ter a total cable vault fire, a highly.unlikely occurrence in view of the dedicated and area sprinkler systems provided in the vecit. These i components were however, established as necessary for hot standby in the FSAR l (See Section II of Appendix 9.5A).

SAFETY IMPLICATIONS If lef t uncorrected, a fire in the ' cable vault' could cause loss of direct RCS

pressure , indication at LCP-43 and control room, and complicate the operator's

. ability to remove reactor decay heat in a controlled manner by use of the ADV's.

' CORRECTIVE ACTION 1-

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-RCS pressure indication cabling shall be rerouted to ensure its availability in-

. the event-of a cable vault fire. Access to the ADV handwheels shall-be upgraded

. to facilitate local manual operation. . In addition, emergency lighting will be provided for associated areas.

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L The'RCS pressure indication ~ cabling will:be rerouted prior to fuel load. Access f- to the ADV's will be upgraded prior to. initial criticality or June 30, 1984, L whichever is earlier. . ,

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A final report.will'be submitted on or before June 30 c1984.

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