ML20090L738
| ML20090L738 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Monticello  |
| Issue date: | 09/27/1976 |
| From: | Mayer L NORTHERN STATES POWER CO. |
| To: | Ziemann D US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9102120590 | |
| Download: ML20090L738 (8) | |
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hNh NOMTHEMN 5TATES PoWKM COMPANY M f N N E A POble. MIN N E e OTA 9540%
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Mr D L Ziemann, Chief s
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U S Nuclear Regulatory Cocunission
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,,u Washington, DC 20555 Dear Mr Ziemann MONTICELLO NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT Docket No. 50-263 License No. DPR-22 Response to 8/23/76 Letter Regarding Potential LPCI Deficiency I
Your August 23, 1976 letter requested specific information re-garding a potential deficiency of the Monticello LPCI system.
The information, along with a re-statement of your request, is
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- attached, j
The requested information concludes that no deficiency exists in the Monticello LPCI system.
Yours very truly, sgo.%y L 0 Mayer PE Manager of Nuclear poort Services LoM/Mnv/ deb l
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9102120590 760927 PDR ADOCK 05000263 S
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'e ADDITIORAL lhTOR% TION Rr4]IR&t1Ris LPCI RUN0lTT IWTICELID NRC Request #1A What break location was asstsned when evaluating the maxinnan flow possible frm two LPCI ptsnps pumping directly to a break?
NSP Response The break location was a>staned to be at the location of the LPCI line connection to the recirculation line.
NRC Request #1B Describe how the syst m losses were calculated, including a sketch of the systen asstaned and a tabulation of the head loss in feet for each ccraponent in the syst m (valves, orifices, heat exchangers, etc.).
NSP Response The method used to detemine systm losses is based on a method contained in Flow of Fluids Through Valves,~ Fittings and Pipe. Technical Paper No. 410 EngineerTng Division, CWG, fourteenth Tin'Tfng,1974 Two steps are required using this method:
- 1) Find the equivalent length of the caponent or systan fra tables and formulas.
- 2) Find the pressure dro fra tables for given flow through the equivalent length of iping found above.
The systm asstrned is the as built "B" loop of the Rim Systen (see FSAR Figure 6-2-6).
"A" loop piping configuration is similar to the "B" loop.
The difference in runout flow and head losses would be negligible.
See attached Table for RIR ccrnponent head losses.
NRC Request #2A Describe the NPSI available (ANPSI) to the LPCI pump for the worst pump configuration (single failure resulting in highest pump flow) as a function of time, both short-tem and long-tem, in the event of a postulated loss-of-coolant accident.
NSP Response ANPSil as a function of time is described by the Figure attached.
NRC Request #215 Suppression pool tmperature versus time should be indicated and the effect of pool temperature should be included in the calculation.
NSP Response Suppression pool imperature versus time is indicated by FMR Figure 5-2 16. Effect of pool tem)erature was included in the calculation of systm head losses and in tTe calculation of ANP91.
NRC Request #3A provide the required hTSI (RhT91) vs. time for a postulatod liCA with the worst pump configuration (single failure resulting in highest pump flow) for both short and long-term cooling.
NSP Response RNP91 vr. time is provided by the Figure attached. The RNp91 is based on the conservative assum3 tion that the two LPCI pumps pumping to the brc, ken loop are left in tTe LPCI mode.
NRC Request #3B Based on a recirculation line break at the flange where LPCI piping connects to the recirculation loop, if at any time RNP91 (this question)
> ANP91 (question 3), then provide either a justification that operator action can be expected before this time, or provide a cceplete description of any tests, performed by you or the pump manufacturer to dmonstrate that the RlR pumps can operate at less than recommended design hT91 conditions without sustaining damage.
The description should include the test procedures, the test points, and data taken at each point i.e.,pumpflow,pumpsuctionpressure,pumpdischargepressure,vlbra-tion, water temperature; etc. Give operating times (estimated if not recorded) over which the pumps operated at less than design hTSil.
Include observations concerning pump vibration, noise and cavitation, during the tests.
NSP Response All safeguard functions which must be accomalished inmediately following a Loss of Coolant Accident are provided witn automatic actuation. The only operator action required during this time is to survey control roca instrumentation to assure that the reactor is shutdown and that the safe-guard systems are functioning as required. Our procedurcsinclude instme-tions to monitor RlR pump flows, toms tmperature and torus pressure and adjust flow to assure pump cavitation is avoided.
It is reasonable to expect that this action can be acccuplished within the time period required to avoid cavitation, t
3 It is noted that an asstaption used in the LPCI runout analysis is that the suppression chamber would not be aressurized during a DM IDCA. With this conservative asstaption the ANPSI is never more than 0.16 feet less than the RNPSil. Under actual 1DCA conditions the minimtn suppregsion chamber pressure during the interval 1.3 x 103 seconds to 5 x 10 seconds (the interval during which cavitation is depicted on the Figure attached) is 17.5 feet of water (see FSAR Figure 5-2 14).
It is, therefore, expected that under actual IDCA conditions no cavitation will occur. Results of the analysis indicate, in fact, that if the containment is pressurized to only 0.16 feet of water during the IDCA, cavitation will be avoided ccupletely.
NRC Request #4A Following a 1DCA, what indication of RlR ptnp flows would the operator have in the control room?
NSP Response The operator is provided with indication of LPCI flow and containment cooling flow for both loops of the PJR System (see FSAR Figure 6-2-6).
NRC Request #4B hhat indications would the operator have to know that the Rim ptnps were cavitating?
NSP Response The operator is provided with indication of tonis temperature, torus pressure and RlR flow. These three indications and prepared guidelines enable the operator to decide if the RlR pinps are cavitating.
IRC Request #4C hhat action could be taken to alleviate such operation, and how long would such action take?
NSP Response RlR wnp cavitation can be alleviated by decreasing flow. Rim flow can ae decreased by throttling the injection valve. This response can be completed in less tlutn one-minute.
4 NRC Request 85 Specify the rarnber of pumps assumed to be availabic in your ECCS 4
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Appendix K Long Tem analysis.
16P Response l
There are two definitions of "long tem" used in TLCS analysis. Most of the attention of the ECCS hearings focused on the first few mirantes after a postulated break.
In our analysis in response to Appendix K, "short tem" refers to the period arior to the end of lower plenin i
flashing. "Long tem" refers to tie interval frm the end of flashing to core reflood. The analysis shows that the most limiting case involves 1
the failure of the LPCI injection valve to open. All four RIR tumps are assumed to be available for all of their various functions, except the ability to discharge into the unbroken recirculation group. The LPCI injection valve failure case is more limiting than to asstane the failure of a single ptnp.
The definition of "long tem" gemane to this discussion is the period of decay heat rmoval from containment after core reflood. During this time the vessel inventory will be maintained by core spray or LPCI kMle the vesse) will be steaming and venting to containment. The analysis of this phase of the event is presented in Section 5 of the Kanticello FMR. Acccatable conditions are shown to exist for five cases based on various comainations of cooling equi nent in service.
If the single failure i
assumed in the ECCS analysis were the failure of the IJCI loop selection logic, as postulated in your letter, the above information shows that RitR pumps will not experience cavitation. The FSAR case compatible with this j
situation is therefore that of all four RIR pumps being available for long term cooling after the DM.
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IIFAD IDSS (h ) AT iMUT FLCW FOR PJ01 SYSTD4 004PO!ERTS t
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Basket Strainer 0.84 Torus Pdng licadcr 3.00 FO 13B 0.28 Pipe and Fittings in Conwn Suction 3.01 Line to hups PJR 152 B (B hedduction) 0.32 Pipe and Fittini','i in Suction Line 2.28 to B pump PJR 152 D (D herr Su: tion) 0.32 Pipe ani Fittinja' in Suction Line 2.43 to D Pump M R 48B (B Pump Discharge) 3.70 Rim 47B (B Pump Discharge) 0.96 Pipe and Fittings in B n np 8.19 Discharge Line RR 48D (D Pump Discharge) 3.73 RlR 47D (D nnp Discharge) 0.97 Pipe and Fittings in D Pump 8.75 Discharge Line Pipe and Fittings in Comen Line to 0.06 Point where Flow Splits between lleat F2 changer Path ani Bypass Path.
PJR 23B (Heat Exchanger Inlet) 0.29 PJR IIcat FacInnger 7.03 PJR 28B Oleat Exchanger Outlet) 0.29 Pipe and Fittings in llcat Fxchanger 4.49 Path FO 65B Oleat F2 changer Bypass) 9.54 Pipe and Fittings in Bypass Path 2.56 Pipe and Fittings from Point where 17.75 Flow Combines downstream of 11 eat Tachanger Path and Bypass Path to Flow Elanent FE 108B 10.72 FO 27B 22.42
LEAD IDSS On) AT, FIDUJT F14h' FOR PJ{R SYSITN C0f0hTRTS ht (ft) ho 25B 0.86 A0 46B 3.43 PJR 81B 0.86 Pipe and Fittings frcn Flow 29.43 Element to System Termination
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FROM:N0*tTilERN STATES POWER CQ.
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( 10CARMON SIGNED CY. RECEIVED)
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ACKNOWLEDGED PLANT HAME:
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SAFETY FOR ACTION /INFORMATION ENVIRO SAB 10-1-76
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