ML20090K043
| ML20090K043 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Catawba  |
| Issue date: | 10/13/1983 |
| From: | Mcmeekin T DUKE POWER CO. |
| To: | |
| References | |
| A-010, A-10, NUDOCS 8405230592 | |
| Download: ML20090K043 (45) | |
Text
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O Applicants' Exhibit _
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Q"
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/0 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION g
BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSINGlBOARD n ~o,._ ],ir
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in the Matter of
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DUKE POWER COMPANY, et & )
Docket Nos.
I 9
(Catawba Nuclear Station,
)
Units I and 2)
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TESTIMONY OF THEODORE C. MCMEEKIN 1
Q.
STATE YOUR NAME AND BUSINESS ADDRESS.
2 A.
My name is Theodore C.
McMeekin, and my business address is 3
Duke Power Company, P.O. Box 33189, Charlotte, North Carolina 4
28242.
5 Q.
STATE YOUR PRESENT POSITION WITH DUKE POWER COMPANY 6
AND DESCRIBE THE NATURE OF YOUR JOB.
7 A.
I am a Principal Engineer within the Design Engineering Department 8
responsible for control systems engineering.
Our responsibilities 9
include the engineering of new generating facilities and 10 modifications to operating stations.
11 Q.
DESCRIBE YOUR PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE AND 12 QUALIFICATIONS, INCLUDING YOUR PRIOR POSITIONS HELD 13 WITH DUKE POWER COMPANY.
14 A.
I have provided in detail my professional qualifications and 15 experience in a resume which is Attachment 1 to my testimony.
I 16 have approximately 18 years of experience within the nuclear 17 industry, which has included both the operation and the design of 18 nuclear facilities.
I spent approximately 5 years in the United 19 States Navy Nuclear Power Program and served on board a nuclear 20 powered submarine.
I held a variety of positions, including Supply 8405230592 831013 PDR ADOCK 05000413 0
1 Officer, Electrical Division Officer, Reactor Control Division Officer, s
2 Auxiliary Division Officer, and was qualified as Engineering Officer
.3 of the Watch, and Officer of the Deck.
4 Following my Navy service, I began work at-Duke Power in 5
1970 and have been involved in the control and instrumentation 6
design of several new generating projects including the O::onee 7
Nuclear Station, Keowee Hydro Station, Belews Creek Station,
8 Jocassee Pump Storage Station, McGuire Nuclear Station and the 9
Catawba Nuclear Station.
I held a variety of engineering positions 10 at Duke Between 1970 and 1975, when I was assigned as Principal 11 Engineer for the Control System Engineering Section.
12 I have a Bachelor of Science Degree in Electrical Engineering 13 fro;n the Pennsylvania State University.
I am a Registered O
14 Professional Engineer in North and South Carolina, a member of the 15 American Nuclear Society, and a Senior Member cf the Institute of 16 Electrical and Electronics Engineers.
17 Q.
DESCRIBE YOUR INVOLVEMENT WITH WHAT WE 't.OW REFER TO AS 18 THE WELDING INSPECTOR CONCERNS AT CATAW3A.
19 A.
I served as a member of the three-man task force charged with 20 reviewing the concerns of the Quality Control Inspectors at the 21 Catawba Nuclear Station.
This has subsequently been referred to 22 as Task Force Number 1.
23 Q.
DESCRIBE THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF YOUR APPOINTMENT TO THE 24 TASK FORCE ON QC INSPECTION, INCLUDING WHO CONTACTED 25 YOU AND WHAT WAS COMMUNICATED TO YOU.
26 A.
On December 11, 1981, C.
J.
Wylie, my boss, advised that an 27 investigative task force was being appointed by W. H. Owen to 28 review recent technical concerns of the QC Inspectors at the i
.1 Catawba Nuclear Station.
I was asked to serve on the task force 2
and in a subsequent call from W. H. Owen, our first meeting was 3
scheduled for December 14 in Mr. Owen's office.
4 Q.
WHO WERE THE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE TASK FORCE?
5 A.
The two other members of the Task Force were E. E. Hoellen, Jr.
6 (Chairman) and A. S. Homesley.
7 Q.
DESCRIBE THE EXPERIENCE AND QUALIFICATIONS OF THE TASK 8
FORCE MEMBERS.
9 A.
E.
E.
Hoellen, the Task Force Chairman, earned a Bachelor in 10 Science and Nuclear Engineering from the University of Virginia in 11 January 1976. He earned,a Masters in Business. Administration from 12 the University of North Carolina at Charlotte, North Carolina in 13 December 1980.
While at Duke Power Mr. Hoellen held a variety of 14 positions dealing with nuclear fuel during the period of 1976-1982.
15 This included assigr.ments as a nuclear engineer in fuel purchases, t
16 the Vice President and Project Manager of the Western Fuel, Inc.,
17 and Assistant Manager of Fuel Purchases - Nuclear.
During these 18 assignments his responsibilities included solicitation, negotiation, 19 and administration of all contracts associated with Duke Power's 20 nuclear fuel supply.
Mr. Hoellen's resume is Attachment 2 to my 21 testimony.
22 A.
S.
Homesley's backgrcund includes an Associate of Arts 23 Degree from Gardner Webb College, a Bachelor of Science in 24 Physical Education from Appalachian State University, and numerous 25 technical, supervisory, and management courses during his 26 employment with Duke Power.
He joined Duke Power in 1954 as a 27 repairman at a fossil power generating facility. He progressed over 28 a variety of technical positions including Assistant Boiler Foreman, l - -.
l i
1 Assistant Plant
- Manager, Plant
- Engineer, Assistant Plant A
2 Superintendent, and in April 1971 was named Plant Superintendent 3
of the Riverbend Steam Station.
Over his 29 years of service, he 4
worked directly with many craftsman,
technicians, and plant 5
operators.
This experience included direct involvement with 6
maintenance craftsman and technicians on boiler tube repair and l
7 boiler tube rehabilitation projects.
He !ikewise has considerable 1
8 experience in the supervision and management of all activities
}
9 and personnel at the Riverbend Steam Station.
Mr. Homesley's 10 resume is Attachment 3 to my testimony.
11 Q.
WHAT WAS COMMUNICATED TO YOU WITH ' RESPECT TO THE 12 NATURE AND SCOPE OF THE WELDING INSPECTOR CONCERNS?
13 A.
At the initial meeting with Mr. Owen he related the current status 14 of the QC Inspector Recourse Action. He explained that during the 15 review process of a pay recourse, several inspectors had commented 16 that they were concerned about quality control at the Catawba 17 Station.
At that meeting Mr. Owen provided a copy of Ms. Gail 18 Addis' December 3,1981 memo, Mr. J. R. Wells' December 11, 1981 19 memo and his December 10, 1981 written summary regarding the 20 quality control concerns.
21 Q.
WHAT WAS YOUR INITIAL UNDERSTANDING OF THE NATURE OF 22 THE WELDING INSPECTOR CONCERNS?
23 A.
I understood the primary concerns to deal with the relationship 24 between the QC Inspectors and the Construction Craft personnel.
25 More specifically, I understood that the concerns included:
the 26 need for QC Inspector instructions to the Craft and the lack of 1
27 QA/QC management support in resolving differences between QC 4
28 Inspectors and Construction Personnel.
1 Q.
WHAT WAS THE PURPOSE OF THIS TASK FORCE?
2 A.
The purpose of the Task Force was to investigate the QC Inspector 3
concerns as they relate to the effectiveness of our overall Quality 4
Assurance Program.
5 Q.
WHAT WAS THE SCOPE OF THE TASK FORCE EFFORT?
6 A.
The scope of the Task Force effort was to investigate the Quality 7
Control Inspection Process as an element of the overall Quality s
8 Assurance Program at the Catawba Nuclear Station, the McGuire 9
Nuclear Station, and the Oconee Nuclear Station.
10 Q.
WHAT DID YOU DO AFTER YOUR ASSIGNMENT TO THE TASK 11 FORCE?
i 12 A.
Immediately following the meeting with Mr. Owen, the Task Force 13 met to further review the written material and begin to plan the 14 investigation.
We each rearranged our schedules to dedicate full O
15 time to the project.
16 Q.
DESCRIBE HOW YOU GATHERED INFORMATION TO UNDERSTAND 17 THE CONCERNS OF THE INSPECTORS.
18 A.
The Task Force arranged a series of meetings to collect information, 19 first in the General Office, and subsequently through interviews 20 with inspectors and others on site.
21 Q.
DESCRIBE IN DETAIL HOW THE TASK FORCE CARRIED OUT ITS 22 WORK.
l 23 A.
Following a planning meeting, the Task Force began a series of 24 information-gathering meetings and interviews.
25 We met with Mr. J. R. Wens on December 16.
This meeting 26 focused on his perception of how the QC Program should function.
27 We had considerable discussion about the overall program and then
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more specifically discussed how the nonconforming item process was
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2 intended to operate.
3 Our next meeting was with Ms. Gail Addis on December 17.
4 We discussed her perception of the inspector concerns, and 5
specifically discussed her December 3 memo to Mr. Owen.
6 After there meetings to obtain background information, the 7
Task Force held a series of planning sessions to review the 8
information that had been gathered and develop a plan for the 9
on-site investigation.
The Task Force decided to conduct on-site 10 interviews with at least half of the inspectors, develop a statement 11 to be made at the beginning of each interview to make our purpose 12 clear, and develop a set of questions to be asked of each inspector.
13 We interviewed inspectors at the Catawba site on December 18, 21,
(]
14 and 22.
We also interviewed management and supervision in the V
15 Quality Assurance and Quality Control organizations, and in 16 Construction Technical Support.
17 The Task Force then met on December 23, 28, and 29 to 18 develop the Task Force Report for the Catawba Station.
This 19 report was issued on December 29, 1981.
A copy of our Report is 20 attached to my testimony as Attachment 4.
21 Q.
WAS THE SCOPE OF THE INVESTIGATION LIMITED TO THE l
22 CATAWBA SITE?
I 23 A.
Although the inspector concerns arose at the Catawba Station, the 24 scope of our investigation included the Oconee and McGuire sites as l
25 well.
On January 6, 1982, the Task Force went to the Ocouee site t
26 and conducted a series of interviews very similar to those
/7 27 conducted at the Catawba site.
On January 7, 1982, the Task U
l 28 Force went to the McGuire site and again conducted a series of
! l
.1 interviews similar to the investigation at the Catawba and Oconee O
2 sites.
3 On January 8 and 11,1982, the Task Force met to develop and i
4 finalize the Task Force Report Addendum to address the McGuire 5
and Oconee Stations.
This addendum report was issued on January I
6 12, 1982.
7 Q.
WHAT WERE THE FINDINGS OF YOUR TASK FORCE WITH RESPECT 8
TO THE QUALITY OF WORK AT CATAWBA?
9 A.
The Task Force found that the overall Quality Assurance Program 10 at the Catawba Nuclear Station was working.
Further, the Task
)
11 Force found no evidence of unacceptable installations which would 12 affect the health and safety of the public and Duke employees.
1 l
13 While the Task Force found no safety implications based on the j
14 concerns expressed by inspectors, it was quite clear to the Task j
15 Force that a communications problem existed between the inspectors, 16 their supervisors and the Construction Department at Catawba.
f 17 Q.
WHAT WERE THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE TASK FORCE?
18 A.
The Task Force made several recommendations aimed at improving l
19 communications between the various parties involved at Catawba.
20 The recommendations are summarized as follows:
i 21 1.
Develop a technique to provide inspectors with a better 22 understanding of the basis for technical acceptability of a l
23 nonconforined item; j
l 24 2.
Avoid the use of memoranda and verbal directives to provide 25 instruction and pursue more expedient procedure revf.sion; i
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1 3.
Provide QA Program training aimed at clarifying job
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2 responsibilities.
More specifically, describe the individual j
3 roles of all QA and QC positions as they relate to the
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4 effectiveness of the overall Quality Assurance Program;
}
5 4.
Advise employees of methods to seek technical resolution of i
j 6
their concerns; 1
I 7
5.
Improve the nonconforming item documentation process by more 8
explicitly stating the nonconformance and ultimately the basis l
9 for its resolution; i
10 6.
Improve lines of communication between QA/QC Management, f
11 supervision, and inspectors; and, 12 7.
Develop an action plan to address the recommendations and 13 ensure that a follow-up is done to assess the effectiveness of 14 the action plan, 15 Q.
DID THE WELDING INSPECTOR CONCERNS IDENTIFY ANY SAFETY 4
i 16 OR QUALITY PROBLEM AREAS?
I 17 A.
Many Welding. Inspectors expressed concern over deviation from l
I j
18 written work procedures by the Construction Craft and discussed i
j 19 several examples of. such instances.
While they were concerned 20 about such deviations, none of the inspectors knew of any work l
21 that would be considered inadequate or unacceptable as it relates to 22 plant safety.
23 Q.
DESCRIBE THE REPORTS OR COMMUNICATIONS YOU HAD WITH 24 MANAGEMENT CONCERNING YOUR FINDINGS AND 25 RECOMMENDATIONS.
26 A.
Following the initial a eeting with Mr. Owen, the Task Force 27 essentially operated independently of management during its I
28 planning, interviewing and report generation phases. _. _ _ _
_. _. _.. _. _ _ _. _ _ _ _ _ _. _ _._._ _ _ _.. _. _ _ ~.. _. _ ~., _
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4 I
i i
- Following the completion of the Reports, the Task Force met l
2 with Mr. Owen, Mr. R. L. Dick, Vice-President of Construction, i
3 and Mr. Wells on January 12, 1982, to discuss our findings and i
4 recommendations.
At this meeting, we reported that the QA j
5 Program was indeed working, but emphasized a need for quick I
j 6
corrective action on the communications problems. Mr. Owen asked l
t 1
2 7
if we thought that the individual inspector concerns might warrant j
8 further investigation. Our response was that the Quality Assurance f
i i
I I
9 Program was working, but it may be prudent to investigate the
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10 specific technical examples expressed by inspectors to better 11 explain the basis for the resolutions. This in itself could go a long I
l' i
j 12 way in improving the communications problem that existed at the j
i' l
13 site.
14 Q.
WHAT WAS THE RESPONSE OF MANAGEMENT TO THE TASK FORCE 4
i i
15 REPORT?
l lI 16 A.
The Task Force Report was well received by management and they 4
t 17 immediately began developing an action plan to address our j
j 18 recosusendations.
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19 Q.
THE CONCERNS EXPRESSED BY THE WELDING INSPECTORS WERE 20 INITIALLY CHARACTERIZED AS CONCERNS AFFECTING THE f
21 QUALITY OF WORK AT THE CATAWBA PLANT.
DID. THE i
l 22 CONCERNS EXPRESSED AFFECT THE QUALITY OR SAFETY OF 23 THE CATAWBA PLANT?
i
)
24 A.
The Task Force concluded that the Quality Assurance Program was 25 working at the Catawba Station, and did not discover any 1
1 l
26 unacceptable work during our interviews with the many people 9-i
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involved.
It is my opinion, and the opinion of each member of the U
2 Task Force that the quality of the work at the Catawba site was 4
3 acceptable.
While the QA Program was working and the work was 4
acceptable, I did feel that we should take prompt corrective action 5
on the communications problems so as not to reduce the 6
effectiveness of the Quality Assurance Program.
7 Q.
DID WELDING INSPECTOR CONCERNS INDICATE THAT THERE WAS 8
A BREAKDOWN IN THE QA PROGRAM AT CATAWBA OR THAT THE 9
QA PROGRAM WAS NOT WORKING 7 10 A.
In my opinion, the Welding Inspector concerns were not indicative 11 of a breakdown in the QA Program at Catawba.
The Task Force 12 found that the nonconforming item report was being used as the 13 appropriate tool to identify workmanship that was unacceptable or of indeterminate quality. Further, we found that such nonconformance O
14 i
15 item reports were following the prescribed QA process of review, I
16 resolution and approval.
As a result of poor communications, some 17 inspectors saw their role as one to require strict adherence to work i
18 procedures, rather than the role of documenting ' variances from 19 such procedures.
The basis for the technical resolution of l
20 nonconforming items was generally not communicated to the 21 inspectors.
Some inspectors concluded that they had inadequate i
22 support from their supervision and management because they felt 23 that the craft was routinely permitted to vary from work procedures 2
24 and that these variances were not being thoroughly analyzed for O -
1-acceptability.
As previously stated, it is my opinion that the 2
inspector concerns stemmed from poor communications.
The 1
3 Catawba QA Program was working.
4 4
5 6
i 7
I hereby certify that I have read and understand this document, and 8
believe it to be my true, accurate and complete testimony.
i 9
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1 12 Theodore C. McMeekin 13 14 15 Sworn to and subscribed before me 16 this 2.2 nd day of September,1983.
b& MA 20 Notary Public 21 My Commission Empires Nw.16,1986 22 Commission Expires j
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ATTACHMENT 1 l-i f
THEODORE C. MCMEEKIN 1
Duke Power Company 1
Principal Engineer, Control Systems Engineering 1
EDUCA uvN:
l June 61-June 65 Pennsylvania State University, University Park, Pennsylvania.
Degree:
B.S.
in Electrical Engineering (Electronics option); Member of N.R.O.T.C. and commissioned Ensign, U.S.N.
j Sept 65-Mar 66 - U.S.
Nuclear Power School, Bainbridge, &ryland.
j Graduate of Nuclear Theory.
Advanced study in Nuclear Reactor i
Theory,
Design,
Construction and Application, Heat
- Transfer, Electronics, Shielding, Nuclear
- Physics, Differential and Integral j
Calculus, and Metallurgy.
I Mar 66-Sept 66 - U.S.
Naval Power School, -West Milton, New York.
i Graduate of Nuclear Propulsion Advanced Course and Prototype operator qualification.
Concentrated study and application of the complete j
functions and operations of land based Naval Nuclear Reactor, full scale engineering plant, DIG Prototype, i
Jan 67-June 67 U.S.
Naval Submarine
- School, New London, Connecticut.
Graduate Officers Basic School.
Advanced study of l
Engineering, Weapons, Supply, Operations, and Navigation of Nuclear Power Submarines.
l PROFESSIONAL AFFILIATIONS:
N.C. Registration N. 05910 - Registered Professional Engineer J
SC. Registration No. 04642 - Registered Professional Engineer Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers, Senior Member i
American Nuclear Society, Member i
American Society of Naval Engineers, Member t
]
WORK EXPERIENCE:
FROM TO TITLE.
PROGRAM COMPANY July 75 Present Principal Enitineer All Projects Duke Power Co.
4 l
Responsible for the Control Systems Engineering for all projects including control system design, _ control complex design, computer j
system design and all related hardware procurement.
June 73
' July.75 Design. Engineer All Projects Duke Power Co.
Responsible for technical aspects of Control and Instrumentation hardware procurement and technical liaison 'with Nuclear Steam Supply System vendors for electrical, control, and instrumentation matters.
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Rssum2 T. C. MCMEEKIN Pega 2 WORK EXPERIENCE CONTINUED:
FROM M
TITLE PROGRAM COMPANY s
Aug 70 June 73 Lieutenant U.S. Navy USS Simon Bolivar (SSBN641) Gold - Charleston, S.C. Nuclear Powered Polaris Missile Firing Submarine.
Officer of the Deck and Engineering Officer of the Watch.
Held final Top Secret security clearance.
Positions held included Auxiliary Division Officer, Electrical Division
- ~
- Officer, Interior Communications Division Officer, Reactor Control Officer, and Supply Officer.
June 67 Aug 67 Naval ROTC Instructor i
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1 RESUME EARL E. HOELLEN, JR.
ATTACHMENT 2 PROFESSIONAL
'O EXPERIENCE 1978-1982 Assistant Manager, Fuel Purchases-Nuclear, Duke Power Company Reporting to Vice President, Fuel Purchases, i
responsibilities included supervision of the solicitation, negotiation and administration of all contracts associated with Duke Power's nuclear fuel supply, including uranium concentrates, UFs conversion
- services, fabrication
- services, reprocessing
- services, and spent fuel transportation equipment, and the davelopment of all commercial policies for this function.
Contractual expenditures approximately
$100 million annually.
Developed computerized contract price analysis system and responsible for market research and cost projections, utilized in corporate budget preparation and strategic planning.
Developed inventory management system for nuclear fuel supply, including marketing policies for excess fuel supply.
Developed reorganization plan which ultimately centered j
commercial responsibility for Duke's nuclear fuel function within Purchasing Department.
Developed purchasing i
policies and procedures for nuclear fuel function.
Developed and staffed Nuclear Fuel Section of Duke q
Purchasing Department.
Member of Duke Power Nuclear Station Crisis Management i
Team, providing management direction in event of nuclear mishap at station.
Member of Duke Power Speakers Bureau, giving several talks and speeches annually to groups throughout Duke 1
service area.
j 1979-1982 Vice President and Project Manager, Western Fuel, Inc.
Responsible for development of Duke's own uranium j
exploration and production venture through a
wholly-owned subsidiary, Western. Fuel, Inc.
Provided general management and authorized all expenditures for project.
Capital investment approximately $15 million, with annual operating budget of $4 million in 1982.
1 Responsible for marketing of uranium production.
i 1976-1977 Nuclear Engineer, Fuel Purchases, Duke Power Company Reporting to Manager, Fuel Purchases, responsibilities included negotiation and administration of Duke's nuclear fuel supply, primarily uranium.
Developed extencive knowledge of U.S. uranium market and production areas.
O
' RESUME EARL E. HOELLEN, JR.
Page 2 O
EDUCATION University of North Carolina - Charlotte, North Carolina M.B. A., December 1980.
Concentration in financial management.
University of Virginia - Charlottesville, Virginia B.S.
Nuclear Engineering, January 1976.
Concentration in reactor safety and power generation.
Executive Management Training Program, Duke Power
- Company, and various other in-house management development programs.
O O
-RESUME ATTACHMENT 3 OF f
')
ALFRED S. HOMESLEY i
MANAGER, RIVEPBEND STEAM STATION EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUND: ENGINEERING / SCIENTIFIC Stanley High School - Stanley, N. C. - Year Completed:
1947 Gardner Webb College - Boiling Springs, N. C. - Year Completed:
1951 Associate of Arts (AA)
Appalachian State University, - Boone, N. C. - Year Completed:
1954 BS - Physical Education Power Plant Engineering - Div.1, Inte national Correspondence School, e
i Scranton,
Penn.,
Year Completed:
1963 DUKE POWER COMPANY TRAINING:
See Attachment #1 SERVICE RECORD WITH DUKE POWER COMPAN_Y:
Repairman 3/8/54 to 3/3/57; Assigned to the Instrument and Performance Section Mechanic "B" - 3/4/57 to 4/30/58; Instrument and Performance Section Assistant Boiler Foreman - 5/1/58 to 3/31/62 Boiler Foreman - 4/1/62 to 9/30/62 C) 7 Assistant Plant Engineer - 10/1/62 to 4/30/67
/
Plant Engineer - 5/1/67 to 1/31/68 Assistant Plant Superintendent - 2/1/68 to 3/31/71 Plant Superintendent - 4/1/71 Manager (Title Change) - 12/1/75 IN
SUMMARY
I worked in the non-exempt group from 3/8/54 to 5/1/58 and in management from 5/1/58 to the present.
I have worked directly and indirectly with many Craftsmen, Technicians and Plant Operators for twenty-nine years.
While as a Boller Foreman and Plant Engineer, much of my time was spent working directly with Maintenance Craftsmen and Technicians on boiler tube repairs and boiler tube rehabilitation projects.
For the last fifteen years, I have been involved in Personnel and Employee Relations such as EEOC, Personnel Testing, Retirement Plan Administration, Safety, OSilA, Training Programs, Coaching employees in work performance, etc.
See Attachment 2 for additional information relating to personal and Company related training.
L:
ATTACHMENT 4
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December 29, 1981 i
4 Mr. W. H. Owen
SUBJECT:
Report by the Task Force on QC Inspections Pursuant to your request, attached hereto is the Task Force's report on the findings and recomendations of the investigation conducted at Catawba Nuclear Station.
As we agreed, this report only covers the investigation at Catawba.
j The Task Force intends to submit a report on the QC inspection pro-1 grams at Oconee and McGuire as soon as practicable after the first 4
of the year.
Should you have any questions or desira additional information, the j
Task Force would be willing to meet with you at your convenience.
l
^
Earl E.
oe len, Jr.
Chairman, Task Force
i On QC Inspection EEHjr:df i
3 cc w/att:
A. S. Homesley T. C. McMeekin 4
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REPORT BY THE TASK FORCE ON QC INSPECTION CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION 1
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INTRODUCTION AND SCOPE i
l During the course of a recent Employee Recourse investigation, a number of allegations and inferences were made by several QC inspectors regarding the 4
quality of certain aspects of construction work performed at Duke Power's I
Catawba Nuclear Station (Attachment 1
.. Addis letter of 12/3/81). The i
management of Duke Power felt that the safety implications of these alle-4 l
gations were quite serious and warranted immediate attention. Consequently, a Task Force on QC Inspections was formed to investigate these allegations and the QA program as it relates to QC inspections.
1 i
While the Employee Recourse action initiated by the QC inspectors was based on a recent pay adjustment for inspectors (Attachment 2. W. H. Owen letter of I
i 12/10/81), the Task Force was only charged with making an assessment of whether program objectives were being fulfilled and whether there was reason f
to believe that work was being accepted at the plant which might create a j
safety problem.
Further, the Task Force was charged with determining the extent of any deterioration in interface between QA/QC personnel and Con-struction personnel and the impact such deterioration has had or potentially i
i could have.on the Campany's QA arogram.
Finally, the Task Force was charged l
with making appropriate recommendations consistent with the findings.
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O V
METHOD Prior to initiating an on-site investigation, the Task Force met with several individuals in the General Office who were familiar with or involved in the Employee Recourse action. Discussions were held with Mr. J. R. Wells, Manager of Corporate Q. A., in order to gain an adequate understanding of the QA pro-gram objectives, as well as to gain Wells' assessment as to the genesis of the current situation (Attachment 3 J. R. Wells letter of 12/11/81). Ms. Gail Addis, Director of Employee Relations, was interviewed in order to get her understanding 'of the events leading up to the Recourse action. The Task Force also met with Mr. R. M. Bisanar of the Corporate legal staff, and t
Mr. Fred Stuart, of Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak, and Stewart, outside labor counsel for Duke Power. Mr. Stuart was brought in to familiarize Task Force members with investigative techniques and general procedures to be 1
followed in conducting an investigation.
As for the actual investigation, the Task Force decided to first make a pre-pared statement to each employee interviewed explaining the Task Force's function (Attachment 4, Statement), and then proceed to ask each employee the same basic set of questions (Attachment 5. Questions). While all inspectors were asked the same basic set of questions, follow-up questions differed, from inspector to inspector, based on their initial responses.
O 2
1
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ItiVESTIGATI0ft l
Utilizing the method described above, the Task Force inte.rviewed at Catawba a substantial sample of QC inspectors and associated supervision during December 18, 21, 22, 1981.
It became apparent early on that welding inspectors had more concerns than other inspectors in the Catawba Project Quality Assurance Division.
In fact, the general feeling of the non-welding inspectors interviewed was that the QA program was working well, and that they were supported in their efforts. Consequently, the Task Force decided to adjust the sample to include more welding inspectors. The final inspector interview sample was as follows:
. Number of Inspectors Interviewed 37
. flumber of Welding Inspectors Interviewed 20 m
(U I
1 of Total Inspectors Interviewed 26%
. % of Total Welding Inspectors Interviewed 57%
The Task Force also interviewed the following personnel
- All (3) first line welding supervisors
. QC Technical Supervisor Welding /NDE
. Project QA Engineer
. Quality Assurance Manager Project utvision
. Two QA Engineering (M/W/tt) employees plus their supervisor
. A supervisor in the Catawba Construction Technical Support Grcup responsible of welding technical support.
A complete list of all employees interviewed and their positions is contained (n!
in Attachment 6.
3
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)
v Inte view Results-Inspectors The foliowing is a summation of overall responses to the specific questions u:ed in tre interviews, as described in the METHOD section above.
Question 1 - Do you have any questions or concerns about the quality of work in your area of inspection?
Findings Non-welding inspectors had no concerns about the quality of work as it related to plant safety. Most of the welding in-spectors initially responded yes, they had concerns, but after further discussion none had any safety concerns or any area of work that they could identify as unsafe. T%eir concerns were:
- 1) perceived inconsistencies in interpretations of compliance or non compliance with erocedures; and 2) ultimate resolution acceptability of NC1's. Previously the Task Force recognized that the responsibility of procedure interpretation and NCI l
resolution was clearly intended by supervision not to rest with the individual inspector.
However, welding inspectors did not seem to understand nor accept this situation. The insractors l
were also concerned about an increasing tendancy to be directed to inspect from written memos or verbal directions from super-vision.
Finally, several welding inspectors questioned the qualifications of those employees of Catawba QA Engineering and Catawba Construction Technical Sapport to resolve NCI's, even though when pressed for specifics noneof the inspectors could describe the criteria for thoso jobs.
4
/
.t Question 2 - What is the purpose of the Quality Assurance and Quality Con-trol functions?
Findings
- All inspectors had a good grasp of the intended functions, but a poor understanding of individual responsibility assignments for the QA program. That is, with the inherent checks and balances of the QA program, the inspectors did not seem to understand where their responsibility began and ended.
Questioa 3 - What do you understand the resolution process of NCI's to be?
Findings
- Most had a reasonable understanding of the process.
- However, while all were aware that site QA was involved in the process, few thought site QA was anything more than a " rubber stamp" for Technical Suppo*t or Engineering. They did not understand QA's scope of responsibility in this area.
In light of their per-ception about the scope of their own jobs, the Task Force felt that the inspectors did not understand the need for site QA.
Question 4&S-Do you feel any pressure from the Construction or Design Engineering Departments to accept non-conforming work? Do you feel any pressure from QA/QC Department to accept non-conforming work?
Findings
- While many experienced the day-to-day work environment questions of whether something is " good enough or not", none felt undue pressure to accept non-cenforming work.
9 5
I 4
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Question 6 - Have you ever personally participated or been involved in a QA audit?
Findings
- Most had not been direct'v involved in an audit.
However, most had been involved in either an NRC inspection and/or an on-site QA surveillance. All were aware that these type audits existed and were performed routinely.
)
Question 7 - Have you ever knowingly accepted or approved non-conforming work?
Findings
- All but one answered No. This case did not involve non-con-forming work but rather an incomplete inspection.
- O Question 8 - Duke Power Corporate Policy No.104, " Nuclear Safety," was 1
related to the interviewees, (Attachment 7 Policy Statement).
They were then asked if they felt the management of Duke Power and at the Catawba Project were committed to this stated policy?
Findings
- All inspectors felt that the corporate management of Duke was '
comitted to this policy. Most inspectors also felt that project management was committed.
However, there was considerable doubt in the inspector's minds as to whether the craft level of super-vision and the craftsman were comitted to this policy.
Several inspectors felt that the crafts were too prodtetion oriented.
6
O Question 9 - Do you have any other quality concerns?
Findings
- Many welding inspectors did not agree with NCI resolutions, particularly those resolutions by Construction Technical l
Support. Examples included procedural variances on weld de-l fects upon visual inspection, material traceability, and a special tool marking. Many welding inspectors were also con-l cerned that an NCI could be voided by their supervisor. They did not agree with the review process by which NCI's could be determined not to be NCI's and subsequently voided.
In-spectors were also dissatisfied with recent directives recom-mending they go to their first and second line supervisors and l
1st them raise any problems with site QA, rather than the in-spectors dealing with QA themselves.
Interview - Supervisors A structured question approach was not used in these interviews.
- Instead, the Task Force pursued supervisor perspective problem areas.
It was quite clear that the first line welding supervisors had the same perspective of probjem areas as did.the QC inspectors.
It was also clear that the senior l
first line supervisor was most adamant in expressing the concerns of most all i
the inspectors and the other two supervisors.
During the inspector inter-views many inspectors mentioned the senior supervisor and what he had told I
them was right or worng. With all three first line supervisors the most significant concerns were NCI resolutions and voiding of NC1's.
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I
kU The second level supervisor, QC Technical Supervisor for welding /flDE, felt that he had the only area where there were prob 1 cms.
Ile felt he was second-guessed by his inspectors at every turn. He also felt that the senior first line supervisor was his biggest problem, that this supervisor would not support him or the other QA supervisors. He indicated that he had a hard time making decisions anymore because of the second-guessing.
The Project QA Engineer for Catawba and the QA Manager of Projects Division had a good grasp on the feelings of the inspectors and had already taken some action and had additional plans to deal with the concerns. They felt that the biggest problems were in the inspector's lack of complete understanding of the QA process and responsibilities (that is, how all jobs in the QA pro-gram fit together to make the program work), a perception of narrowing inspector responsibility, recent changes in objectives of the NCI progrsm (repair work in the field - no unnecessary NCI's) and finally a pay concern which was the cause of the Employee Recourse action.
Through interviews with the QA engineering supervisor and two employees in,
his group, it was learned that they too were aware of the inspector's concerns.
The feelings were that inspectors did not fully appreciate that this technical group had both the expertise and the technical source documents to more fully evaluate tiCI resolutions than the inspectors did. They also recognized that inspectors do not always understand why something is acceptable or not accep-table.
It was clear, however, that the QA section did review each NCI carefully.
Also, QA expressed a strong responsibility to support the inspectors in their efforts.
8
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Finally the Task Force interviewed a Construction Department Technical Support superviser responsible for welding. Through this interview, it was clear that Construction Technical Support was aware of the inspector's concerns and the lack of inspector's acceptance and understanding nf responsibilities and i
associated technical expertisc.
CONCLCSIONS Although the welding inspectors have concerns about the NCI resolution process and the voiding of NCI's, the overall QA Program at Catawba is working.
- Further, the Task Force found no evidence of unacceptable installations which would affect the health and safety of the public and Duke's employees.
(l
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The Task Force found that all NCI's which are evaluated as valid through the review process are forwarded to responsible technical organizations for resolu-tion. Further, all technical resolutions originated are independently checked and approved.
For those NCI's that are not viewed as valid and subsequently voided, the inspectors understand they can and frequently do seek recourse,
through discussion with succeeding levels of supervision or in writing through an on-site " inquiry" process.
Finally, all inspectors were aware that QA audits (either internally or externally) existed and were performed routinely to ensure that the QA program is working on a continuous basis.
While the Task Force found no safety implications during its investigation, it was quite clear that serious communications problems exist between the g
(
)
inspectors, their supervisors, and Construction.
These problems are evidenced 4
9
l by inspectors lack of understanding of NCl resolutions, inspector confusion as to what is expected of them (program objectives changed as a result of changing NRC guidelines), and inconsistencies in communication channels between inspectors and QA. These problems are further complicated throuCh techincal complexity, organizational enanges, position evaluations, and changing objectives of the NCI program.
RECOMMENDATIONS
- 1) Catawba QA/QC organization should pursue techniques for inspectors to better understand bases for technical acceptability. This might be dor.e l
in an overall program rather than on each individual resolution.
O lC
- 2) Supervisor should avoid unnecessary use of memos and verbal directives to instruct inspectors and pursue nre expedient procedure revision.
- 3) Inspectors need to be better trained in the area of job responsibilities for the QA program, what their role is, where it begins and where it ends.
Errphasis should also be placed on educating the inspectors as to how al1, QA positions contribute to the effectiveness of the QA program.
- 4) Employees need to be made aware of Corporate Technical Resolution Pro-cedure.
- 5) Concentrate on more explicit writing of NCI resolution as it relates to both acceptability /unacceptability and inspection cumpliance. That is, there appears to be many NCI's where the inspector correctly fulfills
(
his responsibility of inspecting to the procedures but the variance for 10
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the specific application is acceptable.
This should be made clear in the resolution process so the inspector can know when he has done what is expected of him and when he has nde a mistake.
- 6) QA/QC management and supervision needs to work more closely with inspectors.
I open lines of comunication, and try to help inspectors understand their i
l roles.
- 7) An action plan should be developed. Upon implementation of corrective measures. Duke management should continue to monitor the situation at Catawba and follow-up with a six month review.
I i
l Overall, the Task Force believes that the QA/QC Pro 0 ram at Catawba is warning 1
as intended and that there is no reason to believe that unacceptable crafts-unship and unsafe conditions exist at the plant. We do believe that there is a serious communications problem and information exchange blockage that is creating a working relationship between inspectors, their supervisors and QA which has the potential if not firmly resolved, to reduce the effectiveness of the QA program as it relates to welding inspection.
TA5K FORCC ON QC INSPECTIONS l
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Tefl E. lioellen~, Jr.
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J ATTACHMEtlT 1 December 3, 1981 W. H. Owen
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RE: Employce Concerns at Catawba and Oconec Reporteil thering the Iteview of their Recourse l'rocedures Regarding Pay Grades As yon requested, this is a record of ennsnents made to me by QA Inspectors at Catawba and Oconec concerning work quality and relationships with Construction and Steam.
Hr. UcIls said that he also heard the same general concerns when he met with the Inspectors.
Burr 11/24/81 "We've had craft supervision coine in h-rc who can't (Catawba) read blueprints, paperwork probicms are che major problems."
"I'vc had to f ace feeling like I wimld be fired in (C
order to see the work was donc right.
I caught n bad weld, and wrote an NCl.'due to lack of fusion.
Technical Support said "no"--but ANT and NRC saw it
, and agreed, and then I heard Davidson and Is' ells were going to investigate who talked to NRC, and I didn't
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cven talk to NRC."
Crisp 11/24/81 "For years we'v'c been giving instructions. All levels (Catawba) of supervision have asked us what to do.
Drawings and paperwork are a real prob 1cm--consultation befor~e-3 the work."
9/1/81
" Construction asks QA to teach and direct work; to point out errors and explain what's right."
,En ha,n,k,s l l /24/fil "Af t er 4 nr 5 years giving inst ruct finis ahnut revisionn, (catawha)
I t ' I I I"' d I M I""I L * "
"0A m.inagement.provides very Iittle support. We've been told to OK things that were marginal, over-ruling judgment of what is really first class."
i "Some I*oremen are very abusive to Inspectors."
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12/3/81 page 2
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Canit 11/24/81
" Supervisors (craft) don't know what to do...they ask (Catawba) for direction."
"I was never told not to instruct craf t until recently."
- ~
try,11/24/81 "We Irive to tell (craf t supervinfon) why some paperwork (Catawha) doesn't pans."
"there's a lack of manancment support; tiiey're breaking codes becanse they don't want to make waves."
' "The project is going downhill. Construction controls QA and influences decisions. Construction can't sgnd us going by the book."
"More important than the pay is (M management is weak, gives in to Construction passing sloppy work."
11/9/81 "One Weliling l'oreman told me their bi;: nest complaint was Welding Inspectors' pay -it's political. One foreman said 'Now we got you SOB's back where we want you.'"
" Construction doesn't like the way we stick to pro-cedures."
Kirklanet 11/24/81 "There's a lack of support ~, criticism of over-inspecting.
(Catawba)
I.ast week i had a valid NCI--S procedures viniated.
I tanned the work anil slid the paper into my box (on the way ont). The unrk was wrong. Hy Foreman has heen instructed that if there's a way'ont he gives i
in.
Construction raised cane, and I was criticized.-
~
"I.ast night I wrote an NCI and put it in my locker..
Supervision jumped all over me for the paperwork.
I said I had a valid NCI and this wasn't going in the garbage."
8 "1 he 1.cadman functInns as a supervisni on the necond,
n1:1It. They sa id I hey'il nupport, but on the NCI last week t hey.d idn't suppnrt."
"(:enera l l'oremen and Superlut enih.nr s were t old not t o.
s.iy.iny t h ini: to us uhen our pay was ent, init they do, and onr supervision doesn't back us."
"We work off nemos--Supervisor says we've got to."
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Page 3 Karriker 11/9/81 "We write NCI's and craft goes over our heads and (Catawba) gets them overruled. We're not supported and given no reasons.
" Resolutions are being written by unqualified pcopic."
" Craft supervision try to pull things over on us.
Tlicy're so production mintlett; they've forr,otten qu.il ii y. "
Ilenson 11/23/81
" Foremen come daily and ask us to tell them what to do.
(Catawba)
Some Superintendents are bad."
11/9/81 "Still rect Construction rules our jobs (referring to schedule for Canteen use); there's a lack of manage-ment backing."
Standridge 11/23/81 "They won't let us take time to keep up our certifi-(Catawba) cations.
I'vc lost RT and pT since coming from Cherokee."
"A lot of times we direct craft. 1/cidinn Foremen don't know the guidelines. Welders don't know the procedures; their training doesn't work."
"This Joh has poor supervision. They let poor work, violations, pass just to avoid making waves. They itsk us to sign off sturf that isn' t rigitt."
Wr i r.h t, 11/23/81 "I rect I need to know how to weld and I'm rnipr. to (Catawha) sclient at night to learn.
I feel I nwc it to the Company."
"That's noing to he hard (not giving instructions),
so many Welders are just out of school.
They can't turn to supervision when they're 40 feet in the air."
McDowell 11/23/81 "We're nne responsible for nIving instructions.
(Catawha)
Yesterday one of t he Foremen anked un in check for him...cra f t supervision doesn't linnw t in proces!nres."
l
.fackson 11/23/81
" Attitude between craft is very had. Tliis new deal (Catawba) about us not directing unrk--it's pathetic how much
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Foremen come to us."
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.. +, W110 12/3/81 page 4 5
Jackson (Cont.)
"If Inspectors dn their job by, the book, Construction
. appeals to Technical Support and overrules our decisions."
l Rockholt 11/9/81 "We get threats, harassment. When we were under (Catswha)
Construction, it was no problem. This is QA huckling under to Construction. They complained about our pay--
Ghat they want they get--even in violation of procedures."
"Lle work from memos craft has'never seen.. We were told not to write so many NCI's, then to.id to write more
,in certain areas.
I don't want anything second rate.
'It tears me out of frame to be told to do wrong."
4 Jones 11/23/81 "We instructed (craft) for so long. This is wrong, we're (Oconee) a grade above craft in general."
~
"The nr.w philosophy on NCI's is to resolve them in the field if possible."
"I ntill feel it's politics--QA management ilocsn't stand up for us, l.ots of craft Fo'remen complained g
openly about our pay and it was lowered."
Owens 9/9/81
" Supervisors say 'ask Inspectors.'
Engineers say ' check (Oconce) with inspectors.' (We've) used Inspectors to super-vise and direct. That's the way It went, even in Construction, even though told not to."
"We heard craf t supervision objected to our pay."
Sheriff-11/23/81 "When 1 dress out and go in and reJcet a wcld and th5n (Oconce) can't telI him what to do, then I have to drens ont agaIn and go back In--and he has to find the Foreman to'tell him what to do."
""They just don't kunu what they're dolun'(in SSD and SilS)."
Shythy 1i/23/81 "Innt ruct ion han heen noinn on for years. We'11 just (Oconce) h.ive to play ihe name dif ferent ly."
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Mitchell'11/23/81 "This place is a mess during outages and the new i
(Oconee)
. approach to referring craft back to supervision will cause a slowdown."
9/1/81 "The 00 cept or reject philosophy is impractical during outages, with exposurc and going into many 4
1 areas."
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" Craft supervision don't know QA regulations, and I
we h.ive t o dir ect craft w. irk."
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Cail Addis Director, Employee Relations i
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R'. I.. Dick J. R. Wells j-T. F. McCracken I
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ATTACHf1ENT 2
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Sunmary for Task Force Appointed to Investigate Allegations by QC Inspectors l.
Ilar.ko round Recent allegations expressetltioring on Employee Recourse investigation indicate the potential for a problem to develop between QC inspectors and the craft organizations whose work is beinq inspedted.
This is a particularly sensit'ive interface, one where good performance is dependent on a proper perception of roles, understandinq respective responsibilitics and good human relation skills.
Poor perrnrmance at.this interface could certainly adversely af fect our quality goals.
I have reviewed some past documentation and uould call attention to an
~
flRC special safety inspection conducted at Catawba f rom January 26 through Feb ruary 6, 1981.
This report clearly shrus that this relationship between QC and the craf ts was good at Catawha at that time.
I can find
~
no reason to suspect that anything was dif ferent at either Oconce or ficGul re.
The April 10th report of this flRC inspection wab clea as to their intent:
(
"This inspectinn was a comprehensive examinalion of sitc work in progress anel of your management and quality assurance controls as applied to that work and other act ivit ies.
In arblition to inspect ion of selected arcas of responsibility at the site, discussions were held with many employces to determine their knowledge of and ability to carry not'their individual responsi-bilitics.
Thase discussions included determinatinn of the.cmployees
]
freedom to obtain corrective action on safety issues."
The flRC report.did include Is violations, 1 Severity level IV, 2 Severi ty -
i.evel V and I Severity I.evel VI.
(ilRC violations are categorired from Severity Levels I th' rough VI, with I bcinn the most severc), tione of these had to do with an improper relationship between crafts and inspectors.
The report was clear that'qnod relations existed between craftsmen and Inspectors.
at that time (copy of paqcs 6, 7 T. 8 of flRC report at t achetl.)
print I o I ch e n.it y l'Illi. Ihe f)l' ni q.uii /a l' i t.n u.v.
a p.n ni lhe (nic.:,in tinn Department.
Ilhen'the QA liep.ulment was insmed in l') /Is. it u.is sh cided to put ~ the I)C Iuns I iem in Ihe liner.t e or I inn Dep.H 1 men t her.ns e of potcutial 5
.schedulinq di f ficoll ies between es af t s and intpert os e.
(availability'or inspectors when needed) and the effect that.could have on productivity.
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-The. intervening years have' proven this not to be a major problen so we
~concluded late in 1980 that moving QC to the QA Department could be heneficial in assurine; coordination with QA and more effective use of z QA management experiences at the sites.
4 Somewhat inrfcpendent of that on gointi consideratinn,'we were looking at l'
lhis is an on going kind of review, but things were especially active in the equity of Inn r. raft rates (inclinling in pec t ors) acrov. t he company.
1980 with rapidly increasing inflation and severe external competition, especially in the nuclear field.
With the beginning of nucicar generating plant construction in 1967, craft welders were selected to be welding inspectors because there was no other welding inspection experience in the company, anel there was not time to hire and train Inspectors prior to the start of construction.
When position analyses for non-exempt technical positions were prepared in 197., the welding inspector position had the kncu-bru described in such a way-that it would be difficutt to acquire unless an individual had cxtensive hands-on welding experience.
On the basis of this position analysis, the Construction Departncnt flon-Exempt Evaluation Committee evaluated the welding inspector job as heavier in contint than other inspection positions.
When the Construction Ocpartment non-exempt officc/ technical qualification progression wage program was implernented in February 1980, the welding inspector position wage range was based on this e~ valuation.
4 i.
I
'With the support of the'QA Department,-Cherokee Project quality' control l-management began an inspector. training program for individuals who _did not j
have prior welding cxperientic.
Over a periext of several years, this program demonstrated conclusively that prior welding experience was not required
[
for an indivirtual to perform all of - the-necessary duties of-the welding.
inspector position.
About the same' time, the Construction-Department's Compensation and Benefits Supervisor began a series of incetings with all-of the Senior QC Engineers to examine all QC jobs.pnd identify any differences between sites in'the
> qualifications and dutics required of similar po".itions.
This was.necessary:
.b'ecause tbr majority of-Ihe p.o-iiinn analye.cs h.ul'heen ha*.ed on Ihe.way jobs were consiructed on the licCuire project anel iI was re'cognired that 3
some site.related differences existed.
Differences were dchatcri-and resolved and revised positinn~analyscs were.
written'that provided cons,istent and uniform administration.between. sites.
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Since all' parties agreed that the Cherokee qualification program was valid, i
it was adopted as the basis for the welding inspector position analysis.
Evaluation of the position resulted in a job content weight equivalent to the mechanical, electrical, and other inspector positions.
Late in 1980, when the decision had been made to transfer administrative direction of QC personnel to the nA Department, a survey of external wage practices indic.ated that acute labor shortages was causing some contractors to adopt pay practices above those of Duke.
This information delayed the decision on implementation of the revised pay ranges..
In the spring of th81, af ter transfer of the QC personnel to 0.A, a decision was made to make a two-step change in top rates for insocctors and senior inspectors, which change would bring them in line with other top craft rates throughout the company. The first part of this adjustment was made by giving only.t of thr general increase granted in July, and the plan.is to make the remainder of the adjustment in 1982.
4
]
OA Department management held meetings with all of the QC inspectors at the time of the general increase (and the adjustment) to explain the reasons for the adjustment.
There was sorac reaction in July but more as time passed and the implicalions of the change became an issuc Geage rates relative to crafts, impact on' pride, etc).
. s h*
A number of-the inspectors, starting in
, decided to use the Employee Recourse Procedurc,to ques tion the pay adjustment.
See the Corporate Personnel-Employee Relations report for details.
~ During the investigation at Step 2 of the recourse procedure, interviews with of the QC inspectors were conducted by Gail Addis and Jim Wells.
Their notes of these interviews are attached.
Items 5f,6intheWells'memodated' December 5andanumber-ofallegations and inferences as reported in the Addis letter dated December 3 cause us' serious concern.
11.
The Task Force i.
The safety implications of any suggested deterioration in the interface between our.0A personnel anel ihnse shal des ii;n, c on e. f r u c t, operate and l
maintain our maclear pun r lilant ar e eerion'. -.md me r i l our inmied ia t e i
attention. Thereinre, uc'uill prorced at once 'in undert ake lhe necessary investigation to completely understand the allegations-made by the inspectors i
interviewed at Catawba.
This investigation will be made_by a task force consisting of threc persons not directly involved in t hc' interface or work in ques t ion.
.It will be
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important that this investigating team consist-of. senior persons of
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LO Indisputable integrity, sensitive to human relations aspects of a sensitive interface such as this.
It would be desirable for the team to have some experience with nuclear related work and with craf t work such
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as that currently being donc at Oconce, McGuire and Cataaba.
This task force, once appointed and confirmed by U S Lee, will report to r
W 11 Owen for the course of-'the investiqction, with the final report and t
j recommendations to he reviewcci with and approved by W S Lec.
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The task force will have accru to any resnorces and informat ion available in any department of the company which is needeci for t.hc inves tigation i
and will bc-authori. zed to use any rescurces outside the company deemed j
appropriate by the task force, subject only to the approval of W II Owen.
l The task force will be appointed and confirmed prior to December 11 They will be relieved of all other duties and will begin work as soon as possible in order.to confirm what is needed to completely and fully resolve these charges.
The task force will be expected to complete its work and make a final report by December 31, or sooner if possible.
I Ill.
Related Information A.
On 11/12/81, Larry Jackson, a welding inspc.c4or at Catowha, filed a i
claim of harassment by a Construction Craft inreman.
Tbc charge has been investigated separately by QA and Cctnstruction Enployee Relations i
personnel.
Dob Dick anci Jim Wells are currently reviewing the differences ji in the two repo.rts (copics attached).
]
B.
Since all of the allegations, to date, concerning harassment and undue pressure:are at Catauba, I reviewed HRC findingt there since February j
1981. There have been IB noncompliances covered in llRC inspections.
j through inspection Report bi-17, distributed as follow:
Severity Level 1 0
(most severe) i 11 0
ill 0
IV I.
j.
V 14-VI 3
(Icast severe) j Nonc of these noncinnplianres. seem in in*ar on t he po ol lem.it - h. incl.
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' O This system, while it apparently is of value in some respects, is quite limited in other respects.
Items are entered in the computer 'by a non-technical person and are assigned a key
. designation based on wording of the NCI's.
NCI's of identical items and failures were found by the inspectors to have received different key designations, thus they would not appear on the printout as repeat items.
Also, trending is based on changes in relatively large numbers (50 or more) and thus would not detect five failures, for example, of j
a critical item.
(2) Rework Extensive trending is done of all rework.
Trending reports are developed for time periods throughout site history, by discipline, i
by system, by crew, and by cause. Cause is generally defined as repair or design, with a very low percentage due to repair.
Design may mean any change from original intent, from a regulatory change to rerouting due to interference found in layout provided i
in the field.
3 I
These trending reports are prepared for the. planning manager and are received by the site manager and.others monthly.
They are O
used extensively in planning and evaluation.
The NCI trending described above is not a requirement by NRC or Duke, but is provided for infomation.
Though weaknesses are described in the system, no noncompliance with regulation was found. Weaknesses in the NCI system are described elsewhere in this report.
Management Accessibility to Employees c.
(1) Availability of Technical Assistance Discussions were held with craftsmen, inspectors and engineers by all of the NRC inspectors during conduct of this inspection. As described in other sections of this. report, the site engineering staff works very closely with construction forces. Problems are approached together in the field and resolutions determined.
Construction personnel and inspectors stated that assistance was always available.
(2)
Freedom to Express Opinions Duke ~ procedure Q-1 states that all employees are required to report conditions adverse to quality.
There was evidence that employees are~ encouraged to take any problem to their supervision and to higher supervision, if they feel the need. Employee
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5 Relations has documented 255 cases in 1980 of employees going to I,]
higher supervision and believes there may be many cases undocu-(
mented.
(3)
Employee Relations There is an employee relations office on site located in the work area.
Employees are encouraged to use these services for any problem.
On all terminations for cause, Employees. Relations i
conducts an investigation independent of other company investi-gations.
(4) Grievance Procedure The site has a Construction Department Employee Recourse Procedure which expresses the belief that employee concerns should be f
addressed promptly and should receive thorough consideration without recrimination. The procedure directs Employee Relations to assist in preparation'of grievances as desired by employees; it also details steps and required response times.
An informal procedure is described which provides for oral discussions through four steps to the project manager. A formal written procedure is described with steps up through the president of Duke Power Company.
(5) Harassment The company has a procedure which is posted on site forbidding harassment of any employee for any reason by anyone and describing penalties up through termination.
NRC inspectors. discussed with QC inspectors and craftsmen the possibility that they might be pressured or harassed about rejecting work or into performing poor quality wo.-k.
Some of those interviewed were amused at the thought of such pressure.
None of those talked to felt that such a situation might develop.
(6) Management Contact In January 1981, the company instituted an Employee Forum program.
This provides for meetings with 20-30 employees, without their supervision, by management.
The first meetings were held in January and were attended by craf tsmen and the project manager, the general superintendent, and the personnel manager. Meetings 4
k were described as totally open to any subject, completely confi-dential, and followed up by answers, if the answer could not be provided at the time.
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l The Employee Forum announcement is posted in the general work area.
The project manager stated that he hopes to reach 2000 employees in 1981. The personnel manager described the meetings as very open.
he inspector has observed the project manager in the work areas and noted that he was well known by the workers.
He was requently greeted by his first name.
In summary, it is the inspectors' opinion from interviews, observa-tions, and review of site and company policies.that top management and supervision are available to employees at a very low threshold.
It is i
unlikely that 'harrassment detrimental to quality work could develop under these conditions.
7.
Site Procurement, Receiving and Storage a.
General i
The bulk of equipment or materials received at the site are either NSSS supplied or DPC Engineer procured.
Site requisitioned items are primarily consumables, standard stock items and transfers.
b.
Documents Examined (1)
Requisition 8337-005785 P. O. No. F 6216-13 (2)
Requisition 8337-006075 P.O. No. E-98052-13 (3)
Requisition 8337-009575 P.O. No. F-33825 (4)
Requisition 8337-02195D-3 P.O. No. F-34676 (5) Design Engineering Department QA Program -
Section 300 - Procurement i
I 4
(6)
Construction Department GA Program - Procedure E-3, j
Fleid Procurement of Items and Construction Services 3
l (7) QA Manual for ASME Code Work - Section E l
c.
Program Implementation The inspector examined the above noted requisitions, purchase orders, O
and controlling procedures; held discussions with site QA personnel,
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J ATTACHMENT 3 December 11, 1981
)
J MEMO TO FILE
Subject:
QA Department Employees Second Level Recourse Onc Monday, November 23 and Tuesday, November 24 I talked to 6 employees at Oconce and 10 at Catawba who had filed a secund level recourse because of a pay adjustment.
Gail Addis of the Personnel Department talked to a similar number on the same days.
It was explained to them the process by which their jobs had been analyzed and that it had resulted in a Grade 10 position.
Their reactions can be summarized by the following corrments.
All of the ones had about the same concerns:
j l.
They did not feel that a meaningful evaluation had been made.
The ones 4
Catauba feel their jobs are dif ferent from Oconee and they were not at satisfied because no one came to Catawba to do an evaluation. All were told that they would be given the opportunity to go back to craf t work if they so desired.
O 2.
Most of them feel that their job is more dem nding than the craf t jobs which they are inspecting.
They feel that the skills and knowledge are higher and therefore they should be paid more.
3.
Most feel that they have to tell the craft what.to do in lots of cases or the work would never get done.
4 4.
They feel that the inspectors are held accountable if they do something wrong and that the craf t are not.
5.
Some expressed the feeling that they lack support from their super' vision i
when the schedule gets tight.
6.
A few feel they are abused by the craf t personnel.
Most of them have a good atti tude toward Duke Power and like the company and thei r work.
I bclieve the real concern is the lowering of the pay scale and the loss of status that they feel accompanied this reduction.
sYf J R Wells
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ATTACHMENT 4 STATEMENT During the course of an Employee Recourse investigation, a number of allegations and inferences were made by certain QC Inspectors regard-ing the quality of certain aspects of the construction work performed at Duke Power's Catawba fluclear Station. The safety implications of these allegations are quite serious, and the management of Duke Power believes that they merit immediate attention. Consequently, a Task Force on QC Inspections has been formed to investigate these allega-tions to ascertain their validity and effect their resolution.
i ()
While the Employee Recourse action initiated by certain QC Inspectors was based on recent pay adjustments for Inspectors, this Task Force is only concerned with assessing the quality of work ongoing at Catawba and the impact any suggested deterioration in interface between QA personnel has on the safety of the plant.
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S i
~ O ATTACHMENT 5 r.
1 INTERVIEW QUESTIONS t
1.
Do you have any questions or concerns about the quality of work in your area of inspection?
4 2.
What is the purpose of the Quality Assurance and Quality Cor. trol functions?
3.
What do you understand the resolution process of NCI's to be?
4.
Do you feel any pressure from the Construction or Design Er. gin 2ering i
j Departments to accept non-conforming work?
3 5.
Do you feel any pressure from the QA/QC Department to accept non-l conforming work?
j l
6.
Have you ever personally participated or been involved in a QA audit?
i 7.
Have you ever knowingly accepted or approved non-conforming work?
8.
Relate Duke Power Corporate Policy No.104, " Nuclear Safety", to I
the interviewees. Do you believe the management of Duke Power l
and Catawba Project are committed to this stated policy?
9.
Do you have any other quality concerns?
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] a ATTACHMENT 6 Employees Interviewed i
Management and Supervision L.'R. Davison QA Manager Projects Division R. A. Morgan Project QA Engineer i
C. R. Baldwin QC Technical Supervisor Weld /NDE i
B. W. Deaton Supervisor Technical Welding i
S. W. Ledford Supervisor Technical Welding G. E. Ross Supervisor Technical Welding t
J. C. Shropshire QA Engineer Mech / Weld /NDE
'D. Lewellyn Supervisor Technical Support Weld.
Inspectors
+
l K. Adams Piping K. Guy Mechanical H. Alewine Material J. Hayes Civil i
C. Bearden Material J. Henson Welding D. Bentley Welding L. Jackson Welding j
W. Bettis Electrical B. Karriker Welding i
J. Bryant Welding R. Kirkland Welding a
D. Sullins Civil W. Leeper_
NDE W. Burr Welding M. Mahaffey Administration i
L. Carlisic Materi$1 L. Mauldin NDE
.<n key Arcinistration G. McDowell Welding l
+
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- s. I ob Electrical R. Mills Welding i
T. 31t.nar.
Electrical B. Morgan Electrical
T. Daniels Electrical M. Standridge Welding 1
P. Eberhart Material W. Trout Welding l
H. Eubanks Welding W. Waggoner-Civil A. Gault Welding L. Wilmoth Material
.l D. Wright Welding i
i
'H. Atkins QA Engineer Welding l
R. Blackwelder' QA Technician NDE i
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ATTACHMENT 7 DUKE POWER COMPANY
(~3 M
- nigpu CORPORATE POLICY NUMBER 104 k'
SUBJECT:
NUCLEAR SAFETY j
PAGE -1 of I DATE REVISED NEN DATE EFFECTIVE 5-8-81 POLICY Our Company's commitment to nuclear energy is for the sole purpose of serving the public.
No element of this comc:itment to serve is more important than nuclear safety.
In all our nuclear activities, our first priority is to protect the health and safety of the public and our employees.
This protection can best be assured by each involved i
individual being constantly aware of what we have said for many years about industrial safety:
(
"YOUR WORK IS NEVER SO URGENT NOR OUR SERVICE SO IMPORTANT THAT TIME CANNOT BE TAKEN TO PERFORM THE JOB SAFELY."
Y
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CARL HORN, JR.
g Chairman of the Board
/
W. S. LEE President 9
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