ML20090D700

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AO-50-219/75-10:on 750404,reactor Bldg to Torus Vacuum Breaker Valves V-26-16 & 18 Leak Rates Exceeded Tech Spec Limits.Caused by Component Failure.Valves Adjusted &/Or Repaired
ML20090D700
Person / Time
Site: Oyster Creek
Issue date: 04/14/1975
From: Ross D
JERSEY CENTRAL POWER & LIGHT CO.
To: Anthony Giambusso
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
AO-50-219-75-10, NUDOCS 8303020286
Download: ML20090D700 (3)


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MADISON AVENUE AT PUNCH BOWL ROAD

  • MORRISTOWN, N.J. 07960
  • 201-539-6111

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Washington, D. C. 20555

Dear Mr. Giambusso:

Subject:

Oyster Creek Station Docket No. 50-219 Abnormal Occurrence Report No. 50-219/75-10 The purpose of this letter is to forward to you the attached abnormal occurrence report in compliance with paragraph 6.6.2.a of the Technical Specifications.

Enclosed are forty copies of this submittaf.

Very truly yours, A

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Donald A. Ross, Manager Generating Stations-Nuclear cs Enclosures cc:

Mr. J. P. O'Reilly, Director Office of Inspection and Enforcement, Region 1 N!I.'U al.i.(f p

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Pubisc Utilities Corporation General SFlfi u OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION FORKED RIVER, NEW JERSEY 08731 Abnormal Occurrence Report No. 50-219/75-10 Report Date April 14,1975 Decurrence Date April 4, 1975 Identification of Occurrence Violation of the Technical Specifications, paragraph 3.5. A.1, excessive leakage rate through the reactor building to torus vacuum breaker valves V-26-16 and V-26-18.

This event is considered to be an abnormal occurrence as defined in the Technical Specifications, paragraphs 1.15.B,1.15.D, and 1.15.E.

Conditions Prior to Occurrence The plant was shut down for the 1975 refueling.

Description of Occurrence After performing the local leak rate tests as required by Technical Specification 4.5.E on April 4, 1975, it was found that both reactor building to torus vacuum breaker block valves (V-26-16 and V-26-18) had leak rates exceeding the limits specified in Technical Specification 4.5.F.C and in 10CFR50, Appendix J, as follows:

Valve Ltm (35)

Ltm (20)

V-26-16 196.7 scfh 164.4 scfh V-26-18

78. 8 scfh 65.86 scfh In reviewing this event, an apparent conflict in reporting requirements between Section Appendix J to 10CFR50 and the Technical Specifications was observed.

V.B.3 of Appendix J would require that this event be reported in an accompanying

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Abnormal Occurrence Report No. 50-219/75-10 Page 2 summary report to the next primary containment leak rate test report. According to 10CFR50, therefore, this event need not be reported for two to three years from the date of occurrence. Since the valves may be considered inoperable as defined in the Technical Specifications, the Icakage is being reported in accordance with Technical Specification 6.6.2.

The plant is currently being maintained in a condition that does not require primary containment.

Apparent Cause of Occurrence Component failure is the cause of this occurrence.

Analysis of Occurrence Each of these redundant valves is one of a set of two primary containment isolation valves. The second valve of each set is a check valve.

Neither of the check valves was found to be Icaking and, therefore, would have performed their intended isolation function during operation and under accident conditions.

The failure of the valves to meet the leakage requirements would not impair their ability to perform their function as vacuum breakers. The safety significance of this failure was, therefore, loss of redundancy in primary containment isola-tion valves.

Corrective Action Valves V-26-16 and V-26-18 will be adjusted and/or repaired and retested to reassure their ability to satisfy the Icakage requirements specified in Technical Specification 4.5.F.C and in 10CFR50, Appendix J.

It is anticipated that these valves will be replaced during the current refueling outage.

If this is not donc, the valves will be replaced during the first outage of sufficient length.to allow completion of the replacement.