ML20090D661
| ML20090D661 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oyster Creek |
| Issue date: | 05/14/1975 |
| From: | Ross D JERSEY CENTRAL POWER & LIGHT CO. |
| To: | Anthony Giambusso Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| AO-50-219-75-13, NUDOCS 8303020258 | |
| Download: ML20090D661 (3) | |
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Jersey Central Power & Light Company MADISON AVENUE Al PUNCH BOWL ROAD
- MORRISTOWN,N.J.07960
- 201-539-6111
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Director, Division of Reactor Licensing M'[g d
s Office of Nuc1 car Reactor Regulation United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission at Washington, D. C. 20555
Dear bir. Giambusso:
Subject:
Oyster Crcok Station Docket No. 50-219 A*unurraal Occurrence Re. pert No. 50-210/75 13 The purpose of this letter is to forward to you the attached abnormal occurrence report in compliance with paragraph 6.6.2.a of the Technical Specifications.
Very truly yours, O
A Donald A. Ross, blanager i
Generating Stations-Nuc1 car Cs I
l Enclosures cc: b!r. J. P. O'Reilly, Director Office of Inspection and Enforcement, Region 1 l
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Jersey Central Power & Light Company (,
s MADISON AVENUE AT PUNCH BOWL ROAD e MORRISTOWN, N. J. 07960
- 201-539-6111
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"N OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION Forked River, New Jersey 08731 Abnormal Occurrence Report No. 50-219/75-13 Report Date May 14, 1975 Occurrence Date May 7, 1975 Identification of Occurrente Violation of the Technical Specifications, paragraph 2.3.5 and Table 3.1.1.C.2, which require that the isolation condenser system initiation occur with a time delay of <15 seconds after a specified high reactor pressure is reached, and/or upon a low-low reactor water level condition. This event is considered to be an abnormal occurrence as defined in the Technical Specifications, paragraphs 1.13.A, B, and D.
l Conditions Prior to Occurrence r
The blant was shut down for the 1975 refueling.theREFUELpositionandreactorco The reactor mode switch-A Description of Occurrence On Wednesday, May 7, 1975, at approximatelf 0130, while performing a routine surveillance test on the four reactor high pressure isolation condenser initiation sensors (RE-15A, B, C, and D), and the associated time delay relays (6K9,10,11, and 12), it was discovered that time delay relay 6K11 failed to de-energize within 15 seconds after the associated pressure sensor (RE-15C) was tripped.
(RE-15C was maintained in a tripped condition for three minutes and 6K11 failed to de-energize.) Time delay relay 6K11 was subsequently replaced. The replace-ment relay was tested and found to de-energize nine seconds after RE-15C was tripped.
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Abnormal Occurrence Report No. 50-219/7S-13 Page 2 I i Apparent Cause of Occurrence Component failure (time delay relay) was the cause of the occurrence. The time delay relay will be inspected to determine the cause of its failure.
Analysis of Occurrence Four pressure switche:s are provided in the Reactor Protection System (RPS) to initiate the isolatiort condenser system when there is e persistent 15 second condition with reactor pressure at or abave 1060 psig. 1wo of these pressure switches with associated tiMc delay relays 6K9 and 6K11 are in one RPS channel, and the other two pressure switches with associated t5re delay relays 6K10 and 6K12 are in the other RPSichanncI. liigh pressure signals from two pressure switches, one.fn each RPS channel, are required to initiate the isolation condenser system (colncidence of two RPS channels each of which is tripped by one of two pressure sensors). Similarly, time delay relays 6K9, 10, 11, and 12 are also de-energized by reactor low-low water leve'f sensors RE-02A, 3, C, nrid D.
The failure of time 61ay relay 6K11 would not havb;nrevented isolation condenser system initiation had either a reactor high uressure condition at or above 1060 psig existed for 15 seconds or a reactor los-low water IcVel condition existed for 15 seconds.
Consequently, this event is considered to have no safety significance other than the loss of redundancy in one RPS channel.
Corrective Action Time delay relay 6K11 was replaced and the replacement relay was subsequently tested with satisfactory results. The replacement of this relay is considered sufficient corrective action for this failure.
Failure Data Pertinent manufacturer data are listed below:
Manufacturer:
Agastat Model:
7022 PDT Range:
5 seconds to 50 seconds Serial Number:
1712237 i
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