ML20090A936

Final Unit 2 Part 21 & Deficiency Rept Re Installation of Noncorrosion Resistant Matl for Instrument Air Pipe Penetrations.Initially Reported on 830315.Drawings Revised to Reflect Use of Stainless Steel

ML20090A936
Person / Time
Site:	Grand Gulf
Issue date:	07/03/1984
From:	Richard J MISSISSIPPI POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:	James O'Reilly NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
References
REF-PT21-84-308-000 AECM-84-2-0012, AECM-84-2-12, PT21-84-308, PT21-84-308-000, NUDOCS 8407120186
Download: ML20090A936 (4)

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• J RICH AR E MISSISSIPPI POWER & LIGHT COMPANY Helping Build Mississippi P. O. B OX 16 4 0. J A C K S O N. MIS SIS SIP PI 3 9 2 0 5 34 JUL 6 Ag: 42

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• a Jaly 3, 1984 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II 101 Marietta Street, N.W.

Suite 2900 Atlanta, Georgia 30323 Attention: Mr. J. P. O'Reilly, Regional Administrator

SUBJECT:

Grand Gulf Nuclear Station Units 1 and 2 Docket Nos. 50-416/417 License No. NPF-13 File 0260/15525/15526/16694. ,

PRD-83/06, Final Report for Unit 2, Carbon Steel Instrument Air Penetration AECM-84/2-0012

Reference:

1) AECM-83/0179, 3/15/83

2) AECM-83/0324, 6/6/83 On March 15, 1983, Mississippi Power & Light Company notified Mr. F. Cantrell, of your office, of a deficiency at the Grand Gulf Nuclear Station (GGNS) construction site.

The deficiency concerned the installation of non-corrosion resistant material for instrument air pipe penetrations.

MP&L had evaluated this deficiency and determined that it is reportable under the provisions of 10CFR21 for Unit 1. We had previously stated that it was not reportable under 10CFR50.55(e) for Unit 2 since all Unit 1 Design Change Packages (DCP's) are screened for the purpose of identifying significant Unit 1/ Unit 2 design divergence. Since DCP-82/817 had been generated to correct the noted deficiency on Unit 1 it would also have been implemented on Unit 2. -

Further evaluation, however, of reporting requirements under 10CFR50.55(e) indicated that screening of design changes on Unit 1 for Unit 2 applicability was not sufficient to ensure non-reportability for Unit 2. There fore , on June 4, 1984, Mr. R. Carroll, of your of fice, was notifed of this deficiency for Unit 2 under the reporting requirements of 10CF R50. 55( e) .

All details, including corrective actions and actions to prevent recurrence, are given in our attached supplemental report.

8407120186 840703 Yours truly, PDR ADOCK 05000416 /

S PDR gg _, l;O G'

/(DS O '~ J. B. Richard IrN KDS :dr cc: See page 2 Member Middle South Utilities System M ((A/

Mr. J. P. O'Reilly AECM-84/2-0012 NRC Page 2 cc: Mr. R. B. McGehee Mr. Nicholas S..Reynolds, Esq.

Bishop, Liberman, Cook, Purcell & Reynolds 1200 Seventeenth Street, N . W.

Suite 700 Washington, D. C. 20036 Mr. Richard C. DeYoung, Director Of fice of Inspection & Enforcement U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Mr. G. B. Taylor South Miss. Electric Power Association P. O. Box 1589 Hattiesburg, MS 39401 4

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Attachment to AECM-84/2-0012 Page 1 of 1 FINAL REPORT FOR UNIT 2, PRD-83/06 I. Description of the Deficiency In lieu of corrosion resistant piping specified by the NSSS supplier, carbon steel piping was specified for use in the instrument air system downstream of the final filters. Carbon steel piping is specified for the containment and dtywell penetrations in lines supplying air for the safety related Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) and Main Steam Relief Valve (MSRV) valve operations.

The deficiency af fects the Instrument Air System (P53) and the Nuclear Boiler System (B21). It is not r eportable under 10CFR Part 21 for Unit 2 since the systems have not been turned over to MP&L.

II. Analysis of Safety Implications The Instrument Air System interfaces with the Nuclear Boiler System by supplying air to safety-related air accumulators for the MSIV's and MSRV's. Corrosion p'roducts could prevent the required movement of the solenoid valves that admit air from the air accumulators to the valve operators.

The existence of carbon steel piping and components downstream of the final filters could, over a period of time, induce corrosion products into the instrument air system. These corrosion products could prevent the required movement of the solenoid valves associated with the MSIV's. Failure of the solenoid valves to change position, when required, during a steam line break would prevent closure of the MSIV's. This could lead to exceeding the limits of 10CFR100, during the accident , when the MSIV's are required to close.

III. Corrective Actions Taken Piping & Instrumentation Drawings M-2067A, and NH2067C have been revised to show the proper material, stainless steel, to be used for Unit 2. The entire Unit 2 Instrument Air System has been reviewed in an effort to prevent any further occurrences.

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bec:RMr. D. C. Lucken l Mr. Wh. Cavanaugh, III (

Mr. J. B. Richard  ;

Mr. J. P. McGaughy, Jr.

Mr. *. E. Reaves , Jr.

Middle South Services Nuclear Activities Mr. J. F. Hudson Mr. R. D. Couse Mr. Adrian Zaccaria Mr. A. R. Smith Mr. R. W. Jackson i Mr. M. D. Archdeacon ,

Mr. S. M. Feith '

1- Mr. L. F. Dale ,

Mr. J. E. Cross  !

Mr. T. H. Cloninger (NPE/ Unit 2 (2)) l Mr. L. F. Daughtery L Mr. S. H. Hobbs [

Mr. C. C. Hayes .

Mr. A. G. Wagner  !

Mr. A. S. McCurdy. j Mr. W. E. Edge Mr. J. E. Reaves ,

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Mr. M. D. Houston- f U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission l Division of Licensing i Washington, D. C. 20555 i i

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