ML20088A386
| ML20088A386 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Perry, Clinton, 05000000, Zimmer, Shoreham |
| Issue date: | 03/23/1984 |
| From: | Mattson R Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Eisenhut D Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19292D071 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8404110519 | |
| Download: ML20088A386 (5) | |
Text
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p uog Io, UNITED STATES 8 )*
h NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
.j WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555
., f GAR 2 3 1984 POORANDUM FOR:
D. Eisenhut, Director, Division of Licensing, NRR FROM:
R. Mattson, Director, Division of Systems Integration
SUBJECT:
BOARD NOTIFICATION FOR POSSIBLE INTERACTION OF MAIN STEAM LINES AND MAIN FEEDWATER LINES AT BOILING WATER REACTORS On October 21, 1982, Region III requests (TIA 82-69) that NRR review certain design aspects of the Zimer main steam system, main steam system restraints, and applicable main turbine building supporting structure.
l Our evaluation of Zimmer revealed the potential for failure of the nonseismic Category 2 main feedwater piping resulting in the failure of adjacent main 1
steam line piping, whose pressure boundary integrity is necessary, following an earthquake, for the successful operation of safety-related systems.
This problem was resolved for Zimmer by the applicant proposing modifications to the feedwater piping supports to assure main feedwater line integrity following a safe shutdown earthquake (SSE).
Based on the findings at Zimmer we recomended in the memorandum to you dated December 6,1983 (Enclosure 2) that appropriate board notifications be made for certain plants, as the same situation indicated above may exist at other BWRs.
We stated that we would continue to study this matter on an expedited basis.
This study is now complete.
Our conclusions, the bases for which are contained in Enclosure 1, are as follows:
j 1.
BWRs which were recently reviewed against the guidelines of Regulatory Guide 1.29, Pos'ition C2 (Enclosure 3) can be disregarded because 1) they have seismic Category I main steam and main feedwater lines, thus pre-venting the postulated interaction from occurring, or 2) the postulated failure of the main feedwater piping following an SSE was evaluated and found to satisfy the guidelines of Regulatory Guide 1.29, Position C2.
2.
Addi*.icnally, BWRs which were reviewed a number of years ago (Erclosure 4) may not have been reviewed against Regulatory Guide 1.29, Position C2 but were reviewed using the Giambusso Criteria.
A major portion of these criteria was devoted to the interaction of main steam and main feedwater lines with each other and with structures, systems, and components that are necessary to mitigate the consequences of the postulated pipe break accident and bring the reactor to the cold shutdown conditions.
The plants listed in Enclosure 4 were evaluated and found to be acceptable for the postu-lated interaction of the main steam and main feedwater lines and to be capable of cold shutdown following a break in either of these lines.
M Copy Has Been Sent to PDR
Contact:
P. Hearn, X29468 Grfhup ///S[
MAR 2 31984 4
3.
Zimmer is a unique situation.
While this plant was reviewed against the guidelines of Regulatory Guide 1.29, Position C2 and found not complying, the applicant has conmitted to modify the feedwater piping supports in order to satisfy the guidelines of Regulatory Guide 1.29, Position C2.
J Based on the above three conclusions, we have determined that no further i
action is necessary on this matter.
Dk RogerJ.MItson,L(irector Division of Systems Integration cc:
F. Miraglia D. Terao J. Brammer L. Hulman T. Quay L. Kintner W. Minners D. Wessman F. Rowsome A. Schwencer i
B. Youngblood L. Rubenstein
- 0. Parr J. Wilson P. Hearn R. Bosnak i
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ENCLOSURE 1 BOARD NOTIFICATION FOR POSSIBLE INTERACTION OF MAIN STEAM LINES AND FEEDWATER LINES AT BOILING WATER REACTORS
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Regulatory Guide 1.29, Position C2 states that a Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE) should not result in the failure of safety-related structures, systems or components through the failure of a nonsafety-related structure, system or component.
Our review, as requested by TIA 82-69, revealed that Zimmer did not comply with Regulatory Guide 1.29, Position C2 as far as the potential for nonseismic Category I main feedwater piping failures to cause the failure
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of adjacent main steam piping whose integrity is necessary for the successful operation of safety-related systems.
Consequently, a preliminary review was performed to detemine which BWRs might have similar design deficiencies and would require Board Notification.
Based on the results of our preliminary review we recommended in a memorandum to D. Eisenhut dated December 6,1983, (Enclosure 2), that a Board Notification be issued regarding possible interaction of main steam lines and '.nain feedwater lines for the follcwing plants:
Susquehanna 1 and 2, Shoreham 1, LaSalle 1 and 2. Hope Creek 1, Nine Mile Point 2 and Fermi 2.
We also stated that we would continue to study this matter on an expedited basis to determine whether, I
in. reality, a problem exists at any other BWRs.
This study is now complete.
It has been detemined that the BWRs listed in Enclosure 3, which were recently reviewed against Regulatory Guide 1.29, Position C2, do not require a Board-Notification. includes the six BWRs that had Board Notifications issued and now need the Board Notifications withdrawn.
This detemination
I was based on the fact that 1) these reactors have both seismic Category I main steam lines and main feedwater lines, thus preventing the postulated interaction from occurring or 2) the postulated failure of the main feed-water piping following an SSE was evaluated and found to satisfy the guide-lines of Regulatory Guide 1.29, Position C2.
For the BWRs which were not recently evaluated against Regulatory Guide 1.29, Position C2 (Enclosure 4) it has been determined that they were j
evaluated using the Giambusso criteria contained in Appendix B to Standard Review Plan 3.6.1.
A major portion of the Giambusso criteria is devoted to the interaction of main feedwater lines and main steam lines with each other and structures, systems or components necessary to mitigate the postulated pipe break accident and bring the reactor to cold shutdown.
These reactors were evaluated a number of years ago and found acceptable for the effects of the postulated failures of the main steam lines and main feedwater lines. Although these reactors may not meet the guidelines con-tained in Regulatory Guide 1.29, Position C2, the staff's current judgment is that this is not a safety concern because after a main feedwater line failure the' reactor can be brought to the cold shutdown condition.
From our evaluation of all BWRs we conclude the following:
l.
All BWRs that were recently reviewed against the recommendation of-Regulatory Guide 1.29, Position C2 and the NRC regulations with respect to the interaction of main steam and feedwater lines with safety-related
_ equipment are acceptable,-
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+
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. All BWRs which were previously reviewed against the Giambusso criteria 2.
meet the NRC regulations with respect to the interaction of main steam and feedwater lines with structures, systems or components necessary to mitigate the postulated pipe break accident and bring the reactor to cold shutdown and 3.
Zimmer is a unique situation. While this plant was rereviewed against the guidelines of Regulatory Guide 1.29, Position C2 and found not complying, the applicant has committed to modify the feedwater piping supports in order to satisfy the guidelines of Regulatory Guide 1.29, Position C2.
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ENCLOSURE 2 pysg 1
UNITEo STATES
,, [q,j NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 p
P..C.%/
December 6, 1983
.e MEMORANDUM FOR:
D. Eisenhut, Director, Division of Licensing NRR FROM:
R. Mattson, Director, Division of Systems Integration, NRR R. Vollmer, Director, Division of Engineering, NRR
SUBJECT:
RECOMMENDED BOARD NOTIFICATION FOR POSSIBLE INTERACTION OF MAIN STEAM LINES AND MAIN FEEDWATER LINES AT BOILING WATER REACTORS On October 21, 1982, Region III requested that NRR review certain design aspects of the Zimer main steam system, main steam system restraints, and applicable main turbine building supporting structure.
The Zimer issue was evaluated pursuant to Task Interface Agreement 82-59 and was also the subject of Board Hotification 83-115 " Staff Review of the Zimer Main Steam Line Design Calculations."
The staff evaluation of Zimer revealed the potential for nonseismic main f~edwater piping to fail and conseqoently cause the failure of adjacent e
main steam line piping whose integrity is necessary for the successful operation of safety-related systems.
The applicant was requested to pro-vide additional analyses to demonstrate that the design safety functions would not be impatred.
A recent submittal by Cincinnati Gas and Electric (FSAR Revision 98, dated October 28,1983), indicates that the Zimer feedwater piping design was inadequate and that pipe support modifications would be required.
As a result of the Zimer findings, DL requested DE to evaluate the potential for nonseismic feedwater piping interaction with other safety-related systems at similar BWRs (memorandum from F. J. Miraglia to J. P. Knight dated November 10, 1983).
Subsequent discussion between the staffs of MEB, ASB, and DL revealed that this issue also involved the question of sy:;tems interaction.
In the steam tunnel area, the main feedwat'er piping for some BWRs is routed parallel to and in the vicinity of the main steam piping.
The feedwater piping in this area is classified as high energy piping and may not be seismically qualified.
Thus, a postulated break in the feedwater line could result in unrestrained whipping of the feedwater pipe impacting the nearby main stea:n piping.
If safety-related systems (e.g., MSIV leakage control system) are connected to the main steam line piping in this area, 1
the integrity of this piping must be assured.
M copy gOs g i
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Contact:
R. Lobel, X29463 10 pgg l
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1
2 While this situation has been acceptably resolved for Zimer, it is possible that the same situa1: ion may exist at other BWRs of similar design.
Based upon a preliminary review we reconsnend that the appropriate board notification be made for the following reactors regarding the potential for an interaction of nonseismic feedwater lines.with seismic Category I main steam lines or other safety-related lines whose integrity is necessary to assure the opera-tion of safety-related systems.
l Susquehanna 1/2 387, 388 l
Shoreham 1, 50-322 LaSalle 1/2, 50-373, 374 Hope Creek 1, 50-354 Nine Mile Point 2, 50-410 l
Femi 2, 50-341 Should this problem exist, it could significantly affect the conclusions reached by the staff in the SERs for these reactors since the assumption of steam line integrity is necessary to assure proper functioning of the asso-ciated safety-related systems.
This issue therefore is a new issue which would not have been previously brought to the attention of licensing boards for these facilities or the Comission.
We will continue to study this matter on an expedited basis to determine whether, in reality, a problem exists at these other reactors and will notify you of our findings when we have completed our review.
l
.e en I. ' N N f_* d h i.
R. Matt
. Director Division of Systems Integration On i
R. Vollmer, Director Division of Engineering
. cc:
F. Miraglia F. Rowsome D. Terao A. Schwencer J. Brammer B. Yeungblood j
L. Hulman N. Wagner T. Quay J. Wilson i
L. Kintner R. Lobel W. Minners D. Wessman O
.,.._m.
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ENCLOSURE 3 BWRs REVIEWED AGAINST REGULATORY GUIDE 1.29, C2
- Hope Creek 1
- LaSalle 1 and 2
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- Nine M11e Point 2 WNP-2 Clinton 1
- Fermi 2 Grand Gulf 1 and 2 4
GESSAR Hartsville, Plant A, 1 and 2 Linerick 1 and 2 River Bend 1 and 2
- Shoreham
- Susquehanna 1 and 2 Perry 1 4
- originally recommended for Bo:rd Notification in Enclosure 2 and require withdrawal of Board Notification
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ENCLOSURE 4 BWRs REVIEWED AGAINST THE GTAMBUSSO CRITERIA Big Rock Point Browns Ferry 1, 2 and 3 Brunswick 1 and 2 Cooper Station Dresden 1, 2 and 3 Duane Arnold Fitzpatrick Hatch 1 and 2 i
Humboldt Bay Lacrosse Millstone 1 Monticelio Nine Mile Point 1 Oyster Creek Peach Bottom 2 and 3 Pilgrim 1 Quad Cities 1 and 2 i
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