ML20087G097

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Proposed Tech Specs Re Control Room Air Conditioning Sys
ML20087G097
Person / Time
Site: Waterford Entergy icon.png
Issue date: 03/09/1995
From:
ENTERGY OPERATIONS, INC.
To:
Shared Package
ML20087G095 List:
References
NUDOCS 9503100413
Download: ML20087G097 (10)


Text

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W3F1-95-0034 ATTACHMENT B t

i 9503100413 950309 PDR ADDCK 05000382 P PDR i

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3/4.7.6.1 CONTROL ROON ENERGENCY AIR FILTRATION SYSTEN di i A!

LINITING ColOITION FOR OPERATION 4

-3,7.6.1 Both control room emergency air filtration trains (S-8) shall be OPERABLE.

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APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3. and'4.

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. ACTION:

a. With one control room eiergency air filtration train inoperable, either restore the inoperable train to OPERABLE status within 7 days or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />,
b. With both control room emergency air filtration trains inoperable, restore one train to OPERABLE status within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />, i

' SURVEILLANCE REQUIRENENTS 4.7.6.1 Each control room emergency air filtration train (S-8) shall be demonstrated .;

OPERABLE:  ;

a. At least once per 31 days on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS by initiating, from the control room, flow through the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers and verifying that the system operates for at least 10 continuous hours with the ,

heaters on.

b. At least once per 18 months or (1) after any structural maintenance on the HEPA filter or charcoal adsorber housings, or (2) following painting, fire or i chemical release in any ventilation zone communicating with the system by:
1. Verifying that the filtration train satisfies the in-place testing- '

acceptance criteria and uses the test procedures of Regulatory Positions C.5.a. C.5.c and C.5.d of Regulatory Guide 1.52. Revision 2.

March 1978, and the system flow rate is 4225 cfm *10%.

2. Verifying within 31 days after removal that a laboratory analysis of a representative carbon sample obtained in accordance with Regulatory Position C.6.b of Regulatory Guide 1.52. Revision 2, March 1978. meets the laboratory testing criteria of Regulatory Position C.6.a of Regulatory Guide 1.52. Revision 2. March 1978.
3. Verifying a system flow rate of 4225 cfm i10% during train operation when tested in accordance with ANSI N510-1975.

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1 PUNT SYSTEMS -

SlRVEILLANCE prnuIRENENTS (Contirum n i

c. ' After every 720 hours0.00833 days <br />0.2 hours <br />0.00119 weeks <br />2.7396e-4 months <br /> of charcoal adsorber. operation by verifying within 31 days' after removal that a laboratory analysis of a representative . carbon sample obtained in accordance with Regulatory Position C 6.b of Regulatory Guide 1.52. Revision 2. March 1978, meets the laboratory testing criteria of Regulatory Position C.6.a of Regulatory Guide 1.52. Revision 2. March 1978,
d. At least once per 18 months by:
1. Verifying that the pressure drop across the combined HEPA filters and charcoal adsorber banks is less than 7.8 inches water gauge while operating the train at a flow rate of 4225 cfm *10%.
2. Verifying that on a safety injection actuation test signal or a high .

radiation test signal, the train automatically switches into a~

recirculation mode of operation with flow through the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorber banks.

3. Verifying that heaters dissipate 10 (+0.5. -1.0) kW when tested in accordance with ANSI N510-1975.
e. After each complete or partial replacement of_ a HEPA filter bank by verifying that the HEPA filter banks remove greater than or equal to 99.95% of the DOP ,

when they are tested in-place in accordance with ANSI N5101975 while operating the train at a flow rate of 4225 cfm *10%.

f. After each complete or partial replacement of a charcoal adsorber bank by verifying that the charcoal adsorbers remove greater than or equal to 99.95%

of a halogenated hydrocarbon refrigerant test gas when they are tested in-place in accordance with ANSI N510-1975 while operating the train at a flow rate of 4225 cfm *10%.

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PUNT SYSTEMS .

' 3/4.7.6.2' CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY AIR FILTRATION SYSTEM LIMITING COM)ITION FOR OPERATION 3.7.6.2 One control room emergency air filtration train (S-8) shall.be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: H0 DES 5 and 6.

ACTS:

With both control room emergency air filtration trains inoperable. suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity changes.

SlRVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.7.6.2 The control room energency air filtration trains (S.8) shall be demonstrated OPERABLE per the applicable Surveillance Requirements of 4.7.6.1.

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PUWT SYSTEMS ,

3/4.7.'6.3 ~ CONTROL ROOM AIR TEMPERATlRE LINITING COM)ITION FOR OPERATION D

3.7.6.3 Two independent control room air conditioning units shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: ^" "0 DES MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4. l ACTION:

a. With one control room air conditioning unit inoperable, maintain control room temperature less then or eaual to 80*F. and restore the inoperable unit to OPERABLE status within 7 days or be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the followiw 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />. >
b. With two control room air conditioning units inoperable due t0 : 100 Of c001d^g cap:bFity, and control room temperature greater then or eaual to 80*F. return one unit to an OPERABLE status within 3_1 hours or be in HOT STANOBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />,
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0 DES 5 cr 5 with both co-trol r00 :* condition 4:,9 unit: _ 4n0per:ble'.

6.~.Ond :l' Oper:t!On

  • vol"ing C T E ^1TEP.^7!0"5 Or p0:1tive rc cti"4ty EtW90s
d. "ith te control rc= 21 conditioning unit dn0p^r:b!c due to : 100: Of 21 -

-irculation c:p bi'ity take the appropri:tc .^CTIT *- Speci#dcation 3.'.5.1 Or 3.'.5-2 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.7.6.3 Each control room air conditioning unit shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a. At least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> by verifying that the operating control room air conditioning unit is maintaining average control room air temperature less than or equal to 80*F.
b. At least quarterly, if not performed within the last quarter, by verifying that each control room air conditioning unit starts and operates for at least 15 minutes.

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,- PLANT SYSTEMS "3/4.7.6.4 CONTROL ROOM AIR TEMPERATURE LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.7.6.4 One control room air conditioning unit shall be OPERABLE. ]

APPLICABILITY: MODES 5'and 6.'

~ ACTION:

With both control room air conditioning units inoperable, suspend all

. operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity changes.

$l}r,3ILLANCEREQUIREMENTS 4.7.6.4 The control room air conditioning units shall be demonstrated OPERABLE per the ,

' Surveillance Requirements of 4.7.6.3.

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l PUWT SYSTEMS i i 3/4.7.6.5 CONTROL ROOM ISOLATION MS PRESSLRIZATION LINITING ColeITION FOR OPERATION 3.7.6.5 The control room envelope isolation and pressurization boundaries shall be _

r OPERABLE.* l APPLICABILITY: All IODES.

ACTIO*i:

a. With either control room envelope isolation valve in a normal outside air flow ,

path inoperable. maintain at least one isolation valve in the flowpath OPERABLE. and either restore the inoperable valve to OPERABLE status with 7 days or isolate the affected flow path within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.  ;

b. With any Control Room Emergency Filter Outside Air Intake valve (s) inoperable, j maintain at least one of the series isolation valves in a flowpath OPERABLE, and either restore the inoperable valve (s) to OPERABLE status within 7 days or isolate the affected flow path within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />,
c. With more than one Control Room Emergency Filter Outside Air Intake flow path l inoperable, maintain at least one flow path per intake operable and restore an additional flow path to operable status within 7 days or, be in HOT STANDBY '!

within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />. l d_c-- With the control room envelope inoperable as a result of causes other than thoseaddressedbyACTION(a).(b).oric_)above:

.1. Within I hour and at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> thereafter while the

Breathing Airbanks pressure is greater than or equal to 1800 psig.

  • Breaches in the pressurization boundary may be allowed for a perioo not to exceed 7 days on an intermittent basis under administrative control provided that they are of known origin and either:
1. Breaches with permanent sealing mechanisms (e.g. doorsordampers1  ;
2. breaches less than or eaual to 1 square foot.

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"97 6 PLANT SYSTENS gw

, LINITING C a nITION FOR OPERATION f

ACTION:'.(Continued)

2. MODES 1-4:
a. uith" iS hours.14dentify the cause of the failure within 48 7

' hours and initiate corrective action to restore the control room envelope to OPERABLE status. If ider.ti#1^d the cause of the failure is within LC0 limits, operation may continue for up to 7 days after the control room envelope is declared inoperable.

OtheMse be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and COLD '

5HLITDC4' within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />,

b. Shoula a toxic gas event occur, take immediate steps to restore control room envelope integrity and commence a plant shutdown to be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and COLD SHlfTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.
3. MODES 5 and 6: l
a. Suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity changes and if a toxic gas event occurs, take immediate steps to restore control room envelope-integrity.

SLRVEILLANCE REQUIRENENTS 4.7.6.5 The control room envelope isolation and pressurization boundaries shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 18 months by:

a. Verifying that the control room envelope can be maintained at a positive pressure of greater than or equal to 1/8 inch water gauge relative to the outside atmosphere with a make up air flowrate less than or equal to 200 cfm during system operation,
b. Verifying that on a toxic gas detection test signal, the system automatically switches to the isolation mode of operation.
c. Verifying that on a safety injection actuation test signal or a high radiation test signal, normal outside air flow paths isolate.

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PLMT SYSTENS i e

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-3/4.7.6.1 and 3/4.7.6.2 CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY AIR FILTRATION' SYSTEM During an emergency, both S-8 units are started to provide filtration and adsorption of ,

outside' air and control room envelope recirculated air (reference: FSAR 6.4.3.3). Dosages i received after a full power design basis LOCA were calculated to be orders of magnitude ,

higher than other accidents involving radiation releases to the environment (reference: FSAR ,

Tables 15.6 18. 15,7-2, 15.7-4. 15.7-5, 15.7-7). Because_the consequences of a full power i design basis LOCA are more severe than those occurring during COLD SHUTDOWN and REFUELING, a -

separate specification, 3/4.7.6.2. requires only one OPERABLE S-8 uni.t to guard against accidents during Modes 5 and 6.  !

l The OPERABILITY of this system and control room design provisions are based on limiting the t radiation exposure to personnel occupying the control room to 5 rem or less whole body. or :

its equivalent. This limitation is consistent with the requirements of General Design ,

Criterion 19 of Appendix A. 10 CFR Part 50. l s

Operation of the system with the heaters on for at least ten hours continuous over a thirty-one day period is sufficient to reduce the buildup of moisture on the adsorbers and HEPA filters. Obtaining and analyzing charcoal samples after 720 hours0.00833 days <br />0.2 hours <br />0.00119 weeks <br />2.7396e-4 months <br /> of adsorber operation  !

(since the last sample and analysis) ensures that the adsorber maintains the efficiency assumed in the safety analysis and is consistent with Regulatory Guide 1.52.

t 3/4.7.6.3 CONTROL ROOM AIR TEMPERATURE  ;

, Maintaining the control room cir temperature less than or equal to 80*F ensures that (1) the ambient air temperature does not exceed the allowable air temperature for continuous duty '

rating for the equipment and instrumentation in the control room and (2) the control room will remain habitable for operations personnel during plant operation. l The Air Conditioning System is designed to cool the outlet air to approximately 55'F. Then.

non-safety-related near-room heaters add enough heat to the air stream to keep the rooms between 70 and 75*F. Although 70 to 75'F is the normal control band, it would be too restrictive as an LCO. Control Room equipment was specified for a more general temperature -

range of 45 to 120*F. A provision for the CPC microcomputers, which might be more sensitive to heat, is not required here. Since maximum outside air make-up flow in the normal ventilation mode comprises less than edy ten percent of the air flow from an AH-12 unit. l outside air temperature has little affect on the AH-125 cooling coil heat load. Therefore.

the ability of an AH-12 unit to maintain control room temperature in the normal mode gives adequate assurance of its capability for emergency situations. *c sp^ct'icaticn balanccs [

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cr bth Of" ce^diticnin;; trains.

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t PLANT SYSTENS BASES (Continued) 3/4.7.6.4 CONTROL ROON ISOLATION AND PRESSURIZATION This specification provides the operability requirements for the control room envelope isolation and pressurization boundaries. The Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) specifies specific ACTION STATEMENTS for inoperable components of the control room j ventilation systems, separate from the S-8 and AH-12 units. The operability of the  !

remaining parts of the system can Only affect the ability of the control room envelope to pressurize. A routine maintenance provision is included in the LC0 in the form of a footnote. This provision allows for small penetrations in the control room envelope or blockage of envelope doors or dampers for a period not to exceed 7 days on an intermittent basis provided that appropriate administrative controls are implemented.

1 The ACTION STATEMENTS a and b focus on maintaining isolation characteristics. The valves in :

the flow path referred to in ACTION a are HVC-102 & HVC-101. The Outside Air Intake ((MI)

" series isolation valves" of ACTION b and c are as follows: .

NORTH OAl - HVC-202B & HVC 201A HVC-202A & HVC-201B S0llTH OAl - HVC-204B & HVC-203A HVC-204A & HVC-203B ACTION STATEMENT c preserves the operator action (i.e., manually initiated filtered pressurization) that maintains the control room envelope at a positive pressure during a radiological emergency. As indicated above each OAI series isolation valve is powered by the opposite train. With more than one OAI flow path inoperable a single failure (i.e..

train A or B) could prohibit the ability to maintain the control envelope at a positive  ;

pressure. Therefore in the specified condition. ACTION c requires an additional flow path  !

to be returned to service within 7 days.

ACTION d is intended to restore _in; that pressurization ability as soon as possible for unintended breaches in the envelope. The 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> to locate an unidentified breach is based on an evaluation that considered troubleshooting tasks that would be performed as necessary

, should the integrity of the Control Room Envelope pressure boundary fall into question.

Estimated times associated with each task were based on sound engineering judgment -while providing the abi'ity to ::fely perfor routine 219tenance evolutions. The ACTION statements also recognize the MODE-independent nature of the toxic chemical threat and provides for operator protection in the event of a toxic chemical release concurrent with a breach in the control room envelope. In addition, provisions have been added to the specification that, in the event of a toxic chemical event that threatens control room habitability while in the ACTION statement. Operator act10n "immediate steps" will be initiated to place the plant in a safe condition. In this context. the phrase "immediate steps" is taken to mean that the operators should immediately take reasonable action to restore a known breach in the envelope to an air tight condition. Amplifying instructions are provided in Waterford 3 Administrative procedures. which impose special controls for  !

work that will breach the control room envelope.

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