ML20087A270
| ML20087A270 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palo Verde  |
| Issue date: | 01/02/1992 |
| From: | Conway W ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE CO. (FORMERLY ARIZONA NUCLEAR |
| To: | Martin J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| References | |
| 102-02096-WFC-T, 102-2096-WFC-T, NUDOCS 9201080319 | |
| Download: ML20087A270 (4) | |
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e Arizona Public Service Company now,sw..,,,, w m n.,,u w wwAu r cormAv 102-02096-WFC/TRH/RJR o nwig.rgnu."
Ja w 2, 1992 Mr. J. B. Martin, Ragional Administrator U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region V 1450 Maria Lane, Suite 210 Walnut Creek, CA 94596 5368
Reference:
Letter dated December 4,1991, from Ross A. Scarano, Director, Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards, Region V, to Mr. William F. Conway, Executive Vice President, Nuclear, Arizona Public Service.
Dear Sir:
Subjed:
RESPONSE TO NRC CONCERN File: 91019-026 Arizona Public Service (APS) has reviewed the circumstances described in the enclosure to the reference letter (Enclosure 1). The details of this rev!ew are included in enclosure (2) to this letter.
If you have any questions concerning this information, please contact Mr. Frank Larkin at (602) 393-2527.
Very truly yours, l $7?MM, C
WFC/TRB/RJR/dmn Enclosures k Yp$ Cb A
l ENCLOSURE 1 On November 3,1991, at about 0500 hours0.00579 days <br />0.139 hours <br />8.267196e-4 weeks <br />1.9025e-4 months <br />, a security officer was supposedly dispatched by the Palo Verde Central Alarm Station (CAS) to assess an alarm at vital Door 3A 404.
Shortly afterwards, this officer reported to the CAS via radio that he had verified that the area was secure. The CAS qu;ckly determined through a review of computer records that the officer had not reached Door 3A 404 since he was located in another area of the plant. The CAS Immediately dispatched another security officer to vital Door 3A-404, and the alarm was properly assessed within the required time 3mit. It is our understanding that if the CAS had not detected and resolved this situation, you would have violated your security plan, and that the officer's erroneous actions may have been intentional.
1 Sergeant (
) is supposedly familiar with this incident.
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ENCLOSURE 2 Statement:
On November 3,1991, at about 0500 hours0.00579 days <br />0.139 hours <br />8.267196e-4 weeks <br />1.9025e-4 months <br />, a security officer was supposedly dispatched by the Palo Verde Central Alarm Station (CAS) to assess an alarm at vital door 3A 404.
Response
This statement is true. At approximately 0505 an alarm was received by the CAS on vital door 3A-404. A contractor security officer was directed by CAS personnel to respond to the alarm.
Statement:
Shortly afterwards, this officer reported to the CAS via radio that he had verified that the area was secure.
Retponse:
This statement is true.
Statement:
The CAS quickly determined through review of computer records that the officer had not reached door 3A-404 since he was located in another area of the plant.
1
Response
This statement requires clarification. When the contractor security officer was directed to respond to the alarm, he asked directions to the correct door from an APS security officer. When the contractor c fic.sr called in the area as secure, the APS officer realized the contractor officer must have gone to the wrong door and communicated this information to CAS. The APS officer made this determination because the time lag for the contractor officer to reach the alarmed door appeared too short.
Statement:
The CAS immediately dispatched another security officer to vital door 3A-404, and the alarm was properly assessed within the required time limit.
Response
This statement is true. The alarm was assessed approximately six minutes and forty seconds after receipt.
Statement:
it war our understanding that if the CAS had not detected and resolled this situation, you would have violated your security plan, and that the officer's erroneous actions may have been intentional.
Response
it is true that had the situation not been resolved within the required compensatory period, a violation of the security plan would have occurred.
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No objective evicance could be found which indicates this erroneous action may have brsen intentional. The fact that the contractor officer asked directons to the alarmed door and then apparently misinterpreted these directions would tend to support a belief that this was not, la fact, intentional.
Corrective Actions:
(1)
The CAS operators and security personnel involved in ensuring the alarmod door was compensated within the required time frame were commended.
(2)
APS security and security training have undertaken a program to upgrede contract security personnel familiarization with site locations necessary in the performance of their duties.
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