ML20086Q822

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Proposed Tech Specs 3.9.4,allowing Containment Pal & Equipment Doors in Containment Bldg to Be Open Under Strict Administrative Controls During Core Alterations or Movement of Irradiated Fuel
ML20086Q822
Person / Time
Site: Waterford Entergy icon.png
Issue date: 07/26/1995
From:
ENTERGY OPERATIONS, INC.
To:
Shared Package
ML20086Q821 List:
References
NUDOCS 9507280204
Download: ML20086Q822 (7)


Text

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l REFUELING OPERATIONS j 3/4.9.4- CONTAIMENT BUILDING PENETRATIONS [

j LINITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.9.4 The containment building penetrations shall be in the followi'ng status: i

a. The equipment door closed and held in place by a minimum of four bolts,  ;
b. A minimum of one door in each airlock is closed, and ,
c. Each penetration providing direct access from the containment atmosphere i to the,outside atmosphere shall be either:  !
1. Closed by an isolation valve, blind flange, or manual valve, or
2. Be capable of being closed by an OPERABLE automatic containment purge valve. '

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APPLICABILITY: During CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of irradiat'd e fuel within i the containment. I s

ACTION:

With the requirements of the above specification not satisfied, immediately i suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of irradiated fuel in the containment building. ,

-SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.9.4 Each of the above required containment building penetrations shall be verified to be either in its closed / isolated condition or capable of being closed by an OPERABLE automatic .:ontainment purge valve within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> prior to the start of and at least once per 7 days during CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of irradiated fuel in the containment building.

i WATERFORD - UNIT 3 3/4 9-4 9507280204 950726 PDR ADOCK 05000382 PDR ,

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3/4.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS BASES 3/4.9.1 BORON CONCENTRATION The limitations on reactivity conditions during REFUELING ensure that:

(1) the reactor will remain subcritical.during CORE ALTERATIONS, and (2) a uniform boron concentration is maintained for reactivity control in the water volume having direct access to the reactor vessel. These limitations are con-sistent with the initial conditions assumed for the boron dilution incident in the safety analyses. The value of 0.95 or less for K,ff includes a 1% delta k/k conservative allowance for uncertainties. Similarly, the boron concentration value of 1720 ppm or greater also includes a conservative uncertainty allowance of 50 ppm boron.

3/4.9.2 INSTRUMENTATION The OPERABILITY of the source range neutron flux monitors ensures that redundant monitoring capability is available to detect changes in the reactivity condition of the core.

3/4.9.3 DECAY TIME The minimum requirement for reactor subcriticality prior to movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the reactor pressure vessel ensures that sufficient time has elapsed to allow the radioactive decay of the short lived fission products. This decay time is consistent with the assumptions used in the safety analyses.

3/4.9.4 CONTAINMENT BUILDING PENETRATIONS The requirements on containment penetration closure and OPERABILITY ensure that a release of radioactive material within containment wi'.1 be restricted from leakage to the environment. The OPERABILITY and closure restrictions are sufficient to restrict radioactive material release from a l fuel element rupture based upon the lack of containment pressurization potential l while in the REFUELING MODE.  !

l 3/4.9.5 COMMUNICATIONS The requirement for communications capability ensures that refueling station personnel can be promptly informed of significant changes in the facility status or core reactivity condition during CORE ALTERATIONS.

WATERFORD - UNIT 3 8 3/4 9-1

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REFUELING OPERATIONS 3/4.9.4 CONTAINMENT BUILDING PENETRATIONS' LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.9.4 The containment building penetrations shall be in the following status; i
a. The equipment door:

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1. Closed and held in place by a minimum of four bolts.,0R
2. Open with the door capable of closure by designated i individuals.*  !
b. The personnel airlock: i
1. Closed with a minium of one door. OR  ;
2. Open with a door capable of closure by a designated individual.*
c. The emergency airlock is closed with a minimum of one door. l
d. Each penetration providing direct access from the containment atmosphere to the outside atmosphere shall be either:

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1. Closed by an isolation valve, blind flange, or manual valve, or
2. Be capable of being closed by an OPERABLE automatic containment purge valve OR
3. Opened on an intermittent basis under administrative control  !

provided the penetration is capable of being closed by an isolation l valve.*

  • With any of these penetrations open the plant must be in H0DE 6 with 23 feet of water above the fuel in the reactor vessel.

APPLICABILITY: During CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of irradiated fuel within the containment.-

ACTION:

With the requirements of the above specification not satisfied. immediately suspend all .

operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of irradiated fuel 1.1 the containment building.

WATERFORD - UNIT 3 3/4 9-4 1

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. CONTAINMENT BUILDING PENETRATIONS (Continued) i SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS l

4.9.4 Each of the above required containment building penetrations shall be verified to be ,

either in its closed /4selated condition or capable of being closed '" - ^"r"" r -*--'4a

~+.4-. - - m . i "- within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> prior to the start of and at least once per 7 days *

- during CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of irradiated fuel in the containment building. .

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3/4.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS BASES 3/4.9.1 BORON CONCENTRATION The limitations on reactivity conditions during REFUELING ensure that: (1) the reactor will remain subcritical during CORE ALTERATIONS, and (2) a uniform boron concentration is maintained for reactivity control in the water volume having direct access to the reactor vessel. These limitations are consistent with the initial conditions assumed for the boron dilution incident in the safety analyses. The value of 0.95 or less for Keff includes a 1% delta k/k conservative allowance for uncertainties. Similarly, the boron concentration value of 1720 ppm or greater also includes a conservative uncertainty allowance of 50 ppm boron.

3/4.9.2 INSTRUMENTATION The OPERABILITY of the source range neutron flux monitors ensures that redundant monitoring capability is available to detect changes in the reactivity condition of the core.

3/4.9.3 DECAY TIME The minimum requirement for reactor subcriticality prior to movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the reactor pressure vessel ensures that sufficient time has elapsed to allow the radioactive decay of the short lived fission products. This decay time is consistent with the assumptions used in the safety analyses.

3/4.9.4 CONTAINMENT BUILDING PENETRATIONS The requirements on containment penetration closure and OPERABILITY ensure that a release of radioactive material within containment "" be restricted frem 'eakage to the environinent will be minimized. The OPERABILITY and closure restrictions are sufficient to

  1. Mt+4st minimize radioactive material release to the environment from a fuel element rupture based upon the lack of containment pressurization potential while in the REFUELING MODE.

SEE INSERT A 3/4.9.5 COMMUNICATIONS The requirement for communications capability ensures that refueling station personnel can be promptly informed of significant changes in the facility status or core reactivity condition during CORE ALTERATIONS.

WATERFORD - UNIT 3 B 3/4 9-1

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INSERT A In MODE 6, the Dotential for containment pressurization as a result of an accident is not likely. Therefore, requirements to isolate the containment from the outside atmosphere are less stringent. LCO 3.9.4 specifies requirements that facilitate " containment closure" rather than " CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY." CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY is required during operational Modes 1 through 4 and preserved by other LCOs that specify more stringent requirements (e.g. ,

isolation and leak testing). Containment closure means that all potential escape paths are closed or capable of being closed. Since there is no potential for containment pressurization, the Appendix J leakage criteria and tests are not recuired. Therefore, the specified requirement for closure capability is met with an intact door or valve.

The containment personnel airlock and equipment hatch doors may be open during movement of irradiated fuel in the containment and during CORE ALTERATIONS provided the doors are capable of being closed in the event of a fuel handling accident and the plant is in MODE 6 with 23 feet of water above the fuel seated within the reactor pressure vessel. Should a fuel handling accident occur inside containment, the personnel airlock and equipment hatch doors will be closed following an evacuation of containment.

The LCO requires designated individuals to perform PAL and or equipment door closure. These individuals must be trained and qualified in the procedures governing these closure activities.

Technical Specification 3.9.4.d.3 permits penetrations to be opened on an intermittent basis under administrative control . This provision is allowed if the penetration is capable of being closed by an OPERABLE isolation valve and the following controls are adhered to 1.)

stationing an operator /STA who is in constant communication with control room, at the appropriate valve controls, 2.) instructing this operator to close the valve in an accident situation, and 3.) assuring that environmental conditions will not preclude access to close the valves and that this action will prevent the release of radioactivity outside the containment.

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