ML20086Q468
| ML20086Q468 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | McGuire  |
| Issue date: | 12/17/1991 |
| From: | Mcmeekin T DUKE POWER CO. |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9112300215 | |
| Download: ML20086Q468 (5) | |
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lintersedir Ar:bo!6 bni gyny 73.ppy 19 DUKEPOWER December 17, 1991 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn Documon; Control Desk Washington, DC 20555
Subject:
McGuire Nucioar Station Docket Nos. 50-369, ~370 Inspection Report No. 50 369, ~370/91-22 Gentiomont Purnuant to 10CFR 2.201, pleaso find attached Duke Power company's responso to Violation 369/91-22-03 Station.
Should thoro be any quantiona concerning this matter, contact Larry Kunka at (704)875-4032.
Very truly yours,
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Mr.
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D. Ebneter Administrator, Region 11 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 1001 Mariotta St., NW, Suito 2900 Atlanta, GA 30323 Mr. Tim Reed U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 01fico of Nuclear-Reactor Regulation Washington, D.C.
20555 Mr. P.
K. Van Doorn NRC Resident-Insprsctor McGuiro Nuclear Station i
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Document Control Desk Page 3 December 17, 1991 1
MCGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION RESPONSE TO NOTICE OF VIOLATION Violation 369/91-22-03 Technical Specification 6.8.1 requires written proceduros to be established, implomonted and maintained covering the activities recommended in Appendix A of Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, February 1978 which includes operation of refueling equipment and other safoty related activities.
Proceduro MP/0/A/7150/101, Reactor Vossol Lower Internals Removal and installation, Revision 0, contains the following requirements:
Stop 11.3.16 requiros disabling of the upper containment radiation monitor prior to movement of lower internals.
Stop 11.4.19 requires placement of an olevation gauge on the Iower internals flango.
Stop 11.4.21 requires raising of lower internals until the flange breaks the water surface, stopping the lift and rotating internals to clear the manipulator cranu monorail beam prior to further lifting.
Stop 11.4.22 requires use of an olevation gauge targot during lifting of lower internals.
Stops 11.4.26 and 11.4.27 requires rotation of internals
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prior to lowering on to the storage stand.
Contrary to the above, on October 8, 1991, the 11censeo failed to.
disable upper containment radiation monitor, installed the elevation gauge on the-protection ring on the lifting rig rather than the internals-flango, failed to rotato the'latornals while i
vertical lifting was in progress, failed to use the elevation gauge target and failed to rotate lower internals prior to lowering.
This led to damage to the reactor vetsol, refueling canal liner plato, lower internals, and lower internals-lifting-rig.-
In addition, the licensoo had the potential to dan. age the refueling canal water seal and an excore nuclear-instrument l
cover.
This is a Severity Lovel IV.(Supplement I) Violation;appljcable to Unit 1 only.
i Document Control Desk i
Pago 4 Docombor 17, 1991 Rosponso to Violation i
1.
Roason for the violation:
Prior to the ovent, the upper internals had boon removed for dofueling and woro stored in the deep and of the rufueling cavity.
All fuel had boon removed and was stored in the spent fuoi pool.
Personnel directly involved in the lower internals removal were a Technical Support (TS) representativo, head crew Supervisor, two polar crane operators, a flagman, two Radiation Protection (RP) technicians and in HP Supervisor.
On October 0, 1991, the control room was notified that the lower internals lift was to commonco.
The internals woro raised to the holght necessary for the olovation gauge to be insta11od.
The head crow had boon unable to remove the soal surface protectivo ring from the lifting rig earlier.
The decision was mado by the TS personnel to conduct the lift with the protectivo ring in place.
Due to intorforenco from the protective ring, the gaugo was-installed at the correct location but not the carrect olovation.
At this point in the lift, all personnel except the crano operators woro required to leave containment and communication with the crano operators and control of the lift was turned over to TS personnol.
When the internals flango broko the water surface, radiation monitor 1 EMF 16 alarmed, causing the containment evacuation alarm to sound.
The EMF was required to be disabled by a pc'vious proceduro stop.
This alarm remained activated
\\Pr>ughou the event which contributed to the communication pro'lems.
Wbsn-the TS personnel controlling the lift thought ho saw
.he secondary core support assembly clear the vessel flango, ho instructed the crano operator to make the horizontal move to the doop and of the refueling canal.- The crano operator started the horizontal move and the internals bumped the-vessel.
The crano operator lifted more and began to movo horjr:sb 'ly a second time.
Tho internals again struck the vessil.
43 lifted again.
During the third horizontal movensn b he continued lifting until the lower internals clearen'the vossol flango and moved to the-doop end of the refueling canal.
At the deep ond, the crano operator loworod the int.ornals -
l and bridged the crano to the conter11no of the storage stand.
The crane operator began to lower the internals further.
The protective ring and lifting rig guide bushing
Documunt Control Desk Pago 5 December 17, 1991 contacted the operating dock floor and refueling cavity linor plato.
The flagman ontored containment and resumed control of the lift.
The internals woro placed in the stand without further incident.
2.
Correctivo stops taken and results achievod:
A.
A policy was implemented to require review and approval by a Lift Advisor of any heavy or sensitivo lift in-containment.
Management oversight for this activity was provided by knowledgeablo Technical Support personnel.
3 B.
The Duko Power Company Significant Event Investigation Team (SUIT) was activated.
C.
Proceduro MP/0/A/7150/101, Roactor Vossel Lower Internals Removal and Installation, and proceduro MP/0/A/7150/43, Roactor Vousel Upper Internals Removal and Installation, were evaluated for human factors / human performanco problems by the Human i
Performance Excellenco Team and the SEIT and procedure changes were made.
D.
Proceduro MP/0/A/7150/101, Reactor Vessel Lower Internals Removal and Installation, was changed to incorporato a contingency method to address a loss of seal / canal integrity for returning the lower internals to the reactor vossol.
E.
The provisions of SOER 91-1, Infrequently Performed Tests, woro implemented for returning the lower l
internals to the reactor vessel.
F.
Training was conducted for polar crano operators and Technical Support personnel which included:
Practico drill of polar crane operators exiting the polar crano specific repeat back communications training Dry runs of returning the lower internals to the reactor vessel.
G.
SOER 85-1, Reactor Cavity Seal Failure, was reissued to evaluate seal. failure during reactor vessel lower internals movements.
l H.
A meeting was hold with all involved personnel to 1
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i Document Control Desk Page 6 December 17, 1991 discuss the event and identify actions to provent this type of event from recurring.
3.
Correctivo stops 7that will be taken to avoid _further violationst A.
System Craft Support personnel will review this event through the Work Improvement Term Process with all Roactor Head technicians, Crane Operators, Flagmon and Technical Support personnel.
caso study lessons learned package for this event B.
A which roomphasizes procedure compliance will be developed and presented to all applicable sito employoos.
C.
A McGuire sito group will be formed to use the excellenco program to datormino a solution for tho problem of proceduro compliance.
This group will have clearly defined expectations with members to como from various site groups.
4.
Date when full compliance will be achieved:
McGuire is in full compliance.
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